THE TOUR OF DUTY PROPOSAL: NEED FOR A HOLISTIC APPROACH

Introduction

There has been a great deal of speculation in sections of the media as well as in the social media of a change taking place in the Army's recruitment pattern. Termed as the Tour of Duty (ToD), it envisages recruiting soldiers for a short duration of three to five years service in the Army. It is believed that the proposal is under active consideration by the Ministry of Defence, but in the absence of any official statement from the government on the subject, the purpose of introducing such a concept, the broad contours it may follow, as also a discussion on the pros and cons of such a proposal can at best be based on certain reasonable assumptions. This paper aims to put across the likely thought process behind the proposal, the pattern it can take and the likely impact this proposal will have, if introduced.

Broad Contours of the ToD Proposal

The basic thought process behind the proposal is to reduce the expenditure on military pensions. On a fixed defence budget, reduction in revenue expenditure would make greater funds available for capital outlay, which in turn would facilitate new acquisition and military modernisation. India's budget for FY 2022-23 allocated Rs 5.25 lakh crore for defence, which includes the defence pension component of about Rs 1.2 lakh crore. Obviously, a reduced pension component will lead to a larger capital outlay. With this in view, the proposal is believed to envisage recruiting personnel into the Army for short tenures, akin to conscription but on a volunteer basis.

One of the proposals is to induct personnel for both a three year period as well as for a period of five years to eventually, say within 15-20 years, have an army strength that would comprise 25 percent personnel who would be below 3 years service and another 25 percent who would be between 3 to 5 years service. The rest of the component would be as presently existing. There could be different computations of the above, but the end objective is the same. On completion of ToD, some of these personnel would be absorbed in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) or in the corporate sector while the rest would be free to seek employment elsewhere. Those who do not find employment will be encouraged and assisted to set up small scale individual businesses. The savings accrued during the ToD as well as the lump sum amount they would receive on completion, would provide them the necessary capital for the same.

The individuals serving for periods below five years would not be eligible for pension, so the scheme is slated to reduce the pension bill of the Army. Some of the other benefits envisaged are as under:

• It would reduce the age profile of the Army.
• It would create a large work force of disciplined individuals, who would then be an asset when employed in either the CAPFs or by the corporate sector. 
• Those individuals who cannot get employment will be encouraged to set up small scale private enterprises, which could give them an alternate livelihood. This would also give a boost to the economy.
• It would lead to increased employment opportunities for the youth.

Earlier Proposals

One of the earlier proposals of the Army was lateral induction of short service commissioned officers into other services. For the jawans who retire after 15 to 17 years of service, it was recommended that they be employed thereafter in the CAPF (Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, National Security Guards) or in the para military forces (Assam Rifles). This proposal found little favour with the Home Ministry and was shelved. 

 

In 2019, an army veteran, Lt Gen P. Menon, along with Pranay Kotasthane, both from the Takshashila Institute, wrote a discussion paper recommending an 'inverse induction model' to reduce the Army's pension bill. This was a modification of the earlier Army proposal and envisaged induction of army personnel into the CAPF. The recruitment would be done by the CAPF, but the recruits would be trained by the Army and would revert back to their respective CAPF after completion of 7 years’ service.

Analysis of the Inverse Induction Model

For the purpose of analysing the financial implications of the stated model, the assumptions made are as under:

• For the period, annual pension liability of GoI is assumed to be constant                    for a fixed number of Other Ranks (OR).
• The total Army authorisation of OR is 'A' and their total annual contribution   towards future pension liability is 'P'.
• The number of CAPF recruits each year is x.
• The annual pension contribution of x Army OR is X, ie X Rs saved each         year in pension contribution (notional) by recruiting x number of OR into the CAPF.
• All OR are assumed to retire after 19 years, with uniform rate of recruitment each year. Hence, the total annual training expenses for A/19 number of recruits is T =(A/19) *t, where t is the individual recruit training cost for one year. (See table below)

   

Service  (Year)	CAPF Recruits (Total)	Pension Contribution (Total Army)	Training Expenses (Annual Total)
1	x	P-X	T=(A/19)*t
2	2x	P-2X	Higher
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
7	7x	P-7X	Higher
8	8x	P-7X (as x No of OR have left for CAPF)

 

The following inferences can be made from the above table:

• There is saving in pension contribution from the defence budget for first 7 years and it peaks at 7X. From 8th year onwards, the saving remains 7X.
• The pension budget of CAPF, however,  goes up by an equivalent amount as 7 years of Army Service will be counted for CAPF pension also.
• Net pension savings to the GoI is zero.
• Training costs go up. When no CAPF, annual recruit training cost is At/19. With CAPF recruits, annual cost is (A-x) *t/19  + xt   =  At/19  + 18xt/19 - ie an increase of 18xt/19 in annual training budget.

The Conclusion from the above analysis is as under:

• The saving in defence pension budget peaks after 7 years (can be                                                                   construed from 1-7 years or alternately from 20 to 27 years, when actual pension disbursal commences).
• There is a corresponding increase in CAPF pension budget.
• Net saving to GoI is zero.
• There is increase in annual training expenses in Army.
• Net no savings to GoI while there is increase in Army training budget.

                

The above analysis indicates that the Inverse Induction model does not result in financial savings to the GoI.

The Tour of Duty (ToD)

The ToD concept envisages recruitment of soldiers for a short duration, much like the conscription model existing in some countries. Romantically called 'Agnipath', the soldiers recruited in this proposal will be known as 'Agniveers', following the classic business model of giving a high-sounding name for standard military jobs. The fundamental flaw in this proposal is that it gives primacy to finances over operational effectiveness. It is true that no nation can wish away the larger macro-economic financial constraints, but at the same time, it would be unwise to barter national security and defence preparedness for purely financial reasons. While it is essential to look at optimisation of available resources, it simply cannot be done without holistically looking at all aspects of defence preparedness. This would include the nature of threats we are currently faced with and the force levels required to deal with them, to include the entire gamut of force structuring, weapons and equipment holding, logistic support infrastructure as also the state of morale, training, and a host of other battle winning factors. 

Be that as it may, it is debatable whether the ToD concept will lead to financial savings which are of such great account that it will give a tremendous fillip to capital acquisitions and force modernisations.

Analysis of Financial Implications of ToD

The analysis of the concept of ToD is being restricted to OR; the OR pension budget being the major component owing to large number of OR in the Army. In any case, the officer cadre already has a Short Service Commission  entry where  officers can exit at 5/10/14 years’ service without any pension obligation to GoI.

For the purpose of analysis, it is assumed that the men on ToD of 3/5 years, have the same entry level qualification, same selection criteria, same training duration, same posting profile and salary as the regular Army recruit. It is also assumed that the strength of regular Army will be offset in same numbers as the number of men on ToD. However, what is not clear is the number of men who will be absorbed in the CAPF after the termination of ToD.

With respect to the men who may be absorbed in the CAPF or PSUs, the earlier financial analysis of Inverse Induction Model will apply, albeit for a 3/5 year duration instead of 7 years. Thus, there will be no overall financial savings to the GoI while training budget of Army will go up. The other collateral effects, ie impact on operational effectiveness and unit cohesion will have to be studied separately with appropriate models once details of the employment, manning and posting profile which is envisaged for the men on ToD is known.

In case, these men are to be let off after 3/5 years with a severance package, then this amount, handed over on an annual basis, has to be compared with the annual pension contribution for those numbers of regular Army OR, to determine the savings, if any to the GoI. However, the future career prospects of these ex-ToD personnel, with most of them likely to be only matriculates (10^th) will remain. The jobs which can be made available to such personnel in the private sector will perforce be restricted to those at the lowest rung of the ladder, and the pay and emoluments they will receive will be far lower than what they were authorised while in ToD service.

There is also a possibility of these men being let off without any absorption and severance package, which will restrict their ability to start small scale enterprises on their own. The popularity of such a scheme will hence be eroded and may become unsustainable after a few years.

Concept of ToD : Is it borne out of  the Myths of Defence Budget

From the analysis above, it is evident that the concept of ToD is unlikely to result in considerable revenue savings to the GoI, unless the ToD personnel are left to fend for themselves after termination of their 3/5 years tenure or are given lower emoluments as compared to regular army recruits. Even in the latter case, there is going to be a tradeoff between limited savings (computation has to await full clarity on the concept) and the operational effectiveness, motivational levels and cohesion within a unit. In any case, even if savings are likely to accrue, that will only come about after 15 years, when the total number of pensioners will start to decline each year, and will eventually reach a constant after about 18 years.

There are several myths associated with the defence budget. In a developing natIon, there will always be concerns that the defence budget is eating into the resources of the nation, which could be better spent on other sectors. However, for a nation facing all round security challenges, not taking adequate protective measures will be a sure long-term recipe for disaster and economic ruin. 

A more suitable metric is to view defence allocation as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of total central government expenditure. For India, the defence allocation (excluding pensions) stands at approx 1.45% of GDP and has shown a gradual decline over the decades. This does not mean that in real terms, there has been a reduction in defence expenditure. An analysis of the defence budget over the last few decades indicates that the defence budget has been continuously rising in real terms, even if the rise is not very substantial. This is simply indicative of a higher rate of growth which enables high allocation to defence in real terms. Instead of fixing defence expenditure to a percentage of GDP, it is for consideration whether keeping defence expenditure constant as a total of overall government expenditure would be a better and more viable option.

With respect to the salary and pension bill of defence personnel, It is also to be understood that defence pensions rise in the same manner as other central government employees, the salary and DA structure being largely common. Thus, when experts talk of not enough funds left for modernisation of defence forces due to ever increasing revenue expenditure, they miss the essential point that the real reason is continuous compression of defence budget as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of central government expenditure. One may recall, that during the UPA regime, the then Prime Minister, Shri Man Mohan Singh made a statement that endeavour of his government will be to raise the defence allocation to 3% of GDP. But despite such a declaration, their was no real push for force modernisation and the military suffered great neglect during the ten years that Dr Singh was at the helm of affairs as Prime Minister—that is the period 2004-2014.

As far as pension budget is concerned, it is worthwhile to mention that average per capita pension of defence personnel is much lower than a central government civilian employee. The defence pension budget, however, is big in absolute numbers due to large number of retired personnel, which itself is a function of soldiers being compulsorily retired early from 36 years age onwards owing to the need to meet the requirement of maintaining a young and physically fit Armed Forces.

If we look at the overall revenue expenditure on salary and pension bill of defence personnel, a study has shown that life time earnings (pay and pension till average life expectancy of 70 years) of a civilian central government employee is about 60% higher than a corresponding pay grade defence employee. This simply indicates that the pay and pension bill of the Armed Forces cannot be construed to be exorbitant and a factor in constraining the modernisation effort. Clearly the cause lies elsewhere.

Another myth which abounds is that defence personnel get pension from the government, while civilians (post 2004) are on National Pension Scheme (NPS) and do not contribute to pension liability of the government. The fact is that the government contributes to pension of defence personnel as well as civilian employees (10% of basic pay every month). The difference is only conceptual; while the defence pension system is on “Cash Accounting System,” the NPS is based on the “Accrual System”. Defence pensions have to continue in its existing form as NPS is not suitable for employees who start retiring from the age of 36 years onwards. However, another study on NPS vs defence pension system has shown that if defence personnel also serve for 54 years age or more, NPS may be a preferable system to even the OROP which they are presently entitled to.

With all the data based studies pointing to the inferences outlined above, the question arises that is there a requirement of conceptualising schemes like ToD or are there better alternatives available within the existing paradigm? But before a holistic view of the issues involved is taken, it is essential to correct the misperceptions on defence budget and revenue expenditure including salary and pensions. Evidently, there is a parallax error in the popular perception about the Defence Budget and its constituents.

Optimising Defence Expenditure

Perhaps a better course of action would be to have a holistic overview of the entire defence expenditure, with a view to determining how this expenditure can be optimised, instead of keeping the focus on just reducing the pension component of the budget. Some of the factors which lead to rising costs are poor decision making, wasteful production techniques, reliance on imports, weak defence industrial base, limited participation of the private sector in the defence industry, poor quality control, restricting military hardware for exports and a public sector work force which continuously underperforms. These are the areas where we need to focus on.

Recently, the Government has very wisely done away with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and in its place, the 41 Ordnance Factories (OF) which it controlled have been converted into 7 Defence Public Sector Undertakings. This step was long overdue but was resisted by the unions. The various governments at the Centre, over the years, bowed to the wishes of these employees. This civilian component, by itself, constitutes a sizeable chunk of manpower and resources which could be privatised. The OF were a loss making enterprise, producing shoddy goods at inflated cost and employing manpower, far in excess of requirement. The government now needs to go beyond the bold decision it has taken as far as corporatisation of the erstwhile OFB is concerned. Some of these unproductive units need to be closed down or privatised, some could be retained and some could be handed over to the Ministry of Industry, where these units could compete with the private sector on a level playing field. Reforms here, by themselves will do much to reduce costs, making more money available for the modernisation effort.

Labour productivity in all the DPSU's need to be analysed. As an example, production costs of manufacturing indigenous fighter aircraft is abnormally high. The same goes for ship building, manufacture of heavy weapon systems, etc. Improved labour productivity will lead to dramatic reduction in costs, making more funds available for making up critical deficiencies.

A revamping of the total civil manpower on the rolls of the defence ministry would also be in order. It is not that well known that the defence civilian work force numbers around 4 lakh personnel. Of the 1.2 lakh crore defence pension bill, a substantial part is paid out to these defence civilians. Reducing the civilian work force will ipso facto have an impact on reducing the revenue budget, making more funds available for force modernisation. This will result in far greater savings than any other single measure. The civilian defence component of the Armed Forces is what can be called the tail in the 'teeth to tail' ratio. However, the tail is wrongly construed to be the logistic component of the military. This must be corrected. As a start, it would be beneficial if the Ministry of Defence published yearly figures of the total number of defence civilians on its payrolls, the break up of such a work force and the pension outlays to such personnel.

Savings can also be accrued with intangible factors such as improved decision making. Poor decision making has in the past led to production delays, delayed acquisitions and a phenomenal increase in costs. Within the military, improved logistic procedures will also do a world of good in bringing down holding costs of equipment, stores, spare parts etc.

Finally, there is a downside in the ToD system, which needs to be factored in. This pertains to the state of morale of ToD troops, which could be a vital factor in war. In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) fell like a house of cards to the Taliban, primarily because they were composed of conscripts, who had to serve a short time in the Army. When the chips were down, they exhibited no will to fight. We need to be careful of what we attempt to do with the troops of the Indian Army. This is the final bastion of the nation. If the Army fails, the nation does not survive and that is a possibility which we can never ever allow to happen. Another factor which merits consideration is that a sufficiently large percentage ToD soldiers, after their term is over, are unlikely to find a job which they find suitable. What happens if some of them become soldiers of fortune, trying their luck with anti national forces and organisations! We cannot wish such possibilities away. There will also be a separate set of challenges for the Commanding Officers, which need to be factored in. 

Conclusion

The ToD concept can at best have a limited impact on defence pension outlays, which will start manifesting only after 15 years. The downside of such a proposal is the impact it will have on operational efficiency and the challenges which may accrue in dealing with a large number of trained military personnel, who have no suitable employment after their ToD has been completed. It would hence be better to look at the entire matter in a holistic manner, especially in terms of what Prime Minister Modi has consistently been emphasising and that is to strengthen the defence industrial base, making India truly atmanirbhar in defence production. Combine this with weapon exports and we have a total game changer at hand. Here, we also need to look into the German Mittelstand, which became a model of economic success. For something like that to succeed in India we need a very proactive bureaucracy which acts as an enabler, supporting such enterprises. Unfortunately, as of now, the private sector is hampered by India's bureaucratic maze, which makes many entrepreneurs simply shut shop and move off to other countries where their talents are better appreciated.

If the ToD concept has to be tried out, let us make a start with the Territorial Army.  That would be a better test bed than carrying out such experiments with the field force. We would do well to remember that while future warfare will have a large component of non-contact warfare, the physical blood and gore of war fighting will still remain a constant. For the non-contact part of warfare, getting individuals on short term contracts from the private sector at various levels may also be an option which could be examined, especially in the new emerging field of cyber warfare, artificial intelligence (AI) robotics, et al. 

A holistic long-term view will give the Indian Armed Forces the capability and wherewithal to defend the nation against external threats. Fiddling with the system keeping only the financial aspects in mind could lead to unmitigated disaster in the long run. We have suffered foreign invaders ruling over our land over the last millennium. We cannot traverse that path again. Let us also remember that there is a cost to maintaining a young army. The nation has to be prepared to pay that cost.

Lt Gen Kapil Aggarwal and Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch - Published in IFJ - Vol 3, Issue 3

A GENOCIDE IGNORED

Write and philosopher George Santayana in his monumental work in five volumes, The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress, observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” We tend to forget the past when history is either not recorded or is deliberately distorted. The history of the sub-continent is replete with such examples, the inquisition in Goa carried out by the Portuguese in the 16th century being just one example. But suffice for now to note just a few instances from the last century.

The period August 20, 1921-1922 witnessed the massacre of over 10,000 Hindus in the Malabar region of Kerala by the Mapilla Muslims of Kerala. The killings were brutal and gruesome and exemplified the worst form of ethnic cleansing. Rather than receiving condemnation, later day historians sought to justify the same in the name of social justice. Text books today speak of this dark period as nothing more than a series of riots by peasants against the land owners, leaving out the obvious religious indoctrination which led people to commit barbaric acts in the name of religion.

Post independence, the atrocities committed by the Razakars in Hyderabad find little mention. The Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM), which had become a powerful organisation, "had its storm troopers in the Razakars who were headed by Kasim Razvi, a Muslim educated at Aligarh University who claimed Hyderabad was a Muslim state and that Muslim supremacy was based upon the right of conquest". The rape and murder carried out by the Pakistan army in Kashmir, in conjunction with the tribal militias they had recruited, once again finds little mention in history texts. The perpetrators were never tried for war crimes. Which is perhaps the reason why the Pakistan military continues with its brutal behaviour towards the Baluch, Muhajirs, Pashtuns and also against the marginalised religious groups in Pakistan. The Pakistan military has never been tried for the crimes they have committed in their own country.

The Liberation War was yet another saga of a genocide committed by the Pakistan army, which rightly should have led to a war crimes tribunal to try the guilty personnel of the Pakistan military. Besides the millions of civilians raped and killed, the Indian Army had proof of the Pakistan Army having shot dead Indian prisoners in cold blood, with their hands tied behind their backs. None of this was investigated and no one in the Pakistan military was tried for war crimes.

A culture of impunity created over the years, backed by religious fanaticism, is what led to the genocide in Kashmir. The first warning signs came as far back as 1965, when religious indoctrination was started in some schools in Kashmir by the Falah-e-Aam Trust, the educational wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The rate of intrusion increased rapidly after 1977 and became endemic since the early 1980s. Genocide was waiting to happen, and with the inflow of weapons from Pakistan, it finally took place in 1990. The Jamaat was banned in 1992, but simultaneously, all the teachers in the Falah-e-Aam Trust were absorbed in government run schools. Evidently, the state administration was in cahoots with the Radical Islamist groups. The elitist mullahs who believed in the ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami also controlled the administration, bringing about synergy in the nefarious designs of the mullah-ulema-adminstrator-politician cohort.

The warning signs were deliberately ignored by the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah who tenanted the office of Chief Minister from 23 March 1987 - 19 January 1990—the most critical phase of the growth of terrorism in the Valley. As the Chief Minister, he should have called in the Army, which he refused to do and simply resigned, abdicating his duty. His inaction made him complicit in the crimes that were committed by the fanatic muslim groups against the Hindu minority. Mr Jagmohan, who was the Governor of the state from 26 April 84 - 11 July 1989, sent missives to Delhi, but was repeatedly snubbed by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and he resigned on 11 July 1989. He was replaced as Governor by Gen KV Krishna Rao. Jagmohan was brought back as Governor only on 19 January 1990, but by then the genocide had been set in motion. There was little he could do to stem the tide. 

The period 1986 - January 1989 saw a vicious hate campaign against the Kashmiri Hindus, spread from the mosques and by various militant groups as also by local muslim groups. This led to violence which became more pronounced since July 1989 and culminated in the genocide seven months later on 19 January 1990. The militants had been armed from across the border and on 14 September 1989, they executed their first killing, when Mr Tika Lal Taploo was murdered in broad daylight in cold blood, setting off a wave of murders of people belonging to the Hindu faith. The tragedy of Kashmir was as much the killings of the Hindu minority in a planned pogrom to drive out the population using fear as a weapon, as was the silence and support of the vast majority of Kashmiri muslims who tacitly acquiesced in the pogrom. It was the local muslims who identified Hindu homes and who had posters placed on their doors warning them to leave otherwise they would be killed. The posters also told them to leave their women behind for sex. Kashmir had been shamed to unimaginable levels.

What now? Obviously we need justice for the Kashmiri Hindus. This can come about by firstly, acknowledging in the J&K legislature that a genocide took place and making a public apology for the same. A White Paper also needs to be published by the Centre and made public. This must be followed by instituting special courts to try those responsible for the genocide. Lastly, the Kashmiri Hindus must be resettled in Kashmir, in a separate and secure area, where they form the majority and where protection can be provided to them. Unless appropriate reparations are made to those who face brutal repression, history will repeat itself in some other parts of the country. We will then have only ourselves to blame for our failure to deliver justice.

Published in the Sunday Guardian— 20 March 2022.

REVAMPING INDIA'S DEFENCE SECTOR

The essence of military endeavour in battle is to pose asymmetric threats to which an adversary has no credible response. Such asymmetries can be created through differentials in technology, doctrine or organisation. An example of US technological superiority was on display in the two Gulf Wars and in US operations in Afghanistan, which enabled early success, though a combination of other factors prevented military success from being converted to a political victory. In the Indian context, the nation continues to face both conventional and non-conventional threats from its two inimical neighbours, the threats manifesting the entire spectrum of conflict on land, in the maritime domain, in the air and in space and outer space. This bespeaks the need to have a strong defence architecture to negate all such threats.

A strong defence industrial base is an essential requirement for India's security and well being. A thrust towards this end was made soon after independence in certain key segments in the strategic domain. India’s first nuclear reactor, Apsara, which was indigenously designed and built, went into operation on 04 August 1956, with nuclear fuel supplied from the United Kingdom under a lease agreement. Since then, India has made huge strides in the field of nuclear technology. India also initiated space research activities in the early 1960s, and is today an acknowledged space power, with ability to launch multiple satellites—from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and everything in between. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), established on 15 August 1969, is today, one of the six largest space agencies in the world. It now functions under the Department of Space (DOS) and the Space Commission which were set up in 1972.

India's guided missile development programme is yet another success story. It began in the early 1980s and today, India has developed all types of missile systems including ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, air-defence, air to air and anti-missile systems. From the short range Prithvi Series surface-to-surface missiles, to the Agni 'V' ICBM, which has been inducted into the armed forces, a whole range of surface to air and air to air missiles are in use by the Indian military. India is one of seven countries in the world with ICBM capability and one of four countries with anti-ballistic missile systems. Since 2016, India has been a member of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

However, despite having a large defence public sector, there have been serious weaknesses in the indigenous production of land systems, as well as platforms for the Navy and the IAF which has impacted India's defence capability. Since the last seven years, however, we are seeing a distinct change in government policies, which are now aiming to establish a strong and vibrant defence industrial base. 

Towards this end, the Finance Minister, in the budget he presented for 2018-2019, announced the setting up of two defence industrial corridors, one in Tamil Nadu and the other in Uttar Pradesh, to achieve self-reliance in the aero-space and defence sectors. Production of defence equipment by the private sector comes with its own set of challenges as the customer base is limited, there is a sensitivity attached to such production, gestation periods are long and they need heavy initial investment to fructify. The progress till date has been slow, largely due to the onset of the pandemic in early 2020. Nonetheless, Tamil Nadu has unveiled its plans to establish an ecosystem to make Tamil Nadu the manufacturing and service hub for the entire aerospace and defence industry of the country, to include both the established large players in the defence sector as well as emerging startups. With the pandemic now receding after the onset of the third wave, a fillip needs to be given to make the defence corridors functional in an early time frame.

In Uttar Pradesh, 1,480 hectares of land have already been acquired for the Defence Corridor. With the elections getting over shortly, the next government will have to move with speed and commitment to get the corridor to functionality in an early time frame. As of now, IIT Kanpur and IIT Banaras Hindu University Varanasi have been roped in for establishment of Centres of Excellence related with Defence Industrial Corridor, Brahmos Aerospace has proposed to set up a unit in Lucknow with Rs 300 crore investment to manufacture missiles and a missile manufacturing unit is also proposed to be set up at the Jhansi node. About 90 percent of the land required for the corridor—1480 hectares—has so far been acquired of which a total of 74 hectares has been allotted to 22 companies in Aligarh, Kanpur and Jhansi. Post the election results in March 2022, the next government will have to work on a war footing to get the corridor to full functionality. Both the defence corridors have the potential to catalyse indigenous production of defence and aerospace-related items and promote growth of private domestic manufacturers, MSMEs and startups in the defence sector.

Self reliance in the aviation sector is vital for India, to reduce its dependency for advanced platforms from external agencies. It was tragic that India abandoned its first indigenous fighter aircraft, the HF 24 Marut, manufactured by HAL, on extraneous grounds. Had we continued to develop the aircraft with upgrades, we could possibly have been one of the major powers in the aviation sector today. There have been delays in the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme that began in the 1980s as a replacement for the MiG-21 fighter aircraft, but the programme has yielded the Tejas fighter—an indigenous fighter aircraft for the IAF and the Navy. This project needs to be fully supported by all the agencies concerned, as only then will India have a viable aviation base. While an additional factory to double aircraft production is being set up, India needs to do much more to enhance production capability as the aircraft has excellent export potential too. The private sector needs to be co-opted in a big way for the supply of components which could assist in increasing production capacity. Alongside, the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) project also needs to be given greater impetus, as this is India's 5th generation aircraft under development. The Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), developed both for anti-infantry and anti-armour role is another success story as well as the Dhruv—a utility helicopter. Focus now has to be on enhanced production and exports. 

But the aviation sector is not only about fighter aircraft. India needs to consider manufacture of passenger aircraft. While it may not be feasible to reinvent the wheel, it could be possible to get a jump start by simply acquiring the IPR of a product which is in the market, such as the Embraer passenger aircraft. Alongside, India could look into supersonic passenger aircrafts—the next generation of passenger aircrafts which will transform aviation. There is a market for commercial travel which can halve the time for long distance flights. Development of such aircraft can transform and redefine the airlines industry as we know it today and it would be to India's advantage to jump on the bandwagon of this exciting new technology.

The defence sector is gradually being opened to the private sector, which is the need of the hour. While a great deal of time and resources have been expended on the public sector, it still lacks the capacity to meet even fifty percent of the requirements of the Armed Forces. To reduce imports, it is vital that the private sector be roped in, in a substantial manner. Great success has been achieved in certain sectors such as the manufacture of artillery guns, where 100 K9 Vajra Self Propelled guns have already been delivered to the Indian Army. These guns were manufactured by L&T in collaboration with Hanwha Defence of South Korea. The ATAGS (Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System), produced by DRDO in collaboration with Bharat Forge, Tata Power SED and Mahindra Defence Naval System, has been approved for procurement by the Indian Army. It is important that the Indian Army continues with the indigenous route, for only then can the local industry be enabled. Over time, we need to develop own IP for all platforms for the mechanised forces, artillery guns, drones, radars, communication equipment, etc, and the private sector can play an important role in such development.

There is also a need to enable the growth of the SMEs and MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises). Here, it would be instructive to look into the Mittelstand Model. These were small family owned businesses which achieved unprecedented efficiencies by designing a business model with a razor-thin focus and learning to do the one thing really well. Most importantly, they were given an enabling environment by the Government, and these small enterprises soon became world leaders. The strategy adopted was global niche dominance and world class performance in core sectors. While the Government of India is keen to promote the growth of the SME and MSME sectors, the enabling environment will have to be created by the bureaucracy which must be in sync with the larger aims of creating a strong defence industrial base.

Two additional issues need attention. What India needs is technology, but as of now, there is no institutionalised approach to acquiring the same. Structures for the same need to be built for acquiring strategic technologies. The second issue pertains to leadership. The Ordnance Factory Board has been dissolved and the 41 ordnance factories it controlled have been converted into seven defence public sector undertakings (DPSU). These seven new DPSUs to be effective cannot be run on the leadership style as existed earlier. Perhaps the time has come to infuse them with leadership from the corporate world, injecting into the system fresh ideas and accountability and a work culture which is focussed on results, output and profitability. If the seven new DPSUs can be made to perform like the private sector, it will give a huge boost to the Atmanirbhar Programme in the defence sector, especially as the government has opened the defence sector to exports. If India can export the Brahmos missile to Philippines, then there is really no bar to export any other piece of defence equipment to friendly countries. 

In conclusion, a lot of enabling legislation has been made  and the private sector is gradually becoming an important player in India's defence sector. There is an underlying sense of optimism, but ultimately, the user, that is the Armed Forces, the manufacturer, the research organisations and the decision makers—the political and bureaucratic authority, will have to work with each other in a spirit of cooperation, to achieve the desired results. Synergy between these components will act as a force multiplier and will enable India to be a major player in the defence segment within a decade.

Published in Uday India - March 2022

Crisis in Ukraine: Conflicting Narratives

Russia has amassed about 100,000 troops on its border with Ukraine, sparking off fears of an invasion. In addition, on 11 February, amidst the ongoing tension, Russia moved 30,000 troops into Belarus—a close ally of Russia—for a 10 day joint military exercise. This is widely being seen as yet another attempt to coerce Ukraine to toe the Russian line.

To defuse the crisis, French President, Emanuel Macron, on 7 February, held a meeting with President Putin in Moscow and thereafter flew to Kyiv, where he held talks with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy for over three hours. As expected, there was no breakthrough achieved in the talks. While Macron stated to reporters that he was "reasonably optimistic but I don't believe in spontaneous miracles," the spokesperson from Kremlin was blunt: "the situation is too complex to expect decisive breakthroughs in the course of one meeting," he said. 

The US has warned of a “very distinct possibility” of a Russian invasion of Ukraine and has asked all US citizens to leave the country. Moving beyond rhetoric, President Biden, in a video call he had with president Putin on 11 February, warned that the US and its allies  would respond “decisively and impose swift and severe costs" if Russia invades Ukraine. The response is unlikely to be a military one and will most likely involve sanctions. This could, inter alia, include some or all of the following:

• Imposing sanctions on the secondary market in Russian bonds.
• Closing the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to northern Europe, which though completed, is yet to receive certification for use by the German energy regulator. 
• Impose full-blocking sanctions on large Russian banks, energy companies, defence firms and also on investment and provision of services to conventional Russian oil projects.
• Sanctions on oligarchs and their families, where sanctions could be imposed on Putin-friendly oligarchs.
• Exclude Russia from Swift, the global electronic payment system, based in Belgium. This perhaps would only be used as a last resort.

Background

The situation that has developed and led to the face-off between Russia and the West over Ukraine can perhaps better be understood through a historical lens. The territory which comprises present day Ukraine has had a contested history. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, following the partition of Poland and the Russian conquest of the Crimean Khanate, the area came under the control of the Russian Empire and Hapsburg Austria. The Russian Revolution of 1917 led to a period of chaos and instability in the region. It was during this time that the Ukrainian Bolsheviks defeated the national government in Kiev and established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which on 30 December 1922, along with Russia, became one of the founding republics of the USSR. Post the Second World War, NATO was created in 1949 as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It comprised the US, Canada and several western countries.  

In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev, the then Premier of the Soviet Union, transferred Crimea to Ukraine. Crimea had been a part of Russia since 1783, when it was annexed after Tsarist Russia inflicted a defeat on the Ottoman Turks in the Battle of Kozludzha. The reason for the transfer was stated to be the “unity of Russians and Ukrainians” and to the “great and indissoluble friendship” between the two peoples. The real reason, however, had possibly much to do with Khrushchev seeing the transfer as a way of fortifying and perpetuating Soviet control over Ukraine.

In 1990, to get Russian support for the unification of Germany, US diplomats spoke about the non-expansion of NATO beyond East Germany. Russia, accordingly, supported the reunification, which took place on 3 October 1990, but no formal agreement exists which states that NATO will not expand eastwards. In 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became an independent country, like other constituents of the erstwhile USSR. Subsequently, many countries which were earlier part of the Soviet Bloc, sought and were granted membership of NATO. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO despite Russian opposition. In 2004, seven Central and Eastern European countries, viz Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia joined NATO. Albania and Croatia joined NATO on 1 April 2009 and more recently, Montenegro and North Macedonia joined NATO on 5 June 2017 and 27 March 2020, respectively. The present face off is a result of Ukraine expressing its intent to join NATO.

Opposing Viewpoints

Russia believes its security interests have been comprised by the refusal of the West to honour its pledge. President Putin spoke of this in a speech he delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, especially as the Baltic countries had joined the alliance by 2004, when he asked, "What happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?" Here, President Putin was referring to the famous “not one inch eastward” assurance given by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on 9 February 1990, in his meeting with President Gorbachev. This was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, which made Gorbachev agree to German unification. Gorbachov was also of the view that the future of the Soviet Union depended on its integration into Europe, for which Germany would be the decisive actor.

This is however not viewed in the same light by the western powers, who state that the deal only concerned a reunified Germany, with further eastward expansion being inconceivable at the time as no one could have predicted the collapse of the USSR and the historic upheavals that followed. In a major speech in Warsaw, Poland, on June 15, 2001, President Bush lent support to Clinton's policies, when he stated: “all of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltics to the Black Sea, should have an equal chance to join Western institutions", thus forcefully making the case for NATO's eastward expansion. Putin at that time stated that if NATO were to continue “becoming more political than military” Russia might reconsider its opposition to enlargement. While this was hardly an expression of Russian support for enlargement, it did indicate a Russian desire to accommodate a development that it did not like, but lacked the means to stop. But Putin has drawn the line with attempts to make Ukraine a member of NATO.

What Now

For Putin, the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union under his predecessor Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s is viewed as “a decade of humiliation” in which Bill Clinton’s US “imposed its vision of order on Europe (including in Kosovo in 1999) while the Russians could do nothing but stand by and watch”. If NATO enters Ukraine, then Russia loses a buffer and will be directly confronting NATO. This is perceived to be against the vital security interests of Russia.

NATO, on the other hand,  has an open door policy, which is central to the NATO alliance. The policy, enshrined in NATO’s original 1949 treaty, grants any European nation the right to ask to join. If Ukraine were to become a NATO member, then the alliance would be obligated to defend it against Russia and other adversaries. However, grant of membership has to be by unanimous consent and in the past, both France and Germany as also other European countries have opposed the inclusion of Ukraine into NATO. A war over Ukraine will hurt both Russia and NATO and in the long term, benefits only China which will be watching from the sidelines.

There will be consequences for NATO too. Russia can fuel insurgency in the Donbas region as seen by the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine and NATO will have to grapple directly with ongoing Russian-fuelled conflicts. Russia could also impose other costs on Europe, such as withholding gas exports.

India, while not being directly involved, will, nevertheless be seriously impacted. It has close relations with both the US and Russia and would not like to placed in a situation where it would have to choose sides. It's close relations with the US as well as its dependency on Russian military hardware, including the recently concluded S-400 deal, make the situation more complicated. A rise in energy prices would hit India hard as the country is just recovering from the after shocks caused by the pandemic. More importantly, a conflict in Europe shifts the focus away from Chinese intransigence in the Indo-Pacific, the South China Sea and the India-Tibet border, where Indian and Chinese troops are facing each other in Eastern Ladakh.

An end to the tension prevailing in the region can perhaps only come about with the US and its NATO allies giving a firm assurance that Ukraine will be kept out of NATO, and that the matter could come up for discussion after a period of time—say ten years. This would give enough time for all sides to cool down and review their respective positions. But there is no guarantee that better sense will prevail and we could well be looking into a European conflict which will bruise all the actors involved. Diplomacy is stalling and the threat of war is no longer a distant mirage. 

LEVERAGING SPACE FOR THE SUCCESS OF GROUND OPERATIONS

Geography has placed India between two neighbours, both of whom are hostile and inimical to India’s interests. To the West, India faces a belligerent and antagonistic Pakistan, with which she shares a 3,310 km long land border. To India’s North lies Tibet, which, when it came under Chinese occupation, saw for the first time, Indian and Chinese troops, facing each other across the high Himalayas separated by a 3,448 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese hostility against India is premised on keeping India confined to the backwaters of South Asia and towards that end, China actively colludes with Pakistan. As of now, while relations between India and her two antagonistic neighbours remain troubled, the possibility of full scale war is unlikely. In the near to middle term however, China may attempt to annex her claimed areas by force, if the Chinese political leadership is confident of achieving a quick military victor.

In the event of hostilities breaking out with China, the key to victory for either side will lie in information dominance, battlefield transparency and air superiority. Inter alia, both sides will leverage space to get that edge. Space is thus, the final frontier. The criticality for India will lie in monitoring in real time, Chinese troop movement, build up of artillery and logistic nodes, command and control centres, missile bases and aerial assets. This would require continuous satellite coverage over the Tibetan plateau, for which India would need adequate satellites of its own or leveraging information from satellites of friendly partner countries.

Hostilities with China will in all probability begin with a series of non kinetic responses through the cyber domain, where China will aim to cripple India’s network centric warfare capability and neutralise command and control centres. Non military targets such as financial centres may also be disrupted through cyber attacks. Prior to this, however, there will be a concerted attempt at shaping opinion, both within China and across the world. While China has been carrying out perception management operations through its ‘Three Warfares’ doctrine, encompassing media or public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, there will be a ratcheting up of such activity in the weeks and months prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The cyber attacks would be followed by a series of missile attacks on military targets, before ground operations commence.

India will have to counter Chinese cyber capability by both offensive and defensive means. To counter Chinese ground operations, India would require precision strike capability and a measure of air superiority over the Tibetan plateau. Here is where leveraging space comes into play, to achieve both battlefield transparency as well as precision strike capability. 

Pakistan is no longer a major conventional threat to India, but in conjunction with China, it will impose on India the threat of a two-front war. The criticality here will be to determine the movement of Pakistan’s strategic reserves, which again would require leveraging space capability. 

Whether it is hot war or cold war, or the grey zone in between, the cyber domain will continue to offer almost cost-free opportunities, especially to rogue nations to carry out attacks on non-military targets. This makes cyber-space the most critical domain of future warfare. With rise of AI enabled deep fakes, the cyber frontier is heading for sci-fi like cold war scenarios that is already covertly an active line of conflict for India. India needs to ready herself to counter both hot-war and grey-zone conflict scenarios.

Synopsis for Milit - 19 Jan 2022.

SECURING INDIA'S RISE: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE: Book Review

Since the beginning of 2020, the world is grappling with the Covid-19 pandemic which originated from Wuhan in China sometime in the last quarter of 2019. India too is severely impacted and is currently confronting the third wave of the pandemic, which has hit economic growth across the world. The Indian economy too has suffered, the impact being harshest on the poorer segments of  society, especially in the unorganised sector. India was aiming to be a USD 5 trillion economy by 2025, but the pandemic has delayed that time line. India will, however, eventually not just achieve that landmark, but will thereafter aim to be a USD 10 trillion economy—and India will get there too. India's rise is inevitable and as the 2022 report of the Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) has stated, the Indian economy will overtake Germany by 2031, and with an anticipated GDP of USD 6.8 trillion, be the third largest global economy after the US and China. But there are many challenges to India's rise, some of which are related to geo-political factors and some to the fractious nature of the Indian polity and society.

The book, "Securing India's Rise: A Vision For the Future," edited by Lt Gen. Kamal Davar, looks into the challenges that India has to grapple with. The collection of 19 essays by well known personalities in their respective domains highlight some of these challenges and is a welcome addition to the available literature on the subject. The 19 essays cover a reasonably wide gamut of ideas ranging from the idea of India, to geopolitical considerations, internal and external threats, decision making at the apex level, economic concerns, the digital divide and the fourth estate.

The opening chapter by Shashi Tharoor on 'Law and the Idea of India' delves into some aspects that went into the making of the Constitution and his views on what he believes to be the 'idea of India'. But many of his assertions are debatable. For instance, he states that the 42nd Amendment brought two key principles of India formally into the Constitution—Socialist and Secular. The implication here is that Socialism and Secularism are key principles of the idea of India. But Socialism, as an economic philosophy, has few takers anywhere in the world. As to the insertion of the word Secular into the Constitution of India, it would be naive to think that India is secular because of such insertion. India's secularism derives from its Hindu majority which is accepting of all faiths. The 42nd Amendment was pushed through by Indira Gandhi during the emergency when the entire opposition was in jail. To hold this up as a model to be emulated strikes at the very idea of what India should be and is a contradiction in terms. Tharoor also speaks disparagingly of 'Hindutva', calling it a mirror image of Pakistan. That indicates either a poor understanding of India's civilisational ethos or a deliberate attempt to distort the truth. An essay on Hindutva as a counter to Tharoor would perhaps have set the tone for a more balanced view. The book, The Hindutva Paradigm, by Shri Ram Madhav makes the point most eloquently.

The geo-political terrain has been neatly mapped by Mr Shyam Saran, who has served as India's foreign secretary as also by other authors. The regional and global environment impacting India brings out the challenges that India would continue to face in the foreseeable future. India's security challenges emanating from China and Pakistan have been covered in depth by Prof Kondapalli, a well known authority on China and by Sharat Sabharwal, who has served as India's High Commissioner to Pakistan. With respect to West Asia, the region is important for India to meet its energy requirements as also for the fact that close to eight million Indians live and work there. The subject could have been dealt with in greater depth by KC Singh, especially as the region remains mired in conflict, the more serious being the split on sectarian fault lines. India's foreign policy has been remarkably successful as seen in the growing friendship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the nuanced relationship with Iran, which bodes well for the future.

Two former Service Chiefs, General VP Malik and Admiral Arun Prakash have written very succinctly on India's security concerns, both on land and in the maritime domain. Internal security challenges have also been covered in depth by domain experts. Together, they chart out a course for managing internal fault lines as well as addressing external security challenges. 

Mohan Guruswamy has painted a rather bleak picture of India's economy and the trajectory of its future growth. Seema Mustafa, in her article on Indian journalism, laments the fall in journalistic ethics. And Samir Saran, along with Akhil Deo, writes about the emergence of unevenly governed spaces in the technology and digital domains, which have become new theatres of military and economic confrontation. Manish Tewari in his essay on the Covid 19 challenge, posits the need for regulatory frameworks. This is a lacuna in our system, not just in tackling health emergencies but also in dealing with technological advancements which have transformed the way we communicate with each other, how we conduct business and even impact on how future wars will be fought. The wide range of articles on multiple sectors which impact our lives are thought provoking, but finding solutions to many of the challenges is still a work in being.

The Editor of the book, Lt Gen Kamal Davar has juxtaposed a variety of ideas into this very comprehensive book. It is indeed a labour of love. It should be of interest to all those who deal in international relations and security issues and is a welcome addition to the available literature on the subject.

Published in IF Web: Chintan: Feb 2022

 

A Pragmatic Defence Budget in a Pandemic Year

The Defence Budget announced by the Finance Minister of ₹ 5.25 lakh crore marks an increase of 9.82% over the allocations made in the last fiscal. Even after taking inflation of 5.5% into account, the budget marks an increase of over 4% in real terms over the previous budget. This is indeed credible as the defence allocation has to be viewed in terms of the overall rate of growth of the economy following two years of a  pandemic which has impacted growth in which the poorer section have been badly hit and whose concerns and needs had to be dealt with on priority. The defence allocation is hence a strong signal of the governments commitment to the defence of the country in the prevailing security environment.

Of the defence expenditure of ₹5.25 lakh crore, a sum of ₹2.33 lakh crore has been allocated to Revenue Expenditure and ₹1.52 lakh crore to Capital Expenditure. The balance, ₹1.19 lakh crore goes to defence pensions with ₹20,100 crore going to Civil expenditure. This represents a BE (Budget estimate) to BE increase of  9.8% and a RE (Revised Estimates) to BE increase of 4.43% over the previous fiscal. It is important however to see how the Capital revenue is being addressed as this has a bearing on the modernisation of the military and the expenditure being incurred on Research and Development (R&D).

The Capital allocation of ₹1.52 lakh crore reflects a 12.82% BE to BE increase and a 9.89% RE to BE increase over the last fiscal. This is significant in terms of the modernisation effort for the Armed Forces. The Service allocation of Capital Expenditure is Army: ₹32,015.26 crore, Navy: ₹47,590.99 crore and Air Force: ₹55,586.65 crore. 

The Indian Air Force, like in the previous year, had the largest budget allocation for Capital expenditure and is about 4.5% over the allocation in the previous fiscal. This level of support has to be continued over the next few budgets to cater for the shortage of fighter aircraft squadrons and other needs of the IAF, which are now being made up in an incremental manner. The India Army has, however, seen its budget share going down from ₹36481.9 crore in the previous fiscal to ₹32,102 crore in the present budget—a decrease of 12.2%. However, data for 2021-22 shows that the Army has returned around ₹11,100 crore in the last fiscal, which possibly indicates challenges in expending the amount allotted which need to be looked into, the lacuna identified and corrected.

The Naval budget, on the other hand, has seen a massive jump of 43% from the previous fiscal. This reflects the governments concern on maritime security and its renewed emphasis and focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Naval budget of the previous fiscal saw an increase of ₹12,767.99 crore (from BE ₹33,253.55 crore to RE ₹46,021.54 crore). In the present budget, the Naval budget at ₹47,590.99 crore reflects a massive increase over the previous years BE and a nominal increase of about 3.5% over the RE over the last year. This indicates the Navy's ability to absorb the funds required for modernisation and its focus on building its capabilities in the IOR, based on the threat assessment.

Another important aspect of the defence budget is the push being given to promote indigenisation through policy changes which will encourage self reliance in defence production. This includes reserving 68% of the Capital procurement budget for the domestic industry and ₹3,810 crore for the seven new Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). This should spur both the private sector and the public sector to manufacture locally, both for the domestic market and to make a push for renewed exports in the defence sector. Inter alia, this will also result in reducing the heavy import bill in the defence sector. 

Despite the pandemic, the defence budget has seen a hike in both Capital and Revenue expenditure. This has to be seen in terms of the ongoing threats which India continues to face over her land borders and in the maritime domain and reinforces the thrust on capital acquisitions for force modernisation and building infrastructure for quick and speedy deployment of forces in the required theatres and for maintenance of existing equipment.  

An important highlight of the defence budget was the announcement by the finance minister that Research and Development (R&D) will be opened up for the private industry, start-ups and academia. Of the R&D budget of ₹11,981.81 crore, 25% is being earmarked for the purpose. The private industry will be encouraged to take up the design and development of military platforms and equipment in collaboration with the DRDO and other organisations through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) model. An independent nodal umbrella body for meeting wide-ranging testing and certification requirements has also been announced. 

In the overall analysis, the budget is long-term, looking at force modernisation in a holistic manner. While the budget is focussed on modernisation, it would need to ba accompanied by institutional reforms. For example, the seven defence public sector undertakings need to be put under dynamic management. It may be better to get talent from the corporate sector to head these organisations rather than relying on the civil and military bureaucracy to provide leadership. The emphasis on start ups and R&D is a positive step, but would once again require an enabling bureaucracy for the sector to grow. 

India is at an exciting cusp in its history. The budget is positive. It is now up to the nations bureaucracy to play its part in making India a vibrant defence economy. 

(Sent to Organiser on 2 Feb 2022)