JAMMU AND KASHMIR: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

It is important to understand the historical undercurrents which drive a society to look for its roots. It is equally important to delve into history to see that no set of actors try to misappropriate the legacy of a people by false analogies. Towards the latter end, a deliberate attempt is being made by some motivated groups with a fixed agenda, to portray Kashmir as an entity, which has historically been separate from India. Such falsehoods, fortunately, cannot stand historical scrutiny. Kashmir is not just an integral part of India, but is its very soul.

Since time immemorial, the majestic Himalayas have been part of the Indian social, cultural and spiritual milieu. Ancient Indian religious texts such as the Vishnu, Shiv and Matsya Puranas, as well as the great spiritual epic, the Mahabharata, make constant mention of the Himalayas, and in their description of Bharat, define it as the land lying between the Himalayas to the North and the Ocean in the South. The Markandeya Puraan describes the land mass of Bharat as “the land that is girdled by the sea on three sides and on the North by the Himalayas, which stretch like the string of a bow”. In the  Vishnu Puraan, the people who live in this geographical area, north of the oceans and South of the Himalayas, are described as Bharatiyas, in a beautiful couplet as under:

'Uttaram yat samudrasya, Himadreshchaiv dakshinam,

varsham tad bharatam nama, Bharatee yatra santatihi’. 

That the people of this land were bound together by a common spiritual tradition was also noted by India's first prime minister, Shri JL Nehru, in his 'Discovery of India,' who wrote of 'the uniqueness about this continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history, of invasion and upheaval, a tradition which was widespread among the masses and powerfully influenced them'. Since millennia, sages in India have walked the length and breadth of this land, from North to South and from East to West. Tamil poets from early times have made mention of the Northern extent of Bharat as the land which is the abode of Siva and the ‘tapovan’ (Sanskrit: austerity and spiritual practices) of saints and seers. The centrality of the Himalayas, in India's social and spiritual construct is thus not a modern phenomenon, but is deeply rooted in the psyche of the people—a construct synthesised and refined over thousands of years, and passed on from one generation to the next. That is why, ancients texts make constant reference to the 'Kashmir Mandala' in terms of its spatial and temporal locus as part of India’s sacred geography. Kashmir is hence described, not just as India’s northernmost outpost, but as the very fountainhead of Indian culture—indeed, as the very soul of India.

It is important to understand this historicity, to better appreciate the vicious manner in which attempts are now being made by certain vested interests to portray Kashmir as a land which was never a part of the Indian imagination. The Great Mauryan empire, in its vast spread, encompassed both Kashmir to the North and present day Afghanistan to its West. During the reign of Ashoka, a complete system of administration was established in Kashmir. For Bharat, the Himalayas did not just provide a formidable natural line of defence; these sacred mountains were and are the core of India's spiritual thought. Kashmir, nestled in the lap of the Himalayas, thus became a focal point for the spread of Indian culture to Central, East and Southeast Asia. Straddling the communication network between Central Asia, Afghanistan and China, the region gained strategic significance and in the early years of the 19th century, and became the foci of the rivalry played out between Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, which came to be known as the Great Game. 

The Beginning of the Sultanate 

In the first quarter of the 14th century, the Mongols invaded the land. This invasion was the beginning of the tumultuous events that were to overtake the Kashmir Valley over the next 400 years. After ravaging the land for eight months, the Mongols left before the onset of winter. The ruler at that time was King Suhadeva, who attempted appeasement of the invaders by way of expensive gifts, but these were spurned by the Mongol army which continued its spree of killings, loot and plunder. The King died soon after and his place was taken by his Prime Minister, Ram Chander, who in turn appointed Rinchan, a Buddhist prince from Ladakh, as an administrator. Rinchan soon gained the confidence of the Raja and then treacherously killed him, and anointed himself as the ruler in 1320 CE. At this point of time, the history of Kashmir took a dramatic turn. Rinchan had married Ram Chander’s daughter and desired to convert to Hinduism, but the head priest of the Brahmin Pandit’s Devaswami denied the newly anointed Raja his request. As a result, Rinchan converted to Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Sadruddin Shah. 10,000 of his subjects converted along with him.

Rinchan died three years later, in 1323 CE. He founded a quarter in Srinagar called Rinchanpura on his name and built a mosque, Bud Masjid, on the site of a Buddhist temple. With his death, Kashmir returned to Hindu rule, under Rinchan’s widow, Kota Rani, but this interlude was but a short one. She was defeated by Shahmir, an astute diplomat in her kingdom, who ascended the throne in 1339 CE, with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. While Rinchan was the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, the consolidation of the Sultanate started with Shamsuddin, till the 200 year rule of the Sultans was ended by Mughal emperor Akbar in 1586 CE. 

Mughal, Sikh and Dogra Rule 

The Mughal rule in Kashmir lasted for just over 170 years until 1757 CE. It was marked by the building of pleasure gardens and little else, till Aurangzeb (1658 CE-1707 CE), ascended the throne. His rule saw the return of religious bigotry and intolerance to the Kashmir Valley, with forcible conversions and discriminatory taxation. Mughal influence declined after Aurangzeb’s death, and further weakened after Nadir Shah’s invasion of India in 1738 CE. The death knell to Mughal rule came with their defeat to the Afghan’s in 1753 CE, as a result of which Kashmir came under Afghan rule. This ended 66 years later with the defeat of the Afghans by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819. This also marked the end of Muslim rule in Kashmir, encompassing a period of just over four hundred years. The Afghan rule was noted for its cruelty, barbarity and avarice, and its demise came as a period of welcome relief to the people of the region.

Sikh rule over Kashmir was also short-lived and ended with British victory over the Sikhs in the battle of Sobraon in February 1846, called the First Anglo-Sikh War. Two treaties were signed at the end of the war. The first of these, the Treaty of Lahore, was signed on 9 March 1846 with the 7-year old Maharaja Duleep Singh and the British Empire. Under the terms of the Treaty, Punjab ceded Kashmir and its dependencies to the British. The second treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar was signed six days later on 13 March 1846 with Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Through this Treaty, Kashmir and its dependencies were handed over to Gulab Singh, and thus Kashmir came under Dogra rule. Under the terms of the Treaty, Maharaja Gulab Singh paid a sum of Rs 75 lakh to the British government for the territories ceded to him. This included the whole of the outer hills between the Ravi and the Indus, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and the Indus Valley down to Chilas.

The region of modern-day Jammu, was traditionally ruled by the Dogra Rajputs. For the most part, they maintained their autonomy despite being nominal feudatories to Delhi. At times, they joined the Mughals in their northern conquests, like those of Balkh in 1646-47 CE. With the demise of the Mughal dynasty, Raja Dhruv Deo and later his son, Raja Ranjit Deo rose to greater political prominence, the latter also proceeding to expand his kingdom to include Kishtwar, Chenani, Bhadarwah, Besolhi, Jasrota and parts of Gujrat in Western Punjab. This was, however, a transitory phase as the rise of Sikh power in the region saw Jammu losing its sovereignty over all of their former territories save for Jammu, which was now reduced to a petty state. But it also saw the rise of the line of Raja Dhruv Deo, in the form of his great-great-grandsons, Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh, who joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court and rose rapidly through the ranks, setting themselves apart and above the Maharaja's Sikh courtiers. 

Gulab Singh had joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army in 1809. His father, Miyan Kishore Singh was given the charge to administer Jammu state by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1817, which had been annexed by him a year earlier. Soon thereafter, Miyan Kishore Singh declared Gulab Singh as his 

legal heir. As a reward for the outstanding contribution made by Gulab Singh in the defeat of the Pathans in Kashmir in 1819, Maharaja Ranjit Singh crowned Gulab Singh as the Raja of Jammu on 16 June 1822. Even after getting Jammu and its adjoining principalities under his territory, Raja Gulab Singh continued to serve the rulers of Lahore and at the same time, annexed many small principalities to his kingdom. Kishtwar was subdued and its governorship was handed over to Zorawar Singh, a Rajput soldier in the Sikh army. It was Zorawar Singh who annexed Ladakh in 1842 and added it to Dogra rule.

British interest in the region, during the period of Sikh and Dogra rule had much to do with the great power rivalry that existed at that time between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia. Britain wanted to keep their resident in Kashmir, to keep a watch over the activities of the Sikh rulers and to see that Russian influence was kept at bay. During Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s rule and for a decade after his death in June 1839, the British were kept out, but after the defeat of the Sikh’s in the Second Anglo-Saxon War of 1849, Punjab was annexed by the British and the Dogra rulers thereafter succumbed to British pressure. In 1877, the British established the Gilgit Agency, to guard against the advance of Russia. The Agency, comprising of the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas, was re-established in 1935 under the control of the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. It was given on lease for a period of 60 years commencing from 29 March 1935.

The period of Dogra rule in Kashmir’s history was an epochal event, for it marked the entry of the British into the area. Taken holistically, it was also a period of reasonable prosperity for the state. Gulab Singh was succeeded by his son Ranbir Singh, who in turn was succeeded by Pratap Singh. Here the family line ended as Pratap Singh had no male heir. As a result, his nephew Hari Singh, succeeded him to the throne. Hari Singh was destined to be the last ruler of the state, the Dogra rule having lasted for just over one hundred years.

Pre Independence Developments 

Maharaja Hari Singh ascended the throne on 23 September 1925. It was a moment in history when the Indian independence movement was gathering steam and differences between the Hindus and Muslims had started coming to the fore. Within the state of J&K, Muslim fanatics started a movement to stoke communal violence in the state. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of the J&K Muslim Conference which was formed in 1932. The Party was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on 10 June 1939. When India was partitioned and achieved independence on 15 August 1947, most of the princely states had opted to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had the choice to remain independent under the Maharaja or to join either India or Pakistan. Britain had also terminated its lease of the Gilgit Agency, which reverted back to the state. At this time, the boundaries of the state encompassed the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit and Baltistan in the North, Ladakh in the East, Kashmir and Muzaffarabad in the centre and Jammu, to include Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur, Udhampur, Bhadarwah and Kathua in the South. 

Post Independence Developments 

At the time of independence, Maharaja Hari Singh found himself in a precarious position. His state forces lacked the capacity to protect any part of his landlocked kingdom, which lay between India and Pakistan. There were three battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, with the Kashmir Brigade. 7 J&K Rifles was at Srinagar, 4 J&K Rifles at Domel with a company at Kohala and another company at Keran and 6 J&K Battalion had been sent up to Gilgit. This battalion had moved to Bunji and had a company at Leh and another company at Skardu. South of the Pir Panjal range, 1 J&K Rifles was at Poonch and was being relieved by 8 J&K Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles was at Rawalkot, 2 J&K rifles at Naushera and 3 J&K Rifles at Mirpur. Some of these were mixed battalions with both Dogra and Muslim troops. Poor communications and the vast spread of the area meant that each battalion was really fighting an independent battle and could not depend on support from any one. Pakistan thus thought that it would be easy to militarily take over the state and force its accession to Pakistan. 

The idea of remaining an independent kingdom had appeal for the Maharaja, but he lacked the force to protect his kingdom from external threats. The remaining options were to accede, either to India or to Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh’s dilemma was increased by the fact that the Muslims in his state constituted the larger majority, but the Hindu population was substantial too. Stalling for time, the Maharaja entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 12 August 1947. India however declined his offer. 

To the Pakistani political leadership of that time, led by Mr Jinnah, who had been appointed as the Governor General of Pakistan and his Prime Minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, there was little doubt that Kashmir would be taken over by force, if the Maharaja did not accede to Pakistan. This plan was given the code name “Operation Gulmarg” and planning commenced in August 1947. Maj Gen Akbar Khan, a serving officer of the Pakistan army, was given the command of Operation Gulmarg, and he revealed all the details of this operation in 1975, in his book, “Raiders in Kashmir”. To achieve their objective, the Pakistan military raised 20 lashkars of about 1000 men each from their Pashtun population in the tribal belt. Pakistani military officers and men were embedded into the lashkars. They were given weapons, equipment and logistic support by the Pakistan army which also provided the force its leadership component down to company level. In his book, Khan confirms that the political leadership of Pakistan was fully in sync with these operations. It was thus a politico-military operation carried out by the state of Pakistan. 

The invasion of J&K by Pakistan military, along with the raiders, began on 22 October. The route chosen to reach Srinagar was via Domel, Mahulla and thence to Baramulla. Over 7,000 Pashtun armed tribesmen, led by officers from the Pakistan military, began the invasion, crossing over the state boundary. In a shameful incident, on the night of 21/22 October, the Muslim companies of the 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry, betrayed their oath to their ruler and the state and in an act of treachery, driven by religious fanaticism, killed their commanding officer, Col Narain Singh. They also killed their Dogra colleagues and then deserted, crossing over to the ranks of the tribals. Muzaffarabad and Domel was ransacked, the people butchered, raped and looted. Two days later, in Pulandri, they announced the formation of a provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ government, before continuing their advance to Srinagar. Under these conditions, the Maharaja requested India’s help, but was told that this could not be given unless he acceded to India. This was agreed to by the Maharaja and the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. The Indian Army was flown in to Srinagar on 27 October and the raiders were halted on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, they were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared on 31 December 1948. With this, Pakistan remained in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control. Post the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Turtuk, lying in the Nubra Valley and on the banks of the Shyok River was liberated by Indian forces and now forms one of the northernmost villages in the Leh District of Ladakh. 

Article 370

Maharaja Hari Singh remained the titular Maharaja of the state until 1952, when the monarchy was abolished by Government of India, but political power shifted to the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah in 1948 itself. When India's Constitution was promulgated on 26 January 1950, Article 370 was inserted as a temporary Article. The inclusion of Article 370 into the Constitution of India had not been demanded by the people of J&K, nor was it demanded by Maharaja Hari Singh when he acceded to India. The Article, giving special status to the state was a temporary measure, and so was included in PART XXI of the Constitution, which pertained to Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions. The insertion of Article 35A in 1954, which was the more insidious development, gave the state of J&K the power to determine who was a state subject and such determination could not be challenged by the Indian State. This Article was inserted without the mandatory approval of the Indian Parliament, and thus can be construed as a fraud committed on the Constitution. Both Article 370 and 35 A can be said to have hindered the emotional integration of J&K with the rest of the Indian Union.

The Radicalisation of J&K 

The problem of radicalisation which seeped into the state had its origins in the growth, since the mid-1960s, of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Indoctrinated cadres from the Jamaat were soon absorbed in government institutions, particularly in government schools. It was the Jamaat which radicalised the Muslims in J&K, especially in the Valley. The Government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its educational wing Falah-e-Aam Trust in 1992 for indulging in anti-social activities, but inexplicably, absorbed all the teachers in government schools! Terrorism and radicalisation thus grew hand in hand in J&K, with Pakistan lending full support to terrorist groups. To view the conflict in Kashmir as a fight for ‘Azadi,’ is hence a misnomer. It was always a fight for Nizam-e-Mustafa—rule by Shariat and not by democratic norms. Also, developments with the state always had a Kashmir-centric agenda, despite the Kashmir division having only 55 percent of the population, and just one-sixth of the land area of the state. The voices from Jammu and Ladakh remained smothered. Even within Kashmir Division, it was but a small coterie of people, comprising a fraction of the population, that held complete sway over the state. These were, what Bashir Assad refers to in his book, “K File” as the Mullah clan—the people who had come to the Valley about 600 years earlier to preach Islam. They are the present day Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, and they achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the original inhabitants, as well as the states political and bureaucratic landscape. The power of this group has now been eroded. However, the radicalisation which had seeped into Kashmiri society, beginning in the late 1960's, led to the genocide of the Kashmiri Hindus in 1990 and the growth of terrorism in J&K.

Conclusion 

The abrogation of Special Status to the state of J&K and its bifurcation into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) on 05 August 2019, brings fresh hope of normalcy settling into the region. The perfidious designs of Pakistan and their supporters within India are finally being addressed, which should bring peace to the region. For the moment, the focus and effort of the government of India remains on seeing the total return to normalcy in the Union Territory of J&K. Elections to the State Assembly are yet to be held, as the work of the Delimitation Commission, proposing changes to assembly and parliamentary segments in the Union Territory, is yet to be finalised and approved. But elections to the local bodies have been successfully held and received tremendous local support. Central laws are now applicable, giving hope to the women, Dalits, West Pakistan Refugees and others who were deprived of their rights and liberties due to the application of Article 370 and 35A. There is also a visible decline in levels of terrorist activities across the state, which bodes well for the future.

Transformative changes however take time, and the challenges are tremendous, especially in ensuring the safe return of the half million or so Kashmiri Hindus back to their homeland. The prospects of total normalcy reverting to J&K are at present, not as bleak as they were prior to 5 August 2019, when the provisions of Article 370 were abrogated, bringing J&K into the national mainstream. Though the road is long, there is hope in the air, especially amongst the youth of the Union Territory.

How is Kashmir seen by youth from other parts of India? Towards that end, a group of young Indians from all over the country visited the UT as part of the India Foundation Young Thinkers Meet held in Kashmir Valley towards the latter half of 2021. Post the conclave, some of the individuals gave out their impressions of the UT and how they view the situation as it is developing. It forms an interesting take on the views of a segment of  young India. More such initiatives will result in a better understanding of the horrors of radicalisation and the urgent need to ensure that such movements are nipped in the bud and not allowed to grow.

THE TOUR OF DUTY PROPOSAL: NEED FOR A HOLISTIC APPROACH

Introduction

There has been a great deal of speculation in sections of the media as well as in the social media of a change taking place in the Army's recruitment pattern. Termed as the Tour of Duty (ToD), it envisages recruiting soldiers for a short duration of three to five years service in the Army. It is believed that the proposal is under active consideration by the Ministry of Defence, but in the absence of any official statement from the government on the subject, the purpose of introducing such a concept, the broad contours it may follow, as also a discussion on the pros and cons of such a proposal can at best be based on certain reasonable assumptions. This paper aims to put across the likely thought process behind the proposal, the pattern it can take and the likely impact this proposal will have, if introduced.

Broad Contours of the ToD Proposal

The basic thought process behind the proposal is to reduce the expenditure on military pensions. On a fixed defence budget, reduction in revenue expenditure would make greater funds available for capital outlay, which in turn would facilitate new acquisition and military modernisation. India's budget for FY 2022-23 allocated Rs 5.25 lakh crore for defence, which includes the defence pension component of about Rs 1.2 lakh crore. Obviously, a reduced pension component will lead to a larger capital outlay. With this in view, the proposal is believed to envisage recruiting personnel into the Army for short tenures, akin to conscription but on a volunteer basis.

One of the proposals is to induct personnel for both a three year period as well as for a period of five years to eventually, say within 15-20 years, have an army strength that would comprise 25 percent personnel who would be below 3 years service and another 25 percent who would be between 3 to 5 years service. The rest of the component would be as presently existing. There could be different computations of the above, but the end objective is the same. On completion of ToD, some of these personnel would be absorbed in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) or in the corporate sector while the rest would be free to seek employment elsewhere. Those who do not find employment will be encouraged and assisted to set up small scale individual businesses. The savings accrued during the ToD as well as the lump sum amount they would receive on completion, would provide them the necessary capital for the same.

The individuals serving for periods below five years would not be eligible for pension, so the scheme is slated to reduce the pension bill of the Army. Some of the other benefits envisaged are as under:

• It would reduce the age profile of the Army.
• It would create a large work force of disciplined individuals, who would then be an asset when employed in either the CAPFs or by the corporate sector. 
• Those individuals who cannot get employment will be encouraged to set up small scale private enterprises, which could give them an alternate livelihood. This would also give a boost to the economy.
• It would lead to increased employment opportunities for the youth.

Earlier Proposals

One of the earlier proposals of the Army was lateral induction of short service commissioned officers into other services. For the jawans who retire after 15 to 17 years of service, it was recommended that they be employed thereafter in the CAPF (Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, National Security Guards) or in the para military forces (Assam Rifles). This proposal found little favour with the Home Ministry and was shelved. 

 

In 2019, an army veteran, Lt Gen P. Menon, along with Pranay Kotasthane, both from the Takshashila Institute, wrote a discussion paper recommending an 'inverse induction model' to reduce the Army's pension bill. This was a modification of the earlier Army proposal and envisaged induction of army personnel into the CAPF. The recruitment would be done by the CAPF, but the recruits would be trained by the Army and would revert back to their respective CAPF after completion of 7 years’ service.

Analysis of the Inverse Induction Model

For the purpose of analysing the financial implications of the stated model, the assumptions made are as under:

• For the period, annual pension liability of GoI is assumed to be constant                    for a fixed number of Other Ranks (OR).
• The total Army authorisation of OR is 'A' and their total annual contribution   towards future pension liability is 'P'.
• The number of CAPF recruits each year is x.
• The annual pension contribution of x Army OR is X, ie X Rs saved each         year in pension contribution (notional) by recruiting x number of OR into the CAPF.
• All OR are assumed to retire after 19 years, with uniform rate of recruitment each year. Hence, the total annual training expenses for A/19 number of recruits is T =(A/19) *t, where t is the individual recruit training cost for one year. (See table below)

   

Service  (Year)	CAPF Recruits (Total)	Pension Contribution (Total Army)	Training Expenses (Annual Total)
1	x	P-X	T=(A/19)*t
2	2x	P-2X	Higher
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
7	7x	P-7X	Higher
8	8x	P-7X (as x No of OR have left for CAPF)

 

The following inferences can be made from the above table:

• There is saving in pension contribution from the defence budget for first 7 years and it peaks at 7X. From 8th year onwards, the saving remains 7X.
• The pension budget of CAPF, however,  goes up by an equivalent amount as 7 years of Army Service will be counted for CAPF pension also.
• Net pension savings to the GoI is zero.
• Training costs go up. When no CAPF, annual recruit training cost is At/19. With CAPF recruits, annual cost is (A-x) *t/19  + xt   =  At/19  + 18xt/19 - ie an increase of 18xt/19 in annual training budget.

The Conclusion from the above analysis is as under:

• The saving in defence pension budget peaks after 7 years (can be                                                                   construed from 1-7 years or alternately from 20 to 27 years, when actual pension disbursal commences).
• There is a corresponding increase in CAPF pension budget.
• Net saving to GoI is zero.
• There is increase in annual training expenses in Army.
• Net no savings to GoI while there is increase in Army training budget.

                

The above analysis indicates that the Inverse Induction model does not result in financial savings to the GoI.

The Tour of Duty (ToD)

The ToD concept envisages recruitment of soldiers for a short duration, much like the conscription model existing in some countries. Romantically called 'Agnipath', the soldiers recruited in this proposal will be known as 'Agniveers', following the classic business model of giving a high-sounding name for standard military jobs. The fundamental flaw in this proposal is that it gives primacy to finances over operational effectiveness. It is true that no nation can wish away the larger macro-economic financial constraints, but at the same time, it would be unwise to barter national security and defence preparedness for purely financial reasons. While it is essential to look at optimisation of available resources, it simply cannot be done without holistically looking at all aspects of defence preparedness. This would include the nature of threats we are currently faced with and the force levels required to deal with them, to include the entire gamut of force structuring, weapons and equipment holding, logistic support infrastructure as also the state of morale, training, and a host of other battle winning factors. 

Be that as it may, it is debatable whether the ToD concept will lead to financial savings which are of such great account that it will give a tremendous fillip to capital acquisitions and force modernisations.

Analysis of Financial Implications of ToD

The analysis of the concept of ToD is being restricted to OR; the OR pension budget being the major component owing to large number of OR in the Army. In any case, the officer cadre already has a Short Service Commission  entry where  officers can exit at 5/10/14 years’ service without any pension obligation to GoI.

For the purpose of analysis, it is assumed that the men on ToD of 3/5 years, have the same entry level qualification, same selection criteria, same training duration, same posting profile and salary as the regular Army recruit. It is also assumed that the strength of regular Army will be offset in same numbers as the number of men on ToD. However, what is not clear is the number of men who will be absorbed in the CAPF after the termination of ToD.

With respect to the men who may be absorbed in the CAPF or PSUs, the earlier financial analysis of Inverse Induction Model will apply, albeit for a 3/5 year duration instead of 7 years. Thus, there will be no overall financial savings to the GoI while training budget of Army will go up. The other collateral effects, ie impact on operational effectiveness and unit cohesion will have to be studied separately with appropriate models once details of the employment, manning and posting profile which is envisaged for the men on ToD is known.

In case, these men are to be let off after 3/5 years with a severance package, then this amount, handed over on an annual basis, has to be compared with the annual pension contribution for those numbers of regular Army OR, to determine the savings, if any to the GoI. However, the future career prospects of these ex-ToD personnel, with most of them likely to be only matriculates (10^th) will remain. The jobs which can be made available to such personnel in the private sector will perforce be restricted to those at the lowest rung of the ladder, and the pay and emoluments they will receive will be far lower than what they were authorised while in ToD service.

There is also a possibility of these men being let off without any absorption and severance package, which will restrict their ability to start small scale enterprises on their own. The popularity of such a scheme will hence be eroded and may become unsustainable after a few years.

Concept of ToD : Is it borne out of  the Myths of Defence Budget

From the analysis above, it is evident that the concept of ToD is unlikely to result in considerable revenue savings to the GoI, unless the ToD personnel are left to fend for themselves after termination of their 3/5 years tenure or are given lower emoluments as compared to regular army recruits. Even in the latter case, there is going to be a tradeoff between limited savings (computation has to await full clarity on the concept) and the operational effectiveness, motivational levels and cohesion within a unit. In any case, even if savings are likely to accrue, that will only come about after 15 years, when the total number of pensioners will start to decline each year, and will eventually reach a constant after about 18 years.

There are several myths associated with the defence budget. In a developing natIon, there will always be concerns that the defence budget is eating into the resources of the nation, which could be better spent on other sectors. However, for a nation facing all round security challenges, not taking adequate protective measures will be a sure long-term recipe for disaster and economic ruin. 

A more suitable metric is to view defence allocation as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of total central government expenditure. For India, the defence allocation (excluding pensions) stands at approx 1.45% of GDP and has shown a gradual decline over the decades. This does not mean that in real terms, there has been a reduction in defence expenditure. An analysis of the defence budget over the last few decades indicates that the defence budget has been continuously rising in real terms, even if the rise is not very substantial. This is simply indicative of a higher rate of growth which enables high allocation to defence in real terms. Instead of fixing defence expenditure to a percentage of GDP, it is for consideration whether keeping defence expenditure constant as a total of overall government expenditure would be a better and more viable option.

With respect to the salary and pension bill of defence personnel, It is also to be understood that defence pensions rise in the same manner as other central government employees, the salary and DA structure being largely common. Thus, when experts talk of not enough funds left for modernisation of defence forces due to ever increasing revenue expenditure, they miss the essential point that the real reason is continuous compression of defence budget as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of central government expenditure. One may recall, that during the UPA regime, the then Prime Minister, Shri Man Mohan Singh made a statement that endeavour of his government will be to raise the defence allocation to 3% of GDP. But despite such a declaration, their was no real push for force modernisation and the military suffered great neglect during the ten years that Dr Singh was at the helm of affairs as Prime Minister—that is the period 2004-2014.

As far as pension budget is concerned, it is worthwhile to mention that average per capita pension of defence personnel is much lower than a central government civilian employee. The defence pension budget, however, is big in absolute numbers due to large number of retired personnel, which itself is a function of soldiers being compulsorily retired early from 36 years age onwards owing to the need to meet the requirement of maintaining a young and physically fit Armed Forces.

If we look at the overall revenue expenditure on salary and pension bill of defence personnel, a study has shown that life time earnings (pay and pension till average life expectancy of 70 years) of a civilian central government employee is about 60% higher than a corresponding pay grade defence employee. This simply indicates that the pay and pension bill of the Armed Forces cannot be construed to be exorbitant and a factor in constraining the modernisation effort. Clearly the cause lies elsewhere.

Another myth which abounds is that defence personnel get pension from the government, while civilians (post 2004) are on National Pension Scheme (NPS) and do not contribute to pension liability of the government. The fact is that the government contributes to pension of defence personnel as well as civilian employees (10% of basic pay every month). The difference is only conceptual; while the defence pension system is on “Cash Accounting System,” the NPS is based on the “Accrual System”. Defence pensions have to continue in its existing form as NPS is not suitable for employees who start retiring from the age of 36 years onwards. However, another study on NPS vs defence pension system has shown that if defence personnel also serve for 54 years age or more, NPS may be a preferable system to even the OROP which they are presently entitled to.

With all the data based studies pointing to the inferences outlined above, the question arises that is there a requirement of conceptualising schemes like ToD or are there better alternatives available within the existing paradigm? But before a holistic view of the issues involved is taken, it is essential to correct the misperceptions on defence budget and revenue expenditure including salary and pensions. Evidently, there is a parallax error in the popular perception about the Defence Budget and its constituents.

Optimising Defence Expenditure

Perhaps a better course of action would be to have a holistic overview of the entire defence expenditure, with a view to determining how this expenditure can be optimised, instead of keeping the focus on just reducing the pension component of the budget. Some of the factors which lead to rising costs are poor decision making, wasteful production techniques, reliance on imports, weak defence industrial base, limited participation of the private sector in the defence industry, poor quality control, restricting military hardware for exports and a public sector work force which continuously underperforms. These are the areas where we need to focus on.

Recently, the Government has very wisely done away with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and in its place, the 41 Ordnance Factories (OF) which it controlled have been converted into 7 Defence Public Sector Undertakings. This step was long overdue but was resisted by the unions. The various governments at the Centre, over the years, bowed to the wishes of these employees. This civilian component, by itself, constitutes a sizeable chunk of manpower and resources which could be privatised. The OF were a loss making enterprise, producing shoddy goods at inflated cost and employing manpower, far in excess of requirement. The government now needs to go beyond the bold decision it has taken as far as corporatisation of the erstwhile OFB is concerned. Some of these unproductive units need to be closed down or privatised, some could be retained and some could be handed over to the Ministry of Industry, where these units could compete with the private sector on a level playing field. Reforms here, by themselves will do much to reduce costs, making more money available for the modernisation effort.

Labour productivity in all the DPSU's need to be analysed. As an example, production costs of manufacturing indigenous fighter aircraft is abnormally high. The same goes for ship building, manufacture of heavy weapon systems, etc. Improved labour productivity will lead to dramatic reduction in costs, making more funds available for making up critical deficiencies.

A revamping of the total civil manpower on the rolls of the defence ministry would also be in order. It is not that well known that the defence civilian work force numbers around 4 lakh personnel. Of the 1.2 lakh crore defence pension bill, a substantial part is paid out to these defence civilians. Reducing the civilian work force will ipso facto have an impact on reducing the revenue budget, making more funds available for force modernisation. This will result in far greater savings than any other single measure. The civilian defence component of the Armed Forces is what can be called the tail in the 'teeth to tail' ratio. However, the tail is wrongly construed to be the logistic component of the military. This must be corrected. As a start, it would be beneficial if the Ministry of Defence published yearly figures of the total number of defence civilians on its payrolls, the break up of such a work force and the pension outlays to such personnel.

Savings can also be accrued with intangible factors such as improved decision making. Poor decision making has in the past led to production delays, delayed acquisitions and a phenomenal increase in costs. Within the military, improved logistic procedures will also do a world of good in bringing down holding costs of equipment, stores, spare parts etc.

Finally, there is a downside in the ToD system, which needs to be factored in. This pertains to the state of morale of ToD troops, which could be a vital factor in war. In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) fell like a house of cards to the Taliban, primarily because they were composed of conscripts, who had to serve a short time in the Army. When the chips were down, they exhibited no will to fight. We need to be careful of what we attempt to do with the troops of the Indian Army. This is the final bastion of the nation. If the Army fails, the nation does not survive and that is a possibility which we can never ever allow to happen. Another factor which merits consideration is that a sufficiently large percentage ToD soldiers, after their term is over, are unlikely to find a job which they find suitable. What happens if some of them become soldiers of fortune, trying their luck with anti national forces and organisations! We cannot wish such possibilities away. There will also be a separate set of challenges for the Commanding Officers, which need to be factored in. 

Conclusion

The ToD concept can at best have a limited impact on defence pension outlays, which will start manifesting only after 15 years. The downside of such a proposal is the impact it will have on operational efficiency and the challenges which may accrue in dealing with a large number of trained military personnel, who have no suitable employment after their ToD has been completed. It would hence be better to look at the entire matter in a holistic manner, especially in terms of what Prime Minister Modi has consistently been emphasising and that is to strengthen the defence industrial base, making India truly atmanirbhar in defence production. Combine this with weapon exports and we have a total game changer at hand. Here, we also need to look into the German Mittelstand, which became a model of economic success. For something like that to succeed in India we need a very proactive bureaucracy which acts as an enabler, supporting such enterprises. Unfortunately, as of now, the private sector is hampered by India's bureaucratic maze, which makes many entrepreneurs simply shut shop and move off to other countries where their talents are better appreciated.

If the ToD concept has to be tried out, let us make a start with the Territorial Army.  That would be a better test bed than carrying out such experiments with the field force. We would do well to remember that while future warfare will have a large component of non-contact warfare, the physical blood and gore of war fighting will still remain a constant. For the non-contact part of warfare, getting individuals on short term contracts from the private sector at various levels may also be an option which could be examined, especially in the new emerging field of cyber warfare, artificial intelligence (AI) robotics, et al. 

A holistic long-term view will give the Indian Armed Forces the capability and wherewithal to defend the nation against external threats. Fiddling with the system keeping only the financial aspects in mind could lead to unmitigated disaster in the long run. We have suffered foreign invaders ruling over our land over the last millennium. We cannot traverse that path again. Let us also remember that there is a cost to maintaining a young army. The nation has to be prepared to pay that cost.

Lt Gen Kapil Aggarwal and Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch - Published in IFJ - Vol 3, Issue 3

A GENOCIDE IGNORED

Write and philosopher George Santayana in his monumental work in five volumes, The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress, observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” We tend to forget the past when history is either not recorded or is deliberately distorted. The history of the sub-continent is replete with such examples, the inquisition in Goa carried out by the Portuguese in the 16th century being just one example. But suffice for now to note just a few instances from the last century.

The period August 20, 1921-1922 witnessed the massacre of over 10,000 Hindus in the Malabar region of Kerala by the Mapilla Muslims of Kerala. The killings were brutal and gruesome and exemplified the worst form of ethnic cleansing. Rather than receiving condemnation, later day historians sought to justify the same in the name of social justice. Text books today speak of this dark period as nothing more than a series of riots by peasants against the land owners, leaving out the obvious religious indoctrination which led people to commit barbaric acts in the name of religion.

Post independence, the atrocities committed by the Razakars in Hyderabad find little mention. The Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM), which had become a powerful organisation, "had its storm troopers in the Razakars who were headed by Kasim Razvi, a Muslim educated at Aligarh University who claimed Hyderabad was a Muslim state and that Muslim supremacy was based upon the right of conquest". The rape and murder carried out by the Pakistan army in Kashmir, in conjunction with the tribal militias they had recruited, once again finds little mention in history texts. The perpetrators were never tried for war crimes. Which is perhaps the reason why the Pakistan military continues with its brutal behaviour towards the Baluch, Muhajirs, Pashtuns and also against the marginalised religious groups in Pakistan. The Pakistan military has never been tried for the crimes they have committed in their own country.

The Liberation War was yet another saga of a genocide committed by the Pakistan army, which rightly should have led to a war crimes tribunal to try the guilty personnel of the Pakistan military. Besides the millions of civilians raped and killed, the Indian Army had proof of the Pakistan Army having shot dead Indian prisoners in cold blood, with their hands tied behind their backs. None of this was investigated and no one in the Pakistan military was tried for war crimes.

A culture of impunity created over the years, backed by religious fanaticism, is what led to the genocide in Kashmir. The first warning signs came as far back as 1965, when religious indoctrination was started in some schools in Kashmir by the Falah-e-Aam Trust, the educational wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The rate of intrusion increased rapidly after 1977 and became endemic since the early 1980s. Genocide was waiting to happen, and with the inflow of weapons from Pakistan, it finally took place in 1990. The Jamaat was banned in 1992, but simultaneously, all the teachers in the Falah-e-Aam Trust were absorbed in government run schools. Evidently, the state administration was in cahoots with the Radical Islamist groups. The elitist mullahs who believed in the ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami also controlled the administration, bringing about synergy in the nefarious designs of the mullah-ulema-adminstrator-politician cohort.

The warning signs were deliberately ignored by the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah who tenanted the office of Chief Minister from 23 March 1987 - 19 January 1990—the most critical phase of the growth of terrorism in the Valley. As the Chief Minister, he should have called in the Army, which he refused to do and simply resigned, abdicating his duty. His inaction made him complicit in the crimes that were committed by the fanatic muslim groups against the Hindu minority. Mr Jagmohan, who was the Governor of the state from 26 April 84 - 11 July 1989, sent missives to Delhi, but was repeatedly snubbed by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and he resigned on 11 July 1989. He was replaced as Governor by Gen KV Krishna Rao. Jagmohan was brought back as Governor only on 19 January 1990, but by then the genocide had been set in motion. There was little he could do to stem the tide. 

The period 1986 - January 1989 saw a vicious hate campaign against the Kashmiri Hindus, spread from the mosques and by various militant groups as also by local muslim groups. This led to violence which became more pronounced since July 1989 and culminated in the genocide seven months later on 19 January 1990. The militants had been armed from across the border and on 14 September 1989, they executed their first killing, when Mr Tika Lal Taploo was murdered in broad daylight in cold blood, setting off a wave of murders of people belonging to the Hindu faith. The tragedy of Kashmir was as much the killings of the Hindu minority in a planned pogrom to drive out the population using fear as a weapon, as was the silence and support of the vast majority of Kashmiri muslims who tacitly acquiesced in the pogrom. It was the local muslims who identified Hindu homes and who had posters placed on their doors warning them to leave otherwise they would be killed. The posters also told them to leave their women behind for sex. Kashmir had been shamed to unimaginable levels.

What now? Obviously we need justice for the Kashmiri Hindus. This can come about by firstly, acknowledging in the J&K legislature that a genocide took place and making a public apology for the same. A White Paper also needs to be published by the Centre and made public. This must be followed by instituting special courts to try those responsible for the genocide. Lastly, the Kashmiri Hindus must be resettled in Kashmir, in a separate and secure area, where they form the majority and where protection can be provided to them. Unless appropriate reparations are made to those who face brutal repression, history will repeat itself in some other parts of the country. We will then have only ourselves to blame for our failure to deliver justice.

Published in the Sunday Guardian— 20 March 2022.

REVAMPING INDIA'S DEFENCE SECTOR

The essence of military endeavour in battle is to pose asymmetric threats to which an adversary has no credible response. Such asymmetries can be created through differentials in technology, doctrine or organisation. An example of US technological superiority was on display in the two Gulf Wars and in US operations in Afghanistan, which enabled early success, though a combination of other factors prevented military success from being converted to a political victory. In the Indian context, the nation continues to face both conventional and non-conventional threats from its two inimical neighbours, the threats manifesting the entire spectrum of conflict on land, in the maritime domain, in the air and in space and outer space. This bespeaks the need to have a strong defence architecture to negate all such threats.

A strong defence industrial base is an essential requirement for India's security and well being. A thrust towards this end was made soon after independence in certain key segments in the strategic domain. India’s first nuclear reactor, Apsara, which was indigenously designed and built, went into operation on 04 August 1956, with nuclear fuel supplied from the United Kingdom under a lease agreement. Since then, India has made huge strides in the field of nuclear technology. India also initiated space research activities in the early 1960s, and is today an acknowledged space power, with ability to launch multiple satellites—from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and everything in between. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), established on 15 August 1969, is today, one of the six largest space agencies in the world. It now functions under the Department of Space (DOS) and the Space Commission which were set up in 1972.

India's guided missile development programme is yet another success story. It began in the early 1980s and today, India has developed all types of missile systems including ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, air-defence, air to air and anti-missile systems. From the short range Prithvi Series surface-to-surface missiles, to the Agni 'V' ICBM, which has been inducted into the armed forces, a whole range of surface to air and air to air missiles are in use by the Indian military. India is one of seven countries in the world with ICBM capability and one of four countries with anti-ballistic missile systems. Since 2016, India has been a member of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

However, despite having a large defence public sector, there have been serious weaknesses in the indigenous production of land systems, as well as platforms for the Navy and the IAF which has impacted India's defence capability. Since the last seven years, however, we are seeing a distinct change in government policies, which are now aiming to establish a strong and vibrant defence industrial base. 

Towards this end, the Finance Minister, in the budget he presented for 2018-2019, announced the setting up of two defence industrial corridors, one in Tamil Nadu and the other in Uttar Pradesh, to achieve self-reliance in the aero-space and defence sectors. Production of defence equipment by the private sector comes with its own set of challenges as the customer base is limited, there is a sensitivity attached to such production, gestation periods are long and they need heavy initial investment to fructify. The progress till date has been slow, largely due to the onset of the pandemic in early 2020. Nonetheless, Tamil Nadu has unveiled its plans to establish an ecosystem to make Tamil Nadu the manufacturing and service hub for the entire aerospace and defence industry of the country, to include both the established large players in the defence sector as well as emerging startups. With the pandemic now receding after the onset of the third wave, a fillip needs to be given to make the defence corridors functional in an early time frame.

In Uttar Pradesh, 1,480 hectares of land have already been acquired for the Defence Corridor. With the elections getting over shortly, the next government will have to move with speed and commitment to get the corridor to functionality in an early time frame. As of now, IIT Kanpur and IIT Banaras Hindu University Varanasi have been roped in for establishment of Centres of Excellence related with Defence Industrial Corridor, Brahmos Aerospace has proposed to set up a unit in Lucknow with Rs 300 crore investment to manufacture missiles and a missile manufacturing unit is also proposed to be set up at the Jhansi node. About 90 percent of the land required for the corridor—1480 hectares—has so far been acquired of which a total of 74 hectares has been allotted to 22 companies in Aligarh, Kanpur and Jhansi. Post the election results in March 2022, the next government will have to work on a war footing to get the corridor to full functionality. Both the defence corridors have the potential to catalyse indigenous production of defence and aerospace-related items and promote growth of private domestic manufacturers, MSMEs and startups in the defence sector.

Self reliance in the aviation sector is vital for India, to reduce its dependency for advanced platforms from external agencies. It was tragic that India abandoned its first indigenous fighter aircraft, the HF 24 Marut, manufactured by HAL, on extraneous grounds. Had we continued to develop the aircraft with upgrades, we could possibly have been one of the major powers in the aviation sector today. There have been delays in the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme that began in the 1980s as a replacement for the MiG-21 fighter aircraft, but the programme has yielded the Tejas fighter—an indigenous fighter aircraft for the IAF and the Navy. This project needs to be fully supported by all the agencies concerned, as only then will India have a viable aviation base. While an additional factory to double aircraft production is being set up, India needs to do much more to enhance production capability as the aircraft has excellent export potential too. The private sector needs to be co-opted in a big way for the supply of components which could assist in increasing production capacity. Alongside, the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) project also needs to be given greater impetus, as this is India's 5th generation aircraft under development. The Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), developed both for anti-infantry and anti-armour role is another success story as well as the Dhruv—a utility helicopter. Focus now has to be on enhanced production and exports. 

But the aviation sector is not only about fighter aircraft. India needs to consider manufacture of passenger aircraft. While it may not be feasible to reinvent the wheel, it could be possible to get a jump start by simply acquiring the IPR of a product which is in the market, such as the Embraer passenger aircraft. Alongside, India could look into supersonic passenger aircrafts—the next generation of passenger aircrafts which will transform aviation. There is a market for commercial travel which can halve the time for long distance flights. Development of such aircraft can transform and redefine the airlines industry as we know it today and it would be to India's advantage to jump on the bandwagon of this exciting new technology.

The defence sector is gradually being opened to the private sector, which is the need of the hour. While a great deal of time and resources have been expended on the public sector, it still lacks the capacity to meet even fifty percent of the requirements of the Armed Forces. To reduce imports, it is vital that the private sector be roped in, in a substantial manner. Great success has been achieved in certain sectors such as the manufacture of artillery guns, where 100 K9 Vajra Self Propelled guns have already been delivered to the Indian Army. These guns were manufactured by L&T in collaboration with Hanwha Defence of South Korea. The ATAGS (Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System), produced by DRDO in collaboration with Bharat Forge, Tata Power SED and Mahindra Defence Naval System, has been approved for procurement by the Indian Army. It is important that the Indian Army continues with the indigenous route, for only then can the local industry be enabled. Over time, we need to develop own IP for all platforms for the mechanised forces, artillery guns, drones, radars, communication equipment, etc, and the private sector can play an important role in such development.

There is also a need to enable the growth of the SMEs and MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises). Here, it would be instructive to look into the Mittelstand Model. These were small family owned businesses which achieved unprecedented efficiencies by designing a business model with a razor-thin focus and learning to do the one thing really well. Most importantly, they were given an enabling environment by the Government, and these small enterprises soon became world leaders. The strategy adopted was global niche dominance and world class performance in core sectors. While the Government of India is keen to promote the growth of the SME and MSME sectors, the enabling environment will have to be created by the bureaucracy which must be in sync with the larger aims of creating a strong defence industrial base.

Two additional issues need attention. What India needs is technology, but as of now, there is no institutionalised approach to acquiring the same. Structures for the same need to be built for acquiring strategic technologies. The second issue pertains to leadership. The Ordnance Factory Board has been dissolved and the 41 ordnance factories it controlled have been converted into seven defence public sector undertakings (DPSU). These seven new DPSUs to be effective cannot be run on the leadership style as existed earlier. Perhaps the time has come to infuse them with leadership from the corporate world, injecting into the system fresh ideas and accountability and a work culture which is focussed on results, output and profitability. If the seven new DPSUs can be made to perform like the private sector, it will give a huge boost to the Atmanirbhar Programme in the defence sector, especially as the government has opened the defence sector to exports. If India can export the Brahmos missile to Philippines, then there is really no bar to export any other piece of defence equipment to friendly countries. 

In conclusion, a lot of enabling legislation has been made  and the private sector is gradually becoming an important player in India's defence sector. There is an underlying sense of optimism, but ultimately, the user, that is the Armed Forces, the manufacturer, the research organisations and the decision makers—the political and bureaucratic authority, will have to work with each other in a spirit of cooperation, to achieve the desired results. Synergy between these components will act as a force multiplier and will enable India to be a major player in the defence segment within a decade.

Published in Uday India - March 2022