Tuesday, June 21, 2022

THE GOOD, BAD AND UGLY OF AGNIPATH

A lot has been said and written about the new Agnipath scheme for enrolment into the Armed Forces of India. In essence, the scheme is a radical departure from past practises as from now onwards, all enrolment will only be through the pan-India, merit-based Agnipath scheme. Selected individuals, called 'Agniveers' will serve for a period of four years, which includes a six-month training period. Entry is for individuals in the age bracket of 17.5 - 21 years with educational qualification being 10/12 pass. As no recruitment has taken place for the last two years due to the Covid pandemic, a one time waiver has been given for the year 2022, wherein the upper age limit has been increased to 23 years. 

The Good

The financial package is reasonably attractive. The Agniveers will be entitled to risk and hardship allowance and to death and disability pension. They will contribute 30% of their monthly emoluments with the government contributing an equal amount towards a lump sum gratuity that will be given to each individual on completion of four years contractual service. This amounts to Rs 11.7 lakh. On termination of the contractual period, an option is to be exercised for permanent entry into the Armed Forces, which will be restricted to 25 percent. Selection procedures are well laid out and transparent. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the same.


Itv has been stated that the Agnipath scheme will yield a more youthful profile for the military and will result in improved battle preparedness through more trainable and resilient youth. But the Army already has a youthful profile and the soldiers are well trained, so this will make little difference. The benefits of skill India are also proposed to be harnessed. The individuals not selected will, it is hoped, form a disciplined, motivated and physically fit group of youth that will be inducted into civil society. Some of these youth may be employed by the corporate sector on the basis of their skill sets or by the Central Government in the Central Armed Police Forces (BSF, CRPF, ITBP) or in the para-military forces (Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard). The state government's may also absorb some of these individuals. It is also hoped that all those not so employed will become small-scale entrepreneurs with the skill sets they have gained and the financial package they will receive at the end of four years. Most of what has been stated is more in the nature of a promissory note rather than a concrete proposal, but even so, there is merit in the same.


The Bad

What needs questioning is the basic premise for launching the scheme, which was to bring about a reduction in revenue expenditure. The outgo on pensions every year was thought to be very high and unsustainable in the long run, which necessitated this step. However, a more holistic course of action would have been to look into force effectiveness, based on a fixed budget. There is a large civilian work force numbering over 3.5 lakh persons, which is paid from defence estimates and which has been left outside the ambit of this structure. The productivity of the ordnance factories and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) as also of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have also not been considered. A qualitative improvement in the functioning of all these government owned research and production facilities will, by itself, generate huge revenue for modernisation of the military. Decision making at the apex level too is sluggish, resulting in time delays and cost overruns. Streamlining the same will again lead to reduced costs and enhanced force effectiveness. The utility of a large civilian bureaucracy is also questionable. The Agnipath scheme is modelled in some fashion on the US military, so it would be logical to model higher defence management on the same lines. We could thus consider placing the Department of Defence, the Department of Defence Production and the DRDO under the CDS who would be the one point contact on all military matters with the Defence Minister. This would not be easy to accomplish as the bureaucrats will fight tooth and nail to preserve their turf, though they contribute little to force enhancement. 


The Ugly

In terms of military effectiveness, the scheme will throw up some uncomfortable realities, when it is fully operational. One of these is the fact that about 60 percent of an infantry battalion's profile will be of Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. Armoured,  artillery and engineer regiments will also have a similar profile as shown in the diagram. The Army will no longer have a uniform profile of solders spread equally over the years, but a tiered structure, with the 0-4 years bracket soldiers occupying over 50 percent of the operational space. This will have adverse consequences for the military as seen by the performance of young soldiers in the war in Ukraine.

 

More importantly, the ratio in rifle companies will be further skewed. Training and induction into the specialist platoons like the 81 mm mortar, medium machine gun, anti tank, signal and pioneer platoons will be only of the permanent inductees, which means that the rifle companies will have most of the Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. This ratio could be as high as 80-90 percent and does not augur well for force effectiveness either in a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CICT) environment or in hot war. 


Many other imponderables also crop up. How much time will the unit spend now, on continuously training a bunch of raw soldiers? How will the Agnipath scheme impact on traditional unit activities such as sports and professional competitions, which are so necessary to build esprit-de-corps and unit and sub-unit bonding? What will be the impact on the motivational level of young inductees in the fourth year of their service? 


The list of questions are endless and too innumerable to be dealt with in a short opinion piece, but the challenges are mind boggling. The military leadership would most certainly have given a thought to all these issues, but the devil really lies in the detail. Perhaps, the Agnipath scheme will have greater acceptability if the ratio of permanent inductees into the military is increased to fifty percent and the term of duty for the Agniveers extended to six years instead of the current four. This would give better operational pay offs and would remove most of the infirmities discussed above. Also, it would be better if lateral induction to the CAPF and para military forces is guaranteed to 25 percent of the Agniveers. Then, just a quarter of the Agniveers would require rehabilitation in the private sector, which is a more manageable task. This would cater to both the military's operational requirement as well as the needs of the individuals seeking a career in the military.


Only time will tell whether the scheme to reduce the revenue expenditure has been a worthwhile experiment. In its present form, it will most certainly result in savings to the exchequer. But one shudders to think of the cost the nation will have to pay, in case of defeat on the battlefield.


The author is an army veteran who is presently Director, India Foundation.

Published in Sunday Guardian: 19 Jun 2022.


 

Monday, June 6, 2022

PAKISTAN: IN SLOW BURN


“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” 

(the more things change, the more they remain the same)

 — Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr


When Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was sworn in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, he came in with a promise to usher in a 'naya Pakistan'. The dream never materialised and four years later, in April 2022, with Niazi's unceremonious ouster from the chair in a vote of no confidence, Pakistan was in a far more precarious position than what it was in 2018. The dream of a 'naya Pakistan' was stillborn and Pakistan remains, at least for the world's democracies, a problem child, steeped in debt, obscurantism, religious bigotry and a cradle for fostering terrorism. 


A volatile mix of religion, military control and internal strife has hampered the growth of a healthy democracy within the country. Pakistan's current challenges are a mix of political instability, a tottering economy and ethnic and religious fissures. Much of this has to do with the circumstances of Pakistan's birth, which was  shrouded in an almost total lack of conceptual clarity. The coining of the word ‘PAKSTAN’ by Rahmat Ali is in itself instructive for it included in its vision the Provinces of Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan but left out Bengal. Despite the aspect of territorial ambiguity, there was lack of ideological lucidity. Was it to be a secular state, a state of Muslims or an Islamic state? This lack of clarity still exists in Pakistan despite over seven decades of independence and is one of the reasons why Pakistan continues to teeter on the brink of disaster.


Economy


The World Bank’s Pakistan Development Update, released in April 2022, speaks of double digit inflation in the country caused by high demand pressures and rising global commodity prices, which have adversely impacted the Pakistani Rupee. More importantly, the report states that long-standing structural weaknesses of the economy including low investment, low exports and low productivity growth, pose risks to a sustained recovery. Tighter global financing conditions and a further rise in world energy prices will exacerbate the already high macroeconomic risks, these getting further compounded by the current political uncertainty and policy reform slippages. As per Zehra Aslam, the lead author of the above report, the "government would need to focus on containing the fiscal deficit at a level which ensures debt sustainability, closely coordinate fiscal and monetary policy, and retain exchange rate flexibility to mitigate immediate macroeconomic risks," but that is easier said than done. 


An economic crisis in Pakistan is not something new, the country having faced such a situation twice in the 1990s and a few times thereafter, but the magnitude this time is unprecedented.  Besides other issues, Pakistan is faced with a severe debt crisis, with serious concerns about its ability to repay and service external debt. Pakistan's external account is under pressure due to a spike in import prices, coupled with lax handling of domestic policy. Unlike 2018, this time Pakistan's ability to deal with the crisis is severely challenged by political strife, internal security challenges as well as a volatile global situation caused by the war in Ukraine. Pakistan's external debt repayments profile is very high, and its gross external financing requirement is estimated to be around nine per cent of GDP. While Pakistan has just about enough foreign exchange reserves to cater for two months of import requirements, it will have to depend on the generosity of the IMF and other lenders to keep its economy afloat. Inability to do so will cause Pakistan to slip further into an economic debt trap.


Conflict


Pakistan remains mired in internal conflict, the origins of some of which stretch all the way back to the early years of independence. As stated by Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s leaders since the country’s inception have played upon religious sentiment as a nation building tool, and turned Pakistan into an ‘ideological state’ whose ideology is Islam. Zia's policy of ‘Islamising’ Pakistan’s legal and educational system was merely an extension of a consistent state policy, though he went further down that road than his predecessors. The alliance between the mosque and the state, forged over decades, has had its pitfalls on two counts. Terrorist groups such as the TTP have sprung up, which seek imposing Sharia in Pakistan. These groups are at war against the Pakistani state. Then we have groups which were created to fight India such as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the Lashkar-e Taiba. The State has not always been able to control them, as seen in the radical and violent manifestations of an Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan’s stability.


In Balochistan, a freedom movement has been ongoing since 1948. The Baluch people are still engaged in a freedom struggle to rid them of the yoke of Pakistan, which continues to exploit their resources and offers little in return. The suicide bombing which took place at the Confucius Institute at Karachi University on 26 April 2022, is but a grim reminder of the desire of the Baloch people to attain freedom. The bombing killed the Director of the Institute, Mr Huang Guipin along with two other Chinese, Ding Mufang and Chen Jai. A fourth Chinese national, Wang Yuqing was seriously injured, along with a private security guard and two personnel from the Pakistan Rangers. Also killed was the driver of the van, a Pakistani national. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which they stated was carried out by the Majeed Brigade of the BLA. A statement released by the spokesperson of the group, Jeeyand Baloch, warned of many more attacks to come, the note in English stating: “Hundreds of highly trained male and female members of the Baloch Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade are ready to carry out deadly attacks in any part of Balochistan and Pakistan.” This is the first case of a suicide bombing being carried out by a female bomber. More importantly, the bombing was not carried out on religious motivations, but on the grounds of achieving independence for the Baloch people. This will open up a whole range of new challenges for the Pakistani establishment, besides acting as a motivator for Baloch youth to continue with their quest for independence.


There is internal turmoil also in Gilgit-Baltistan, which too has been exploited by the Pakistani State at the expense of the local residents. To make matters worse, the Chinese have made great inroads in this area, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has added to the angst of the local population. While the  China-Pakistan nexus at the political and military level is vibrant and strong, a similar level of connect at the people to people level is distinctly missing. Chinese investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (C-PEC) are viewed with distrust by the Baloch people who feel that their land in Gwadar has been bartered away. The BLA hence targets both the Pakistan government and Chinese nationals. The C-PEC is also viewed with distrust by the people of Gilgit Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which means that the entire corridor requires protection from sabotage by inimical groups.


Political Turmoil


Pakistan's economy is in shambles and it is dealing with multiple internal security challenges. To make matters worse, there is lingering political instability in Pakistan, which inhibits effective decision making. The ouster of Imran Khan from power followed a script much akin to a Bollywood thriller, with desperate attempts being made by Khan to stick on to his chair, but the combined opposition finally outmanoeuvred him. The Army's decision to stay neutral is widely viewed as support for Khan's bête noire, Shehbaz Sharif.


Khan has since been holding massive political rallies across the country and has called for early elections. He retains popularity amongst a large section of the populace, particularly the youth, and believes that he will sweep the elections, as and when they are held, on the basis of the strong stance he has taken against the US.


Shehbaz Sharif, who took over as Premier after Khan's ouster, is struggling to deal with a deteriorating economy, rising inflation and the devaluation of the rupee. He has had to take the unpopular decision to hike fuel prices, the price of petrol having increased by a whopping PKR 60 a few weeks back. This was necessitated to get an IMF loan to bail out the economy. As usual, the incumbent government blames Khan for mismanaging the economy, but the onus now is squarely on the present set of rulers to pull Pakistan out of the economic morass. 


The stakes are high for the Pakistan military, which too will face a funds crunch, which will adversely impact its preparedness to deal with both internal and external threats. The core interest for the Pakistan military for the moment is internal stability, as an increase in political turmoil will more likely than not descend into political violence. With its current security commitments, and with the precarious state of Pakistan's finances, this is not something which the military will look upon favourably. Despite the political turmoil, the military is unlikely to effect a takeover, as directly ruling the country will be far more problematic.  A combination of the financial mess that Pakistan finds itself in, the volatile political environment and a wide-ranging set of security challenges will see Pakistan tottering on the verge of collapse. Western financial support may however prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state.


Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch is an Army veteran who is currently Director, India Foundation.

Targeted Killings in Kashmir: A New Phase of Terrorism



The recent spurt in killings of civilians in the Kashmir Valley is not a random act of violence but a well thought out strategy by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, to continue to fuel terrorism in the Union Territory (UT). The killings may be random but the act has a deeper purpose of spreading fear among the minority Hindu population and forcing once again, a mass exodus of this minuscule group. The message being given by the terrorists is clear: leave the UT or be killed. In terms of optics, an exodus now will be reminiscent of what happened earlier to this hapless Hindu population in Kashmir in 1991 and will be viewed as a failure of the Centre in bringing about normalcy post the abrogation of the Special Provisions of Article 370. On the ground, through ethnic cleansing, the terrorist groups and their Pakistani sponsors intend to keep the valley on the boil, in furtherance of their aim to create an Islamic caliphate in Kashmir, which would be a step towards their ultimate goal of Ghazwa-e-Hind.


Paradoxically, this revision in strategy by the Pakistani deep state is a result of the success achieved in moving swiftly towards the total integration of the state, post the abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament on 5 June 2019. Since the abrogation, terrorism in the UT has nosedived considerably, with normalcy returning to large parts of the Valley. Local body elections have been successfully conducted and the delimitation exercise has been completed. Tourism has picked up despite the lingering fears of  Covid-19— the Wuhan virus. The first five months of this year have already seen more arrivals than the 6.6 lakh tourists that visited Kashmir in 2021, and all hotels in Kashmir are filled to capacity. The number of terrorists being killed every month remains high, while the casualties suffered by the security forces have gone down. It is this disproportionate losses being suffered by terrorist groups and the swift manner in which Kashmir was returning to normalcy that has unnerved their sponsors in Pakistan and prompted a shift in their strategy to targeting the minority Hindu community. So how should India respond to this challenge?


There are just about 5000 Kashmiri Hindus employed by the government who are currently working in Kashmir. In addition, over one lakh people from other parts of India are working as labour in the Valley. Providing security to each individual is physically impossible, but during the high level review meeting held by India's Home Minister, Mr Amit Shah on 3 June, future actions to be taken to counter the threat were discussed. This included providing security to the migrant Hindu labour as well as to Kashmiri Hindus by concentrating them in clusters, which would facilitate protection. But it would be naive to presume that a problem which has been festering for decades can be quickly resolved, especially as it involves de-radicalising a population which has been exposed to an insidious ideology for two to three generations. It is a work in progress that requires sustained action over a period of time. 


The current approach to tackling terrorism in J&K is holistic, encompassing political, diplomatic, military and administrative initiatives. This has worked well in bringing a large semblance of normalcy to the state, but the fact remains that a society so deeply radicalised over two to three generations will take time to revert to normalcy. The UT has also been caught off guard by the change in tactics being employed by terrorist groups, wherein they are using young Kashmiris who have no earlier criminal record, in random killings of innocent Hindus. The capacity of the terror groups to strike at such soft targets was perhaps underestimated. 


As a long term measure to combat terrorism, it would be important to impose further deterrents on Pakistan to force that country to stop using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy. It is also important to address the issue of radicalisation which has seeped into a large segment of Kashmiri muslims. An important step towards this end would be an acknowledgement that what Kashmir has faced over the last few decades is not a movement for 'Azadi', but an attempt to create an Islamic State. Only then will policies be focused on countering this hateful ideology among Kashmir's muslims. These would include keeping a check on what is taught to school children in schools and madrassas, and what is preached by the clerics in mosques. 


The return of the Kashmiri Hindus to their homeland must also be taken up on priority. For these individuals to go back to their original homes is presently fraught with danger. It may be advisable then, to resettle them in one or two areas, where appropriate security measures can be put in place. In addition, as and when elections are held in the UT and a new government is installed, the genocide that the Kashmiri Hindus were subjected to must be publicly acknowledged and the perpetrators made to stand trial, regardless of the time that has elapsed since then. Such an act will bring about the process of healing which will bode well for the future of all Kashmiris. The Kashmiri Hindus must also be compensated for the loss they have suffered.


As an immediate measure, it is vital to instil in the minority population, a sense of confidence in the ability of the administration to protect their lives and property. Simultaneously, it is important to impose a deterrent to the terrorists and to their sympathisers and supporters which will make them desist from carrying out such attacks in future. All such offences must legally be non-bailable. In addition, all individuals providing support to terrorists should be deprived of all elements of state support such as subsided ration and other facilities as also employment in government jobs. They must be debarred from standing in elections at all levels and must be made to surrender their passports. Terrorists who are killed must not be allowed a funeral. Their remains must be burnt and the ashes disposed off. Their property must be confiscated by the state and sold and the proceeds given to the victims of terror. Property of individuals apprehended on terror charges or for supporting terror activities must also be confiscated and disposed off in like manner.


The administration also needs to be revamped, especially at the lower levels. Many individuals in the police, education, revenue and other administrative departments are beholden to Geelani of the Hurriyat Conference for their jobs. They remain compromised in their loyalty to the country. Such individuals need to be weeded out in a phased manner. 


Finally, it is for the Kashmiri muslims to rise against terrorism. They have been exploited long enough and they need to break the shackles which their clergy and regional political parties have confined them. Only with a concerted action by all concerned can the scourge of terrorism be permanently erased from the face of this region.

Published in Chintan: 6 June 2022.


Monday, May 16, 2022

BOOK REVIEW : ESSENCE OF THE FIFTH VEDA Author: Gaurang Damani

India's spiritual and scriptural heritage derives from the Vedas, the word Veda meaning wisdom, knowledge or vision. A correlation of archaeological, literary and astronomical evidence suggests that the Vedas date back to at least 6000 BCE, which makes the Vedas the world's most ancient texts. The fact that India was home to the Vedic civilisation for at least the last eight millennia if not earlier, has effectively laid to rest many foreign inspired versions of India's past, most significantly the myth of the so-called Aryan invasion!


The Vedas, being the original source of Hindu teachings, delve on all aspects of life. It is no surprise then that the followers of  Sanatana Dharma have always viewed the Vedas as the highest religious authority. The laws of the Vedas have regulated and continue to regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs of Hindus up to the present day. All the obligatory duties of Hindus at birth, marriage, death etc. are guided by Vedic rituals. For mankind in general, they also serve as a repository of wisdom. Classified into four volumes: the Rig Veda, the Sama Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Atharva Veda, it is the Rig Veda which serves as the principal text, with the four Vedas collectively being known as “Chathurveda”. Each Veda, in turn, consists of four parts—the Samhitas (hymns), the Brahmanas (rituals), the Aranyakas (theologies) and the Upanishads (philosophies). As the Upanishads form the concluding portions of the Veda, they are called the “Vedanta” or the end of the Veda. They contain the essence of Vedic teachings.


The Vedas have been passed on from generation to generation through word of mouth and form the basis of Sanatana Dharma. This foundation is hence called Shruti (that which has been heard) and the walls of this structure are called Smriti (that which has been remembered). While the Shruti and Smriti are the walls and foundation of Sanatana Dharma, there are two other important supports—the Puranas and the Itihasa. The word 'Purana' is Sanskrit for something that is ancient. The Puranas consist of ancient histories, stories and allegories, which have been composed for the lay public and for those that could not study the Vedas. The Itihasa refers to the collection of written accounts of events that were witnessed by the author and signifies traditional history, (literally meaning, thus it happened). In the Indian tradition, both the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, two of India's most sacred texts are considered as Itihasa. In the case of the former, Sage Valmiki, who composed The Ramayana was himself a witness to the events as they unfolded. Similarly, Veda Vyasa, who composed The Mahabharata, witnessed the events as they unfolded. These great Indian spiritual texts fall under the category of Itihasa and Smriti literature. The Puranas, eighteen in number, cover a diverse range of topics from legend to mythology, cosmogony, genealogies, etc. The Itihasa (Ramayana and Mahabharata) and Purana are collectively sometimes referred to as the Fifth Veda. In this delightful book written by Gaurang Damani, stories from these two sacred texts are recounted in a readable fashion, which serves as a primer to understand India's scriptures.


The book is laid out in a story format, in three main chapters. The first of these chapters, titled Tirupati Balaji and Ramayana, dwells on stories from the Ramayana. Starting with Shri Rama's lifting of the celestial bows, the 14 stories in this chapter dwell on various facets of the Ramayana, the last of which is The Philosophy of Yoga 'Vasishtha'. The second chapter has nine delightful stories on  Krishna. His miracles as a child in Vrindavan, Rasa Lila, His travels and why Krishna had 16,108 wives are all covered in this chapter, in an easy to read and understand format. The final chapter delves on the Mahabharata, in 21 short stories, covering the reasons for this epic battle and expounding on the code of Dharma, which can be subtle at times. Most importantly, the three chapters, through these well laid out stories, brings out not just the Itihasa of those times, but the moral code by which it is necessary to live our lives to attain fulfilment. 


It is a telling indictment and commentary of post-independence India that religious and ethical instruction based on Hindu scriptures is not imparted to children in our schools. Most Hindu children thus grow up without an adequate understanding of their scriptures and the rich moral and ethical code that they espouse. This book, to some extent, provides the lay public with an authentic account of our great epics through these short stories, which also bring out the essence of Dharma. Hopefully, this should spur the parents to delve deeper into the foundations of Sanatana Dharma, so that they and their progeny, grow up as better citizens. 


For Gaurang Damani, the author of this book, it has apparently been a labour of love. This is but the first book, which is a blend of the Itihasa and the Purana. In his next book, the author aims to help the reader go deeper within, based on the prescribed Vedic path to happiness and spirituality. The book, while easy to read and understand, could have had a greater impact with more subtle editing, which could have made it a gripping read. But even so, it is a valuable work on our Itihasa, which is strongly recommended for all, both adults and school children, to enable a better understanding of India's rich scriptural and spiritual ethos.


Thursday, May 5, 2022

A Tattered Legacy

A documentary-drama titled 'The Saviour,' based on the life of Major Pritam Singh, recently received the Best Punjabi Documentary Award at the 12th Dada Saheb Phalke Film Festival 2022, held in Noida on April 30. By itself, this news item would have attracted little attention, but for the fact that the said documentary is based on the war time exploits of a man, who later was tried by a General Court Martial and dismissed from service on grounds of moral turpitude. This, off course creates a dilemma in the eyes of the military, in how such a legacy is to be remembered and portrayed. Can performance in battle absolve a person from disreputable acts, deliberately committed? Such questions not only must be asked, but need to be answered.

As a young Captain serving in the British Indian Army in World War II, Pritam Singh was captured and made a prisoner of war in Singapore, but he escaped from prison, and walked on foot through Malaya, Thailand, and Burma, covering a distance of over  3000 miles to reach the Indian border. Post independence, Pritam was promoted to the rank of Lt Col and given command of 1 Kumaon (Para). Here, the battalion, as part of the newly raised 161 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig (later Lt Gen) LP Sen, took part in the famous battle of Shalteng on 07 November. The enemy was routed with heavy casualties and fled from the scene. Pattan was retaken the same evening and  Baramula fell to the Indian forces the next day.


At this time, the situation South of the Pir Panjal pass was fast deteriorating, with thousands of persons fleeing the border areas. Poonch alone had about 40,000 refugees. To relieve pressure on Poonch, Major General (Later Lt Gen) Kulwant Singh, Commander, Jammu and Kashmir Force, despatched a column under 161 Infantry Brigade for its relief. Moving Southwards from Uri, this Force was halted at the Betar Nala, just 16 km short of Poonch, as the Poonch garrison, unaware of the link up being planned, had blown up the bridge there. Consequently, 1 Kumaon under Lt Col Pritam Singh was ordered to effect the link up with the garrison by moving on foot. This was successfully executed and Pritam was made the garrison commander with the acting rank of Brigadier. He successfully defended Poonch for full one year till it was finally relieved in November 1948.


While Brig Pritam Singh displayed commendable front line leadership as commander of the Poonch garrison, his personal conduct  wholly undid the honour that he had earned. The Ruler of Poonch, Raja Kalan Bahadur Ratan Dev Singh had left Poonch in October 1947, when the hostilities had commenced and his official residence, Moti Mahal Palace had been left under the care of retainers. The Raja returned to Poonch in  May 1948, after the Indian Army had stabilised the situation, found that Brig Pritam Singh had moved into the palace and had also located the garrison headquarter inside the premises. But what was infinitely worse was the act of blatant theft, Pritam Singh had indulged in. As per the statement given by the retainers of the palace, Pritam Singh had stripped Moti Mahal of its priceless heirlooms and artefacts and carted them away in an IAF aircraft. Writing on this issue, Thakur Raman Dev Singh, the son of the Raja, further stated that his aunt, while on holiday in Mt Abu in the 1970s, paid a courtesy call on Mrs Pritam Singh, the wife of the erstwhile garrison commander of Poonch, who was living there. When she entered the house, she was horrified to find all the priceless family heirlooms displayed there, which was further proof of the villainous theft that had taken place in 1948. 


On the Raja's complaint, the matter was investigated and Brig Pritam Singh was tried by a General Court Martial, for which purpose he was brought down to his substantive rank of Major. The Court found him guilty of the offences as charged and dismissed him from service. The Dismissal Order was published in the Gazette of India, August 4, 1951. Since then, there have been many attempts to gloss over the theft and highlight only the military prowess of the dismissed officer, including petitioning the highest authorities in the land, seeking pardon. Fortunately, both the military as well as the Ministry of Defence have stuck to their principled stand. 


A facile argument given in support of restoring the honour of Pritam Singh is that as the garrison commander, he saved the town from falling into enemy hands. Had he failed, the enemy would have been in possession of the palace and the Raja would have lost everything. Such a thought process is poor justification for immoral behaviour and is a self defeating one. Can victorious commanders be given license to loot their fellow citizens? They cannot be permitted to do so even in lands captured from the enemy, for that too is a dishonourable act. It is this code of ethics, bound in honour, which makes the Indian Army such a formidable force and contributes to its moral calibre. The love and respect which the people of India have for their Army is precisely because they know that the men in olive green will give their lives to protect the honour, dignity, lives and property of its citizens. And the Indian Army lives up to that reputation in foreign lands too, as seen in their conduct in the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, in restoring the government in Maldives in 1988 (Operation Cactus) and in operations in Sri Lanka (Operation Pawan). As the garrison commander, Pritam had a moral obligation to safeguard the property in which he was staying as a guest. He betrayed that trust by stealing from those that had provided him such gracious hospitality and indelibly sullied the image of the Army and its officer corps. The act was unforgivable, even though his role in defence of Poonch was greatly praised and appreciated. 


It is regrettable that those defending Pritam Singh and seeking a pardon for his act, have also interjected the communal angle in his conviction by a General Court Martial. This is laughable as the Indian Army has never functioned on that basis. Yes, Pritam was a Sikh, but so were some of the commanding Generals in the chain of command who initiated the court martial proceedings against him—Maj Gen Atma Singh and Lt Gen Kulwant Singh. He was defended by Sardar Swaran Singh, an eminent Sikh lawyer, who specialised in criminal suits, and who was to become, in later years, India's longest serving union cabinet minister. And the Defence Minister at that time was also a Sikh, Sardar Baldev Singh. 


While we appreciate the leadership displayed by Pritam Singh in the defence of Poonch, we must never forget the nefarious role he played in committing theft of priceless heirlooms, while staying as a guest in the Moti Mahal palace. Condoning such acts will set a precedent that will encourage others to follow a path, which can but lead to moral decay. We must never allow that to happen. In India's Armed forces, valour and honourable conduct go hand in hand. There is no place in the military for villainy, even if it is accompanied by valour.


The author is a retired veteran who is presently Director, India Foundation. This article was published in the Sunday Guardian dt 8 May 2022.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

It is important to understand the historical undercurrents which drive a society to look for its roots. It is equally important to delve into history to see that no set of actors try to misappropriate the legacy of a people by false analogies. Towards the latter end, a deliberate attempt is being made by some motivated groups with a fixed agenda, to portray Kashmir as an entity, which has historically been separate from India. Such falsehoods, fortunately, cannot stand historical scrutiny. Kashmir is not just an integral part of India, but is its very soul.

Since time immemorial, the majestic Himalayas have been part of the Indian social, cultural and spiritual milieu. Ancient Indian religious texts such as the Vishnu, Shiv and Matsya Puranas, as well as the great spiritual epic, the Mahabharata, make constant mention of the Himalayas, and in their description of Bharat, define it as the land lying between the Himalayas to the North and the Ocean in the South. The Markandeya Puraan describes the land mass of Bharat as “the land that is girdled by the sea on three sides and on the North by the Himalayas, which stretch like the string of a bow”. In the  Vishnu Puraan, the people who live in this geographical area, north of the oceans and South of the Himalayas, are described as Bharatiyas, in a beautiful couplet as under:

'Uttaram yat samudrasya, Himadreshchaiv dakshinam,

varsham tad bharatam nama, Bharatee yatra santatihi’. 


That the people of this land were bound together by a common spiritual tradition was also noted by India's first prime minister, Shri JL Nehru, in his 'Discovery of India,' who wrote of 'the uniqueness about this continuity of a cultural tradition through five thousand years of history, of invasion and upheaval, a tradition which was widespread among the masses and powerfully influenced them'. Since millennia, sages in India have walked the length and breadth of this land, from North to South and from East to West. Tamil poets from early times have made mention of the Northern extent of Bharat as the land which is the abode of Siva and the ‘tapovan’ (Sanskrit: austerity and spiritual practices) of saints and seers. The centrality of the Himalayas, in India's social and spiritual construct is thus not a modern phenomenon, but is deeply rooted in the psyche of the people—a construct synthesised and refined over thousands of years, and passed on from one generation to the next. That is why, ancients texts make constant reference to the 'Kashmir Mandala' in terms of its spatial and temporal locus as part of India’s sacred geography. Kashmir is hence described, not just as India’s northernmost outpost, but as the very fountainhead of Indian culture—indeed, as the very soul of India.

It is important to understand this historicity, to better appreciate the vicious manner in which attempts are now being made by certain vested interests to portray Kashmir as a land which was never a part of the Indian imagination. The Great Mauryan empire, in its vast spread, encompassed both Kashmir to the North and present day Afghanistan to its West. During the reign of Ashoka, a complete system of administration was established in Kashmir. For Bharat, the Himalayas did not just provide a formidable natural line of defence; these sacred mountains were and are the core of India's spiritual thought. Kashmir, nestled in the lap of the Himalayas, thus became a focal point for the spread of Indian culture to Central, East and Southeast Asia. Straddling the communication network between Central Asia, Afghanistan and China, the region gained strategic significance and in the early years of the 19th century, and became the foci of the rivalry played out between Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, which came to be known as the Great Game. 

The Beginning of the Sultanate 


In the first quarter of the 14th century, the Mongols invaded the land. This invasion was the beginning of the tumultuous events that were to overtake the Kashmir Valley over the next 400 years. After ravaging the land for eight months, the Mongols left before the onset of winter. The ruler at that time was King Suhadeva, who attempted appeasement of the invaders by way of expensive gifts, but these were spurned by the Mongol army which continued its spree of killings, loot and plunder. The King died soon after and his place was taken by his Prime Minister, Ram Chander, who in turn appointed Rinchan, a Buddhist prince from Ladakh, as an administrator. Rinchan soon gained the confidence of the Raja and then treacherously killed him, and anointed himself as the ruler in 1320 CE. At this point of time, the history of Kashmir took a dramatic turn. Rinchan had married Ram Chander’s daughter and desired to convert to Hinduism, but the head priest of the Brahmin Pandit’s Devaswami denied the newly anointed Raja his request. As a result, Rinchan converted to Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Sadruddin Shah. 10,000 of his subjects converted along with him.


Rinchan died three years later, in 1323 CE. He founded a quarter in Srinagar called Rinchanpura on his name and built a mosque, Bud Masjid, on the site of a Buddhist temple. With his death, Kashmir returned to Hindu rule, under Rinchan’s widow, Kota Rani, but this interlude was but a short one. She was defeated by Shahmir, an astute diplomat in her kingdom, who ascended the throne in 1339 CE, with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. While Rinchan was the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, the consolidation of the Sultanate started with Shamsuddin, till the 200 year rule of the Sultans was ended by Mughal emperor Akbar in 1586 CE. 


Mughal, Sikh and Dogra Rule 


The Mughal rule in Kashmir lasted for just over 170 years until 1757 CE. It was marked by the building of pleasure gardens and little else, till Aurangzeb (1658 CE-1707 CE), ascended the throne. His rule saw the return of religious bigotry and intolerance to the Kashmir Valley, with forcible conversions and discriminatory taxation. Mughal influence declined after Aurangzeb’s death, and further weakened after Nadir Shah’s invasion of India in 1738 CE. The death knell to Mughal rule came with their defeat to the Afghan’s in 1753 CE, as a result of which Kashmir came under Afghan rule. This ended 66 years later with the defeat of the Afghans by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819. This also marked the end of Muslim rule in Kashmir, encompassing a period of just over four hundred years. The Afghan rule was noted for its cruelty, barbarity and avarice, and its demise came as a period of welcome relief to the people of the region.


Sikh rule over Kashmir was also short-lived and ended with British victory over the Sikhs in the battle of Sobraon in February 1846, called the First Anglo-Sikh War. Two treaties were signed at the end of the war. The first of these, the Treaty of Lahore, was signed on 9 March 1846 with the 7-year old Maharaja Duleep Singh and the British Empire. Under the terms of the Treaty, Punjab ceded Kashmir and its dependencies to the British. The second treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar was signed six days later on 13 March 1846 with Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Through this Treaty, Kashmir and its dependencies were handed over to Gulab Singh, and thus Kashmir came under Dogra rule. Under the terms of the Treaty, Maharaja Gulab Singh paid a sum of Rs 75 lakh to the British government for the territories ceded to him. This included the whole of the outer hills between the Ravi and the Indus, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and the Indus Valley down to Chilas.


The region of modern-day Jammu, was traditionally ruled by the Dogra Rajputs. For the most part, they maintained their autonomy despite being nominal feudatories to Delhi. At times, they joined the Mughals in their northern conquests, like those of Balkh in 1646-47 CE. With the demise of the Mughal dynasty, Raja Dhruv Deo and later his son, Raja Ranjit Deo rose to greater political prominence, the latter also proceeding to expand his kingdom to include Kishtwar, Chenani, Bhadarwah, Besolhi, Jasrota and parts of Gujrat in Western Punjab. This was, however, a transitory phase as the rise of Sikh power in the region saw Jammu losing its sovereignty over all of their former territories save for Jammu, which was now reduced to a petty state. But it also saw the rise of the line of Raja Dhruv Deo, in the form of his great-great-grandsons, Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh, who joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh's court and rose rapidly through the ranks, setting themselves apart and above the Maharaja's Sikh courtiers. 


Gulab Singh had joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army in 1809. His father, Miyan Kishore Singh was given the charge to administer Jammu state by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1817, which had been annexed by him a year earlier. Soon thereafter, Miyan Kishore Singh declared Gulab Singh as his 

legal heir. As a reward for the outstanding contribution made by Gulab Singh in the defeat of the Pathans in Kashmir in 1819, Maharaja Ranjit Singh crowned Gulab Singh as the Raja of Jammu on 16 June 1822. Even after getting Jammu and its adjoining principalities under his territory, Raja Gulab Singh continued to serve the rulers of Lahore and at the same time, annexed many small principalities to his kingdom. Kishtwar was subdued and its governorship was handed over to Zorawar Singh, a Rajput soldier in the Sikh army. It was Zorawar Singh who annexed Ladakh in 1842 and added it to Dogra rule.


British interest in the region, during the period of Sikh and Dogra rule had much to do with the great power rivalry that existed at that time between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia. Britain wanted to keep their resident in Kashmir, to keep a watch over the activities of the Sikh rulers and to see that Russian influence was kept at bay. During Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s rule and for a decade after his death in June 1839, the British were kept out, but after the defeat of the Sikh’s in the Second Anglo-Saxon War of 1849, Punjab was annexed by the British and the Dogra rulers thereafter succumbed to British pressure. In 1877, the British established the Gilgit Agency, to guard against the advance of Russia. The Agency, comprising of the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas, was re-established in 1935 under the control of the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. It was given on lease for a period of 60 years commencing from 29 March 1935.


The period of Dogra rule in Kashmir’s history was an epochal event, for it marked the entry of the British into the area. Taken holistically, it was also a period of reasonable prosperity for the state. Gulab Singh was succeeded by his son Ranbir Singh, who in turn was succeeded by Pratap Singh. Here the family line ended as Pratap Singh had no male heir. As a result, his nephew Hari Singh, succeeded him to the throne. Hari Singh was destined to be the last ruler of the state, the Dogra rule having lasted for just over one hundred years.


Pre Independence Developments 


Maharaja Hari Singh ascended the throne on 23 September 1925. It was a moment in history when the Indian independence movement was gathering steam and differences between the Hindus and Muslims had started coming to the fore. Within the state of J&K, Muslim fanatics started a movement to stoke communal violence in the state. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of the J&K Muslim Conference which was formed in 1932. The Party was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on 10 June 1939. When India was partitioned and achieved independence on 15 August 1947, most of the princely states had opted to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had the choice to remain independent under the Maharaja or to join either India or Pakistan. Britain had also terminated its lease of the Gilgit Agency, which reverted back to the state. At this time, the boundaries of the state encompassed the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit and Baltistan in the North, Ladakh in the East, Kashmir and Muzaffarabad in the centre and Jammu, to include Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur, Udhampur, Bhadarwah and Kathua in the South. 


Post Independence Developments 


At the time of independence, Maharaja Hari Singh found himself in a precarious position. His state forces lacked the capacity to protect any part of his landlocked kingdom, which lay between India and Pakistan. There were three battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, with the Kashmir Brigade. 7 J&K Rifles was at Srinagar, 4 J&K Rifles at Domel with a company at Kohala and another company at Keran and 6 J&K Battalion had been sent up to Gilgit. This battalion had moved to Bunji and had a company at Leh and another company at Skardu. South of the Pir Panjal range, 1 J&K Rifles was at Poonch and was being relieved by 8 J&K Rifles, 9 J&K Rifles was at Rawalkot, 2 J&K rifles at Naushera and 3 J&K Rifles at Mirpur. Some of these were mixed battalions with both Dogra and Muslim troops. Poor communications and the vast spread of the area meant that each battalion was really fighting an independent battle and could not depend on support from any one. Pakistan thus thought that it would be easy to militarily take over the state and force its accession to Pakistan. 


The idea of remaining an independent kingdom had appeal for the Maharaja, but he lacked the force to protect his kingdom from external threats. The remaining options were to accede, either to India or to Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh’s dilemma was increased by the fact that the Muslims in his state constituted the larger majority, but the Hindu population was substantial too. Stalling for time, the Maharaja entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 12 August 1947. India however declined his offer. 


To the Pakistani political leadership of that time, led by Mr Jinnah, who had been appointed as the Governor General of Pakistan and his Prime Minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, there was little doubt that Kashmir would be taken over by force, if the Maharaja did not accede to Pakistan. This plan was given the code name “Operation Gulmarg” and planning commenced in August 1947. Maj Gen Akbar Khan, a serving officer of the Pakistan army, was given the command of Operation Gulmarg, and he revealed all the details of this operation in 1975, in his book, “Raiders in Kashmir”. To achieve their objective, the Pakistan military raised 20 lashkars of about 1000 men each from their Pashtun population in the tribal belt. Pakistani military officers and men were embedded into the lashkars. They were given weapons, equipment and logistic support by the Pakistan army which also provided the force its leadership component down to company level. In his book, Khan confirms that the political leadership of Pakistan was fully in sync with these operations. It was thus a politico-military operation carried out by the state of Pakistan. 


The invasion of J&K by Pakistan military, along with the raiders, began on 22 October. The route chosen to reach Srinagar was via Domel, Mahulla and thence to Baramulla. Over 7,000 Pashtun armed tribesmen, led by officers from the Pakistan military, began the invasion, crossing over the state boundary. In a shameful incident, on the night of 21/22 October, the Muslim companies of the 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry, betrayed their oath to their ruler and the state and in an act of treachery, driven by religious fanaticism, killed their commanding officer, Col Narain Singh. They also killed their Dogra colleagues and then deserted, crossing over to the ranks of the tribals. Muzaffarabad and Domel was ransacked, the people butchered, raped and looted. Two days later, in Pulandri, they announced the formation of a provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ government, before continuing their advance to Srinagar. Under these conditions, the Maharaja requested India’s help, but was told that this could not be given unless he acceded to India. This was agreed to by the Maharaja and the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. The Indian Army was flown in to Srinagar on 27 October and the raiders were halted on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, they were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared on 31 December 1948. With this, Pakistan remained in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control. Post the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Turtuk, lying in the Nubra Valley and on the banks of the Shyok River was liberated by Indian forces and now forms one of the northernmost villages in the Leh District of Ladakh. 


Article 370


Maharaja Hari Singh remained the titular Maharaja of the state until 1952, when the monarchy was abolished by Government of India, but political power shifted to the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah in 1948 itself. When India's Constitution was promulgated on 26 January 1950, Article 370 was inserted as a temporary Article. The inclusion of Article 370 into the Constitution of India had not been demanded by the people of J&K, nor was it demanded by Maharaja Hari Singh when he acceded to India. The Article, giving special status to the state was a temporary measure, and so was included in PART XXI of the Constitution, which pertained to Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions. The insertion of Article 35A in 1954, which was the more insidious development, gave the state of J&K the power to determine who was a state subject and such determination could not be challenged by the Indian State. This Article was inserted without the mandatory approval of the Indian Parliament, and thus can be construed as a fraud committed on the Constitution. Both Article 370 and 35 A can be said to have hindered the emotional integration of J&K with the rest of the Indian Union.


The Radicalisation of J&K 


The problem of radicalisation which seeped into the state had its origins in the growth, since the mid-1960s, of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Indoctrinated cadres from the Jamaat were soon absorbed in government institutions, particularly in government schools. It was the Jamaat which radicalised the Muslims in J&K, especially in the Valley. The Government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its educational wing Falah-e-Aam Trust in 1992 for indulging in anti-social activities, but inexplicably, absorbed all the teachers in government schools! Terrorism and radicalisation thus grew hand in hand in J&K, with Pakistan lending full support to terrorist groups. To view the conflict in Kashmir as a fight for ‘Azadi,’ is hence a misnomer. It was always a fight for Nizam-e-Mustafa—rule by Shariat and not by democratic norms. Also, developments with the state always had a Kashmir-centric agenda, despite the Kashmir division having only 55 percent of the population, and just one-sixth of the land area of the state. The voices from Jammu and Ladakh remained smothered. Even within Kashmir Division, it was but a small coterie of people, comprising a fraction of the population, that held complete sway over the state. These were, what Bashir Assad refers to in his book, “K File” as the Mullah clan—the people who had come to the Valley about 600 years earlier to preach Islam. They are the present day Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, and they achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the original inhabitants, as well as the states political and bureaucratic landscape. The power of this group has now been eroded. However, the radicalisation which had seeped into Kashmiri society, beginning in the late 1960's, led to the genocide of the Kashmiri Hindus in 1990 and the growth of terrorism in J&K.


Conclusion 


The abrogation of Special Status to the state of J&K and its bifurcation into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) on 05 August 2019, brings fresh hope of normalcy settling into the region. The perfidious designs of Pakistan and their supporters within India are finally being addressed, which should bring peace to the region. For the moment, the focus and effort of the government of India remains on seeing the total return to normalcy in the Union Territory of J&K. Elections to the State Assembly are yet to be held, as the work of the Delimitation Commission, proposing changes to assembly and parliamentary segments in the Union Territory, is yet to be finalised and approved. But elections to the local bodies have been successfully held and received tremendous local support. Central laws are now applicable, giving hope to the women, Dalits, West Pakistan Refugees and others who were deprived of their rights and liberties due to the application of Article 370 and 35A. There is also a visible decline in levels of terrorist activities across the state, which bodes well for the future.


Transformative changes however take time, and the challenges are tremendous, especially in ensuring the safe return of the half million or so Kashmiri Hindus back to their homeland. The prospects of total normalcy reverting to J&K are at present, not as bleak as they were prior to 5 August 2019, when the provisions of Article 370 were abrogated, bringing J&K into the national mainstream. Though the road is long, there is hope in the air, especially amongst the youth of the Union Territory.


How is Kashmir seen by youth from other parts of India? Towards that end, a group of young Indians from all over the country visited the UT as part of the India Foundation Young Thinkers Meet held in Kashmir Valley towards the latter half of 2021. Post the conclave, some of the individuals gave out their impressions of the UT and how they view the situation as it is developing. It forms an interesting take on the views of a segment of  young India. More such initiatives will result in a better understanding of the horrors of radicalisation and the urgent need to ensure that such movements are nipped in the bud and not allowed to grow.


Tuesday, April 26, 2022

THE TOUR OF DUTY PROPOSAL: NEED FOR A HOLISTIC APPROACH



Introduction


There has been a great deal of speculation in sections of the media as well as in the social media of a change taking place in the Army's recruitment pattern. Termed as the Tour of Duty (ToD), it envisages recruiting soldiers for a short duration of three to five years service in the Army. It is believed that the proposal is under active consideration by the Ministry of Defence, but in the absence of any official statement from the government on the subject, the purpose of introducing such a concept, the broad contours it may follow, as also a discussion on the pros and cons of such a proposal can at best be based on certain reasonable assumptions. This paper aims to put across the likely thought process behind the proposal, the pattern it can take and the likely impact this proposal will have, if introduced.


Broad Contours of the ToD Proposal


The basic thought process behind the proposal is to reduce the expenditure on military pensions. On a fixed defence budget, reduction in revenue expenditure would make greater funds available for capital outlay, which in turn would facilitate new acquisition and military modernisation. India's budget for FY 2022-23 allocated Rs 5.25 lakh crore for defence, which includes the defence pension component of about Rs 1.2 lakh crore. Obviously, a reduced pension component will lead to a larger capital outlay. With this in view, the proposal is believed to envisage recruiting personnel into the Army for short tenures, akin to conscription but on a volunteer basis.


One of the proposals is to induct personnel for both a three year period as well as for a period of five years to eventually, say within 15-20 years, have an army strength that would comprise 25 percent personnel who would be below 3 years service and another 25 percent who would be between 3 to 5 years service. The rest of the component would be as presently existing. There could be different computations of the above, but the end objective is the same. On completion of ToD, some of these personnel would be absorbed in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) or in the corporate sector while the rest would be free to seek employment elsewhere. Those who do not find employment will be encouraged and assisted to set up small scale individual businesses. The savings accrued during the ToD as well as the lump sum amount they would receive on completion, would provide them the necessary capital for the same.


The individuals serving for periods below five years would not be eligible for pension, so the scheme is slated to reduce the pension bill of the Army. Some of the other benefits envisaged are as under:

  • It would reduce the age profile of the Army.
  • It would create a large work force of disciplined individuals, who would then be an asset when employed in either the CAPFs or by the corporate sector. 
  • Those individuals who cannot get employment will be encouraged to set up small scale private enterprises, which could give them an alternate livelihood. This would also give a boost to the economy.
  • It would lead to increased employment opportunities for the youth.


Earlier Proposals


One of the earlier proposals of the Army was lateral induction of short service commissioned officers into other services. For the jawans who retire after 15 to 17 years of service, it was recommended that they be employed thereafter in the CAPF (Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, National Security Guards) or in the para military forces (Assam Rifles). This proposal found little favour with the Home Ministry and was shelved. 

 

In 2019, an army veteran, Lt Gen P. Menon, along with Pranay Kotasthane, both from the Takshashila Institute, wrote a discussion paper recommending an 'inverse induction model' to reduce the Army's pension bill. This was a modification of the earlier Army proposal and envisaged induction of army personnel into the CAPF. The recruitment would be done by the CAPF, but the recruits would be trained by the Army and would revert back to their respective CAPF after completion of 7 years’ service.


Analysis of the Inverse Induction Model


For the purpose of analysing the financial implications of the stated model, the assumptions made are as under:

  • For the period, annual pension liability of GoI is assumed to be constant                    for a fixed number of Other Ranks (OR).
  • The total Army authorisation of OR is 'A' and their total annual contribution   towards future pension liability is 'P'.
  • The number of CAPF recruits each year is x.
  • The annual pension contribution of x Army OR is X, ie X Rs saved each         year in pension contribution (notional) by recruiting x number of OR into the CAPF.
  • All OR are assumed to retire after 19 years, with uniform rate of recruitment each year. Hence, the total annual training expenses for A/19 number of recruits is T =(A/19) *t, where t is the individual recruit training cost for one year. (See table below)

   


Service 

(Year)

CAPF Recruits

(Total)

Pension Contribution

(Total Army)

Training Expenses

(Annual Total)

1

x

P-X

T=(A/19)*t

2

2x

P-2X

Higher

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

7

7x

P-7X

Higher

8

8x

P-7X (as x No of OR have left for CAPF)


 


The following inferences can be made from the above table:

  • There is saving in pension contribution from the defence budget for first 7 years and it peaks at 7X. From 8th year onwards, the saving remains 7X.
  • The pension budget of CAPF, however,  goes up by an equivalent amount as 7 years of Army Service will be counted for CAPF pension also.
  • Net pension savings to the GoI is zero.
  • Training costs go up. When no CAPF, annual recruit training cost is At/19. With CAPF recruits, annual cost is (A-x) *t/19  + xt   =  At/19  + 18xt/19 - ie an increase of 18xt/19 in annual training budget.


The Conclusion from the above analysis is as under:

  • The saving in defence pension budget peaks after 7 years (can be                                                                   construed from 1-7 years or alternately from 20 to 27 years, when actual pension disbursal commences).
  • There is a corresponding increase in CAPF pension budget.
  • Net saving to GoI is zero.
  • There is increase in annual training expenses in Army.
  • Net no savings to GoI while there is increase in Army training budget.

                

The above analysis indicates that the Inverse Induction model does not result in financial savings to the GoI.



The Tour of Duty (ToD)


The ToD concept envisages recruitment of soldiers for a short duration, much like the conscription model existing in some countries. Romantically called 'Agnipath', the soldiers recruited in this proposal will be known as 'Agniveers', following the classic business model of giving a high-sounding name for standard military jobs. The fundamental flaw in this proposal is that it gives primacy to finances over operational effectiveness. It is true that no nation can wish away the larger macro-economic financial constraints, but at the same time, it would be unwise to barter national security and defence preparedness for purely financial reasons. While it is essential to look at optimisation of available resources, it simply cannot be done without holistically looking at all aspects of defence preparedness. This would include the nature of threats we are currently faced with and the force levels required to deal with them, to include the entire gamut of force structuring, weapons and equipment holding, logistic support infrastructure as also the state of morale, training, and a host of other battle winning factors. 


Be that as it may, it is debatable whether the ToD concept will lead to financial savings which are of such great account that it will give a tremendous fillip to capital acquisitions and force modernisations.


Analysis of Financial Implications of ToD


The analysis of the concept of ToD is being restricted to OR; the OR pension budget being the major component owing to large number of OR in the Army. In any case, the officer cadre already has a Short Service Commission  entry where  officers can exit at 5/10/14 years’ service without any pension obligation to GoI.


For the purpose of analysis, it is assumed that the men on ToD of 3/5 years, have the same entry level qualification, same selection criteria, same training duration, same posting profile and salary as the regular Army recruit. It is also assumed that the strength of regular Army will be offset in same numbers as the number of men on ToD. However, what is not clear is the number of men who will be absorbed in the CAPF after the termination of ToD.


With respect to the men who may be absorbed in the CAPF or PSUs, the earlier financial analysis of Inverse Induction Model will apply, albeit for a 3/5 year duration instead of 7 years. Thus, there will be no overall financial savings to the GoI while training budget of Army will go up. The other collateral effects, ie impact on operational effectiveness and unit cohesion will have to be studied separately with appropriate models once details of the employment, manning and posting profile which is envisaged for the men on ToD is known.


In case, these men are to be let off after 3/5 years with a severance package, then this amount, handed over on an annual basis, has to be compared with the annual pension contribution for those numbers of regular Army OR, to determine the savings, if any to the GoI. However, the future career prospects of these ex-ToD personnel, with most of them likely to be only matriculates (10th) will remain. The jobs which can be made available to such personnel in the private sector will perforce be restricted to those at the lowest rung of the ladder, and the pay and emoluments they will receive will be far lower than what they were authorised while in ToD service.


There is also a possibility of these men being let off without any absorption and severance package, which will restrict their ability to start small scale enterprises on their own. The popularity of such a scheme will hence be eroded and may become unsustainable after a few years.


Concept of ToD : Is it borne out of  the Myths of Defence Budget


From the analysis above, it is evident that the concept of ToD is unlikely to result in considerable revenue savings to the GoI, unless the ToD personnel are left to fend for themselves after termination of their 3/5 years tenure or are given lower emoluments as compared to regular army recruits. Even in the latter case, there is going to be a tradeoff between limited savings (computation has to await full clarity on the concept) and the operational effectiveness, motivational levels and cohesion within a unit. In any case, even if savings are likely to accrue, that will only come about after 15 years, when the total number of pensioners will start to decline each year, and will eventually reach a constant after about 18 years.


There are several myths associated with the defence budget. In a developing natIon, there will always be concerns that the defence budget is eating into the resources of the nation, which could be better spent on other sectors. However, for a nation facing all round security challenges, not taking adequate protective measures will be a sure long-term recipe for disaster and economic ruin. 


A more suitable metric is to view defence allocation as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of total central government expenditure. For India, the defence allocation (excluding pensions) stands at approx 1.45% of GDP and has shown a gradual decline over the decades. This does not mean that in real terms, there has been a reduction in defence expenditure. An analysis of the defence budget over the last few decades indicates that the defence budget has been continuously rising in real terms, even if the rise is not very substantial. This is simply indicative of a higher rate of growth which enables high allocation to defence in real terms. Instead of fixing defence expenditure to a percentage of GDP, it is for consideration whether keeping defence expenditure constant as a total of overall government expenditure would be a better and more viable option.


With respect to the salary and pension bill of defence personnel, It is also to be understood that defence pensions rise in the same manner as other central government employees, the salary and DA structure being largely common. Thus, when experts talk of not enough funds left for modernisation of defence forces due to ever increasing revenue expenditure, they miss the essential point that the real reason is continuous compression of defence budget as a percentage of GDP or as a percentage of central government expenditure. One may recall, that during the UPA regime, the then Prime Minister, Shri Man Mohan Singh made a statement that endeavour of his government will be to raise the defence allocation to 3% of GDP. But despite such a declaration, their was no real push for force modernisation and the military suffered great neglect during the ten years that Dr Singh was at the helm of affairs as Prime Minister—that is the period 2004-2014.


As far as pension budget is concerned, it is worthwhile to mention that average per capita pension of defence personnel is much lower than a central government civilian employee. The defence pension budget, however, is big in absolute numbers due to large number of retired personnel, which itself is a function of soldiers being compulsorily retired early from 36 years age onwards owing to the need to meet the requirement of maintaining a young and physically fit Armed Forces.


If we look at the overall revenue expenditure on salary and pension bill of defence personnel, a study has shown that life time earnings (pay and pension till average life expectancy of 70 years) of a civilian central government employee is about 60% higher than a corresponding pay grade defence employee. This simply indicates that the pay and pension bill of the Armed Forces cannot be construed to be exorbitant and a factor in constraining the modernisation effort. Clearly the cause lies elsewhere.


Another myth which abounds is that defence personnel get pension from the government, while civilians (post 2004) are on National Pension Scheme (NPS) and do not contribute to pension liability of the government. The fact is that the government contributes to pension of defence personnel as well as civilian employees (10% of basic pay every month). The difference is only conceptual; while the defence pension system is on “Cash Accounting System,” the NPS is based on the “Accrual System”. Defence pensions have to continue in its existing form as NPS is not suitable for employees who start retiring from the age of 36 years onwards. However, another study on NPS vs defence pension system has shown that if defence personnel also serve for 54 years age or more, NPS may be a preferable system to even the OROP which they are presently entitled to.


With all the data based studies pointing to the inferences outlined above, the question arises that is there a requirement of conceptualising schemes like ToD or are there better alternatives available within the existing paradigm? But before a holistic view of the issues involved is taken, it is essential to correct the misperceptions on defence budget and revenue expenditure including salary and pensions. Evidently, there is a parallax error in the popular perception about the Defence Budget and its constituents.


Optimising Defence Expenditure


Perhaps a better course of action would be to have a holistic overview of the entire defence expenditure, with a view to determining how this expenditure can be optimised, instead of keeping the focus on just reducing the pension component of the budget. Some of the factors which lead to rising costs are poor decision making, wasteful production techniques, reliance on imports, weak defence industrial base, limited participation of the private sector in the defence industry, poor quality control, restricting military hardware for exports and a public sector work force which continuously underperforms. These are the areas where we need to focus on.


Recently, the Government has very wisely done away with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and in its place, the 41 Ordnance Factories (OF) which it controlled have been converted into 7 Defence Public Sector Undertakings. This step was long overdue but was resisted by the unions. The various governments at the Centre, over the years, bowed to the wishes of these employees. This civilian component, by itself, constitutes a sizeable chunk of manpower and resources which could be privatised. The OF were a loss making enterprise, producing shoddy goods at inflated cost and employing manpower, far in excess of requirement. The government now needs to go beyond the bold decision it has taken as far as corporatisation of the erstwhile OFB is concerned. Some of these unproductive units need to be closed down or privatised, some could be retained and some could be handed over to the Ministry of Industry, where these units could compete with the private sector on a level playing field. Reforms here, by themselves will do much to reduce costs, making more money available for the modernisation effort.


Labour productivity in all the DPSU's need to be analysed. As an example, production costs of manufacturing indigenous fighter aircraft is abnormally high. The same goes for ship building, manufacture of heavy weapon systems, etc. Improved labour productivity will lead to dramatic reduction in costs, making more funds available for making up critical deficiencies.


A revamping of the total civil manpower on the rolls of the defence ministry would also be in order. It is not that well known that the defence civilian work force numbers around 4 lakh personnel. Of the 1.2 lakh crore defence pension bill, a substantial part is paid out to these defence civilians. Reducing the civilian work force will ipso facto have an impact on reducing the revenue budget, making more funds available for force modernisation. This will result in far greater savings than any other single measure. The civilian defence component of the Armed Forces is what can be called the tail in the 'teeth to tail' ratio. However, the tail is wrongly construed to be the logistic component of the military. This must be corrected. As a start, it would be beneficial if the Ministry of Defence published yearly figures of the total number of defence civilians on its payrolls, the break up of such a work force and the pension outlays to such personnel.


Savings can also be accrued with intangible factors such as improved decision making. Poor decision making has in the past led to production delays, delayed acquisitions and a phenomenal increase in costs. Within the military, improved logistic procedures will also do a world of good in bringing down holding costs of equipment, stores, spare parts etc.


Finally, there is a downside in the ToD system, which needs to be factored in. This pertains to the state of morale of ToD troops, which could be a vital factor in war. In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) fell like a house of cards to the Taliban, primarily because they were composed of conscripts, who had to serve a short time in the Army. When the chips were down, they exhibited no will to fight. We need to be careful of what we attempt to do with the troops of the Indian Army. This is the final bastion of the nation. If the Army fails, the nation does not survive and that is a possibility which we can never ever allow to happen. Another factor which merits consideration is that a sufficiently large percentage ToD soldiers, after their term is over, are unlikely to find a job which they find suitable. What happens if some of them become soldiers of fortune, trying their luck with anti national forces and organisations! We cannot wish such possibilities away. There will also be a separate set of challenges for the Commanding Officers, which need to be factored in. 


Conclusion


The ToD concept can at best have a limited impact on defence pension outlays, which will start manifesting only after 15 years. The downside of such a proposal is the impact it will have on operational efficiency and the challenges which may accrue in dealing with a large number of trained military personnel, who have no suitable employment after their ToD has been completed. It would hence be better to look at the entire matter in a holistic manner, especially in terms of what Prime Minister Modi has consistently been emphasising and that is to strengthen the defence industrial base, making India truly atmanirbhar in defence production. Combine this with weapon exports and we have a total game changer at hand. Here, we also need to look into the German Mittelstand, which became a model of economic success. For something like that to succeed in India we need a very proactive bureaucracy which acts as an enabler, supporting such enterprises. Unfortunately, as of now, the private sector is hampered by India's bureaucratic maze, which makes many entrepreneurs simply shut shop and move off to other countries where their talents are better appreciated.


If the ToD concept has to be tried out, let us make a start with the Territorial Army.  That would be a better test bed than carrying out such experiments with the field force. We would do well to remember that while future warfare will have a large component of non-contact warfare, the physical blood and gore of war fighting will still remain a constant. For the non-contact part of warfare, getting individuals on short term contracts from the private sector at various levels may also be an option which could be examined, especially in the new emerging field of cyber warfare, artificial intelligence (AI) robotics, et al. 


A holistic long-term view will give the Indian Armed Forces the capability and wherewithal to defend the nation against external threats. Fiddling with the system keeping only the financial aspects in mind could lead to unmitigated disaster in the long run. We have suffered foreign invaders ruling over our land over the last millennium. We cannot traverse that path again. Let us also remember that there is a cost to maintaining a young army. The nation has to be prepared to pay that cost.

Lt Gen Kapil Aggarwal and Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch - Published in IFJ - Vol 3, Issue 3