Commemorating Kargil Vijay Divas: Eternal Vigilance is the Key to Peace

On 26 July 2022, the 23rd anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, the nation gets together once again to pay homage and tribute to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who took part in that war. For those who had seen the war at close quarters, achieving victory against the enemy, ensconced at advantageous positions in the icy high-altitude mountains, seemed like 'Mission Impossible'. And to achieve what was thought of to be an impossible task, 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while 1363 were wounded. It was a victory won against all odds, but Mission Impossible was achieved.

Nasim Zehra,  a well-known Pakistani journalist and writer, in her book, From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan, has given a detailed expose of the role of the Pakistan Army in the planning and conduct of 'Operation Koh-e-Paima,' the name given to Pakistan's military misadventure in the Kargil sector. This misadventure had its roots in Pakistan's attempts to forcibly gain control over the Siachen Glacier, which India thwarted in 1984 by occupying the Saltoro Ridge, overlooking the Glacier. It was Pakistan's repeated failures to evict Indian troops from the Saltoro ridge that led to the assumption that if Pakistan occupied the heights around the  Kargil sector, overlooking the vital Leh-Srinagar road, they would be able to cut off Ladakh from the rest of India and avenge their humiliation in Siachen. In October 1998, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Koh-e-Paima, infiltrating small groups of soldiers into unoccupied territory across the Line of Control. By May 1999, they had established over 140 posts in the Kargil-Drass region. The Indian operations launched thereafter to evict the intruders was codenamed 'Operation Vijay,' the Operation ending on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian victory.

While we pay homage to the heroism and courage of the Indian soldier on this day, it would be equally appropriate to reflect on the lessons that the war in Kargil highlighted.  At the national level, there are seven important lessons which we would do well to remember. 

Blind Trust can be Fatal 

The first of these lessons is that blind trust can be fatal. The Indian military as well as intelligence agencies missed vital signs and made wrong assessments, primarily because a push for peace was being made in the political space by India's Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihar Vajpayee. In  his famous bus 'yatra' of 19 February 1999, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech at Lahore, where he spoke for peace. “Hum jung na hone denge ... Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda... Hum jung na hone denge…” were the words he used, but even as those stirring words were uttered on Pakistani soil, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, was already across the Line of Control, and had surreptitiously occupied some of the unoccupied heights, overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships. India's focus on peace blinded it to the prospect of a Pakistani betrayal, which was considered unthinkable in the prevailing bonhomie between the two countries. Pakistan thus achieved strategic surprise and was successful in the initial operations carried out by their army. We must never ever allow that to happen again. 

Expect the Unexpected 

The Indian Army had war-gamed the possibility of precisely such an occurrence as the intrusion of a vast body of Pakistan military personnel in small groups to occupy the heights overlooking India's vital national highway. Such an action was considered possible but was discarded due to the difficulty of maintaining a large body of troops in the mountains. It was also assessed that while such a course of action could lead to the enemy achieving short term tactical success, it was bound to result in a strategic disaster. The conclusion drawn from the assessment was faulty in that it presumed that the enemy would not undertake such a risky adventure which was doomed to failure. What was missed out was the fact that Pakistan has consistently made illogical deductions about India's capabilities and so it would have been prudent to at least cater for such an eventuality. An improbable occurrence must always be catered for, if the consequences of such an occurrence would be costly for the nation. It is not the job of the military to guess. It is its job to remain prepared at all times for all eventualities.

Higher Defence Planning

When the Kargil war started, both the Army and the Air Force were short of vital ammunition and other items. That is what prompted the then Army Chief to say that we will fight with what we have. This reflects a weakness in higher defence planning, primarily because in the Indian system, we have a bureaucracy that is interposed between the military leadership and the political authority. The bureaucracy controls the procurement process but remains unaccountable for its actions, while the military has the responsibility but not the power to do anything about it. While the office of the CDS has now been created, we need to go further in the reform process and like other modern armies, remove the bureaucracy completely as the middle-man interposed between the political authority and the military leadership.

The Intelligence Factor 

The induction of thousand of trained troops in small groups all across the Line of Control in the Drass, Kargil and Batalik sectors reflected a gargantuan failure on the part of India's intelligence agencies in failing to detect such intrusion. The induction of such a large force took place over many months and was common knowledge in the areas across the LoC. Such feverish activities should have been picked up but it is evident that India lacked suitable assets which could have provided adequate early warning. The Kargil War once again highlights the importance of both human intelligence as well as electronic and other means of gathering information, to include intelligence gathering by means of satellites.

Unity of Effort 

In the modern age, it is not just armies that go to war, but the nation as a whole, which implies unity of effort in prosecuting war. The Kargil Review Committee highlighted many of these weaknesses, some of which have been addressed, such as the creation of the office of the CDS. What is now needed is to make a big push for self sufficiency in defence production. This is being done through the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative, which needs to be further strengthened, streamlined and made user-friendly. While the political intent is clear, huge changes are required in mindsets, especially in the nation's bureaucracy and in the research and development organisations. To make this a truly integrated approach, the private sector has to play a major role and for this it requires a great deal of facilitation by both the military as well as the political authority.

Role of the Media 

The Indian media played an excellent role during the Kargil conflict and created a positive climate for the prosecution of war, both within the country as well as in the international arena. Press freedom contributes greatly to national security and must be preserved at all times.

The Seventh Lesson: Do not Assume 

The seventh lesson is from the stables of the enemy. They prosecuted the war on three fatal assumptions. One, the Indian Armed Forces will not be able to dislodge the encroachments made by the Pakistani troops as they were occupying the strategic heights on the Srinagar-let axis. Two, India would be restricted in its response as Pakistan was a nuclear armed state. And three, The international community would call an early halt to the war between the two nuclear armed neighbours, leaving Pakistan in possession of its ill-gotten gains. In reality, Pakistan was wrong in all three of the assessments so made. They under-estimated the will of India to fight for its land and for its people. That is a lesson which unfortunately still does not appear to have been learnt by Pakistan. And so India must be ready to deal with the Pakistani state as it currently is—hostile and bitterly opposed to India. Seeking friendship is not a mistake, but seeking friendship by keeping our eyes closed to reality will cost India dearly in the future. We must always be conscious of the real nature of the enemy.

Conclusion 

As we celebrate the 23rd Anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, let us bow our heads in gratitude to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who laid down their lives for their country. And in their honour and in their memory, let us resolve to make India strong and resilient, to face any challenges that the future may have to offer. And while doing so, let us remember, that eternal vigilance is the key to peace.

Published in Chintan: 26 July 2022

THERE CAN NEVER BE A LICENCE TO KILL

It is a sign of our times, especially in India with its 1.3 billion plus population, that each and every issue can be converted into a controversy that spills over into violence and destruction of property. The last decade, or most specifically since 2014 when the BJP led NDA registered a thumping victory in the national elections, certain vested interests who had lost power, deliberately started creating tensions in society to stoke such violence, at times with finances received from sources outside the country.

Communal tensions were repeatedly created on fake narratives, in a bid to divide communities. The falsehood spread on attacks on churches in 2015 is but a case in point. As also the isolated cases of attacks on cow smugglers that were blown out of proportion to create religious strife. Then there were attacks on economic entities, all of them justified on spurious premises. Protests against the Kudankulam power project and Sterlite Copper (both located in Tamil Nadu), as also protests against the Narbada dam in Gujarat are cases in point. Foreign entities had huge stakes in such protests, and funding for the same came from quarters inimical to India. More recently, we have seen protests against the CAA and the Farm Bills which disrupted normal life for many months at a stretch. There is a pattern in all such protests, an agenda which is dangerous and which needs to be addressed with all the might of the Indian state. Recently, even a military reform in the form of the Agnipath scheme led to violence and destruction of property. This was clearly motivated and organised.

It is in the above light that the recent controversy over the remarks of Ms Nupur Sharma have to be seen. In end May, a TV debate on the Shiva Lingam found at the Krishna Janambhumi turned into a slanging match in which a panellist referred to Lord Shiva in objectionable terms. In response, Ms Sharma, who was the spokesperson of the ruling BJP dispensation made comments about Islam that went way beyond her brief. The issue would probably have died down there, but a few groups took up the matter, leading to protests across India and in some of the Islamic countries in the Gulf. The BJP spokesperson was suspended on 7 June, but the protests continued.

The controversy over the comments made by the spokesperson refuses to die down. Here too, vested interests are fuelling the controversy. Death threats were issued to Sharma by radicalised groups and a host of cases were filed against her in opposition ruled states for creating religious discord. The people who filed complaints against Ms Sharma did not file cases against the panelist who was the initial provocateur. Street protests continued, with a tailor being murdered in Udaipur on June 28 for supporting Nupur. Another murder took place earlier on 21 June, when Umesh Kohle, a chemist was stabbed to death in Maharashtra's Amravati district for supporting Nupur in a FaceBook post. Numerous other people have received death threats merely for supporting Nupur, which activity is an infringement of their right to free speech.

The spate of criminal cases registered against Nupur Sharma from across the country got her to approach the Apex Court, with a prayer to club all the FIRs registered against her. The two-judge vacation bench of the Supreme Court rejected her appeal in a terse one line order on 01 July, and made scathing verbal comments against her, which set off a fresh round of controversy. 

Coming down heavily on Nupur Sharma, Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala faulted Sharma for “igniting emotions" and held her responsible for “what is happening” in the country. This prompted a group of Concerned Citizens to dash off an open letter on the issue, seeking repeal of these remarks. But there is a larger issue which is involved here, and these concerns ought not to be brushed aside.

I am not looking into the legal argument which is more a matter for trained and experienced lawyers. Of great concern is an issue equally fundamental. Can Nupur Sharma, because of her remarks, be held solely accountable for creating mayhem in the country? That belies the very nature of the radicalised mindset. It was sometime in the 1960s that radicalism started growing in Kashmir, which led to the tragic genocide of Kashmiri Hindus in 1990. This radicalisation, promoted by funds received from the Gulf countries, was not confined to Kashmir alone but encompassed many other parts of India and has now also  become a threat to those very countries which spread such a discourse, besides being a threat to India. So to castigate the former BJP spokesperson as the sole cause of violence in India was perhaps going a bit too far.

But the more worrying aspect of the obiter dicta is the interpretation being given to it by radicalised groups in the major minority community. They are claiming it to be a justification delivered by the Apex Court for the calls being given by some of these groups to behead Ms Sharma.This was surely far from the intent of the learned Justices who in open court commented on the former BJP spokesperson's appeal to club all cases filed across the country to a single court, given the security risk that she was facing. That the threat cannot be taken lightly is seen by the brutal murders committed by fanatics on those who supported Nupur Sharma in online posts. The effort of fringe groups to wrongly use any obiter dicta as a justification for committing heinous crimes must be condemned, including by the apex court.

Ian Fleming, the celebrated author and creator of James Bond, speaks of the Double-O prefix given to certain secret agents as the Licence to Kill. There is no and never can there be any  'licence to kill' by radicalised fringe elements in society.

The author is a retired major General of the Indian Army. He is currently, Director, India Foundation. Published in the Sunday Guardian, 10 July 2022.

AGNIPATH: TRANSFORMING THE ARMY

The ongoing war in Ukraine has thrown up a humungous list of lessons for militaries across the world. Undoubtedly, these will be studied, analysed and debated in the coming years to determine how future militaries should be structured, trained and equipped. While various facets of the Ukraine war were being discussed in military and think tank circles in India, the Armed Forces announced the roll out of Agnipath—a new policy document wherein both the procedure for enrolment of personnel in the Armed Forces as well as the terms and conditions of such service stand radically altered. In its breadth and scope, the policy is both transformational and revolutionary. That is why a furious debate is raging in the country on the pros and cons of such a policy. This is not an alarming development, but a natural reaction to a change in the status quo.

No reform can be painless. The nation has to bite the bullet and implement such reforms, if the long-term impact is beneficial. In the economic sphere, the implementation of GST went through a difficult birth, but now the nation is reaping the benefits which will only grow in the years to come. The abrogation of the special status given to J&K by both houses of Parliament on 5 August 2019 was another revolutionary reform in the political sphere, which is still playing out but the dividends of which are clearly visible in the political, social, economic and security domains in the newly formed Union Territory of J&K. Agnipath too, can be a huge game changer, but certain modifications may be required along the way. Fortunately, in the implementational phase, the policy will have very little impact on the Forces in the first four years after it is rolled out. So enough time is available to look into course corrections to make this transformational and revolutionary concept beneficial to the Armed Forces, to the soldier and to the nation. 

The scheme departs radically from past enrolment practises, as from now on, enrolment for the Armed Forces will only be through the Pan-India, merit based Agnipath scheme. Eligibility for enrolment is open to all Indian citizens in the age group of 17.5 to 21 years. A one time age waiver has been given for the current year wherein individuals up to the age of 23 years can apply, as no enrolment has taken place in the last two years due to the pandemic. Selected individuals, called Agniveers, will be required to serve for four years, which includes a six month training period. Thereafter, 25 percent will be retained in the military for permanent absorption, while the remaining 75 percent will be given a financial package which will assist them in either finding other means of employment or in becoming small scale entrepreneurs themselves. Through this, a vast pool of disciplined work force will be available to the nation. The Agniveers will be entitled to all the allowances of regular troops, to include risk and hardship allowance and death and disability pension. 30 percent of their monthly emoluments will go towards a lump sum gratuity that will be paid to them on completion of their contractual service. The government will contribute an equal portion, the net lump sum gratuity coming to Rs 11.7 lakh. This, combined with the individuals savings over four years, could be in the range of Rs 18- 22 lakh—an amount which is not unsubstantial for a 22-23 year old youth. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the selection of Agniveers for retention in the military.

The Challenges

Fears have been expressed on the motivational levels of youth who have but a four year tenure of service. There are also concerns about their standards of training. The war in Ukraine has shown limitations in the performance of Russian troops who, for the most part were conscripts with short service tenures. The Ukrainian military too, suffered from such infirmities. In the Indian context, individual training for Agniveers who are enrolled in the Armoured Corps, Mechanised Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and EME poses huge challenges which will need to be overcome. But the larger training challenge is group cohesion and functioning as part of a well oiled sub unit. This is particularly applicable to the combat arms and combat support arms. 

The Armed Forces are cognisant of these concerns and will look into measures to address them over the next few years. But more serious is the skewed impact on the age and service profile of soldiers over a 20 year period when the policy has totally matured. In this scenario, we are likely to have up to 60 percent of a unit in the below four year service bracket and only 40 percent in the bracket of 4-20 years service. This will throw up serious operational challenges to the combat arms.

The yearly burgeoning pension bill of defence pensioners has been one of the major reasons necessitating reforms in the military. A soldier, unlike his civilian counterpart, retires at an early age. This is necessary to keep a youthful profile of the Armed Forces. Over the years, this has led to the number of veterans exceeding the number of serving personnel, the ratio presently being in the region of 1:1.8 or thereabout. This will keep increasing over the years and may eventually be to the order of 1:2.5. Obviously, this will impact on force modernisation as a major chunk of defence expenditure gets consumed in revenue expenditure, leaving that much less for capital acquisitions. 

A Road Map for the Future

Can something be done to allay the concerns which have been expressed and at the same time, continue with the reform process? Certain actions have already been initiated, but the forces need to look outside the ambit of the personnel in uniform and integrate the reform process with a much wider set of reforms which would encompass the entire security architecture of the country. Three issues need consideration. One, the entire civilian work force needs to be included in the ambit of defence reforms. Two, the governance structure in the Ministry of Defence needs to be revamped and three, the security forces working under the ambit of the Ministry of Home Affairs needs to be co-opted into the military reform process. Let us look at the third aspect first.

The Sixth Central Pay Commission, in its recommendations made a strong pitch for the lateral movement of Defence Forces personnel into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The Commission was of the view that while a good compensation package is essential for the morale and quality of officers and men in the Defence Forces, the same will also, to a large extent, depend on those personnel being provided a life time career. The recommendations were not implemented, largely due to resistance by the CAPF in taking in personnel with different service profiles and seniority, which would impact the seniority and functioning of their existing cadre. These concerns cannot be easily brushed away, but a ready solution exists in the form of absorption of Agniveers. 

Presently, a large number of personnel are recruited in the CAPFs who have to be trained before they can be employed in various security agencies of the Ministry of Home Affairs such as the BSF, CRPF and the ITBP. In addition we have the paramilitary forces under the ministry—the Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard. What needs to be done is to make entry into these forces only through Agniveers. The twin problems of locating suitable trained manpower for induction into these forces and providing sufficiently long tenure for the Defence Forces personnel can be addressed in one stroke. The earlier hesitations which were expressed by the CAPF in taking in retired personnel from the defence forces into their organisations will no longer apply. These organisations will now get well trained and well disciplined personnel,  who are not only proficient in the use of weapons but also skilled in sub-unit level functioning which is required by these forces in combatting militancy, terrorism or other tasks. And these personnel are, on an average, just 23 years old. The CAPF also get substantial financial savings as they do not now have to budget for recruitment and training expenses. The Agniveers joining the CAPF get a life time career while the Armed Forces, get a more youthful profile. Such lateral absorption can take in about 30 percent Agniveers each year, which would be the average replacement requirement of the CAPFs retiring personnel.

In the Agnipath scheme, the civilian work force which numbers about 3.75 lakh personnel has been left out. This is the real tail of the military which needs serious reforms. A large part of this workforce is employed in the nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) and the 41 Ordnance factories which have now been reconstituted into seven fully government-owned corporate entities on the lines of DPSUs. Force effectiveness depends to some extent on the capability and ability of these production agencies in delivering cost effective quality products to the Armed Forces in a time bound manner. The entire civilian workforce should, therefore,  have been assessed in a performance audit as they are paid out of defence estimates and also consume about a quarter of the pension budget. While the issue of privatising most of these entities will have to confront political hurdles, the same would have to be done at some stage. In any event, the step taken by the government in dissolving the Ordnance Factory Board and merging the 41 Ordnance Factories into seven corporate entities, was, by itself, a major first step. If privatisation cannot be immediately done, then at least these entities should function under the ministry of Commerce and Industries and not under the Ministry of Defence, where they have a captive market. This reform, if done, will ignite competition and make them more accountable to the user. A performance audit of the DRDO would also be beneficial in determining whether the country is getting its money's worth in investing huge sums in this organisation. In terms of manpower, it is evidently overstaffed as compared to similar organisations in the West. This needs to be looked into and the flab cut. Perhaps the model to be emulated could be a mix of India's ISRO and the US DARPA, to see that the nations limited resources are used in the most efficient manner. 

We also need to look into the functioning of the Ministry of Defence itself, which has a very large civilian workforce. Agnipath is sought to be justified on the model of the militaries of the US, Israel and other Western democracies. In all these countries, there is no bureaucratic interface between the political authority and the military. Perhaps India should follow suit, as is the norm in all the countries of the world. This by itself, will save the exchequer a few thousand crore INR every year. The Railways has no bureaucratic interface and the military should follow suit.

Finally, a little tweaking of the Agnipath scheme will ensure its acceptability to all those who are currently opposing it. One, as mentioned earlier, recruitment to the CAPF should be only through Agniveers who have completed four years service.  Roughly, they would be able to take in about 30 percent of Agniveers each year. These individuals could be selected on a random basis to ensure that the CAPF get a fair mix. Two, for the Military, increase the service limit to six years and retain 40 percent. That would give a more balanced service profile, which eliminates infirmities which are envisaged with a shorter service tenure. Thirdly, only 30 percent of the Agniveers will now be required to be released to the environment. This is a smaller number to deal with. Some of these personnel would be desirous of leaving the military after completing their time. The others could be helped to settle down, where needed.

Conclusion

Agnipath has received a mixed response from the military community. There have been a few bouquets and a lot of brickbats but the underlying fact remains is that it is reform which is needed. The implementation details are the only issues which need to be ironed out. We can get into a win-win situation by making the system more holistic and by following a whole of nation approach, rather than just confining the policy to the uniformed fraternity of the Armed Forces. 

Published in the IFJ, 1 Sep 2022

THE GOOD, BAD AND UGLY OF AGNIPATH

A lot has been said and written about the new Agnipath scheme for enrolment into the Armed Forces of India. In essence, the scheme is a radical departure from past practises as from now onwards, all enrolment will only be through the pan-India, merit-based Agnipath scheme. Selected individuals, called 'Agniveers' will serve for a period of four years, which includes a six-month training period. Entry is for individuals in the age bracket of 17.5 - 21 years with educational qualification being 10/12 pass. As no recruitment has taken place for the last two years due to the Covid pandemic, a one time waiver has been given for the year 2022, wherein the upper age limit has been increased to 23 years. 

The Good

The financial package is reasonably attractive. The Agniveers will be entitled to risk and hardship allowance and to death and disability pension. They will contribute 30% of their monthly emoluments with the government contributing an equal amount towards a lump sum gratuity that will be given to each individual on completion of four years contractual service. This amounts to Rs 11.7 lakh. On termination of the contractual period, an option is to be exercised for permanent entry into the Armed Forces, which will be restricted to 25 percent. Selection procedures are well laid out and transparent. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the same.

Itv has been stated that the Agnipath scheme will yield a more youthful profile for the military and will result in improved battle preparedness through more trainable and resilient youth. But the Army already has a youthful profile and the soldiers are well trained, so this will make little difference. The benefits of skill India are also proposed to be harnessed. The individuals not selected will, it is hoped, form a disciplined, motivated and physically fit group of youth that will be inducted into civil society. Some of these youth may be employed by the corporate sector on the basis of their skill sets or by the Central Government in the Central Armed Police Forces (BSF, CRPF, ITBP) or in the para-military forces (Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard). The state government's may also absorb some of these individuals. It is also hoped that all those not so employed will become small-scale entrepreneurs with the skill sets they have gained and the financial package they will receive at the end of four years. Most of what has been stated is more in the nature of a promissory note rather than a concrete proposal, but even so, there is merit in the same.

The Bad

What needs questioning is the basic premise for launching the scheme, which was to bring about a reduction in revenue expenditure. The outgo on pensions every year was thought to be very high and unsustainable in the long run, which necessitated this step. However, a more holistic course of action would have been to look into force effectiveness, based on a fixed budget. There is a large civilian work force numbering over 3.5 lakh persons, which is paid from defence estimates and which has been left outside the ambit of this structure. The productivity of the ordnance factories and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) as also of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have also not been considered. A qualitative improvement in the functioning of all these government owned research and production facilities will, by itself, generate huge revenue for modernisation of the military. Decision making at the apex level too is sluggish, resulting in time delays and cost overruns. Streamlining the same will again lead to reduced costs and enhanced force effectiveness. The utility of a large civilian bureaucracy is also questionable. The Agnipath scheme is modelled in some fashion on the US military, so it would be logical to model higher defence management on the same lines. We could thus consider placing the Department of Defence, the Department of Defence Production and the DRDO under the CDS who would be the one point contact on all military matters with the Defence Minister. This would not be easy to accomplish as the bureaucrats will fight tooth and nail to preserve their turf, though they contribute little to force enhancement. 

The Ugly

In terms of military effectiveness, the scheme will throw up some uncomfortable realities, when it is fully operational. One of these is the fact that about 60 percent of an infantry battalion's profile will be of Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. Armoured,  artillery and engineer regiments will also have a similar profile as shown in the diagram. The Army will no longer have a uniform profile of solders spread equally over the years, but a tiered structure, with the 0-4 years bracket soldiers occupying over 50 percent of the operational space. This will have adverse consequences for the military as seen by the performance of young soldiers in the war in Ukraine.

 

More importantly, the ratio in rifle companies will be further skewed. Training and induction into the specialist platoons like the 81 mm mortar, medium machine gun, anti tank, signal and pioneer platoons will be only of the permanent inductees, which means that the rifle companies will have most of the Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. This ratio could be as high as 80-90 percent and does not augur well for force effectiveness either in a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CICT) environment or in hot war. 

Many other imponderables also crop up. How much time will the unit spend now, on continuously training a bunch of raw soldiers? How will the Agnipath scheme impact on traditional unit activities such as sports and professional competitions, which are so necessary to build esprit-de-corps and unit and sub-unit bonding? What will be the impact on the motivational level of young inductees in the fourth year of their service? 

The list of questions are endless and too innumerable to be dealt with in a short opinion piece, but the challenges are mind boggling. The military leadership would most certainly have given a thought to all these issues, but the devil really lies in the detail. Perhaps, the Agnipath scheme will have greater acceptability if the ratio of permanent inductees into the military is increased to fifty percent and the term of duty for the Agniveers extended to six years instead of the current four. This would give better operational pay offs and would remove most of the infirmities discussed above. Also, it would be better if lateral induction to the CAPF and para military forces is guaranteed to 25 percent of the Agniveers. Then, just a quarter of the Agniveers would require rehabilitation in the private sector, which is a more manageable task. This would cater to both the military's operational requirement as well as the needs of the individuals seeking a career in the military.

Only time will tell whether the scheme to reduce the revenue expenditure has been a worthwhile experiment. In its present form, it will most certainly result in savings to the exchequer. But one shudders to think of the cost the nation will have to pay, in case of defeat on the battlefield.

The author is an army veteran who is presently Director, India Foundation.

Published in Sunday Guardian: 19 Jun 2022.

 

PAKISTAN: IN SLOW BURN

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” 

(the more things change, the more they remain the same)

 — Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr

When Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was sworn in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, he came in with a promise to usher in a 'naya Pakistan'. The dream never materialised and four years later, in April 2022, with Niazi's unceremonious ouster from the chair in a vote of no confidence, Pakistan was in a far more precarious position than what it was in 2018. The dream of a 'naya Pakistan' was stillborn and Pakistan remains, at least for the world's democracies, a problem child, steeped in debt, obscurantism, religious bigotry and a cradle for fostering terrorism. 

A volatile mix of religion, military control and internal strife has hampered the growth of a healthy democracy within the country. Pakistan's current challenges are a mix of political instability, a tottering economy and ethnic and religious fissures. Much of this has to do with the circumstances of Pakistan's birth, which was  shrouded in an almost total lack of conceptual clarity. The coining of the word ‘PAKSTAN’ by Rahmat Ali is in itself instructive for it included in its vision the Provinces of Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan but left out Bengal. Despite the aspect of territorial ambiguity, there was lack of ideological lucidity. Was it to be a secular state, a state of Muslims or an Islamic state? This lack of clarity still exists in Pakistan despite over seven decades of independence and is one of the reasons why Pakistan continues to teeter on the brink of disaster.

Economy

The World Bank’s Pakistan Development Update, released in April 2022, speaks of double digit inflation in the country caused by high demand pressures and rising global commodity prices, which have adversely impacted the Pakistani Rupee. More importantly, the report states that long-standing structural weaknesses of the economy including low investment, low exports and low productivity growth, pose risks to a sustained recovery. Tighter global financing conditions and a further rise in world energy prices will exacerbate the already high macroeconomic risks, these getting further compounded by the current political uncertainty and policy reform slippages. As per Zehra Aslam, the lead author of the above report, the "government would need to focus on containing the fiscal deficit at a level which ensures debt sustainability, closely coordinate fiscal and monetary policy, and retain exchange rate flexibility to mitigate immediate macroeconomic risks," but that is easier said than done. 

An economic crisis in Pakistan is not something new, the country having faced such a situation twice in the 1990s and a few times thereafter, but the magnitude this time is unprecedented.  Besides other issues, Pakistan is faced with a severe debt crisis, with serious concerns about its ability to repay and service external debt. Pakistan's external account is under pressure due to a spike in import prices, coupled with lax handling of domestic policy. Unlike 2018, this time Pakistan's ability to deal with the crisis is severely challenged by political strife, internal security challenges as well as a volatile global situation caused by the war in Ukraine. Pakistan's external debt repayments profile is very high, and its gross external financing requirement is estimated to be around nine per cent of GDP. While Pakistan has just about enough foreign exchange reserves to cater for two months of import requirements, it will have to depend on the generosity of the IMF and other lenders to keep its economy afloat. Inability to do so will cause Pakistan to slip further into an economic debt trap.

Conflict

Pakistan remains mired in internal conflict, the origins of some of which stretch all the way back to the early years of independence. As stated by Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s leaders since the country’s inception have played upon religious sentiment as a nation building tool, and turned Pakistan into an ‘ideological state’ whose ideology is Islam. Zia's policy of ‘Islamising’ Pakistan’s legal and educational system was merely an extension of a consistent state policy, though he went further down that road than his predecessors. The alliance between the mosque and the state, forged over decades, has had its pitfalls on two counts. Terrorist groups such as the TTP have sprung up, which seek imposing Sharia in Pakistan. These groups are at war against the Pakistani state. Then we have groups which were created to fight India such as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the Lashkar-e Taiba. The State has not always been able to control them, as seen in the radical and violent manifestations of an Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan’s stability.

In Balochistan, a freedom movement has been ongoing since 1948. The Baluch people are still engaged in a freedom struggle to rid them of the yoke of Pakistan, which continues to exploit their resources and offers little in return. The suicide bombing which took place at the Confucius Institute at Karachi University on 26 April 2022, is but a grim reminder of the desire of the Baloch people to attain freedom. The bombing killed the Director of the Institute, Mr Huang Guipin along with two other Chinese, Ding Mufang and Chen Jai. A fourth Chinese national, Wang Yuqing was seriously injured, along with a private security guard and two personnel from the Pakistan Rangers. Also killed was the driver of the van, a Pakistani national. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which they stated was carried out by the Majeed Brigade of the BLA. A statement released by the spokesperson of the group, Jeeyand Baloch, warned of many more attacks to come, the note in English stating: “Hundreds of highly trained male and female members of the Baloch Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade are ready to carry out deadly attacks in any part of Balochistan and Pakistan.” This is the first case of a suicide bombing being carried out by a female bomber. More importantly, the bombing was not carried out on religious motivations, but on the grounds of achieving independence for the Baloch people. This will open up a whole range of new challenges for the Pakistani establishment, besides acting as a motivator for Baloch youth to continue with their quest for independence.

There is internal turmoil also in Gilgit-Baltistan, which too has been exploited by the Pakistani State at the expense of the local residents. To make matters worse, the Chinese have made great inroads in this area, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has added to the angst of the local population. While the  China-Pakistan nexus at the political and military level is vibrant and strong, a similar level of connect at the people to people level is distinctly missing. Chinese investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (C-PEC) are viewed with distrust by the Baloch people who feel that their land in Gwadar has been bartered away. The BLA hence targets both the Pakistan government and Chinese nationals. The C-PEC is also viewed with distrust by the people of Gilgit Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which means that the entire corridor requires protection from sabotage by inimical groups.

Political Turmoil

Pakistan's economy is in shambles and it is dealing with multiple internal security challenges. To make matters worse, there is lingering political instability in Pakistan, which inhibits effective decision making. The ouster of Imran Khan from power followed a script much akin to a Bollywood thriller, with desperate attempts being made by Khan to stick on to his chair, but the combined opposition finally outmanoeuvred him. The Army's decision to stay neutral is widely viewed as support for Khan's bête noire, Shehbaz Sharif.

Khan has since been holding massive political rallies across the country and has called for early elections. He retains popularity amongst a large section of the populace, particularly the youth, and believes that he will sweep the elections, as and when they are held, on the basis of the strong stance he has taken against the US.

Shehbaz Sharif, who took over as Premier after Khan's ouster, is struggling to deal with a deteriorating economy, rising inflation and the devaluation of the rupee. He has had to take the unpopular decision to hike fuel prices, the price of petrol having increased by a whopping PKR 60 a few weeks back. This was necessitated to get an IMF loan to bail out the economy. As usual, the incumbent government blames Khan for mismanaging the economy, but the onus now is squarely on the present set of rulers to pull Pakistan out of the economic morass. 

The stakes are high for the Pakistan military, which too will face a funds crunch, which will adversely impact its preparedness to deal with both internal and external threats. The core interest for the Pakistan military for the moment is internal stability, as an increase in political turmoil will more likely than not descend into political violence. With its current security commitments, and with the precarious state of Pakistan's finances, this is not something which the military will look upon favourably. Despite the political turmoil, the military is unlikely to effect a takeover, as directly ruling the country will be far more problematic.  A combination of the financial mess that Pakistan finds itself in, the volatile political environment and a wide-ranging set of security challenges will see Pakistan tottering on the verge of collapse. Western financial support may however prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state.

Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch is an Army veteran who is currently Director, India Foundation.

Targeted Killings in Kashmir: A New Phase of Terrorism

The recent spurt in killings of civilians in the Kashmir Valley is not a random act of violence but a well thought out strategy by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, to continue to fuel terrorism in the Union Territory (UT). The killings may be random but the act has a deeper purpose of spreading fear among the minority Hindu population and forcing once again, a mass exodus of this minuscule group. The message being given by the terrorists is clear: leave the UT or be killed. In terms of optics, an exodus now will be reminiscent of what happened earlier to this hapless Hindu population in Kashmir in 1991 and will be viewed as a failure of the Centre in bringing about normalcy post the abrogation of the Special Provisions of Article 370. On the ground, through ethnic cleansing, the terrorist groups and their Pakistani sponsors intend to keep the valley on the boil, in furtherance of their aim to create an Islamic caliphate in Kashmir, which would be a step towards their ultimate goal of Ghazwa-e-Hind.

Paradoxically, this revision in strategy by the Pakistani deep state is a result of the success achieved in moving swiftly towards the total integration of the state, post the abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament on 5 June 2019. Since the abrogation, terrorism in the UT has nosedived considerably, with normalcy returning to large parts of the Valley. Local body elections have been successfully conducted and the delimitation exercise has been completed. Tourism has picked up despite the lingering fears of  Covid-19— the Wuhan virus. The first five months of this year have already seen more arrivals than the 6.6 lakh tourists that visited Kashmir in 2021, and all hotels in Kashmir are filled to capacity. The number of terrorists being killed every month remains high, while the casualties suffered by the security forces have gone down. It is this disproportionate losses being suffered by terrorist groups and the swift manner in which Kashmir was returning to normalcy that has unnerved their sponsors in Pakistan and prompted a shift in their strategy to targeting the minority Hindu community. So how should India respond to this challenge?

There are just about 5000 Kashmiri Hindus employed by the government who are currently working in Kashmir. In addition, over one lakh people from other parts of India are working as labour in the Valley. Providing security to each individual is physically impossible, but during the high level review meeting held by India's Home Minister, Mr Amit Shah on 3 June, future actions to be taken to counter the threat were discussed. This included providing security to the migrant Hindu labour as well as to Kashmiri Hindus by concentrating them in clusters, which would facilitate protection. But it would be naive to presume that a problem which has been festering for decades can be quickly resolved, especially as it involves de-radicalising a population which has been exposed to an insidious ideology for two to three generations. It is a work in progress that requires sustained action over a period of time. 

The current approach to tackling terrorism in J&K is holistic, encompassing political, diplomatic, military and administrative initiatives. This has worked well in bringing a large semblance of normalcy to the state, but the fact remains that a society so deeply radicalised over two to three generations will take time to revert to normalcy. The UT has also been caught off guard by the change in tactics being employed by terrorist groups, wherein they are using young Kashmiris who have no earlier criminal record, in random killings of innocent Hindus. The capacity of the terror groups to strike at such soft targets was perhaps underestimated. 

As a long term measure to combat terrorism, it would be important to impose further deterrents on Pakistan to force that country to stop using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy. It is also important to address the issue of radicalisation which has seeped into a large segment of Kashmiri muslims. An important step towards this end would be an acknowledgement that what Kashmir has faced over the last few decades is not a movement for 'Azadi', but an attempt to create an Islamic State. Only then will policies be focused on countering this hateful ideology among Kashmir's muslims. These would include keeping a check on what is taught to school children in schools and madrassas, and what is preached by the clerics in mosques. 

The return of the Kashmiri Hindus to their homeland must also be taken up on priority. For these individuals to go back to their original homes is presently fraught with danger. It may be advisable then, to resettle them in one or two areas, where appropriate security measures can be put in place. In addition, as and when elections are held in the UT and a new government is installed, the genocide that the Kashmiri Hindus were subjected to must be publicly acknowledged and the perpetrators made to stand trial, regardless of the time that has elapsed since then. Such an act will bring about the process of healing which will bode well for the future of all Kashmiris. The Kashmiri Hindus must also be compensated for the loss they have suffered.

As an immediate measure, it is vital to instil in the minority population, a sense of confidence in the ability of the administration to protect their lives and property. Simultaneously, it is important to impose a deterrent to the terrorists and to their sympathisers and supporters which will make them desist from carrying out such attacks in future. All such offences must legally be non-bailable. In addition, all individuals providing support to terrorists should be deprived of all elements of state support such as subsided ration and other facilities as also employment in government jobs. They must be debarred from standing in elections at all levels and must be made to surrender their passports. Terrorists who are killed must not be allowed a funeral. Their remains must be burnt and the ashes disposed off. Their property must be confiscated by the state and sold and the proceeds given to the victims of terror. Property of individuals apprehended on terror charges or for supporting terror activities must also be confiscated and disposed off in like manner.

The administration also needs to be revamped, especially at the lower levels. Many individuals in the police, education, revenue and other administrative departments are beholden to Geelani of the Hurriyat Conference for their jobs. They remain compromised in their loyalty to the country. Such individuals need to be weeded out in a phased manner. 

Finally, it is for the Kashmiri muslims to rise against terrorism. They have been exploited long enough and they need to break the shackles which their clergy and regional political parties have confined them. Only with a concerted action by all concerned can the scourge of terrorism be permanently erased from the face of this region.

Published in Chintan: 6 June 2022.

BOOK REVIEW : ESSENCE OF THE FIFTH VEDA Author: Gaurang Damani

India's spiritual and scriptural heritage derives from the Vedas, the word Veda meaning wisdom, knowledge or vision. A correlation of archaeological, literary and astronomical evidence suggests that the Vedas date back to at least 6000 BCE, which makes the Vedas the world's most ancient texts. The fact that India was home to the Vedic civilisation for at least the last eight millennia if not earlier, has effectively laid to rest many foreign inspired versions of India's past, most significantly the myth of the so-called Aryan invasion!

The Vedas, being the original source of Hindu teachings, delve on all aspects of life. It is no surprise then that the followers of  Sanatana Dharma have always viewed the Vedas as the highest religious authority. The laws of the Vedas have regulated and continue to regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs of Hindus up to the present day. All the obligatory duties of Hindus at birth, marriage, death etc. are guided by Vedic rituals. For mankind in general, they also serve as a repository of wisdom. Classified into four volumes: the Rig Veda, the Sama Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Atharva Veda, it is the Rig Veda which serves as the principal text, with the four Vedas collectively being known as “Chathurveda”. Each Veda, in turn, consists of four parts—the Samhitas (hymns), the Brahmanas (rituals), the Aranyakas (theologies) and the Upanishads (philosophies). As the Upanishads form the concluding portions of the Veda, they are called the “Vedanta” or the end of the Veda. They contain the essence of Vedic teachings.

The Vedas have been passed on from generation to generation through word of mouth and form the basis of Sanatana Dharma. This foundation is hence called Shruti (that which has been heard) and the walls of this structure are called Smriti (that which has been remembered). While the Shruti and Smriti are the walls and foundation of Sanatana Dharma, there are two other important supports—the Puranas and the Itihasa. The word 'Purana' is Sanskrit for something that is ancient. The Puranas consist of ancient histories, stories and allegories, which have been composed for the lay public and for those that could not study the Vedas. The Itihasa refers to the collection of written accounts of events that were witnessed by the author and signifies traditional history, (literally meaning, thus it happened). In the Indian tradition, both the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, two of India's most sacred texts are considered as Itihasa. In the case of the former, Sage Valmiki, who composed The Ramayana was himself a witness to the events as they unfolded. Similarly, Veda Vyasa, who composed The Mahabharata, witnessed the events as they unfolded. These great Indian spiritual texts fall under the category of Itihasa and Smriti literature. The Puranas, eighteen in number, cover a diverse range of topics from legend to mythology, cosmogony, genealogies, etc. The Itihasa (Ramayana and Mahabharata) and Purana are collectively sometimes referred to as the Fifth Veda. In this delightful book written by Gaurang Damani, stories from these two sacred texts are recounted in a readable fashion, which serves as a primer to understand India's scriptures.

The book is laid out in a story format, in three main chapters. The first of these chapters, titled Tirupati Balaji and Ramayana, dwells on stories from the Ramayana. Starting with Shri Rama's lifting of the celestial bows, the 14 stories in this chapter dwell on various facets of the Ramayana, the last of which is The Philosophy of Yoga 'Vasishtha'. The second chapter has nine delightful stories on  Krishna. His miracles as a child in Vrindavan, Rasa Lila, His travels and why Krishna had 16,108 wives are all covered in this chapter, in an easy to read and understand format. The final chapter delves on the Mahabharata, in 21 short stories, covering the reasons for this epic battle and expounding on the code of Dharma, which can be subtle at times. Most importantly, the three chapters, through these well laid out stories, brings out not just the Itihasa of those times, but the moral code by which it is necessary to live our lives to attain fulfilment. 

It is a telling indictment and commentary of post-independence India that religious and ethical instruction based on Hindu scriptures is not imparted to children in our schools. Most Hindu children thus grow up without an adequate understanding of their scriptures and the rich moral and ethical code that they espouse. This book, to some extent, provides the lay public with an authentic account of our great epics through these short stories, which also bring out the essence of Dharma. Hopefully, this should spur the parents to delve deeper into the foundations of Sanatana Dharma, so that they and their progeny, grow up as better citizens. 

For Gaurang Damani, the author of this book, it has apparently been a labour of love. This is but the first book, which is a blend of the Itihasa and the Purana. In his next book, the author aims to help the reader go deeper within, based on the prescribed Vedic path to happiness and spirituality. The book, while easy to read and understand, could have had a greater impact with more subtle editing, which could have made it a gripping read. But even so, it is a valuable work on our Itihasa, which is strongly recommended for all, both adults and school children, to enable a better understanding of India's rich scriptural and spiritual ethos.