In the early hours of 6 September, 1965, exactly half a century ago, three divisions of India’s XI Corps, crossed the International Border in Punjab and in pitch darkness, moved towards the Ichhogil canal. The news was flashed across the world, with newspaper headlines of 6 September announcing, “Indian Army Crosses into Pakistan–Indian Forces in Vicinity of Lahore.” The second Indo-Pak war had begun.
Why did India and Pakistan go to war in the Autumn of 1965? A conflict was not in the interest of either country and no major world power wanted an escalation of tensions in this part of the world. Yet, for the perceptive observer, the signs of conflict were all to visible and apparent.
This was the time when the cold war was at its zenith. Pakistan had astutely sided with the West and in return had received economic and military assistance, ostensibly to fight communism, but covertly to be used in its struggle against India. Pakistan played its cards with panache and finesse, and in the process, bolstered its economic and military capability with aid from the western powers. This gave Pakistan the wherewithal to wage war. At the same time, India was hampered by a slow growth rate and internal turmoil. The debacle suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 had left deep scars in the national psyche and consequently, India in the early sixties, was at a low ebb, economically and militarily. India’s perceived weakness was seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to wrest Kashmir from India by force. However, as India was in the process of augmenting her military capability, policy makers within Pakistan veered to the view that this window of opportunity was limited in time.
In early 1964, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the ‘Kashmir Publicity Committee’, to keep the Kashmir issue alive. From this committee emerged a plan in February 1965 to engineer a revolt in J&K, by sending armed infiltrators to foment violence. This was to be followed with a quick military thrust to capture the strategic Indian township of Akhnur. The underlying hope was that this would lead to the state of J&K, falling like a ripe plum into Pakistani hands. The plan was however shelved as both President Khan and his army chief, General Musa were apprehensive of such action leading to a full scale war with India. Two months later, Ayub had a change of heart and gave his assent to the plan, though his army chief still demurred.
The Pakistani plan consisted of two components. The first, code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’, envisaged the infiltration of thousands of regular and irregular troops dressed as Kashmiri guerrillas into Jammu and Kashmir, to create an uprising in the state. The Pakistan army would then move in to capture Akhnur. While President Ayub Khan was not unaware of the possibility of his actions leading to an all out war with India, he veered around to the view that India was unlikely to expand the area of conflict. The weapons received by Pakistan from the West gave Pakistan’s military both a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Indians. If India did expand the conflict, international opinion would bring the war to a swift closure. By then Kashmir, would be in Pakistani hands. The events however, did not unfold in the manner envisaged by Pakistan’s top brass.
Pakistani attempts to destabilise India in Operation Gibraltar in August 1965 were foiled. Much to Pakistani’s chagrin, the local people did not rise in revolt against the Indian state, but actively supported the Indian army in neutralising the infiltrators. Pakistan also went on to lose the strategic Hajipir Pass to an Indian offensive, which sealed the routes of ingress of the infiltrators into J&K. Pakistan then launched Grand Slam on 1 September but a plucky Indian defence and incompetent Pakistani leadership prevented Akhnur from falling into enemy hands. However, to relieve pressure from this sector, India was forced to extend the conflict across the IB. All the premises on which Pakistan had based its design to capture J&K were thus reduced to nought.
Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. That is the lesson which India would do well to remember.
This article was published in the Pioneer, 7 September 2015.
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