For nation states, national security would mean securing the National Interest—but what constitutes the National Interest (NI) must first be determined and then clearly stated. Broadly, the NI could be seen in terms of the survival of the nation-state, wherein the minimum requirement would be the protection of its physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states. These remain the primary and vital interests of a state, which cannot be compromised and which must be defended at all costs.
The above formulation, when placed in specifics for a nation state, would encompass the preservation of one, the territorial integrity of the state, two, the preservation of the existing politico-economic structure and three, the preservation of the nation-states’ ethnic, religious, linguistic and historical norms and traditions. Post the First World War, American policy makers such as President Woodrow Wilson, while formulating their nations foreign policy, drew upon the work of scholars and philosophers like Sir Alfred Zimmer, Nicholas Murray Butler and others who dedicated their efforts to promoting a more peaceful world and was essentially Utopian in concept. Post the Second World War, American foreign policy was driven by a sense of realism, promoted by the work of authors such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Hallet Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr and others. Indeed, Henry Kissinger credited Morgenthau with making the study of international relations into a major discipline.
In India, Post independence, the decision makers were not associated with an institutionalised doctrinal approach to foreign policy-making. Though attention to India’s foreign policy making has attracted major intellectual inputs, it remains insulated from outside influence. India’s national security policy-making process too has not yet been institutionalised, nor has it defined the incorporation of stakeholders and their role. The policy is personality driven and remains highly individualistic and hostage to those who are in key decision making roles, with hardly any publicly accepted inputs from non-partisan strategic planners or experts belonging to think-tanks, the academia or public intellectuals.
Shri Jaswant Singh, who in the Vajpayee led government (1998-2004) held at various times, the important portfolios of Defence, External Affairs and Finance, expounded on this aspect in 1995. He spoke of a document called the Operational Directive, which “seeks to bring out as clearly as possible, under the given circumstances, the threat situation which has been visualised in consultation not only with the three Services but the various agencies, the Ministry of External Affairs, and when necessary, with the Home Ministry in consultation with the Prime Minister’s Office and, finally, it is approved by the Defence Minister”. he further went on to state that “the contents of this document required considerable change because of the enormous change that has taken place or is taking place not only in our immediate vicinity but all round…Now if you were to ask, is this the defence policy? I would not be able to say that the answer is in the affirmative because India’s defence policy, to the extent that I can venture to make a statement, on it, from 1947 onwards— more precisely from 1950 onwards—has been basically a policy to defend our territory, our sovereignty and our freedom, and no more than that”.
This very clearly brings out the fact that India at that time did not have a declared defence policy. The situation has not changed much till date, in terms of a clear enunciation of a national security policy, which has led some Indian and foreign strategic thinkers to state that India lacks a strategic culture. Foremost amongst them, George Tanham, came to the conclusion that Indian political elites showed little evidence of having thought coherently or systematically about national strategy, reasoning that the forces of history and culture had worked against the cultivation of a strategic mindset. This however betrays a limited understanding of India and its civilisational construct of over five thousand years. We have the example of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, which propounds the science of governance including the relationship with other powers, kingdoms and rulers. Hindu scriptures, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, Hitopadesa, Manu Smriti, Bhagavatam Purana and others, all have large sections devoted to statecraft and external relations. So to state that India lacked strategic thought would not be accurate. India has a sense of history and is very clear of what it wants to be. It wants rapid domestic growth, abolition of poverty, national unity and equality. It is not looking to burning bridges, but will stand up for what is right and just, with a world view based on equality and non-discrimination.
The objectives then of India’s National Security, would be threefold: first, national stability and integrity; second, social political and economic progress; and third, peace and stability in terms of India’s relationships with other countries across the globe. India’s national security as an essential component to securitise its national interest must be seen in terms of these larger goals. In effect, this would encompass ensuring a safe environment within the country, free from internal and external threats, and a dynamic foreign policy, to enable social, political and economic progress of the nation.
Changing Global Economic Scenario: The Rise of Asia
In the 17th century, Asia was the envy of Europe with India and China alone having nearly half the worlds share of GDP. The Indian economy went into a state of decline at the beginning of the 18th century, though China continued to prosper for another hundred years before slipping into rapid decline at the turn of the 19th century, a period referred to by Chinese scholars as the century of humiliation, denoting the period between the First Opium War in 1839 and the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. A turn around started towards the close of the 20th century as seen in the chart at figure 1. By 2000 CE, Asia accounted for just over a third of the world output. This is set to equal the output of the rest of the world in 2020, and thereafter surpass the economy of the rest of the world, marking the world’s imminent entry into the Asian age. This is taking place, not just because of the growing economies of India and China, but also due to growth among smaller and midsize countries in Asia. (See Figure 2)
The reversal of the Asian decline has set in motion changes in the geopolitical landscape of the world, with nation states coming to grips with an altered reality. The Chinese leadership is conscious of China’s growing economic clout and has characterised the first two decades of the 21st century’s as a “period of strategic opportunity,” to facilitate domestic development and the expansion of China’s “comprehensive national power.” China is leveraging its growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand the country’s international influence. In the 19th National Conference of the CPC, President Xi Jinping laid emphasis on a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. He outlined China’s ambition to emerge as a superpower by 2049, which will mark the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Timelines to achieve those targets are the full modernisation of the PLA by 2020, emerging as a socialist modernised country by 2035 and having a world-class army and the eventual attainment of super power status around the middle of the century.
India’s foreign policy too, under the Modi led NDA government, has seen great transformational changes since 2014. Prime Minister Modi has led the transformation, which is clearly visible and is now seen to be more bold, proactive, innovative and ambitious—and also clearly showing an uncompromising firmness on issues relating to the nation’s integrity and honour. While traditionally, India has been looked at as a notoriously reticent nation in international affairs, it is now being seen as proactive in its engagements with the international fora. There is a greater expectation of India’s role in the world, as reflected by India emerging as a natural participant in several regional and global discourses. Another important transformation has been the rekindling and strengthening of India’s linkages with its diaspora, cooperation in the field of counter terrorism, emphasis on the neighbourhood with significant progress taking place in terms of physical and cultural connectivity and on a renewed economic vigour.
China now views itself as the natural competitor to the United States, and seeks a bipolar world with China being the second pole. Within Asia, China views India as its only economic and geo-strategic rival. Regardless of any churning which may take place in the internal power dynamics in China’s ruling communist party, Beijing's policy towards Delhi will continue to be shaped by its desire to achieve pre-eminence in the region. There will thus be renewed competition between India and China, but there will also be cooperation.
The India-China Relationship
The driving force in the India-China relationship is political, with the governments of the two countries’ determining its shape and content. The people and the media have had little role to play in shaping this relationship; however, since the mid-eighties, people to people interaction has enabled broadening and stabilising the relationship to some extent. Chinese perceptions of and policies regarding India have had greater continuity and focus than Indian perceptions of and policy towards China, largely due to the different nature of the polity of the two countries. Primarily, the focus of both has had a heavy security component. Since the mid-eighties however, there is an increasing emphasis on development issues, helped in no small measure by a consensus that the ‘development of one would in no way constitute a threat to the other’. History, however, imparts to both India and China the same need to restore a feeling of national pride, a need that each fulfils in parallel quests for greater international standing. In this paradigm, Beijing's policy towards Delhi will continue to be assertive, shaped by its desire to achieve pre-eminence, initially in the region and by 2050 in world affairs. Today, a combination of historical circumstances, cold war rivalry and a competition for resources is setting the agenda for the way the two nations perceive each other. While commonality of interests exists in some areas that widen the field for further cooperation, other factors are pushing the two countries towards the path of rivalry and confrontation in pursuance of each nation’s perceived self-interest.
The India-China relationship remains strained, largely due to India’s unsettled border with Tibet. Today, the relationship can be categorised as stable at the strategic level, but marked by political, diplomatic, and military instability at the tactical level. The major irritant in the relationship is the unresolved border issue, which has the potential to lead the two countries to conflict. China illegally occupies the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh and also lays claim to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. While the McMahon Line is the effective boundary between India and China, its legal status is disputed as China does not accept the validity of the 1914 Simla Accord. India thus has both a territorial as well as a boundary dispute with China, which has the potential to lead to conflict in future. Massive upgradation of infrastructure in Tibet by China has a distinct military bias and is a cause of concern to India as it greatly enhances Chinese military capability across the Himalayas. When considered with growing military asymmetry including nuclear capability, the threat to India increases exponentially. It must be noted that China has moved away from its earlier theme of peace as the dominant trend, to stating that some conflicts may be inevitable. It is in this respect that India needs to be prepared to thwart any hostile activity by China across the Himalayas.
For many years, China has supported insurgencies in India’s Northeastern states and continues with transgressions across the undemarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC). On the diplomatic front, China has been particularly assertive in recent years, continuously blocking Indian attempts to become a Member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and resisting India’s attempt to seek a place on the high table as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. For long, it resisted India’s efforts to list Masood Azhar, the founder of the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad—a UN-designated terrorist group, to be labelled a terrorist by the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and only relented on this on 1 May 2019, after China dropped its long-held objections to the move. Beijing had earlier put a "technical" hold on the 1267 UN resolution in March, the fourth time it had scuttled India's attempt to sanction the man it holds responsible for multiple terror attacks in India. China also needlessly objects every time an Indian political leader visits Arunachal Pradesh. But it is the collusive nuclear warhead-ballistic missile-military hardware nexus between China and Pakistan, described by both as an 'all-weather friendship,’ which is of major concern to India.
Post the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, the relations between India and China remained frozen for 26 years, thawing finally with the visit of then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988. A slew of confidence building measures started in September 1993, with the signing of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border, which was followed up in 1996, 2005 and in 2012. However, to prevent border incidents from flaring up, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) was signed between the two countries in October 2013. The BDCA reiterated the provisions of most of the earlier CBMs, but in addition provided for additional mechanisms for the maintenance of peace in a situation involving a direct face off between the soldiers of the two countries, such as Article VI which stipulates that the two sides shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the LAC. While the border has remained peaceful, with no incidences of firing taking place since then, the possibility of a flare up still exists as seen in the India-China border stand off for 70 days in Doklam—a tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China. The statements issued by Chinese government controlled media during the course of the crisis including Global Times, Xinhua and others, as well as spokespersons of the foreign and defence ministries of China went ballistic in condemning India. Offensive epithets were used to threaten India to withdraw or to face consequences, which would be far worse than the defeat of 1962. India however stood its ground, and China was eventually forced to back off, marking a victory for the Indian stand, and highlighting India’s firmness and resolve, on issues relating to the nation’s integrity and honour.
The Doklam face-off further strained relations between the two countries, but a reset took place with Prime Minister Modi meeting his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinxing in Wuhan in April 2018. The two leaders are set to meet again at an informal summit, this time in India, later in 2019. Despite differing perceptions on many issues between India and China, India’s approach in dealing with China has been one of pragmatism, wherein the focus has been on compartmentalising the problems and not letting the differences turn into disputes and disputes into conflict. Today, there is substantial economic engagement between the two countries as also an ever increasing people to people contact. There is also substantial cooperation on regional, multilateral and global issues, a prime example being on climate change. But despite the many positives, there is a need to reset the relationship in a new paradigm, as the relationship has entered a more challenging phase, though remaining as a mix of competition and cooperation.
There are growing concerns in India about China’s increased assertiveness, and about China’s regional and global ambitions. China is no longer seeking a multi polar world, but seeks bipolarity and in the hierarchical order, aims eventually to replace the United States and occupy pole position. This is in strong contrast to India, which would like to see not only a multi polar world, but also a multi polar Asia. The India under Modi has a vision for the country that is distinct from the kind of approach taken earlier about India’s role as a balancing power—a non-aligned power. That terminology fortunately lies buried now, and in its place is a new found assertion of Indian interests and what that means for India. This will lead to contestation, as India will not bow down to any foreign power. In the long term, the India-China relationship will hence be a difficult one to manage. India’s core concerns will remain the economic upliftment of its people, technological advancement, military modernisation and gaining its rightful place under the sun. In this process, it would not like to be sidetracked by any distractions from China or any other power in the region.
China’s Assertiveness in the Region
China’s “One Belt, One Road,” now renamed the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues. Countries participating in BRI could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could leverage to achieve its interests. For example, in July 2017, Sri Lanka and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) signed a 99-year lease for Hambantota Port, following similar deals in Piraeus, Greece, and Darwin, Australia.
China seeks to secure its objectives without jeopardising the regional stability that remains critical to the economic development that has helped the CCP maintain its monopoly on power. However, China is also willing to employ coercive measures—both military and non-military—to advance its interests and mitigate opposition from other countries. For example, in 2017, China used economic and diplomatic pressure, unsuccessfully, in an attempt to urge South Korea to reconsider the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
In its regional territorial and maritime disputes, China continued construction of outposts in the Spratly Islands, but also continued outreach to South China Sea claimants to further its goal of effectively controlling disputed areas. China also maintained a consistent coast guard presence in the Senkakus.
The Pakistan Factor
Chinese desire to contain India finds a willing ally in Pakistan. Here, the interests of both Beijing and Islamabad converge. The nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus between the two is well known and is a cause of serious concern for India. China is Pakistan's largest defence supplier and is widely perceived to be using Pakistan to fight its proxy war against India, to counter Indian power in the region and to divert Indian military force and strategic attention away from China. It also provides a bridge between Beijing and the Muslim world, a geographically convenient trading partner, and a channel into security and political relations in South Asia. For Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India. Chinese officials also view a certain degree of India-Pakistan tension as advancing their own strategic interests as such friction bogs India down in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi's ability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at the international level. China is also expanding its footprints in Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, which leads to a perception within India of being hemmed in by the Chinese. When viewed with Chinese capability to support insurgent groups in Northeast India and to Left Wing Extremists, India’s concerns deepen.
India is also concerned about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the crowning jewel of which is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), connecting China’s Xinjiang province to Gwadar in Balochistan, Pakistan. In April 2015 President Xi Jinping signed agreements with Pakistan over development projects worth USD 46 billion, focussed on building a 3000 km (1800 miles) CPEC. This corridor will connect Pakistan’s deep sea port Gwadar, located at the Arabian Sea, to China’s western Xinjiang region. International analysts see this CPEC as President XI Jinping’s biggest gambit in the One Belt One Road strategy. The projects under development are now assessed to be in the range of USD 62 billion.
Indian concerns over the CPEC pertain primarily to issues of sovereignty. In its annual report submitted to Parliament on 11 July 2018, the Union Defence Ministry bluntly stated, “The CPEC passing through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir challenges Indian sovereignty”. A large number of Chinese labour along with military personnel are also located in Gilgit-Baltistan, which has grave security implications for India. Many in Pakistan, especially those in the military, see the completion of the CPEC as a possible game changer in the region, which could lift Pakistan out of poverty. That view is however now being contested as most of the economic benefits will go to Chinese hands. In the Gwadar port complex itself, where the expectation is that one million tons of cargo will be handled annually, 91 per cent share of the revenue from the operations of the port and the terminal and 85 per cent of the revenue generated by the free zone will go to Chinese companies. There is also the underlying fear that such a huge investment could result in a debt trap for Pakistan, much on the lines of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which China has now taken over on a lease for 99 years. There are also fears that the CPEC may not dee fruition, primarily because it passes through territory which is increasingly being contested. in Balochistan, the ongoing freedom movement, which keeps cropping up off and on since 1947, is major source of concern to the Pakistani establishment. The current struggle of the Baloch people against Pakistani subjugation dates back to 2005. The ethnic Baloch feel marginalised at the plunder of their rich resources, and are waging a bitter freedom struggle against the government, targeting both the Pakistan security forces as well as the Chinese workers. The CPEC is also vulnerable to attacks emanating from Gilgit-Baltistan and from the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), which has forced it to upgrade security measures across the length of the project. Pakistan is now raising a Special Security Division comprising approximately 15,000 personnel to provide security for the CPEC against attacks.
Pakistan has also been waging an undeclared war on India since the last three decades, through what its leadership called a ‘war by a thousand cuts’. The Indian response to Pakistani intransigence was reactive, and based on taking defensive measures to reduce the impact of terrorism which emanated from across the border. There was hence no punitive action taken against Pakistan, despite a series of highly provocative attacks such as the attack on India’s parliament in December 2001, Akshardham Temple in September 2002, Mumbai in September 2008, Pathankot Air Base in January 2016 amongst others. But it was the attack on a forward military base Kashmir in Uri which made the government rethink its strategy. It was Pakistan’s analysis that India would not retaliate against a nuclear armed neighbour, and hence it continued these acts of terrorism on Indian soil under the nuclear umbrella. Indeed, when Indian forces raided a terrorist hideout in Myanmar, the Pakistan interior minister, Mr Nisar Ali Khan, in response to a statement by Minister of State for Information & Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore that military action in Myanmar to hit back at rebels who killed 18 soldiers in Manipur was a message to other countries, said, “Pakistan is not like Myanmar”. He further added that Pakistan will not be cowed down by threats from across the border. That was an oblique reference to Pakistan’s nuclear capability and response options. However, when the Indian forces carried out a retaliatory strike on terrorist hideouts within Pakistan occupied Jammu & Kashmir, 11 days after the Uri attack, on 29 September 2016, it caught the Pakistani establishment off balance, especially because India’s Director General of Military Operations, Lt Gen. Ranbir Singh, in a press conference, announced the details of the operation. Pakistan responded with a denial, saying that Indian troops had not entered Pakistani territory but had only fired at Pakistani positions which was for the most part ineffective. Denial by Pakistan was mainly to reassure its home constituency and enabled Pakistan to avoid confrontation and an escalation of hostilities. But on a more serious note, in a car bomb attack on an Indian police convoy on 14 February 2019 in Pulwama, J&K, which led to the death of 40 police personnel, the Indian Prime Minister made it clear that the attack would not go unavenged. Pakistan’s Prime Minister, in response said that Pakistan would retaliate, with all the means at their disposal if India were to attack Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan officials had threatened to use nuclear weapons should India attack Pakistan. The Indian response with an air strike against the base of Jaish-e-Mohammad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, deep inside Pakistani territory, shattered once and for the nuclear myth and set in place a new normal in India-Pakistan relations. It gave a clear message to Pakistan and indeed to the rest of the world that India will not be cowed down by the threat of nuclear weapons and would respond firmly to any attack on Indian soil, sponsored by Pakistan. The era of nuclear blackmail was over. To this end, it appears that India’s policy towards Pakistan is veering from deterrence to compellance.
While the new Indian policy of taking the fight to the enemy in his own territory has set a new normal in India-Pakistan relations, it is yet to be seen whether this will impact on Pakistan’s support to terrorist groups based in its areas of control for operations against India. Pakistan views these groups as its strategic assets, and would be unwilling to disband them. The inter-se dynamic between the two countries will hence remain hostile, at least for the immediate future and ties between the two countries will remain strained. While Pakistan is no longer a conventional military threat to India, its capacity to foment terrorism within India remains intact. That is a reality which India will have to live with. Peace can only come about if the costs to Pakistan for indulging in terror attacks are made unbearable and this will be the thrust of the Modi government in its second tenure after winning a handsome mandate in the elections in May 2019.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
The Indian Ocean holds 16.8% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 27.9% of proven natural gas reserves. An abundance of natural resources in the Indian Ocean, among other factors, has facilitated trade-led growth within this region. Home to major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas, these vital sea routes facilitate maritime trade in the IOR, carry more than half of the world’s sea-borne oil and host 23 of the world’s top 100 container ports. Container traffic through the region’s ports has increased fourfold from 46 million TEUs in 2000 to 166 million TEUs in 2017. Increased connectivity within the region has strengthened ties with external trading partners. China has emerged as the most important trading partner of the IOR, accounting for 16.1% of its total goods trade in 2017, up from 4.8% in 2000. On the other hand, between 2000 and 2017 the share of trade has declined with other major partners such as the EU (16.8% to 12.0%), the US (13.9% to 7.9%), and Japan (14.6% to 6.5%). Intra-regional trade is even stronger, accounting for 27.2% of total trade in 2017. Increasing share of trade to Asian players marks a shift to the Asian century.
Over 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean (Journal of the Indian Ocean), making the sea lanes of vital strategic importance. This aspect gets magnified as the sea lanes pass through various choke points—the Strait of Hormuz (40%), the Strait of Malacca (35%) and the Bab el-Mandab Strait (8%). Both India and China are dependent on their energy flows from these sea lanes. Over 70 per cent of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East and Africa, which has to transit through these vulnerable choke points. While China is exploring other means of energy supply, the vulnerable sea transport from the Middle East and Africa will remain the primary mode of petroleum import for the foreseeable future. To secure its Sea Lines of Communication, China has embarked on what has been described as its “String of Pearls” geopolitical strategy. Stretching from Gwadar in Baluchistan province of Pakistan to the Hainan Islands, these strategic geopolitical ‘pearls’ have however been non-confrontational, with no evidence as yet of imperial or neocolonial ambition. However, powerful and modernised armed forces provide China with military capabilities that could potentially alter the status quo in future. As of now, for both New Delhi and Beijing, trade and commercial activities will play the dominant role in their strategies for the IOR.
India’s location in the Indian Ocean gives it a unique centrality and importance. While India’s fixation since independence remained on its land borders, to deal with threats posed by China and Pakistan, this changed in the 1990s, when it started to look towards the Oceans to address severe economic problems at home. The Look East policy was initiated to boost trade and commercial ties to Southeast Asia and East Asia, while at the same time, ties were strengthened with the gulf countries to secure energy supplies, to expand trade and to support the Indian diaspora working in these regions. Thus, India’s more militarised continental approach saw a shift towards an economically focussed strategy for the region. This was given a much needed push by the Modi government in 2015, with Prime Minister Modi enunciating a new vision for the IOR, called SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) and a strengthening of the Look East Policy which was called Act East. India’s External Affairs Minister, Ms Sushma Swaraj defined the region as extending from the Gulf of Aden in the West, through Chabahar Port in southwest Iran, and over to Burma and Thailand in the East. The emphasis is on commerce, infrastructure development and diplomatic engagement, all three drivers being critical to India’s domestic economy and electoral politics.
China however treats the Indian Ocean as an extension of its Maritime Silk Road—the trade and infrastructure corridor linking coastal China to other Asian countries—which is a subset of its broader BRI, and seeks to expand China’s links throughout Eurasia. For Beijing, the region has a wider sweep, extending from coastal China to the Saudi peninsula and African littoral. The land half of the BRI, the Silk Road Economic Belt, extends from western China through Central Asia to the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Russia, with both axes have endpoints in Europe. The aim of the BRI hence appears to be to dominate Eurasia, which leads Beijing to pursue an integrated set of trade, commercial, diplomatic, and military initiatives from the South China Sea to the African littoral.
While the emphasis in the IOR is on trade, freedom of navigation and in keeping the Sea Lines of Communication secure, security considerations cannot be overlooked as presently, more than half the world’s armed conflicts are located in the IOR. The waters too are home to continually evolving strategic developments including the competing rises of China and India, potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamist terrorism, growing incidence of piracy in and around the Horn of Africa, and management of diminishing fishery resources. Consequently, there is a substantial deployment of military force in the IOR, with almost all the world’s major powers have deployed substantial military forces in the Indian Ocean region.
Both India and China have genuine aspirations of developing blue water naval capabilities through the development and acquisition of aircraft carriers and an aggressive modernisation and expansion programme. As China increases its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is increasingly focused on countering its Chinese counterpart. However, absent a direct confrontation, it seems likely that military factors will remain secondary drivers. In addition, the dominance of the army in Indian military planning, together with persistent problems in acquiring advanced naval and air equipment to operate in the Indian Ocean, will continue to undermine India’s ability to be a strategic partner to the United States in the region.
The U.S. initiated a pivot or rebalance of its strategy towards Asia in 2011, marking a change in its perspective based on over seven decades of forward presence in East Asia. The Indo-Pacific strategy now enunciated ties the growing U.S.-India relationship to the wider Asia-Pacific region, reflecting the growing economic, trade, and diplomatic links between the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean and those in Southeast and East Asia. In terms of geographical reach, the Indo-Pacific strategy largely excludes Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and the African littoral from its conception of the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. has sought to de-hyphenate India from Pakistan, in order to improve its relations with India and views Pakistan as a part of its South Asia policy, which is focussed on counter terrorism. Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the African littoral are viewed as Middle Eastern or continental African issues, with U.S. strategy in the region being shaped by concerns relating to energy supplies, counter-terrorism, and other security matters.This fits in well with America’s strategic interests in the Middle East, its ongoing troop commitment to Afghanistan, and its global role.
While the U.S. will push for strengthening of ties with India, especially in the military domain, the Indian response will be more measured and cautious. The U.S. will continue to look at the region through a military lens, while the Indian concerns will predominantly be on increasing their economic footprints in the area. The region is likely to witness continued contestation and shifting coalitions between the U.S., India and China with other countries in the IOR and outside powers like Russia and Japan.
China’s aggressive soft power diplomacy has widely been seen as arguably the most important element in shaping the Indian Ocean strategic environment, transforming the entire region’s dynamics. By providing large loans on generous repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, dams, ports, power plants,and railways, and offering military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through its veto powers, China has secured considerable goodwill and influence among countries in the Indian Ocean region.
India’s centrality in the Indian Ocean region and its control over the air and sea lines of communication, provides it geographic domination. While India has increased its engagement with the region since the turn of the century, it faces challenges to its further expansion and cannot compete head-to-head with China which has much deeper pockets and is able to invest far more in trade and commercial investments. New Delhi will hence be forced to calibrate its resistance to Beijing. While increasingly aligning with the U.S., New Delhi will seek to minimise the possibilities of a U.S. China confrontation which could spill out of control. As of now, the further escalation of such geopolitical tensions, as seen in the South China Sea, would threaten freedom of navigation which is vital for the smooth flow of Indian Ocean maritime trade and the openness of the region’s sea routes, which would negatively impact on energy flows.
Neighbouring Countries
China’s growing influence in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal would need to be watched and countered both diplomatically and economically. Closer ties with China provide Bangladesh with a sense of security against India. China values Bangladesh for its immense natural gas reserves where Bangladesh’s geographical proximity to Myanmar makes these reserves accessible to China through pipelines as also providing a strategic foothold to China in South Asia. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Dhaka in 2016, the two countries established a strategic partnership. Bangladesh has been an official partner of the China-led BRI since then. In terms of military cooperation, the Bangladesh armed forces are largely equipped by Chinese armaments. China also sold six surface ships to the Bangladesh Navy between 2009-2015 and two submarines in 2016. But it is the economic ties that form an important aspect of the bilateral relationship. China is Bangladesh’s biggest trading partner with bilateral trade worth USD 10 billion, thought the trade is skewed in China’s favour. In terms of infrastructure development, China is building bridges, roads, railway tracks, airport, and power plants. In terms of economic cooperation, there is greater scope for Bangladesh trade with India. Relevant in this regard is a statement by the Bangladesh Additional Foreign Secretary, “We have nothing to sell to the Chinese. We could sell a great deal more to the Indians if they allowed us.” Bangladesh also shares three of its borders with India and none with China, thereby limiting Bangladesh’s ability to distance itself from India.
While India considers Nepal a part of its sphere of influence, it is increasingly being challenged by China’s inroads into Nepal with China providing assistance in exploiting Nepal’s hydro electric potential and in construction of road and rail linkages. There has thus evolved a multi-layered engagement between China and Nepal which supports its wider South Asia policy. In Myanmar, China's strategic objective appears to be to gain direct access to Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea through Myanmar, bypassing the narrow Straits of Malacca. China has greater economic, political, and military clout than India and India is unlikely to replace China’s position as the most influential country in Myanmar. However, both Chinese and Indian interests converge in Myanmar towards economic development and maintenance of peace. While there would be competition, there would also be cooperation.
Internal Armed Conflict and Terrorism
Internally, conflict in India’s Northeast has reduced considerably, though Manipur still remains disturbed and getting peace to Nagaland is still a work in being. Concerns remain in Assam about illegal immigration, wherein the influx of Bangladeshis has considerably altered the demography in certain areas. Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has been contained from the levels that existed in the period 2004-2014, but while the number of districts affected by LWE has reduced, the ability of the Maoists to cause casualties to the security forces remains. However, concerted efforts by the Centre and the states, both in enhancing security measures as well as in effective development produces has reduced the reach of the Maoists and they are getting confined to increasingly smaller spaces.
The situation in J&K remains volatile. Conflict in the state is externally sponsored which is why it remains difficult to achieve conflict resolution. In Sri Lanka, the Island nation’s military was able to defeat the LTTE because they were able to seal the battle space. The Soviet Union’s inability to do so let to their exit from Afghanistan. The U.S. too, in its war against terror in Afghanistan, has not been able to defeat the Taliban as the latter have safe havens within Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistani support to terrorism in J&K has enabled the conflict to continue over the last three decades. However, the change in policy being adopted against Pakistan after calling out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, is likely to reduce Pakistan’s overt support to the terrorist groups operating in the state. There is also a concerted effort by the Indian authorities to pursue the money trail and restrict the money flows to the coffers of terrorist groups. This, in conjunction with legal action being initiated against the Hurriyat and other groups supporting the terrorist in the state is likely to have a positive impact and will likely lead to peace returning to the state.
A matter of concern is the Islamic State (IS) indicating its presence in India. IS's Amaq News Agency, in an announcement on 10 May 2019, named the new province, “Wilayah of Hind”. The easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka which killed over 250 people, had linkages with groups in Southern India, which indicated that the ideological spread of the IS has made some inroads in certain parts of India. While the investigative agencies have made a number of arrests and while the IS has not carried out any terror attack in India, it would be advisable to err on the side of caution and presume the existence of sleeper cells which could get activated.
ASSESSMENT
As China and India rise politically and economically on the world stage, it is natural that they compete with one another for influence. Rivalry between the two nations will be fuelled especially by each country's efforts to reach into the other's traditional spheres of influence, for example, China in South Asia and India in Southeast Asia. China's willingness to overlook human rights and democracy concerns in its relations with the smaller South Asian states will at times leave India at a disadvantage in asserting its power in the region, as was seen recently in Nepal and Sri Lanka. India will need to significantly enlarge its economic footprint in the South Asian region to ensure it maintains an edge in its traditional spheres of influence.
Energy competition between India and China is also reflected in the two countries' assertions of naval power. As India reaches into the Malacca Strait, Beijing is developing facilities along the Indian Ocean littoral to protect sea lanes and ensure uninterrupted energy supplies. Militarily, there can be no let up in India’s preparation to counter any Chinese misadventure. In the Himalayas, India will have to ensure air superiority at least in the areas South of the Tsang Po River. It will also have to upgrade its artillery capability in the mountains as well as develop infrastructure compatible to that which China has built up in Tibet. India will also have to ensure that its Navy maintains an edge in the Indian Ocean region to protect national interests. To that extent, it is time that the country takes a de novo look on prioritising its defence expenditure to meet the challenges of the future. India also needs to change the way in which advice is tendered to the Government so that the Services concerns are adequately represented to ensure that the nations defence is not compromised.
Pakistan is unlikely to cease support to terrorist groups which it uses as its strategic assets against India. However, it will lay greater stress on promoting and using indigenous groups within the state of J&K to target the security forces or to carry out suicide attacks, so that the blowback against Pakistan can be avoided. India will, however continue to put diplomatic, economic and political pressure against Pakistan, to compel it mend its ways. In case of Pakistani intransigence, a military response by India remains a high possibility.
The downward trend in terrorist related activity in areas impacted by LWE is likely to continue. However, resolving the problem is unlikely at least in the immediate future. We are likely to see sporadic attacks by the Maoists in the coming years, thought he intensity and the frequency will see a decrease.
The coming decade will see a further decrease in violence levels in the Northeast. A political solution to the problem in Nagaland is possible and would greatly alter the security scenario in the entire region. However, the problem of illegal infiltration, which has altered the demographic balance is likely to create social tension in the region which would require strong governance to keep the situation under control. However, much of the angst will be reduced if the Act East policy of the Centre creates huge economic opportunities for the states
The state of J&K is likely to limp back to normalcy, provided the Centre continues with the firm policy which it has adopted, which constitutes firm action against the terrorists by the Army, restricting financial flows to terrorist groups, and investigating and prosecuting all those involved in fraudulent financial dealings and in providing support to terrorist groups. Certain legislations, like repeal of Article 35A and the abrogation of Article 370 may throw up temporary instability, but will in the long run lead to the emotional integration of the state with the rest of the Union.
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