An extremely complex region in human terms, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) includes within its ambit a wide variety of races, cultures, and religions. Differences in development levels and pace of economic growth, varying political structures with different levels of stability, demographic pressures, ethnic and religious tensions and wide variations in the quality of governance in the rim countries of the Ocean add to the complexity of the region.
Though Asia is home to over half the world’s population, at the turn of the century, it accounted for barely 35 percent of the world’s GDP at PPP $. Even this low figure marked a quantum leap from the earlier three centuries, as Asia’s economy shrank while the Western economies expanded, powered by the industrial revolution and advances in science. But the gradual transformation of Asia since 1950 has reversed a long historical trend and by 2020, Asia will equal the world’s GDP in PPP terms and thereafter will surpass it. This is largely attributed to the growth of India and China and also to the growth of smaller and mid-size countries. In a sense, we are seeing the reset of history, for towards the end of the 17th century, Asia accounted for over two-thirds of the global GDP. Today, while Asia still remains poorer than the rest of the world, the gap is narrowing, marking the end of “The west’s two-century epoch as global powerhouse” as Kishore Madhubani puts it in his book, “Has the West Lost it?”.
This shift marks the appearance of the Indian Ocean as a key emerging region in world affairs and a major transit route for the world’s shipping and energy needs. Over two-thirds of global oil shipments and one-third of global bulk shipping trade, including petroleum products and coal transit across this region. About 80 per cent of the world’s maritime oil trade flows through three narrow choke points in the Indian Ocean—Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. Unhindered flow of trade and energy resources would need stability in the region and security of the sea lanes of communication. Changes in the regional and global geo-political landscape are posing challenges to stability in the IOR which could lead to tensions that may play out over the sea lanes. Non-traditional maritime threats ranging from maritime terrorism to natural disasters, human smuggling and illegal fishing, could further increase the risks to maritime security and stability.
Geo-political Landscape
The Western limit of the Indian Ocean is defined by the East African coast, stretching from South Africa to Somalia. The African coastline states are relatively stable barring Somalia. The criticality of the region pertains to the narrow Bab-el-Mandeb outlet from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Northeast of the Strait lies Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with the latter embroiled in a civil war, where Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, in 2014, allied with the Houthi rebels against the government led by Mr Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The conflict escalated in 2015 with Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states, jumping in the fray to support Hadi. In 2017, the Houthis broke with Saleh and he was killed in December of that year. The Houthis are seeking independence for South Yemen. The region remains a flashpoint which could lead to a wider conflagration, especially as Iran is supporting the Houthis. In the Horn, Somalia remains unstable, increasing the risks of piracy in the region. While Somalia has no strategic importance, it is a source of violent Islamist extremism that affects neighbouring states and its poverty has been a source of piracy.
The major challenge in the Red Sea and Horn will thus remain to achieve regional stability and end piracy.
The Strait of Hormuz is another flashpoint, especially since the US reimposed sanctions on Iran, after withdrawing from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the grounds that the Agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its role in regional wars. Iran has responded by resuming some of its nuclear activities, leaving the deal in a tenuous state. Tensions in the region have risen following attacks on oil tankers in May 2019 in the Persian Gulf, which the US blames Iran of orchestrating and which Iran denies. Tensions flared further when the United Kingdom seized an Iranian oil tanker of the coast of Gibraltar in July on suspicion it carried Iranian crude oil to Syria in breach of European Union sanctions against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran thereafter seized a British flagged oil tanker in the Start of Hormuz, further escalating tensions in the Gulf. Needless to say, a conflagration in the Gulf could also spill over to the Bab-el-Mandeb, which will have serious ramifications across the world, but more so on the Asian economies heavily dependent on crude supplies from the Gulf.
Within the Gulf, while the civil war in Iraq is over, the Islamic State continues with a lower-scale insurgency. In Syria, the civil war still rages, with numerous factions, both foreign and domestic involved, including the Islamic State. Iran, Russia and Hezbollah support the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad while the US-led international coalition, established in 2014 with the declared purpose of ousting the Islamic State, supports the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria and its armed wing, the SDF, materially, financially, and logistically. Turkey is also directly involved in operations against the Syrian government since August 2016. The region hence remains volatile, and is also seeing the play out of an ethnic conflict between the Sunni and Shia, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, with both countries jockeying to increase their influence.
In South Asia, the situation in Afghanistan remains a major concern. Elsewhere, the region has varying levels of stability, though strained relations between India and Pakistan remain a source of concern. Conflict between the two is however unlikely, though Pakistan’s attempts to ratchet up terrorist attacks on Indian soil will be responded with increasing vigour by India. The abrogation of provisions of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution and the break up of the state of J&K into two Union Territories—The Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of J&K (With a legislature) has led to a heightening of tensions between the two countries, but over the long term, this will lead to stability in the region.
Conflict continues to rage in Afghanistan, with the Taliban appearing to be on an ascendant path, following the proposed withdrawal of US forces from the region. Pakistan is riddled with terrorist factions, some of which it supports and others which are fighting against the state. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are also vulnerable to terror attacks, though both states are taking resolute measures to combat the menace.
In Southeast Asia, the broader risks driving security and stability in the subregion are shaped by the threats posed by piracy and by ethnic and sectarian divisions. The concerns of most ASEAN countries therefore revolve around dealing with extremism, terrorism, and ethnic and sectarian tensions and threats. There is also concern expressed about the strategic threats posed by rising competition with China. China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea, which borders many states in the region, add to the complexity of Southeast Asian security concerns. All of the states in the region, with the exception, of Myanmar – have some form of security ties to the United States.
India is also expanding its footprints in the IOR as a counter to Chinese moves to gain salience in the Indian Ocean. China already has its footprints in the region, having built the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. It has also constructed a port in Karachi, several ports in Myanmar, and container terminals in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. While none of these ports have become naval bases, their potential for such use in future remains a possibility. Chinese concerns in the IOR mainly stem from its need to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf. It will thus continue to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India.
India sees itself as the dominant naval power in the IOR in spite of the role that US air and sea forces have played and continue to play in the region. China’s emergence as a major air-sea power is a challenge to India’s position in the IOR and a future source of political or military challenges to India, besides being a potential source of aid to Pakistan. China will continue with its efforts to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India, primarily to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf.
The US remains the dominant outside power in the Gulf and in the IOR. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, described as a strategic “rebalancing” of its interests from Europe and the Middle East toward East Asia, is a signal that the US will be less obsessed with the happenings in the Gulf, especially as it is no longer dependent on energy supplies from the region. With East Asia becoming the “Economic Centre of Gravity,” there will be increased focus of the US in East Asia and the IOR. The US will however remain committed to the defence of the Gulf and will maintain a major presence in the IOR. The US most likely will also continue to seek closer ties, both military end economic with countries dotting the Pacific rim, which will enhance economic opportunities as well as providing these countries a hedge against growing Chinese power, which is getting increasingly assertive, clashing with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands to laying expansive claims elsewhere in disputed maritime territory. While the rise of China is the single biggest causal explanation for the pivot, there are other concerns too, which encompass issues such as nuclear proliferation, climate change and the need to ensure free passage across the seas.
The coming years will see an increasingly contested regional security landscape. The waning of American power will see its disengagements from many of the conflicts in the region, which also explains the desire of the Trump administration to disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq. The US will increasingly look towards a shared reliance on a network of allies to retain dominance in the Indo-Pacific against a China which is getting more capable to challenge the regional order by force.
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