LESSONS FROM THE 1965 WAR

No war takes place in a vacuum. There are indicators strewn all over, but the rhetoric of peace sometimes blinds decision makers to the possibility of conflict. Such indeed was the case in 1965. The hyperbole that emanated from Pakistan in the early sixties was of such decibels that it should have set the alarm bells ringing in South Block. A cursory look at the content of their media - both radio and print should have caused India to sit up and take notice, but for some unfathomable reason, war with Pakistan was never considered as a serious possibility. That represents the first lesson of the 1965 war - both political and military. Pay heed to what the enemy is saying - and prepare accordingly. Today, when Pakistan talks of using nuclear weapons against India, it cannot be construed as bluff and bluster. The antidote must be readied now, to include signalling of resolve and intent, as much as development of capacity and capability.

Preparedness for war is a long drawn process. No nation is ever able to maintain a hundred percent readiness rate. But the capacity to reach that level within a set period of time must be aimed for. The early sixties were a period of rejuvenation for Pakistan. They were getting stronger economically through beneficial alliances with the West, which led to the flow of great economic and military assistance. India was reeling from the 1962 debacle and internally, its economy was poor, wheat was being imported from the US, and there were myriad agitations taking place in the country, from the language agitation in Tamil Nadu to insurgency in the Northeast, a restive Punjab, agitating for Punjabi Suba and increased dissonance in Jammu and Kashmir, for a variety of reasons. Geopolitically, Pakistan had all the major powers aligned with it, or at lease not overtly hostile to it. India, was not so fortunately placed. A perceived Indian weakness was the trigger which led to war. Which brings home the second lesson. A strong military is the best antidote to war. This again is a function of capacity, capability and will. Politically, the lessons were well learnt as India went in for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union, which enabled India to successfully pursue operations in East Pakistan in 1971, leading eventually to the birth of Bangladesh. But militarily, the lessons, though known, are far from being addressed. We still have a weak military industrial complex, the government run research institutes and defence production facilities continuously underperform, hollowness within the Services, especially in the Army and Air Force is high, and we are today, the worlds largest importers of defence equipment. This opens up the country to foreign pressures and forced compromises and is an aspect which need to be urgently addressed. While the present government is cognisant of and sensitive to the issues involved, and the Prime Minister no less, has embarked on an ambitious ‘Make in India’ campaign, the road ahead is long and arduous and will require dramatic changes in the functioning of the Ministry of Defence and other organs of the government of India.

A brief overview of the war makes it easy to compartmentalise it into various stages. Operations in Kutch, in April 1965, Operation Gibraltar, launched by Pakistan in August, Grand Slam launched by Pakistan on 1 September, and then the Indian counter offensives on night 5/6 September and 8 September, called Operations Riddle and Nepal respectively. And to complete the picture, a counter launched by Pakistan in Khem Karan - Operation Mailed Fist on 8 September.

India was unfortunately surprised at each stage. We were caught unaware at Kutch, which should have forced us to raise our guard. We did not do so and were surprised again in J&K when thousands of infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line (CFL) on 1 August, as part of Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar. To add salt to our festering wounds we were surprised yet again when Pakistan launched Grand Slam on 1 September in Chhamb. Divine providence and incompetence of the Pakistan military prevented the fall of Akhnur, which lay exposed and was open to capture that very day itself. We were surprised for the fourth time with the sudden appearance of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division in Kasur. This constituted serious drawbacks in our external intelligence collection methodology, which persist till date. The Army too, missed obvious signals and was repeatedly surprised. Serious lacunae still exist in our intelligence set up, as reflected by Kargil in mid 1999. While efforts are being to made towards this end, much more needs to be done towards integrating the efforts of various agencies and introducing at least some levels of accountability in the system. 

The operational and tactical level also threw up a host of lessons which have applicability today.

Foremost is the need to be mentally and physically prepared for war. In 1965, there was a feeling which existed throughout the field army, that there would be no war. Despite Kutch, despite Gibraltar, despite Grand Slam, units on the ground were not sure whether they would actually go to war or not. This constitutes a very serious failure of command, especially at the level of brigade and above. Ultimately, when units were pushed into battle, they were not mentally prepared for war. The imperatives for secrecy were such that troops which went into battle on the first day, on night 5/6 September, went in hopelessly unprepared, lacking briefing and a clear concept of what was expected of them. The enemy was certainly surprised, but the advantage was frittered away in a lack of direction - a result of commanders at division level and below, not being clear about their tasks or the end state objectives to be achieved. It however redounds to the credit of the units and formations that they still performed creditably, despite the limitations faced by them.

The 1965 war was fought in silos, with no worthwhile integration taking place in operational plans between the Army and the Air Force. It was apparent that both sides were fighting their own war, independent of each other, leading to a lack of synergy in operations. This proved to be costly and constitutes yet another important lesson of the 1965 war - the necessity to bring forth the total combat power of a country against an adversary. We are still far from achieving that goal, despite mouthing platitudes on such issues. The aspect of integrating the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ though a Chief of Defence Staff is repeatedly stressed, but action on that front remains slow due to a host of factors, not least being resistance within the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ themselves. This would require political will to pull through, much on the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, of the United States. 

Administratively, the field army was ill prepared for war. It seem surprising that units and formations went into battle, including the famous 1 Armoured Division, without adequate maps of the area. These were peace time issues which unfortunately were not addressed. It continues to be India’s Achilles heel even today as our experience of Operation Pawan and other out of area contingencies shows. The Survey of India comes under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and much greater integration is required in its functioning with the armed forces. The Armed Forces too, need to be more proactive in projecting their demands well in time.

It also seems surprising that troops went into battle in the plains without anti tank weapons. The 106 mm anti tank gun was made available to troops of 4 Infantry Division only on 7 September 1965. Why this was not done in the months leading up to the war indicates severe administrative lapses at senior levels of command. Communication equipment was also deficient/ unreliable, which seriously impacted the conduct of operations. A lot of these deficiencies stand rectified today, but it needs to be emphasised that communications at the ground level, need to be reliable and foolproof. Preparation for war takes place during peace time and commanders need to hone their administrative skills to avoid such lapses.

Finally, a word about leadership. At the tactical level, the leadership was commendable. That continues to be the state today. At the operational level, the leadership exhibited was weak and vacillating. Even today, the focus in the military is not so much on winning the war, as ensuring that we do not lose. A more offensive orientation in senior military leadership is required. In 1965, we missed many opportunities to exploit success. XI Corps operations could have exploited the success achieved in the opening stages of the offensive when Dograi was captured. There were other fleeting opportunities during the war which were not seized. The biggest failure in offensive operations was however the stalling of 1 Corps operations on 8 September. Boldness shown on that day could have led to the defeat of the Pakistan army, but the momentum was allowed to lapse due to faulty appreciation of ground realities. That opportunity was not to come again. Herein lies the challenge for the Armed Forces. While we continue to produce outstanding tactical commanders, very few come up to the level of acumen as displayed by Lt Gen. Sagat Singh in 1971. That needs to change.

Overall, the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces is something which the nation can be proud off. But  we would do well to remember, that going to war is a complete national effort. The wherewithal to fight long drawn out battles must come from within the country, which means that we have to concentrate on building capacities, capabilities and skills. These are long term efforts, but only through such proficiency will we be in a position to prosecute and win wars. Most importantly, the existence of military capability, remains the best antidote to war.

Published in SALUTE Magazine, Aug-Sep, 2015

An analysis of 1965 Indo-Pak War

A study of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan makes for interesting reading, but more importantly, even fifty years later, holds important lessons for the country. 

The war was brought on by Pakistan’s intransigence and failure to accept the fact that the accession of the state of J&K to India was final and could not be undone.  To keep the Kashmir issue alive in the international arena, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the Kashmir Publicity Committee in 1964. It was this committee that first mooted the proposal to President Khan, to send Pakistani army personnel, disguised as infiltrators into J&K, to create an uprising in the state, which would then be followed up by a quick offensive by the Pakistani army to capture the strategic township of Akhnur. President Khan and his army chief, General Musa, initially demurred, as they felt that such a move could lead to a full scale war with India. However, In April 1965, Ayub Khan gave the go ahead for these operations despite his army chief still having reservations on the subject. Consequently, in August 1965, about 8000 to 10,000 infiltrators crossed over into J&K to create a mass uprising in the state in an operation codenamed Gibraltar.

Though the Indian Army was initially taken by surprise, it reacted swiftly and with firmness and by the end of the month, most of the infiltrators were either killed or captured. The few that remained, were thoroughly demoralised and by mid-September had exfiltrated back to Pakistan. The operations conducted by 19 Infantry Division also resulted in the capture of the strategic Hajipir Pass on 28 August 1965, which gave India a direct link between Poonch and Uri. the capture of the Hajipir Pass also cut off the major ingress routes into J&K. While Gibraltar had been defeated, Pakistan continued with the second part of its plan, which envisaged the capture of Akhnur in an operation codenamed ‘Grand Slam’. 

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan carried out a surprise attack on Chhamb. At this time, the defences in Chhamb were held by 191 Infantry Brigade. The brigade had four battalions, two of which were deployed in the Kalidhar  ranges, one on the ceasefire line (CFL) in the plains sector and the fourth battalion around the Mandiala heights near Chhamb. Beyond Chhamb, upto Akhnur, there were no forces available to guard positions in depth. For this operation, Pakistan used two armoured regiments to spearheaded an attack launched by an infantry division and supported by the fire of over a 100 artillery guns. 

Despite the overwhelming superiority of the Pakistani forces, which outnumbered the Indians by more than six times, the defenders put up a staunch resistance. Though the lone battalion holding defences along the CFL was overrun, the depth defence held out and the Pakistanis could not cross the Munawar Wali Tawi that day. That night, Indian forces withdrew in good order to take up defences in Akhnur. On 2 September, Pakistan occupied Chhamb as the Indian forces had withdrawn the previous night. Here, they made the strategic blunder of waiting for two days before resuming the offensive. By that time, Indian troops had taken up defences in Jaurian and also in the Fatwal ridge, which prevented the enemy from capturing Akhnur. 

To relieve pressure on Akhnur, India launched operations against Pakistan across the International Border (IB) on 6 September. This forced the Pakistanis to pull back their forces in the Akhnur sector as Indian offensives threatened the Pakistani townships of Lahore and Sialkot. 

Indian offensive operations in the Lahore sector were carried out by XI Corps, on three axes, to threaten Lahore. These operations were launched on 6 September with mixed results. In the Khem Karan Sector, the attacks launched by 4 Infantry Division were beaten back by the Pakistanis, with heavy losses to own troops. On 8 September, Pakistan launched a counter attack with its 1 Armoured Division, with the avowed aim of capturing Amritsar and Delhi. In a heroic defence put up by the troops of 4 Indian Division, from 8 to 10 September 1965, in the fields astride the villages of Asal Uttar and Chima, more than a 100 Pakistani tanks were destroyed. This was a serious body blow to Pakistan which now had no capability left to carry out offensive operations. This was the place where CQMH Abdul Hamid was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for gallantry in operations, for single handedly destroying a large number of enemy Patton tanks, before he himself was killed by enemy tank fire.

The Indian offensive in the Sialkot sector started on 8 September, with an advance by India’s 1 Corps, but did not achieve much headway initially. Thereafter, it was resumed on 11 September and the township of Phillora was captured. This area saw some of the heaviest tank battles since World War 2, in which the enemy’s 6 Armoured Division suffered very heavy casualties. However, India could not capture the strategic township of Chawinda, which would have enabled the Indian forces to completely destroy Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division. When the ceasefire took effect on 23 September, Indian was in possession of vast amounts of Pakistani territory, but the Pakistan Army had not been defeated. However, India had achieved its wartime aim of protecting Jammu and Kashmir from aggression and in destroying a major part of the enemy’s offensive potential.

An analysis of the war throws up many shortcomings, which India would do well to heed. the first of these was the failure of intelligence. India was surprised by Operation Gibraltar, launched on 1 August and again by Grand Slam launched on 1 September. We also did not know that Pakistan had raised a new armoured division which very nearly proved disastrous for us in Asal Uttar. This reflects a critical weakness in gathering external intelligence, which has been repeated in 1971 and later in Kargil. It is evident that India’s external intelligence agencies need to be revamped, otherwise we are likely to be surprised again.

Another weakness was in wartime preparations leading up to the war. There were critical shortages of basic requirements needed to prosecute war. The attacking troops did not have maps of the area, communication equipment was poor, many infantry battalions were still holding the outdated .303 rifle, anti tank guns were not available upto authorisation, and vehicles with the units were in short supply. In Asal Uttar, the 106 mm recoilless guns were made available to the units only on 7 September, just a day before Pakistan launched an attack! It was the sheer grit of the Indian Army which saved the day, but such callousness needs to be overcome. The problem areas that need to be addressed lie in the Ministry of Defence. Here, bureaucrats wield power without accountability and the Services have to shoulder responsibility without power. It is imperative that integration of military personnel in the Ministry of Defence takes place at the earliest, as recommended by various committees formed by the government. That we have still failed to do so points to a very serious lacuna in our defence preparedness, which may cost the country dearly in any future conflict.

Another major weakness was the total lack of integration in war plans between the Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each Service prosecuted its war independently, which resulted in lack of synergy in operations. This lacuna too needs to be overcome through institutionalising mechanisms for joint operations. A step has been made by creating the Integrated Defence Staff, but we have to go much further than this and create the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, who shall be the single point advisor to the Raksha Mantri, as is the norm in all modern militaries across the world. Resistance by the Services will have to be overcome by firm directions from the political authority.

Finally, we need to ponder why Pakistan took the gamble of carrying out offensive operations in August and early September, knowing fully well that this could lead to war with India. Simply put, they perceived India to be militarily weak. This was the time when Pakistan was equipped with modern military hardware from the West and its economy was robust and growing steadily. India, on the other hand was recovering from the after-affects of the 62 war with China and was beset with internal problems in the Punjab, J&K, Tamil Nadu and in parts of Northeast India. It was Pakistan’s belief that a quick offensive would give them disproportionate gains and that in the event of an all out war, the world body would call an early end to hostilities. Pakistani miscalculation led to war. 

Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. Let us therefore, remain prepared at all times.

Published in Organiser, Sep 13, 2015.