FIVE FINGERS AND THE PALM

Soon after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed power in China, its Chairman, Mao Zedong, described Tibet as his right palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as its five fingers. Mao’s expansionist policies became evident when he annexed Tibet in 1950, and then devoted hs attention to dominating, if not taking over, the entire Himalayan range. Because the world was silent when China occupied Tibet, the CCP was emboldened to move towards the five fingers.

China made its first move towards Ladakh when it started construction of a 1200 km long road connecting East Turkestan (Xinjiang) with Western Tibet, of which 179 kms of the road passed through the Aksai Chin, which was part of Ladakh. China began construction of this road in 1951 and completed the same in 1957. Surprisingly, India’s political establishment as well as its intelligence agencies remained blissfully unaware of Chinese incursions into the Aksai Chin till the Chinese themselves publicly inaugurated this road and marked it on their maps. India found that it could do little to change the status quo, other than making weak feeble protests.

India’s post independence political leadership was, for some unfathomable reasons, enamoured with the Chinese ruling establishment and never for a moment thought that they had a potential enemy at their doorsteps. This lack of strategic comprehension of what national security demanded was in ample display in an incident which occured shortly after India achieved independence on 15 August 1947. General Sir Rob Lockhart, a British officer who was appointed as the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, took a strategic plan to the prime minister, asking for a government directive on the defence policy. Mr Nehru blew his top. “Rubbish,” he shouted, “total rubbish! We don't need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs”.

This lack of strategic thought was to cost India dearly. In 1950, China annexed the palm which Mao had spoken off and within a few years thereafter, they had sliced off a portion of the Ladakh finger—the Aksai Chin. As the world quietly acquiesced to an expansionist China, it continued with its plans to control the fingers. Thus was born the Chinese rationale of staking claims over the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, all the while keeping a surreptitious glance at the rest of Ladakh, where their focus was on Gilgit-Baltistan. This region was part of the Ladakh Wazarat during the Dogra rule but was illegally occupied by Pakistan post independence. In an agreement signed between Pakistan and China on 2 March 1963, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley—an area of approximately 7000 square kilometres bounded by the Kun Lun Mountains in the north and the Karakoram peaks to the south, to China. Today, Chinese forays into Gilgit Baltistan, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has given China virtual control over this region.

Chinese actions in Eastern Ladakh and Sikkim in May-June 2020, their claims over Arunachal Pradesh, their recent forays in Nepal and their constant needling of Bhutan must be seen in the light of their long term aim to gain control over the entire Himalayan range. This gives China direct access to the waters which flow into the downstream countries, which in turn gives Beijing leverage over South Asia. At present, in the Eastern Himalayas, the Chinese control little water except for the  Yarlung Tsangpo (the name of the Brahmaputra River as it flows in Tibet). The river takes a U turn at its Eastern extremity as it circumvents the Namcha Barwa massif and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang River. But the waters of the Tsangpo are just a small part of the total waters of the Brahmaputra River which eventually drain into the Bay of Bengal. Even if China were somehow to develop the technology to transfer the Tsangpo waters in a cost effective manner to its own parched lands, the impact on the downstream countries would not be significant as the catchment areas of the Brahmaputra River are the Southern slopes of the Eastern Himalayas. This explains Beijing’s motive for claiming Arunachal Pradesh.

Likewise, China is angling for influence and domination in Nepal and Bhutan and is seeking to exert pressure on India in Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh. Should China get control, it would facilitate dam construction and enable the regulation and flow of water to the downstream countries, forcing them to remain in China’s servitude. That appears to be China’s larger game plan for gaining control over the five fingers. In addition, the glacial waters which China hopes to get through this land grab would service its massive semi-conductor industries. A typical semiconductor manufacturing facility uses 2-4 million gallons of ultra-pure water per day. Eastern Ladakh, in addition, also provides China with an opportunity to shorten the loop of the BRI-CPEC sustaining Western Karakoram Highway via Kashgar and to connect a fresh alignment through the Karakoram Pass, shortening the present highway passing though East Turkestan by 1800 km.

China aims to be the sole power in Asia and the alternate pole to the US in the world.  Towards this end it seeks India territory in the Himalayan Range, which will provide  it great strategic advantage through control of water and shortening communication links. It is a nefarious plan which must be nipped in the bud. The surest way for India to protect the five fingers is to support a free and independent Tibet. With the palm as an independent entity, China is denied access to the Himalayan Range. An independent Tibet is a strategic necessity for India and for peace and stability in the sub-continent.

For India Foundation - Chintan.

India - China Relations: Deal with a Measure of Pragmatism

Much has been written on the possible future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Will India and China be partners? Or, are they unavoidable rivals? Some, like the late Bharat Verma, visualised an intransigent China which, sooner rather than later, would attack India - a throwback to the 1962 conflict which rankles India but which, surprisingly, is not much talked about in China. The optimists, on the other hand, promote the concept of ‘Chindia’ - a term coined by Goldman Sachs, suggesting that both India and China could jointly create a new world order. In April 2005, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called the economic cooperation between the two countries as the ‘two pagodas of hardware and software’, some were ready to believe that the statement reflected a deep rapprochement between the two countries which could give rise to a new Asian trade and power bloc. Both these viewpoints appear to be oversimplifications, reflecting long held fears and hopes in equal measure.

In the Preface to his book ‘India’s China Policy’ (Indiana University Press, 1962), P. C. Chakravarti wrote: “The key to Sino-Indian relations lies hidden in the soil of Tibet. It is on the rocks of the Roof of the World that our friendship with China will flourish or flounder”. Written in 1961, the premise of the author still appears to be valid. The unresolved border and territorial dispute between the two countries that led to the conflict in 1962 and the refuge given by India to the Dalai Lama, are issues which continue to bedevil relations between the two countries. Chinese sensitivity on the question of Tibet is well known, China being wary of any type of support being given to the independence movement in Tibet. To these historical legacies have been added Chinese plans for hydrographical projects on the Yarlung Tsang Po river, Chinese concerns over the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement deal and the increasing military cooperation between India and the USA, which China perceives as being directed at isolating China. On the Indian side, Chinese support to Pakistan - especially in the field of nuclear and missile technology and the strategic nature of its partnership with that country – have led many Indian defence analysts to believe that the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India is being done at the behest of China. This is to ostensibly confine India to the backwaters of South Asia and prevent its emergence as a dominant player in world affairs, in conformity with a Chinese saying that ‘one mountain cannot hold two tigers’!

In 1954, the Indian leadership believed that Sino-Indian relations could be conducted with ‘mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non aggression, mutual non interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit’. Thus was signed the Sino Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954, relating to trade and other contacts between ‘the Tibet region of China and India’. This was also called the Panchsheel Treaty. The ink had hardly dried on these admirable sentiments when acrimony broke out between the two countries on what constituted the border, and of border violations by each side. Real politics is devoid of sentiment as rightly stated by Dr Buchanan-Hamilton, who when advising Lord Hastings against the occupation of Nepal, pointed out that ‘a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace’ (Papers Respecting the Nepaul War - The Administration of the Marquis of Hastings in India, India House Library, Page 45). A newly independent India had yet to learn that lesson.

The border issue remains intractable, even after nineteen rounds of talks, the latest being held in April 2016 amid growing discord between the two nations over Beijing blocking India’s bid to get JeM chief Masood Azhar banned by the UN. This is hardly surprising. The dispute is both a border dispute as well as a territorial dispute, with China occupying the Aksai Chin area and also laying claims to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The origins of the dispute were not created by the present disputants, the dispute having originated under Manchu China and Imperial Britain, against the backdrop of the ‘great game’ of the nineteenth century between Russia and Britain. Today, India and China are trying to solve a problem which their imperialist predecessors found either insoluble or undesirable to solve. The narrative on both sides has reinforced legacy attitudes, which makes acceptance of any position well nigh impossible.

Rather than attempting to solve the problem, it may be more prudent to simply freeze the issue for future generations to solve. In the interim, both sides could look into the possibility of delineating the positions held by each side on the ground with exchange of maps, and without any prejudice to the claims of either side. Even this limited course of action has little traction with the Chinese, making any further headway impossible. The Chinese have nothing to lose by keeping the issue open as they have the military muscle to hold on to the areas they are currently in occupation of. These they consider to be ‘de facto resolved issues’. Negotiation for the Chinese implies seeking an adjustment of the areas they lay claim to, which is not just the Tawang tract but the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Obviously, India cannot accede to this. The larger danger for India lies in the growing military asymmetry with China. As of now, India can effectively ensure against a Chinese military adventure to forcibly take its claimed areas. Within a decade from now, the military situation may tilt so drastically in Beijing’s favour that she could be tempted to resolve the issue through the use of force. That situation can be guarded against by ensuring adequate military capability to defend Indian interests. Diplomacy can only take us that far.

The river waters issue is much hyped, and often misunderstood. It is true that China is building dams at the Great Bend in the Yarlung Tsang Po river; but a deeper understanding of the issues is required. Firstly, as of now, there is no technology available to take the waters of the Tsang Po river to other parts of China. Secondly, and more importantly, is the fact that the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, as they enter India to become the Siang river, constitute just a small percentage of total water flows in the Brahmaputra basin. The average discharge of the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India is just about 1980 cumec. This increases to 16,240 cumec as the river enters Assam to form the Brahmaputra. This is mostly due to the very high levels of precipitation within the catchment areas in India and Bhutan. So the water issue is not about the Chinese attempting to divert the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, but the possible impact of what could happen if the waters are dammed and released suddenly. India needs to have an agreement with China on information sharing of water flows in the Yarlung Tsang Po, which could subsequently be followed up with a treaty.

Transparency in data sharing and the development of required data matrix is the ultimate necessity. With the association of basin neighbours, India and China should organise such a Core Data Agency (CDA). In the meantime, India should, on its own, keep regular tabs on the water inflow from the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India to form the Siang river and thereafter, periodically monitor flow levels all along the course of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. Satellite imagery of the area will also keep India abreast of the ground situation with respect to water flows and construction activities on the Yarlung Tsang Po.

The Tibet issue and the status of the Dalai Lama are of serious concern to China. The Dalai Lama remains the honoured guest of India, and this is a situation not to the liking of the Chinese. Most Tibetans are not prepared to accept Chinese sovereignty, and the struggle within Tibet, though largely peaceful, simmers and could take a violent turn. What were to happen after the passing away of the present Dalai Lama? That is a question which worries the Chinese, as they seek ways and means to put their own nominee as the next Dalai Lama. While India has not allowed the Dalai Lama to carry out political activities in India, his very presence poses a threat to the Chinese, as he is seen as a symbol of Tibetan resistance. Some observers see the Chinese claims over the Tawang tract as a ploy to ensure that the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama does not come from Tawang, which is the seat of one of the sacred Buddhist monasteries. How this pans out in the future will impact ties between India and China.

China remains concerned about the strategic partnership developing between the USA and India, just as India is concerned about the close strategic embrace of Pakistan by China that is perceived to be aimed against India. While the key to the India-China relationship does lie on the soil of Tibet, geopolitical realities also play a significant role towards that end. Today, Sino- Indian politics go far beyond their mere bilateral significance. While India is too big a player to be the willing handmaiden of any particular power bloc, the fact remains that it suits US interests to leverage India as a counterweight against China. To that extent, both US and Indian interests stand aligned against what is perceived to be an increasingly assertive China on the world stage. While continuing with enhancing the security component of its relationship with the US, India would continue to develop its relations with China through cooperation on the economic front as well as on issues which affect both countries in the international arena.

China however, is unlikely to let go of its support to Pakistan, despite the fact that such support could have a negative impact on China’s restive Xinjiang province. The much hyped China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) should, however, not cause too many sleepless nights in New Delhi. The internal security situation in Pakistan – especially the movement within Baluchistan for independence, the ongoing conflict against the Taliban in FATA, and the various ethnic and sectarian conflicts that Pakistan is plagued with – all work against the fruition of the envisaged corridor. It would be in India’s interest to extend moral and diplomatic support to the people of Baluchistan, which would serve Indian interests in obviating the China-Pak strategic axis.

Equally worrying for India as of now, is the presence of a large number of Chinese personnel, many of whom are from their military, in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of POK. Reports emanating from the region point to demographic changes being made in the area, with a large number of Sunni settlers from the Punjab coming into the region, altering both its ethnic and sectarian demography. India would do well to extend its support to the indigenous people of the region, to preserve their lifestyle and culture.

In the final analysis, India needs a measure of pragmatism in its policy of dealing with China. Increased trade flows do not by themselves lead to an absence of conflict. The excellent personal rapport developed between the Indian Prime Minister and his Chinese counterpart, while useful, is also not a guarantor of peace. That comes about through hard power. India will need to develop its economic and military might to safeguard its vital national interests. Militarily, it is vital that India maintain adequate deterrent capability in the oceans as well as over the Tibetan skies. That is the guarantor of peace.

Note: Published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol 11, No 1 - Jan-Mar 2016.