Response to those who want to change the Indian Army's regimental system
A lot of attention continues to be spawned at periodical intervals on the composition of the Indian Army, with subtle suggestions that the Army is casteist and racist in its origins—qualities not compatible with a modern Indian State. Such allegations can be dismissed off hand, but the manner in which such slurs continue to be cast, raises doubts on the motives of those trying to peddle a particular type of narrative.
Recently, Caravan magazine published an article on 01 March 2020, titled ‘Beneath the Uniform’—The casteist and racist origins of the Indian Army’s recruitment policies, authored by Sabyasachi Dasgupta, an Assistant Professor in Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan. The author alleges that racist and casteist assumptions of the British era still continue to have a significant influence on the composition of the Indian Army and goes on to conclude; “while the India State is often hailed for its ‘unity in diversity,’ a look at the Army’s community based deployments indicates that the state might be harnessing the social divides to maintain its control”.
Individuals not well conversant with the military ethos often tend to make sweeping statements that are wide off the mark. A test of a military must be predicated on its stated role, which in the Indian context is to protect the nation from external aggression and internal disorder. This forms the very raison d’être of its existence. If shortcomings are found here, then most certainly questions need to be asked which could inter alia include all aspects of the functioning of a force, including its composition. If there are no shortcomings, then the motives of those raising frivolous issues must be placed on the scanner. So let us examine the performance of the Indian Army, since independence.
Soon after independence, the Indian Army found itself embroiled in a war in Jammu and Kashmir, to counter Pakistani aggression. In perhaps one of the most brilliant actions, troops were airlifted to Srinagar and the invaders were stopped in the nick of time on the outskirts of Srinagar, from where they were gradually pushed back till a ceasefire was accepted by the Indian government, bringing that war to an end. Since then, except for some minor changes to what was then called the Ceasefire Line and is now called the Line of Control, the status quo has been maintained. Pakistani aggression was again foiled in the 1965 war. Six years later, in the Liberation War, the nation achieved its biggest victory in millennia when the Pakistan Army in its eastern Wing surrendered and a new nation, Bangladesh was created in December 1971. Pakistan suffered a further humiliation in 1999, when it was forced to vacate its aggression on the Kargil heights.
It is true that the Indian Army suffered a setback in 1962, in its short border war with China, but that had little to do with the troops and was largely the consequence of political shenanigans, weak logistic infrastructure, poor equipment and inept political, bureaucratic and military leadership at the highest levels. It must be noted that it was the Indian Army which carried out the political integration of the country with swift actions in Junagadh (September 1947), Hyderabad (Operation Polo - September 1948), and the Liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu in December 1961. It is the Indian Army which has held the fabric of the nation together and quelled insurgencies in Northeast India, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, which is still an ongoing process in some areas. Obviously, if the Army has so effectively succeeded in its mandate of protecting the country from external aggression and internal disorder, then it is based on a sound organisational structure which has stood the test of time. Why then call for a change of such a system? Why is there a disquiet in some quarters, which would like to portray a negative narrative? Or are silent forces at work, deliberately trying to sow dissension within the rank and file of the Army for certain ulterior motives?
In each and every deployment of the Indian Army since independence, either for conflict resolution or for any other purpose, the consideration has never been the caste or class composition of the unit. That is immaterial to the requirement of the task and to suggest otherwise denotes ignorance of the functioning ethos of the Army and indeed of the Armed Forces of India. To suggest that while dealing with internal security situations, the Army deploys troops which are from a different region or ethnicity is patently false. As an example, as part of its counter-terrorism effort in J&K, troops from all infantry regiments have been deployed since the last three decades. The same goes for quelling the insurgency in Punjab and in the Northeast. Whether troops are from the same area or from other areas, does not form part of the deployment philosophy of the military commanders. Hence, statements made that in cases of conflict and unrest, the Army deploys a regiment of a community from a different region or ethnicity to control the violence, pitting one people against the other, is patently false and malicious. On the contrary, in cases of internal disorder, the presence of the Army is welcomed by the people, as the public knows that the Army functions in a non-partisan manner. The deployment of troops is based on availability and location of the units and not on extraneous considerations such as the caste and class composition of the troops. In fact, such a thought is never even entertained.
The British Indian Army may or may not have had the concept of what is called the martial races. Post independence, however, within the military fraternity, no such concept existed. It is a well known fact in the Army that the performance of a unit is not based on the caste or class composition of its constituents, but on its leadership, training and morale. The concept of martial races, even if it was propagated by the British for their own purposes, was never a matter of consideration for enrolment of personnel in the Indian Army. So why did the Indian Army, post independence, continue with the British regimental system for its infantry? The answer is simple. The character and composition of the existing regiments was not changed, because fighting units thrive on tradition. Many units are centuries old, with a glorious past, evoking a sense of pride. In addition, the Infantry units at the time of Independence represented a cosmos of the Indian nation, as troops came from all parts of the country. There really was no sense in changing a system which had worked so well in two World Wars, simply to appear to be ‘politically correct’. It is also worth noting that Infantry is the arm that closes in with the enemy in close combat. It requires a very high of level of cohesiveness, camaraderie and esprit de corps which takes years to build and to develop. That is why, when units go into battle, the prime motivation is the ‘izzat’ of the battalion, which makes men go beyond the call of duty for mission accomplishment. Unlike other professions, a nations armed forces are the final bastion. If the bastion falls, the nation falls and will slip into subjugation. Indian history for over a millennia is testimony to the fact that India was subjugated because it had lost the military edge to foreign invaders.
But the above notwithstanding, recruitment to the army, post independence, was open to all citizens of India. Region wise recruitment however remained the norm, because it was administratively convenient. Getting together a host of people from a particular area and grouping them together for training and administrative needs, made a great deal of sense to both the military hierarchy as also to the troops concerned. Here, stress needs to be laid on the fact that recruitment did not discriminate based on caste. For example, recruitment in the Dogra Regiment was open to all residents of the geographical area of Himachal Pradesh, and parts of Punjab and J&K, regardless of their caste. Similarly, the same could be said for other Regiments of the Infantry such as Bihar, Punjab, Maratha, Madras, to name but a few. However, there were Infantry regiments like the Brigade of the Guards, where recruitment was from across the country as far as the regiment was concerned. But the units still had troops from a particular geographical area. As far as the logistic support units are concerned, which from a sizeable chunk of the Army, the recruitment base remained all India.
Regardless of the composition of units, the Army functions as one team. The Armed Forces are the only organisation in India, where caste, class or religion is not a factor. When units operate as part of a brigade or higher grouping, they are bound by the soldierly code of ‘nation first’. If one wishes to see a totally homogenous society, free of prejudice, then that can be witnessed in India’s Armed Forces. This culture is imbued in the ethos of the Armed Forces, which is why the nation trusts its men and women in uniform.
The Armed Forces rightly rejected the call for reservations within the Forces, as recruitment to the Force is based on merit, with no consideration of class, caste or religious affiliation. Every person who enters the Force, does so on merit. Yes, the Army does have regiments, based on historical factors, such as the Sikh Light Infantry and the Mahar Regiment. But that does not exclude those who have been historically discriminated against, in joining other regiments also. For example, in the Dogra regiment, the recruitment base of troops is from a particular geographical area, but caste is not a consideration, which is why every caste is represented in the Regiment. The same goes for regiments like the Garhwal Rifles and others, which are also based on geographical contiguity and not on caste lines. The underlying principle for joining the Armed Forces remains constant; the ability to do the assigned task. Merit remains the sole criteria.
It has been claimed that the regimental system was created as a ploy by the British rulers to prevent any formidable coalition against them as occurred in the mutiny. However, geographical contiguity has been a guiding principle for recruitment by armies across the world as it makes for ease in administration. For a country as diverse as India, with its multiplicity of languages, customs and food habits, it makes far greater sense to group people on the basis of geographical contiguity. In the case of the Indian Army, the Regimental System has never been divisive. On the contrary, it has led to greater homogeneity at the unit level as also at the level of field formations where the wider intermingling with troops from other regions takes place. It is the strong military ethos and sense of nationalism that has kept the Indian Army free from the virus of caste, class and religious polarisation. Perhaps there is a lesson here, that could be imbibed by people all across the length and breadth of India.
Finally, many people continue to express concerns on what they perceive to be the unequal representation of India’s multi-faceted society in the officer cadre of the Armed Forces. This is perhaps the biggest canard that has been spread by people who are either misinformed or who have a purpose in spreading such misinformation. Selection to the officer cadre is open to all Indians, and is based on merit. Over a million people every year apply for a commission in India’s Armed Forces, but most are weeded out after the initial written tests conducted by the UPSC. This is then followed by a grinding process of going through the Services Selection Board and finally through a medical board. The merit list is prepared thereafter, and finally, on an annual basis, we have about 1500 officers selected for training. The entire process is very transparent and the sole criteria for selection is merit. The system has stood the test of time for its impartiality and each batch which is commissioned, is in a sense a reflection of the composite nature of India’s society. The officers of India’s Armed Forces are true leaders in every sense of the word, imbued with the code “The Safety, Honour and Welfare of your country, comes first, always and every time”. This selfless service goes beyond the narrow straitjacket of caste, class or religious differentiation, so common in other organisations. This is what has enabled India to win its many wars. This is what has kept the country united and as one entity.
Let us not then fiddle with a time tested system which has served the nation well, simply to pander to the ego of some self professed know alls, who unfortunately have never served in the Forces and have little knowledge of their functioning. It would be far better if such people devote their time and energy in creating a more homogenous society in the country, which remains riven and split on caste and communal lines. They could learn a thing or two from how the military conducts its affairs instead of trying to alter a system which has stood the test of time. The sage advice, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” must be heeded, especially in matters pertaining to India’s Armed Forces.
‘Beneath the Uniform’ - The casteist and racist origins of the Indian |
Army’s recruitment policies By Sabyasachi Dasgupta (assistant professor at the department of history at Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan) |
Published in Caravan Magazine - 1 March, 2020
THE PRESIDENT’S BODYGUARD—a unit of the Indian Army—is considered |
one of the most prestigious postings within the armed forces. In 2018, one Gaurav Yadav from Haryana’s Revari district filed a public-interest litigation in the Delhi High Court, alleging that the recruitment policy of the President’s Bodyguard discriminated by caste. The unit, as Yadav correctly pointed out, only recruits from three castes—Rajputs, Hindu Jats and Sikh Jats. According to Yadav, these three castes are being given “preferential treatment” to the detriment of other citizens of the country. A bench of the Delhi High Court, hearing the petition, asked the defence ministry and several senior army officials to file their counter affidavits on the issue by 9 May 2019. Both the army and the government have exceeded the deadline, and are yet to file their responses. This is not the first time the army’s recruitment policy has been challenged in |
court. In 2012, IS Yadav, an Uttar Pradesh-based doctor, filed a petition in the Supreme Court, seeking an end to recruitment in the army on the basis of caste, region and religion. “In the army alone there are caste, religion and region-based regiments such as the Jat Regiment, Sikh Regiment, Mahar Regiment, Gorkha Rifles, Garhwal Regiment, Dogra Regiment, etc,” Yadav’s petition said, “and hence recruitment to these regiments is primarily based on caste, region and religion.” |
The petition also questioned the existence of two separate regiments for Sikhs—one for Jat Sikhs, and a different one for Mazhabi and Ramdasia Sikhs, |
who were formerly considered untouchables. The petitioner urged the court to end discrimination in recruitment to the army and to frame a new hiring policy |
for the force. In its response, the army said that it did not recruit on the basis of caste, region and religion, but it grouped recruits according to their communities for “administrative convenience” and “operational requirements.” The Supreme Court quashed the petition, saying that it did not want to “rock the army’s boat.” The Indian Army’s own admission that caste-based stratification is necessary for “administrative convenience” gives a glimpse of the central role caste and identity play in the functioning of the force. In its organisation and composition, |
the army still closely resembles the pre-Independence British Indian Army. The British concept of “martial races,” drawn from India’s own caste traditions, declared some communities “martial” and others incapable of fighting. This theory—with its racist and casteist assumptions—continues to have a significant influence on the composition of the Indian Army. The history of the British Indian Army constitutes necessary context to understand the identity politics in India’s armed forces today. THE BRITISH INDIAN ARMY was in reality three armies until 1895. Each of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Presidencies had its own army, and each force had a different caste dynamic. The Bengal army, set up by the East India Company in 1756, was dominated by upper castes. Its infantry units, besides a small number of Ahirs and Yadavs, |
mostly recruited upper-caste Hindu peasants from modern-day eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, referred to as Purbaiyas. Serving sepoys helped in recruitment, as they were encouraged to bring back potential recruits from among their relatives and friends. Thus, the Bengal army functioned like an upper-caste club, where ties of clan and neighbourhood took centre stage and high-caste rhetoric was endemic. The sepoys claimed a certain amount of leeway in matters of religion. A high-caste |
ethos pervaded the army and, in certain instances, sepoys refused the call of military duty if it conflicted with their religious beliefs. For example, sepoys |
could refuse overseas service if it involved sea travel, which many dominant- caste Hindus believed would cause one to lose caste status. A culture of |
conditional obedience evolved, where the high-caste sepoy was ready to render obedience as long his notions of religion and caste were not violated. The dominance of upper-caste sepoys in the Bengal army was punctured somewhat by the induction of Gorkhas in the 1830s and Sikhs in the 1840s. Both communities were destined to play a central role in the post-1857 colonial armies. Nevertheless, high-caste domination continued to be a cardinal feature of the Bengal Army till 1857. In contrast, the army of the Bombay presidency, despite the presence of a large |
number of Purbaiyas, gave short shrift to religious or caste sentiments if they were used as a bargaining chip to evade military duty. One probable reason for the Purbaiyas’s inability to extract concessions from the Bombay army was that, unlike in the Bengal army, they did not constitute a brute majority there. The Bombay army had a diverse composition, and recruited from a large array of communities, including Dalits from the Mahar community. Mahars would play an important role in the battle of Bhima Koregaon in 1818, an event that has contemporary reverberations. The lack of numbers was not the only reason for Purbaiyas’ diminished leverage in the Bombay army. The force’s policy differed significantly from that of the Bengal army. While its leaders professed respect for the caste sentiments of the sepoys, they were uncompromising in their belief that caste could not be |
allowed to come in the way of military duties. All efforts of the Purbaiyas towards extracting some concessions in this respect were resisted firmly. The pre-Mutiny Bombay army was one of those rare colonial institutions where the dynamics of caste did not assume a domineering role. This policy of keeping caste beliefs at bay was reasonably successful. While nearly the entire Bengal force revolted in 1857, only five out of the 29 regiments of the Bombay army mutinied. Thus, while the Bombay army demanded unconditional obedience from the sepoy, the Bengal army settled for conditional obedience. |
The Madras army adopted a middle ground. In the final decades of the eighteenth century—after an initial period of preferring dominant castes, |
including Purbaiyas from the Bengal Presidency—it shifted its focus to recruiting from the middle and oppressed castes, apart from a large number of Muslims. This shift in policy was to avoid conflicts over caste notions. The policymakers of the Madras army also seemed sanguine over the prospects of successfully dealing with the religious sentiments of the Muslim recruits. In 1806, a major mutiny, driven by dominant castes and Muslims, broke out in the Vellore cantonment. The sepoys were up in arms over an order calling for the strict implementation of a pre-existing regulation banning the wearing of |
caste marks. Muslim soldiers, too, had been asked to shave off their mustaches and beards. Matters were further aggravated by the issuing of new turbans, which sepoys found to be too similar to the headgear worn by “half-caste” Portuguese drummers, whom the sepoys detested and looked down upon. The sepoys appealed to the authorities, arguing that nobody would marry their daughters or share food and water with them if the new headgear was adopted. On 10 July that year, roughly two and a half thousand sepoys broke out in open revolt. The uprising was quelled, with the sepoys suffering heavy casualties. In the aftermath of the Vellore mutiny, discontent surfaced among native regiments in several stations, but any brewing rebellions were nipped in the bud. A potentially major uprising spread over south India, predating the revolt of 1857 by fifty years, fizzled out before it could assume ominous proportions. It is unclear whether the sepoys had the kind of civilian support that was later |
witnessed in the 1857 revolt. The sepoys had a partial victory as the order prohibiting the wearing of caste marks and whiskers on parade was rescinded. The controversial headgear was not issued. The Madras army henceforth concentrated on empowering the middle- and oppressed-caste sepoys. For instance, it awarded palanquin allowances to sepoys who performed gallantly on the battlefield. This privilege of riding a palanquin, which had been the reserve of the elite castes until then, |
was a rare honour for oppressed-caste soldiers. Army service thus empowered oppressed castes, giving them a new, distinct identity. The strategy clearly |
worked well, as the sepoys in the Madras army remained steadfastly loyal in 1857. |
The 1857 revolt was mostly led by units of the Bengal army, which was nearly disintegrated after the conflict. Dynamics of caste and religion were among the multiple factors that spurred the revolt, arguably the greatest anti-colonial struggle of the nineteenth century, which in its initial phase posed a fundamental challenge to the continuance of British rule in India. The tide, however, gradually turned in favour of the British. AFTER THEIR TRIUMPH, the British brought in fundamental changes in the army. Only a few regiments of the Bengal army were retained, as the British |
went about changing the army’s composition. Their initial strategy was to use different castes and communities to balance each other, and to increase recruitment from areas that had been loyal, such as Punjab. In the 1880s, a new recruitment policy was devised, which came to be known as the martial-race theory. Initially propounded by the British military commander Frederick Roberts, it stated that only a few select communities, such as the Gorkhas, Dogras, Pathans and Punjabis—Muslim, Hindu or Sikh— and a few others in the subcontinent, were to be dubbed “martial castes,” capable of fighting bravely and effectively. Proponents of the theory gave several reasons why some communities possessed martial qualities and others did not. The only point of agreement among them was that wheat-eating, less-literate peasants from the rural areas |
made the best fighters. Some of the proponents of the martial-race theory ascribed martial qualities to advantageous genes, while others stressed ecological, environmental, historical and political factors. What often was not stated was that most “martial” communities had been loyal during the 1857 revolt. According to some historians, the theory appropriated the varna system, and articulated it in racial terms. Roberts believed that long years of peace in the Madras Presidency had |
enervated the Madras sepoy and made him unmartial. He also believed that those who live in colder areas proved to be better fighters. George MacMunn, |
another British general, believed in the superiority of Aryans over Dravidians. He believed Aryans had enslaved the original inhabitants and deprived them of |
the right to bear arms. Therefore, only communities of supposedly Aryan origin were capable of being martial. MacMunn also believed that the tenets of certain religions, such as Sikhism, made their adherents martial. Many similar beliefs remain alive in the modern Indian army. Caste played a crucial role in the labelling of communities as martial or non- martial. The dominant-caste Purbaiyas, the original martial class of the colonial armies, were not labelled a martial race because of the near total revolt of the Purbaiyas of the Bengal army in 1857. |
Many oppressed castes became the first casualties of the martial-race theory. As the scholar Stephen P Cohen wrote in his 1969 essay “The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics and the Indian Army,” a view was formed that Dalits were by birth and varna “inherently unmilitary.” A series of articles written before Independence in The Pioneer argued: why bother to recruit the “dhobi battalions” if they could not be trusted against the formidable Pathans? Mahars were gradually phased out by the 1890s. Mazhabi Sikhs were also weeded out of the ranks around the same time. The Bhils and several tribes from Assam, many of whom had served loyally in 1857, suffered the same fate. It seemed that proponents of the martial-race theory did not believe the oppressed castes worthy of being martial races. The First World War saw an incredible demand for manpower. The army |
initially tried to meet the challenge by intensifying recruitment from the martial communities. When it failed to recruit enough men, the colonial government reluctantly turned to the communities dubbed non-martial for recruitment. The Mahar regiment was reinstated, as was the recruitment of Mazhabis. But both communities would be demobilised again after the conclusion of the war. Many other oppressed-caste soldiers, recruited during the war, suffered the same fate. The army’s bias against non-martial communities was made clear by the fact |
that their members were rarely posted at the frontlines, and often found |
themselves serving in auxiliary branches. The fighting was left to the martial races. |
History repeated itself during the Second World War. The enormity of the situation forced army recruiters to grudgingly turn towards non-martial communities. Mahars and Mazhabis were again recruited. The Mahars now had a powerful patron in BR Ambedkar, a member of a national defence board and a Mahar himself. Nevertheless, deep-seated bias ensured that the non-martial communities would not be posted at frontline areas. Units composed of non- martial recruits would invariably be classified as incapable of fighting well, though they were hardly given the chance of proving their mettle. However, this |
time the oppressed-caste units were not demobilised after the war. The post-independence Indian army claims that caste plays a minimal role in its functioning. An order passed in January 1949 by General KM Cariappa, then its commander-in-chief, stated that recruitment to the army would be open to all classes of Indians, irrespective of caste, creed, ethnicity, religion and so on. However, the ethos of the martial-race theory continued to play a major role, and these races provide the bulk of the manpower to the army. Though most of the regiments raised after Independence have been mixed units, recruited on what the army calls an “All India” basis, the basic composition of the old single- class regiments has been left untouched, even though there have been alterations and additions to the strength of such regiments. The result is that a significant number of infantry regiments are still single-class or fixed-class |
ones. A single-class regiment recruits from one single community or caste. For example, the Sikh regiment is composed solely of Jat Sikhs, while the Sikh Light Infantry recruits solely from Mazhabi Sikhs. A fixed-class regiment recruits from more than one community, but only from certain specified classes. Each battalion of the Punjab regiment typically has two Jat Sikh and two Dogra companies. Similarly, each battlion of the Bihar regiment has two companies of Biharis and two companies of Adivasis recruited from Bihar, Jharkhand, |
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The all-India regiments raised after Independence can have mixed recruitment and organisation. However, recruitment to these regiments is regional in |
nature, to ensure that differences in food habits, language and so on are not overwhelmingly wide. These regiments recruit from a much wider pool and mix troops hailing from different communities. The most high-profile of these new all-India regiments are the Guards regiments, formed in 1949. The military establishment after Independence has staunchly opposed dissolving caste-based regiments and ending heavy recruitment from martial races. It continues to do so in the ongoing case of Gaurav Yadav. Most of the top generals in the initial decades of Independence, such as Cariappa, KS Thimayya, |
JN Chaudhuri and, later, Sam Manekshaw, were firm in their belief that no radical change should be effected in the recruitment policy of the Indian Army. They took a double-edged public position—on one hand, they said that caste- based regiments are needed for efficiency in fighting and argue that people from the same community fight better together; on the other, they claim that the army is now open to all classes, irrespective of caste, ethnicity and religion. The civilian establishment, out of a desire to not rock the boat, has not interfered much in this strategy. It has, however, tried to diversify the officer corps, which seems more representative of the country’s diversity than the larger body of jawans. But certain groups and communities remain overrepresented among military officers. The civilian establishment has also been steadfast in shooting down any proposal to form new regiments on the |
basis of caste or region. Unlike during the colonial era, oppressed-caste recruits or existing regiments with predominantly oppressed-caste recruits have not been dubbed non- martial and shunted out in the post-Independence army. But the army has stood firm against any attempts to introduce caste-based reservations. When the former defence minister VK Krishna Menon asked Thimayya, who was then the army chief, why the army was not implementing reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Thimayya replied that the army was open to all |
Indians irrespective of caste, creed and religion. Thimayya then argued that the |
army’s recruitment policy is based “largely on time-tested traditions and kinship.” Despite his reputation for being stubborn, Menon dropped the matter. |
For all its denials, the Indian Army does rely on religious and caste traditions to indoctrinate new recruits, particularly in single-class regiments. The new recruit in such regiments is not to merely undergo training in arms, he is also to imbibe the doctrines and the supposedly true traditions of his faith, for his martial qualities are seemingly linked to his religious ethos. Matters came to a head again in the 1970s, when the then defence minister, Jagjivan Ram, again asked why the army was not implementing reservations in recruitment. Fuming at what he felt was a completely unwarranted, and |
dangerous, intervention in army affairs, the army chief, Maneckshaw, asked his deputy adjutant general to reply that when reservations were introduced in the 1950s, a clause in the legislation said that they did not apply to the army. The underlying logic behind Manekshaw and Thimayya’s refusal to entertain proposals for reservation was very clear. While time-tested regiments composed overwhelmingly of the oppressed castes were valued, and there was no bar to their recruitment in mixed regiments provided they met the required criteria, any provision that seemingly relaxed the norms for entry into the army would be firmly resisted. Among the oldest critiques of the martial-race theory and single-class regiments came from Ambedkar. In a posthumously published manuscript, he |
wrote: The principle of organisation that was introduced in 1890 is known as the principle of class composition as against the old principle of a mixed regiment. Under the new principle, the Indian Army was organized on the principle of class regiment or the class squadron or company system. This means, in the first case, that the whole regiment is composed of one class (or caste) and in the second case, that every squadron or company is formed entirely of one class. The old principle of recruiting was to take the best men available, no matter |
what his race or religion was. Under the new principle, race of the man became a more important factor than his physique or his intellect. For the purposes of |
recruitment, the different castes and communities of India are divided into categories, those belonging to the martial races and those belonging to the non- |
martial races. The non-martial races are excluded from military service. Only the castes and communities which are included in the category of martial races are drawn upon for feeding the Army. Ambedkar wrote disapprovingly of single-class regiments. “The reasons which underlie the principle of class composition it is said, ‘are to a certain extent political, as tending to prevent any such formidable coalition’ against the British, as occurred in the Mutiny,” he wrote. “I should have thought that the old system of a mixed regiment was safer.” |
Years later, in 1969, Stephen Cohen noted that unlike in the US military, where “caste-based (all-Negro) units were ideologically resented and militarily inefficient,” caste-based organisation finds general acceptance within India. Speculating on for how long such organisation will remain socially acceptable, he wrote, “They will probably remain so until general social disapproval of caste as an organising principle becomes significantly greater, or until a rapid rise in the technological sophistication of the army requires higher educational levels for recruits. Both developments seem unlikely in the next decade.” Fifty years later, little has changed despite many challenges to caste-based recruitment over the years. The Indian Army continues to support sentiments of caste pride and loyalty, and finds them essential to operational efficiency. In cases of conflict and unrest, it would deploy a regiment of a community from a |
different region or ethnicity to control the violence, pitting one people against the other, as the British once did. India is often hailed for its “unity in diversity,” but a look at such community-based deployments indicates that the state might be harnessing the social divides to maintain its control. |
