J&K Post Abrogation of Article 370: A Brighter Future Beckons

On 5 August 2019, the nation witnessed what can perhaps best be described as the passing of the most transformative piece of legislation since Independence by India's law makers, in both the Houses of Parliament. This historic legislation pertained to the abrogation of Article 35A and of the provisions of Article 370 of India's Constitution—which paved the way for normalcy to return to J&K after decades of terrorism, death, destruction and fear. Today, 5 August 2022 marks the completion of three years into this transformative journey; a journey on a road not hitherto traversed, a tryst once again with freedom, but this time within the ambit and protection of the Indian Constitution, signifying freedom in its truest sense. 

It was Article 370 which stultified the growth of J&K and prevented its emotional integration with the rest of the country. Why Article 370 was introduced into the Constitution, albeit as a temporary provision, is itself a matter of debate, but the more insidious legislation was the introduction of Article 35A into the Constitution in 1954, which empowered the J&K state’s legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and provide special rights and privileges to those permanent residents. This piece of legislation was added to the Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Introduced through the back door, bypassing India's Parliament, it was in that sense, a fraud committed on the Constitution. 

But not everyone was happy with the events that transpired on 5 August 2019. Pakistan was taken by surprise and is still reeling from the legislative shock, which was a body-blow delivered to its efforts to keep the region in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. But within India too, there were nay sayers, especially from amongst the radicalised segments of society. In an article published in Dawn, a Pakistani daily, in January this year, Mr AG Nororani, a Bombay based lawyer who has for long written on Constitutional issues, showed his bias and proclivity for partisan reporting when he opined that Kashmir is in flames and that the entire exercise of repealing the provisions of Article 370 was to give to J&K, a Hindu Chief Minister. Nothing could be more preposterous, but the bias is inherent in Noorani's belief that J&K can only have a Chief Minister from the Islamic faith. What happens then to India's secular Constitution? Has Noorani forgotten that India has had Muslim Chief Ministers in Maharashtra, Assam, Rajasthan, Bihar, Kerala and Manipur? This is what gives vibrancy to India's democracy and secular mindset. Noorani was also concerned with the removal of Urdu as the official language of J&K. But why should Urdu have been the official language of the state, when the people in the Valley spoke Kashmiri and the Jammu Division spoke Dogri and Hindi? That Noorani had a Muslim centric world view is apparent. As a lawyer, he held the view that Article 370 had acquired the status of a permanent fixture in India's Constitution and could not be modified or withdrawn! Really!

People like Noorani, since independence, have attempted to distort narratives to suit a particular ideology, propagating the worldview of the Left-Islamist combine. But Kashmir, after decades of violence is finally on the mend. This year has already seen a footfall of 1.06 crore tourists, with 55 to 60 flights into Srinagar each day. The hotels in the Valley are full to the brim, and getting a room requires booking months in advance. The inflow of tourists has been the highest ever, which is but one indicator of the rejection of violence by the local population and the return of normalcy. The Tricolour can be seen fluttering proudly from all government buildings, which was not the case earlier. In Srinagar itself, over 80 government departments have installed permanent Tricolour, which also flutters on 100 feet masts in Hari Parbat, Shopiyan, Gulmarg and Kupwara. The National Anthem is sung proudly now, and a visit today to Ghanta Ghar and Lal Chowk in Srinagar is a visible symbol of Naya Kashmir.

The success achieved in development initiatives has also been amazing. The performance of Panchayats, District Development Council and Municipal Corporations has been good resulting in better administration. There is a distinct improvement in the performance of youth in sports (Rowing, Taekwondo, Cricket, etc) at National and International levels and campaigns to clean the Jhelum River as well as the Dal, Wular and  Manasbal lakes are proceeding apace. 

On the security front, there is strong synergy between UT Administration, Security Forces and the Centre. There is a distinct public push back against the Gupkar group, JeI, APHC and against Pakistan supported terror groups, which has resulted in near zero incidences of stone pelting and bandh calls. Attempts by Pakistan and their backers in the Valley to engineer a seventh exodus of Kashmiri Hindus has been thwarted, which speaks well for the security situation in the Union Territory. 

It is true that J&K is yet not fully terror free, but great strides have been made over the last three years to achieve that goal. It is understandable that decades of violence would require greater time for complete healing to take place, and cannot be achieved in a short period of time, but the task would have been impossible to achieve had Article 370 still been in force. Terror related incidents have dipped by half over the last three years, and with the support of the local population, we can expect a return to total normalcy in the not too distant future. 

In his iconic poem, The Road Not Taken, Robert frost ends with these stirring lines: 

Two roads converged in a wood, and I,

I took the one less travelled by

And that has made all the difference. 

On 5 August 2019, the Indian Nation embarked on a journey in Jammu and Kashmir, on a road that had not been travelled in. And yes, that has made all the difference, because we are now witnessing, despite the many challenges still remaining, the dawn of a happier and brighter future for the people of India, and more so for the residents of Jammu and Kashmir. 

INTEGRATING THE ERSTWHILE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR: REIMAGINING POSSIBILITIES

Introduction

The Kashmir issue has been at the centre stage of India-Pakistan relations since Independence. Tensions have run high between the two neighbours since partition, but it would be incorrect to state that the causative factor is the Kashmir issue. The fault lines lie much deeper and are embedded in the ideological moorings of Pakistan and the larger than life role which that country’s military plays within the country. The Kashmir issue however, has been used by Pakistan to draw the attention of the world community on Pakistani claims to that area. This has resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan and a prolonged proxy war, since the late 1980’s which is still ongoing. An understanding of the issues involved in the dispute between the two countries must of necessity begin with historical legacies of the pre-partition era, and a recounting of events as they took place in the first decade post independence, and thereafter till the present times. But it would not be out of order to first understand the significance of the area as part of India’s civilisational heritage.

Early History

Ancient Indian spiritual texts such as the Vishnu Purana, Shiv Puraan, Matsya Puraan and the Mahabharata, describe India as stretching between the Himalayas in the North and the sea in the South. A passage in the Vishnu Puraan states that the country South of the Himalayas and North of the Ocean is called Bharat and all born to it are called Bharatiyas.

Uttaram yat samudrasya, himadres saiva dakshinam

Varsam tad Bharatam, nama Bharati natra santati

The Markandeya Puraan too states that “India is girdled by the sea on three sides and on the North by the Himalayas, which stretch like the string of a bow”. That the Himalayas were a part of the Indian experience since millennia is also made clear by the work of early Tamil poets who marked the mighty peaks as the northern extent of India and spoke of the land as the abode of Siva and the tapovans of saints and seers. Indian scriptures thus make repeated references to the Himalayas as part of India’s civilisational ethos. Here, Kashmir had an important role to play, with ancient texts constantly referring to Kashmir Mandala in terms of its spatial and temporal locus as part of India’s sacred geography which was why Kashmir has been variously described as the northernmost outpost and sometimes even as the very fountainhead of Indian culture.

While the Himalayas, for millennia, provided India with a formidable natural line of defence, they also formed the cradle from where ancient Indian culture spread to Central Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia and became an important constituent of trans-Himalayan communication networks. Kashmir, nestled in the lap of the Himalayas connects with Afghanistan, China and Central Asia and is thus a region of great strategic significance. It was this facet of the region which in the early 19th century saw developments in the region which were consequential to the rivalry being played out between Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, which came to be called the Great Game.

At the time of Partition, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. This was a Hindu land since ancient times, being part of the Mauryan empire. It was Ashoka who expelled the Greeks from Kashmir, and during his reign, established a complete system of administration. Perhaps the most well known Hindu King was Lalitaditya of the Karkota dynasty (724 CE - 760 CE) during whose reign Kashmir flourished. Over the next 600 years, Kashmir was ruled by different dynasties and had its fair share of trials and tribulations. But it was the first quarter of the fourteenth century which witnessed major upheaval in Kashmir, when the Mongols invaded the land. The then King, Raja Suhadeva thought of appeasing the Mongols by way of expensive gifts, but that was spurned by the Mongol army which ravaged the land for eight months, leaving only before the onset of winter. With Suhadeva’s death, his Prime Minister, Ram Chander occupied the throne. He appointed Rinchan, a Buddhist prince from Ladakh as an administrator. Rinchan soon wormed his way into the confidence of the Raja and then treacherously killed him, usurping the throne in 1320 CE. To gain legitimacy, he married Ram Chander’s daughter and desired to convert to Hinduism, but the head guru of the Brahmin Pandit’s Devaswami spurned his request due to his role in eliminating the erstwhile Raja. Rinchan then converted to Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Sadruddin Shah. 10,000 of his subjects converted along with him.

The Sultanate

Thereafter, Rinchan did not live long. He founded Rinchanapura, a quarter in Srinagar after his own name and built a mosque, known as Bud Masjid on the site of a Buddhist temple. He died in 1323 CE. There was a brief interlude when Kashmir reverted to Hindu rule under Kota Rani, the widow of Rinchan. But she was defeated by Shahmir, an astute diplomat in her kingdom, who ascended the throne in 1339 CE, with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. His son, Jamshed, ascended the throne but was killed in battle a year and a half later by his younger brother Allauddin. While Rinchan was the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, the consolidation of the Sultanate started with Shamir, till the advent of the Mughals.

This period also witnessed the reformation of Hinduism as it was practised in Kashmir through Padmavati, a yogini par excellence who was given the appellation Lai Ded. She remains much revered in Kashmir to this day as the earliest known social and educational reformer of Kashmir. She laid emphasis on the brotherhood of man and the unity of god. She was a pioneer of Hindu-Muslim unity. She stood like a bridge between Hinduism and Islam, and left it for her younger contemporary, Shaikh Nur-ud-din, popularly known as Nund Rishi, the founder of the celebrated order, to popularise.

This period also saw the arrival of Saiyid Ali Hamadani to Kashmir in 1379 CE in the reign of Qutb-ud-din. He came with 600 disciples, with the purpose to convert the populace to Islam. Popularly known in Kashmir as ‘Shah-i-Hamadan,’ he was the son of Saiyid Shahab-ud-din, who was the son of Mir Saiyid Muhammad Al-Hasani of Hamadan, Persia. He distributed his disciples in the towns and villages so that they would live among the people and spread their faith by example as well as by precept. He himself took upon the task of preaching true Islam to Sultan Qutb-ud-din and his close associates at Srinagar. His Islam was more virulent, though some of the precepts were aligned with the teachings of Lai Ded and Nund Rishi and thus made Ali Hamdani’s work easier. We thus see both a fusion of Hinduism and Islam in Kashmir as also the gradual conversion of the local population to Islam, through coercion. Successive Sultans thereafter destroyed Hindu temples and inflicted cruelties upon the Hindu population, as per Persian Chroniclers.

Mughal, Sikh and Dogra Rule

The rule of the Sultans, encompassing a period of over 200 years, ended with the conquest of Kashmir by the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1586. During Mughal rule, the period under Aurangzeb (1658 CE-1707 CE) was once again characterised by religious intolerance and discriminatory taxation. After his death in 1707 CE, the influence of the Mughals declined. Nadir Shah’s invasion of India in 1738 CE led to further weakening of Mughal influence and by 1753 CE, Kashmir had come under Afghan rule. The brief Afghan interlude was noted for its cruelty and avarice, and it was with a sense of relief that the people witnessed the conquest of Kashmir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819, ending the despotic rule of the Pathans and also marking the end of Muslim rule in Kashmir.

Sikh rule over Kashmir was short lived and ended with the defeat of the Sikhs at the hands of the British in the battle of Sobraon in February 1846. The British did not annex Punjab but ended the war with the Treaty of Lahore. Thereafter, on 16 March 1846, through the Treaty of Amritsar, Kashmir was handed over to the Dogra ruler, Maharaja Gulab Singh and thus Kashmir came under Dogra rule. 

Gulab Singh had joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army in 1809 and rose to be a commander of the Sikh army. Jammu state, which had been annexed by Ranjit Singh in 1816, was handed over to Miyan Kishore Singh for administration in 1817. Miyan Kishore Singh, during his lifetime, declared his son Gulab Singh as the legal heir. In 1819, seeing the outstanding contribution made by Gulab Singh in the defeat the Pathans in Kashmir and in strengthening Sikh rule, Maharaja Ranjit Singh crowned Gulab Singh as the Raja of Jammu on 16 June 1822. Even after getting Jammu and its adjoining principalities under his territory, Raja Gulab Singh continued to serve the rulers of Lahore and at the same time, annexed many small principalities to his kingdom. Kishtwar was subdued and its governorship was handed over to Zorawar Singh, a Rajput soldier in the Sikh army. It was Zorawar Singh who annexed Ladakh in 1842 and added it to Dogra rule.

It needs mention that through the Treaty of Amritsar, read along with the Treaty of Lahore (Article 12), the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a sum of Rs 75 lakh, paid to the British Government. This sum was paid for the whole of the outer hills between the Ravi and the Indus, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and the Indus Valley down to Chilas. The Treaty was modified soon thereafter in respect of the Ravi River, which was taken as the boundary with the Chamba State and which divided the Chamba State into two portions. The Raja of Chamba objected to this arrangement as he did not want any part of his state to being subject to Jammu. Under the new arrangement, Chamba surrendered its claim to Bhadrawah in lieu of territory to the west of Ravi. Chandgraon and Lakhanpur were also exchanged. While not part of the Treaty, there is a belief that Maharaja Gulab Singh paid money not for the territories alone, but also for being recognised as the Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This was also the time when great power rivalry between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia was at the fore, in what came to be called the ‘Great Game’. Britain, in its desire to keep Russian influence at bay, wanted to keep a watch over the activities of the Sikh rulers and desired to keep their resident in Kashmir. This was resisted, but after the defeat of the Sikhs by the British in the Second Sikh War in 1948-1949, Punjab was annexed by the British, the Dogras could not but succumb to the pressure put on them by the British who were focussed on furthering imperial interests in Kashmir. In 1877, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British India Government, acting as the suzerain power of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency. The Agency was re-established in 1935 under the control of the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas. The agency was given on lease for a period of 60 years commencing from 29 March 1935.

The Dogra period of Kashmir history is thus also marked with British advent into the area. After Maharaja Gulab Singh, his son Ranbir Singh ascended the throne (1856 - 1885), and on his death, his eldest son  Pratap Singh (1885 - 1925) was crowned the Maharaja. Pratap Singh passed away without leaving a male heir and so his nephew, Hari Singh became the ruler. He was destined to be the last Dogra ruler of the state. Dogra rule saw reasonable prosperity of the state. But the period of the last Maharaja was also the time when the independence movement in India was gathering steam. At this time, there also developed a movement by Muslim fanatics to stoke communal violence in the state. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of the J&K Muslim Conference which was formed in 1932. The Party was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on 10 June 1939. When India was partitioned and achieved independence on 15 August 1947, most of the princely states had opted to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had the choice to remain independent under the Maharaja or to join either India or Pakistan. Britain had also terminated its lease of the Gilgit Agency, which reverted back to the state. At this time, the   boundaries of the state encompassed the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit and Baltistan in the North, Ladakh in the East, Kashmir to include Muzaffarabad in the Centre and Jammu, to include Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur, Udhampur, Bhadarwah and Kathua in the South. A hand drawn map, not to scale, of the territory which came under the control of the Maharaja on 15 August 1947 is placed at appendix.

Post Independence Developments

On 12 August 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He offered the same to India which India did not accept. To force the Maharaja’s had to accede to Pakistan, armed raiders were sent under its military officers to forcibly annex the state. On 22 October 1947, about 7000 Pashtun armed tribesmen in 300 trucks, pushed their way through the Domale-Mahulla-Baramulla-Srinagar road, in a bid to capture the capital city. Two days later, a provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ government was announced in Pulandri. These raiders then continued their advance to Srinagar. In Poonch, the situation took on an equally serious turn. Here, the Muslim troops of the Maharaja, in the early hours of 22 October, while their Dogra comrades lay sleeping, rose, drew their weapons from the company armoires and trained their fire on the barracks where the Dogra troops were sleeping to prevent them from getting their weapons. They killed their own comrades including their commanding officer, Lt Col Narain Singh who had placed implicit trust in them and then moved to establish contact with the Pakistani raiders. They then swarmed in on the town of Muzaffarabad and indulged in loot, rape and arson.  

Under these conditions, the Maharaja requested India’s help, but was told that this could not be given unless he acceded to India. This was agreed to by the Maharaja and the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. The Indian Army was flown in to Srinagar on 27 October and they managed to halt the raiders on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, the raiders were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared between the two sides on 31 December 1948. With this, Pakistan remained in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control.

Post 1947, the fortunes of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir went into different trajectories. On the Indian side, there were elections held periodically, and the state remained relatively peaceful. In the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the Pakistani forces were resisted by the local population and failed to achieve any of the objectives set to capture the Kashmir Valley by force. On the contrary, they suffered huge reverses and were edited from the Haji Pir Pass. Post the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Turtuk, lying in the Nubra Valley and on the banks of the Shyok River was liberated by Indian forces and now forms one of the northernmost villages in the Leh District of Ladakh.

While the state continued with its political and economic progress over the decades, its emotional integration with the Indian Union was hindered due to the impact of Article 370 and Article 35 A. A more insidious aspect of the states growth, however, was the fact that in the mid 1960s, Jamaat-e-Islami indoctrinated cadres first made their appearance in the Kashmir Valley and were soon absorbed in government institutions, particularly in government schools. This process continued  in the 1970s, with the rate of intrusion increasing rapidly post the onset of armed insurgency in 1989. While the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its educational wing Falah-e-Aam Trust in 1992 for indulging in anti-social activities, the teachers from the Trust were all absorbed in government schools! Terrorism and radicalisation grew hand in hand in Kashmir, the former supported by Pakistan and the latter by the Jamaat, as a result of which the Kashmir Valley today stands totally radicalised. The conflict in Kashmir has never been for Azadi—whatever the term may mean to different people. It was always a fight for Nizam-e-Mustafa—rule by Sharia and not by democratic norms. The deployment of the Army to curb terrorist violence kept the situation under control, but Articles 370 and 35 A were a hindrance to the restoration of complete normalcy in the Valley and in other parts of the state. As the provisions of these Articles stand repealed and as the Constitution of India is now applicable to the whole state of J&K, the prospects of complete peace descending on the state have considerably been enhanced. Moreover, the bifurcation of the state into the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature has come as a boon the people of Ladakh who have long felt stifled and deprived by the policies of all the earlier governments of J&K. 

It is a well known fact that the Kashmiri politicians led the agenda for the whole state (prior to bifurcation), despite being only 55 percent of the population. In terms of land area, Kashmir is just one-sixth of the state. Yet it held complete political and economic domination of the whole state, with voices from the Jammu and Ladakh divisions being smothered. Even in Kashmir, a small coterie, comprising just about three percent of the population of Kashmir Division held total political dominance over the state. These were the Mullah clan—the people who had come to the Valley about 600 years earlier to preach Islam. They are the present day Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, and they achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy and dominating the original inhabitants. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze. With the state being bifurcated into two, the possibility of peace now appears far brighter than ever.

Pakistan Occupied Ladakh (POL) and J&K (POJK)

Now, let us shift focus to the region occupied by Pakistan, through aggression. This is the region of Gilgit and Baltistan, earlier referred to by Pakistan as the Northern Areas and also the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad, which Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir. The former will be referred to here as Pakistan occupied Ladakh (POL) and the latter as Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK).

As stated earlier, in the pre Mauryan period, the entire state of J&K (as it existed in 1947) was ruled by local Hindu Kings. Buddhism replaced Hinduism in the reign of Emperor Ashoka (274 BCE-237 BCE). Buddhism was the dominant religion till the time of  the Kushan dynasty in the first century till about 375CE after which period Hinduism replaced Buddhism as the dominant religion. The region came under Lalitaditya (724 CE-761 CE), whose empire stretched all the way down to Southern India, and remained with the Karkota kings who followed him. The region thus has had a historical and civilisational connect with the rest of India for at least three to five thousand years. It is important to understand this fact, to negate the propaganda which is spewed by Pakistan on the subject.

The first India-Pakistan war of 1947-48 came to an end with the declaration of a ceasefire, which took effect on 1 January 1949, leaving the region of POJK and POL under Pakistani control. On 28 April 1949, the occupied territories purportedly entered into a formal agreement with the Government of Pakistan, which was called the Karachi Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the so called “Azad Kashmir,” ceded to the Government of Pakistan complete control over Gilgit-Baltistan (then called the “Northern Areas”), and the control over subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications in its own area. For some reason, this Agreement was kept as a secret document till the 1990s! It came to light for the first time when the High Court of Azad Kashmir gave a verdict on Gilgit-Baltistan (Northern Areas), which stated that the agreement "appears to have been executed on 28 April 1949." Later, it was published as Appendix XVII of The Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir by Justice Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani in 2008.

The Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949 formalised the links between Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan. Through this agreement, all affairs of Gilgit and Baltistan, which were referred to as Northern Areas, were placed under the control of Pakistan through their political agent, who was given full powers. The Northern Areas consisted of the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Astor Wazarat and Skardu Tehsil of Ladakh Wazarat—an area of 72,496 square kilometres (excluding the Trans Karakoram Tract which was ceded to China in 1963).

The agreement lacked constitutional legitimacy as Gilgit-Baltistan was never a part of the so called “Azad Kashmir”. It also lacked popular support as the people of the region were not consulted. A matter to note was that the region was kept constitutionally separate from the rest of Pakistan, and was ruled directly by the Karachi based Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA). The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which treated tribesman as barbaric and uncivilised, and levied collective fines on them, were applied to Gilgit-Baltistan. Political activity was not permitted, there was an absence of socio-economic development and the region was treated as a virtual colony of Pakistan. To compound matters further, the Government of Pakistan signed an agreement with China ceding the entire Shaksgam Valley to China—an area of 5,180 square kilometres. which was the territory of the former state of Hunza. When the Karakoram highway was built which passed through the region, the people were not consulted. In 1969, the Northern Areas Advisory Council was formed which functioned under the Resident, but it had a purely advisory role. The first elections for the 16 members were  held in 1970, but it remained a toothless body. 

Post the 1971 war, the Bhutto administration carried out some administrative reforms. The princely states were abolished and Chitral was annexed and merged with the North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Interestingly, in 1972, the “Azad Kashmir” General Assembly passed a resolution asking Pakistan to return the Northern Areas, which it had taken over temporarily on the basis of the Karachi Agreement. But Pakistan has remained silent over this till date. 

In 1972,  Presidential Ordinance abolished the jagirdari system and with it, the institutions of Rajas. Gilgit and Baltistan were designated as districts and their political agents were designated as Deputy Commissioners and the Resident for the Northern Areas was designated as the Commissioner. Subsequently, Diamer, was constituted as a district. However, the region has never been represented in the Pakistani Parliament nor in the “Azad Kashmir” Assembly. In 1974, the Bhutto government removed the FCR and brought the region under the purview of the Pakistan Penal Code. The 16 member Advisory Council was converted to Northern Areas Council with 14 directly elected members, but it was presided over by the Commissioner and lacked legislative and executive powers. The Pakistan government also abolished the State Subject Rule which provided protection to the local populace by preventing outsiders from becoming naturalised citizens of the state. The floodgates were thus opened for outsiders to settle in the region and with state connivance, the demography of the region started changing.

When President Zia imposed martial law on 05 July 1977, the region came under the military jackboot. In May 1982, Zia made the astonishing claim that Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu were outside the Kashmir dispute and were an integral part of Pakistan, but he later backtracked from that statement in an interview he gave to Mr MJ Akbar. In 1999, the NAC was expanded and renamed as the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). It however failed to legislate on any subject, though it did pass 18 resolutions recommending issues of public interest to the ministry of KANA, but none were executed.

The attempts by Zia to introduce Sunni-Deobandi Islam led to the sprouting of Sunni-Deobandi groups like the Sipa-e-Sahaba in the region, which further exacerbated the local population and led to increased alienation. The region, in May 1988, also witnessed the first violent demonstration by the Shias in Gilgit. In retaliation, the Sunni hordes, supported by the state, descended from outside the region and indulged in murder and mayhem, killing hundreds of people and burning their crops and houses. Ever since, sectarian strife has become a regular feature in the region. When Zia died in 1993, riots erupted in which over 20 people were killed. The Pakistan army accused the Shias of bringing in weapons from Iran and thereafter started persecuting them. In 2005, schools remained closed for a full year in protest when Pakistan introduced Urdu and Sunni Islam texts in school books. The schools reopened only when all controversial portions were removed. The Sunnis, unhappy with this outcome assassinated the revered Shia cleric Imam Aga Syed Ziauddin, which once again resulted in large scale violence. Such violence has become a recurring feature of the region since then.

In 2009, the Northern Areas were renamed as Gilgit Baltistan. The two administrative divisions are Gilgit and Baltistan. The former has five districts namely Astore, Diamer, Ghizer, Hunza Nagar and Gilgit. Baltistan has four districts, namely Skardu, Ghanche, Kharmang and Shigar. The region is currently administered under the Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order issued by the government of Pakistan in August 2009. Gilgit-Baltistan now has a Legislative Assembly which has 24 directly elected members and a 15 member Gilgit-Baltistan Council headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The structures work under the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan (KAGB).

The region has a high percentage of Shia Muslims and many Ismailis, who are considered heretics by hardline Islamists. Since 1974, people from outside the region were settled in the area at the behest of the Pakistan government and today, there is demographic change to what was earlier a majority Shia area. Now, the Shias in Gilgit comprise just 60 percent of the population, with the remaining 40 percent being Sunnis. The Hunza, Punial, Yasin, Ishkoman and Gopis are 100 percent Ismailis. Nagar remains 100 percent Shia while Astor is 90 percent Sunni and 10 percent Shia. In Baltistan, the Shias are 96 percent, with Sunnis and Nurbakshi forming the remainder with two percent each. Lack of educational facilities and poor economy have made the region a hub of continual strife and the Shia feel a sense of neglect and marginalisation. It is apparent that Pakistan is intent on changing the demographic composition through large scale influx of people from outside the region, to suit its own agenda.

Causative factors of violence in the region can thus be attributed to absence of political rights, lack of representation in government, cultural, linguistic, sectarian and ethnic marginalisation, lack of educational opportunities, poor health cover and  unemployment. The area has also seen economic exploitation, with the benefits going mainly to Pakistan Punjab. The impoverished people are concerned about their unique ethnocultural identity being wiped out by the state, and have demanded the opening of the Skardu-Kargil bus service to revive their cultural links with Ladakh and Kargil. Due to the strategic significance of the area, connecting as it does Pakistan to China, and being the source of Pakistan’s fresh water resources, Pakistan seeks to tighten its hold over the area. The people are forced to live in abject conditions, under the jackboot of the Pakistan military.

The so called “Azad Kashmir,” referred to here as POJK, is presently administered by Pakistan as a nominally self-governing jurisdiction. It is one-sixth the size of Gilgit-Baltistan with a total area of 13,297 square kilometres and comprises the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. POJK has a parliamentary form of government with President being the constitutional head of state, while the Prime Minister, supported by a Council of Ministers, is the chief executive. The unicameral Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elects both the Prime Minister and President. The state has its own Supreme Court and a High Court. However, the Government of Pakistan's Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan serves as a link with the “Azad Kashmir’s” government, although “Azad Kashmir” is not represented in the Parliament of Pakistan. Despite their so called independent status, POJK is but a colony of Islamabad. The people remain confused about their identity and desire to be rid of Pakistani dominance. In 2018, riots in Muzaffarabad saw two locals killed in police fining, with many being injured. October 22 is commemorated as a black day, marking the invasion of the area by Pakistani troops.

What Next?

Pakistan’s attempts to annex the state of Jammu and Kashmir by force has been the prime causative factor for conflict in the region. The discourse for the first time changed after India abrogated Article 35A and certain provisions of Article 370 in the Indian Constitution in August 2019 in a bid to emotionally integrate the state with the rest of the Union. The state was split into two union territories, thus meeting the aspirations of the people of Ladakh division who felt stifled and short changed by the successive governments in Srinagar. Ever since the splitting of the state, the levels of violence have diminished considerably, giving hope that violence in the Valley will soon be a thing of the past and peace and tranquility will emerge.

More importantly, a radical change has come in the discourse between India and Pakistan over the issue. Earlier, whenever the Kashmir issue came up for discussion, it was presumed that the only issue for discussion was the state of J&K with India. The areas illegally occupied by Pakistan were, for some unfathomable reason, not part of the discussion. Now, post the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, the Indian Government has made it clear that the only point to be discussed with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue is the areas illegally occupied by them—POL and POJK. This has altered the dynamics of the discourse as India is firm on its resolve to get these areas back. 

A unification through military force is however not a viable option. However, this remains the longterm goal and would need to be fulfilled. The Indian Parliament has passed a resolution in the House in 1994, that the territories of the erstwhile state of J&K, illegally occupied by Pakistan were  part of India. Interestingly, In 2017, the British Parliament, too, adopted a resolution stating that Gilgit-Baltistan legally belongs to India by virtue of accession of princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

The best way forward would be to see that the two Union Territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, develop in such a manner, that the people from across the border would willingly want to join India. POL has historical linkages with India and there is already a strong groundswell of opinion for merger with India, though this gets suppressed by the force used by the Pakistan military. However, an upraising in the future against the Pakistan establishment cannot be ruled out and the area can be liberated, if the local people so desire, on the lines of the Liberation of Bangladesh. POJK is a different matter, as the people there have been thoroughly indoctrinated over the past 70 years. However, there is a desire there too, to be free of the Pakistani military. How this will pan out, remains to be seen.

For the moment, the efforts of the government of India must remain on seeing the total return to normalcy in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the development of the Union Territory of Ladakh. This area as as beautiful if not more than Switzerland; yet, for the last six hundred years of its history, it has been mired in conflict and poverty. The contrast with Switzerland is both relevant and thought provoking, considering the levels of development achieved by that country. Can J&K and Ladakh follow that course? That is the dream that the Indian state must realise. And in the achievement of that dream, it will be but a matter of time that the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan will finally be merged with India.

BOOK REVIEW: K File: The Conspiracy of Silence By Bashir Assad

What can explain the fact that one of the most beautiful places on earth has been turned into a living hell? Much of the troubles faced by the state can be attributed in the initial years to the ambitions of two men—Maharaja Hari Singh, who was looking at ways and means to remain in power and Sheikh Abdullah, who was determined to oust the Maharaja and take over the reins of the state. The Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947, following the Pakistan backed tribal invasion of India. It was fortuitous  that Indian forces, which were flown in to Srinagar Airfield on the very next day, reached just in time to halt the raiders at the outskirts of Srinagar. Over the next 14 months, the Pakistani backed forces were pushed back, till a ceasefire was declared, leaving Pakistan in control of Gilgit-Baltistan and the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. With minor modifications, this has, since the Simla Accord of 1972, been sanctified as the Line of Control.

A great deal of political shenanigans took place since the accession of the state to India in October 1948. But what is generally not known is how a small coterie of people, whom the author of K File: The Conspiracy of Silence, Mr Bashir Assad describes as the Mullah caste—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy. This was the clan which moved into Kashmir from Arabia, and slowly established dominance over the original inhabitants of Kashmir. Today, this small group, representing  just about 3 per cent of the Valleys Muslim population, has a stranglehold on the state’s politics and on its bureaucratic structure. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze.

Article 370 was never a demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, it was not even the demand of Sheikh Abdullah! Why India’s first Prime Minister, Mr JL Nehru insisted on including it in the Constitution remains a mystery. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar was vehemently imposed to the same and he made this known in no uncertain terms, while the Constitution was being drafted. That is why it was kept as a temporary provision. Would the history of the State have taken a different trajectory if such a provision had not been placed on the statute book? The answers can only be hypothetical. But one thing cannot be denied. The seeds of separatism were sown with the inclusion of Article 370 in the Constitution. And later, with the promulgation of Article 35A through a Presidential Ordinance, free rein was given to the politicians of the Valley to keep the embers of a separatist philosophy alive.

These aspects are not covered in the book, which is rightly focussed on a singular theme; the radicalisation of a society that had absolutely no reason to take to that path. How is it that a society, which for millennia symbolised a culture of inclusiveness,  now celebrates death through jihad as a means of gaining salvation? Why is death celebrated? Why is the word of the hate mongers and terror perpetrators taken as the truth? Why have the scholarly institutions of traditional Islamic jurisprudence been demolished in Kashmir? How and why have we allowed the youth of Jammu and Kashmir to be swayed by the force of a radical ideology which seeks the killing of those not conforming to the Muslim faith as a righteous act; which believes that it is a moral imperative to take up arms against the state; and which is ideologically primed to the extent of believing that laying down one’s life for the cause of jihad is an act that will win rewards in heaven? Once we find answers to these questions, we will be a step closer to understanding the causative factors of violence in the state of J&K. Only then, can we begin to look at policy options to address the alienation that has evidently taken place.

Bashir Assad is a son of the soil. Born in South Kashmir and having being educated in a Madrassa, he was privy to every aspect of life in the state and thus is perhaps more competent than others to expound on the radicalisation that has swept through the Valley and destroyed its Sufi culture. Unknown to many is the fact brought out by Assad that the spread of radicalisation was linked to the growth of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir. The process started sometime in the mid 1960’s, when Maududi’s literature was first made available. It gained impetus after 1977, ostensibly with Pakistani backing—a throwback to the Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Liberation war. With the advent of armed insurgency in 1989, the process took on a menacing hue. 

All these aspects are well covered in the book. Most alarmingly, while the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its Falah-e Aam Trust (Educational Wing)  in 1992, it simultaneously issued orders for the absorption of the teachers of Falah-e-Aam Trust in government schools. And thus began the onslaught of a radical ideology on young and impressionable minds. It is incomprehensible to understand why this was done by the State. A charitable explanation is that the state leadership was naive. More likely however is the possibility that they were complicit. Be that as it may be, the end result today is that the educational system has been taken over by a radicalised clergy and even government jobs are available only to those who support the Mullah caste. A small group of people, who had no Kashmiri roots and who comprise barely three percent of the Muslim populace, are thus now ruling the roost. 

Why did we allow this to happen? Both the Centre and the State must accept responsibility for the mess that has been created in Kashmir. The Mullahs mentioned earlier—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis et al, are the ones spearheading the Azadi narrative, and linking it with Islam. Thus the slogan—‘Azadi ka matlab kya, La illaha illallha’. The factors which drive the terrorist movement in the state have been variously attributed in public discourse to poverty, a sense of alienation, joblessness, and many other factors. But the real cause, radicalisation of the minds of the youth, is rarely discussed. That is the nature of the secular state, wherein to speak of an issue in religious terms gets the individual labelled as communal! But unless the facet of radicalisation is addressed—something that has been ongoing for close to over five decades—peace cannot return to the Valley.

It is surprising that the Mullahs exhort the common Kashmiri, the original inhabitants of the land to make sacrifices for the cause. Yet they themselves keep their children safely ensconced in other parts of India, where they receive a good education. These Mullahs have amassed fortunes in the name of the poor and have cornered political and administrative power.  Their shackles need to be broken if Kashmir is to return to peace. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A is but a first step in this direction. The road ahead is however going to be long and arduous one, but it is one that must be traversed.

Bashir Assad’s book must be read to understand the way the narrative has been shaped and exploited by a small group for their personal ends. It gives out a facet of Kashmir from the perspective of a son of the soil, that has never before been penned, because of the risk to life and limb that such an account would invariably bring. It is thus a brave account, giving out in explicit detail how the Valley got radicalised and in the process, exposing the author and his family to great risk. The author appears to have a soft corner for Sheikh Abdullah and his brand of politics, but that is par for the course. There is also an oblique reference in passing, linking the growth of the Jamaat to the rising influence of the RSS. This may be the popular narrative in Kashmir but it is devoid of substance and is a mere rationalisation of the acts of the Jamaat. The radicalisation of the Valley was a deliberate act, well thought out and planned by a rabid clergy, supported from across the border and was not a result of internal causes. It is a sad reflection of our times, and of the state of India’s professed  secularism, that this philosophy was not nipped in the bud and allowed to flourish till it had all but consumed the state. 

For those looking at conflict resolution in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, post the dramatic revocation of the special status of the state on 5 August 2019, this book must be read. It provides an essential backdrop to understanding the situation in the Valley, which makes it an indispensable read for policy makers, think tanks, personnel form the Armed Forces, Police personnel and even the lay public. A few printers devils have entered into the book which otherwise has been well produced by Vitasta Publications. These need to be corrected in the next edition. Overall, a very brave book on Kashmir, for which the author must be commended.

WHAT MAKES A SOLDIER FIGHT: The Challenge of Operating in J&K

2016 has been a tumultuous year for the Indian Army deployed in J&K. The challenge ironically came from a growing perception that normalcy was setting in and the role of the Army required to be re-calibrated to facilitate the normalisation process. How this was to come about was not defined, but a general perception that trickled down to the rank and file was that nothing should be done that could vitiate the atmosphere and which could potentially lead to alienating the people in the Kashmir Valley. Herein lay the flaw. The assumption, though not stated, implied that a major contributing factor to alienation was the presence and actions of the Indian Army. Remove that, and voila, peace and tranquility would return. By laying the onus of a return to peace on the men in uniform, causative factors were brushed aside, and the insidious role played by terror groups, their supporters from across the border and fifth columnists operating from inside the state and in other parts of the country was glossed over. Also overlooked was the role of the political class and the state administration in the entire process.

Peace in the Kashmir Valley as indeed in the whole state of J&K will remain a chimera for a host of reasons, not least of which is the fact that a peaceful J&K state does not fit in with the larger aims of Pakistan and its military. Kashmir is not the core dispute between India and Pakistan as is generally stated and believed. That core is ideological, going back to the events in history that led to the creation of Pakistan as a separate country for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Kashmir is but a symptom of the larger malaise that afflicts Pakistan’s polity and its military leadership. It defines itself as the antithesis of India and in that sense, Pakistan is what India is not. If the two countries were to live in peace, then the question - why partition, would be difficult to answer. Are the two nations condemned by history to live in a state of constant friction and hostility? That is the fundamental issue which policy makers in India and its military leadership need to confront and address. Pakistan will continue to keep the pot boiling in J&K. The challenge is to keep the population of J&K, immune to such influence. 

Like other states in the Indian Union, J&K too has had its share of poor governance, corrupt administrators and self serving politicians. While such factors have contributed to the spread of terrorism in the state, they are neither primary nor causative factors.  Had this been so, we would have seen a similar influx of violence in many other parts of the country. Violence in the state of J&K is more a product of instigation by forces inimical to the state and a vitiated political discourse. The threat is from deliberate fomentation of violence by foreign backed terrorist groups who are supplied weapons, explosives and money by their cross border handlers to carry out their nefarious designs and who are also trained and indoctrinated in safe havens across the border. Threats also emanate from a focused campaign to indoctrinate the people through propaganda and imposition of an alternate ideology which is inimical to the idea of a secular state. The latter is the more dangerous and insidious, as it poison’s the minds of the youth through a surreptitious network that has infiltrated into the states education system, sections of the print and audio visual media, government offices and into its religious edifice - the mosques. The psychological dimension of subversion of society also needs urgent address, along with measures to eliminate violence, stabilise the polity, improve justice delivery and ensure an efficient administration. As of now, the state suffers from multiple infirmities, and it is in such an environment of fear and distrust that the Indian Army has been operating. Since Independence, the Army has played a sterling role in the state, and has been very active in the last three decades in combatting terror supported from across the border. What India faces is not a proxy war by Pakistan but a war by other means emanating from that country. That is the prime reason why normalcy is yet to return to the state. Internal fault lines aggravate the situation further. The Army has successfully kept the situation under control but a total return to normalcy would require synchronised efforts of multiple organs of the state to play their part in sync with security force operations. That is still a work in being and hence the challenge faced by the Army is immense. In such an environment, we need to revitalise the capability and capacity of the military to ensure stability till a durable peace returns to the state.

In his ‘Mann ki Baat’ of 26 November, the Prime Minister stated “When the entire country stands with our jawans, their strength increase 125 crore times.” This is a truism which is oft forgotten. The support a soldier receives form the nation contributes in great measure to his morale and enables him to  perform, well over his abilities. Sadly, this support is conspicuous by its absence, both in India’s polity and in its administrative network, over long stretches of time. The row over AFSPA is but a manifestation of this malaise. AFSPA is neither the cause of violence, nor of its continuation. It is simply an enabling provision to permit the Army to effectively discharge its duties. But it becomes a handy tool for various inimical groups to demonise the Army and disparage the work it does in most trying and difficult circumstances. 

In conventional conflict, the whole nation stands as one behind its Armed Forces. All the wars that the nation has fought in since Independence stand testimony to the above observation, the Kargil war being the most recent expression of national will against an external enemy. But in long drawn out insurgencies and in wars conducted by other means, such as the current conflict in J&K, such support is not always forthcoming. In some cases, there are voices raised in the country supporting the terrorists, as happened in the prestigious environs of the Jawahar Lal University in February 2016, and later also in the Jadavpur University in  Kolkatta. What then compels the Indian soldier to fight, despite a perceived lack of support from the nation he is committed to defend? The reputed historian, S.L.A. Marshall, in his book, “Men Against Fire” was remarkably prescient in his observation when he stated: “I hold it to be of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade…He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily.”

Indeed, the primary motivation of men in battle is related to strong group ties and the desire of not letting their buddy down. Another noted research paper by Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz also showed similar results among Germany’s Wehrmacht soldiers who fought on even as Berlin fell. This primary motivation is as true today as it was in the great World Wars. The US validated this truth yet again in a study carried out in Iraq on what motivated soldiers to fight. The paper, published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute in 2003 validated the popular belief that unit cohesion is a key issue in motivating soldiers to fight. What makes men fight is hence a product of unit cohesion, esprit de corps and strong bonds of loyalty to one’s comrades in arms and the unit one belongs to.

This has been the Indian experience too. The ‘izzat’ of the ‘paltan’, unit cohesion and strong bonding makes a soldier persevere, despite the most formidable odds. The saga of Lance Naik Hanumanthappa Kopad, who was rescued alive after being buried 25 feet in an avalanche for five days at minus 50 degrees Celsius, in the Siachen Glacier, reflects that spirit. The nation mourned when the brave heart passed away after being evacuated to the Command Hospital at Delhi, but the sheer grit in surviving such odds galvanised the whole nation. While the courage and fortitude of the soldier was commendable, equally commendable was the will of his commanding officer and all ranks of the battalion, who continued with the rescue efforts in extremely hostile terrain and weather conditions, despite knowing that medically, the chance of finding a survivor were nil. It is this spirit instilled in the fighting soldier that imbues him with the will to fight. He will fight for his comrades, because he knows that his comrades will fight for him. The larger cause is the nation, but the immediate context is survival, the izzat of his paltan and the desire to stand up for his comrades, knowing fully well that his comrades will always stand up for him.

Imbuing such spirit in the rank and file of the Armed Forces is a product of regimentation. Simply stated, the ethos of the unit requires each man to ensure that his unit or sub unit is the very best that can be. No sacrifice is big enough to uphold the honour and good name of the unit. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, as the Army Chief succinctly stated this in his address to the Gentleman Cadets in the Passing out Parade of the Indian Military Academy. “You are required to ensure the security of your country” he said. “Should you have to fight, you must fight to win. There are no runner’s up in war”. That desire to win is the cutting edge of every unit’s ethos.

It is regimentation that builds up the will to win, to conquer and persevere against all odds. Regimentation gives the individual the responsibility for the success of the unit and for preserving its honour. That is why he is ready to die to protect his comrades. And as his comrades are similarly inclined, the soldier gets the confidence that his back is also being protected. He thus trusts his colleagues with his life, just as they trust him with theirs. The third factor is trust in the military and political leadership and faith in the national aim. This is vital both in war and in long drawn out anti insurgency and anti terrorism campaigns. But this faith and trust is not something that can be taken for granted. It has to be nurtured, else, like everything else, it can decay and wither over time, with negative consequences for the Army and for the nation. It is this aspect that remains worrying in the ongoing war by other means which Pakistan is waging against India in Jammu and Kashmir.  

The war against terror being waged in J&K has been ongoing for nearly three decades and is not likely to terminate any time soon. In 2015, India witnessed the fourth highest number of terrorist incidents globally as indicated in the Statistical Appendix of US Country Report on Terrorism 2015. Civilian and security forces fatalities were 181 and 155 respectively, in 2015. The figures for 2016 are slightly higher, at 191 civilian fatalities and 173 security forces fatalities. Of these, 84 security forces fatalities have taken place in J&K alone. The environment of operations is thus difficult, but soldiers still persevere because of the strong regimental traditions and unit ethos. However, certain incidents in the recent past have the potential to erode the confidence of the rank and file in its leadership - both political and military. That is a cause for concern. 

Mistakes invariably will be committed by troops on the ground, which obviously must be investigated and analysed to learn the appropriate lessons.  How such incidents are dealt with however, requires a great deal of sensitivity and finesse to avoid an adverse impact on the morale and confidence of troops. An incident in November 2014 where a mobile check post of the Army fired on a car which did not stop is a case in point. The incident led to the death of two and injury to two more persons, all of whom were later found to be teenagers. The uproar over the killing of innocent schoolchildren is understandable, but the immediate reaction by the Army, (perhaps on political considerations) that the guilty Army personnel will be dealt with, sent a wrong message to the rank and file. How was guilt established without even a cursory investigation? Why was it made so public? Could not there have been better means to inform the public and assuage their anger? Regardless of the fact that the troops in this incident acted in good faith or otherwise, to arbitrarily condemn them as guilty broke that trust which a soldier has placed in his superiors. The larger fear of such breach in faith is that troops will prefer inaction rather than aggressively pursue a line which may have negative consequences for them, should things go wrong.

It is important that the morale of soldiers is maintained at any cost. Adverse occurrences need to be dealt with through skilful perception management which, while assuaging public sentiments, does not cause damage to military morale. At this all important cusp in the developing situation in J&K, it must also be ensured that the offensive spirit is not sacrificed in an attempt to reach a quick peace. This will lead to a siege mentality where troops will stay confined to their areas of operation, and will seek to avoid combat when they do venture out. In the process, we will see a resurgence in terrorist activity which for the moment has been effectively contained. 

It is also important for the state to get its act together. A revamping of the state’s administration and improvement in the criminal justice system is a crying need and must be taken up urgently along with steps to check the mushrooming of Madrasas that preach a virulent Wahhabi discourse. Many school’s too have been infiltrated which now propagate Wahhabism and which is putting a death knell into the ‘Kashmiriyat’ that was the state’s tradition. The Army on its part must continue with offensive operations, and must learn to handle flak when things go wrong. The road ahead is long and slippery, but it would be a test of the military’s leadership at all levels. The Army has no option but to persevere and come out with flying colours.

For CLAWS Journal, Spring 2017.