Promoting Hidden Agendas

Recently, a group of retired civil servants, under the banner of an organisation called the Constitutional Conduct Group (CCG), released a statement in the public domain, expressing “deep concern at the assault on the Rule of Law in India and on its citizens’ rights to free speech and dissent”. The statement was purportedly signed by 99 of them, or at least their consent was presumably obtained to affix their name to this document. By itself, this was a non-event, as the nation is used to such shenanigans by groups who make a visible pretence of speaking for the poor and the dispossessed, but in actual fact advance an agenda which is far removed from such noble motives. However, as all of the signatories have served in government, and some among them have held positions of great power and authority within the country, the intent and motive of putting out such a statement needs to be deliberated upon.

The signatories to the statement wrote and I quote, “The rights to Freedom of Speech & Expression, Freedom of Assembly and the like, guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution, are a corrective to the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged across the axes of income, gender, religion, caste and community. To uphold the rule of law and enforce the rights to freedoms, the judiciary must be the vigilant sentinel guarding the values of constitutional propriety”. That was simply stating the obvious. But after uttering such pious sentiments, the authors seem to have gone astray and focussed their energy, not in alleviating the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged, but in promoting the cause of those forces which are hell-bent on destroying the very soul—the very fabric and integrity of India.

A curious omission that these authors made while referring to Article 19 (1) and its sub clauses was in ignoring Article 19 (2), which places restrictions on Article 19 (1). The said restrictions came about as a result of an amendment to the Constitution in 1951—The First Amendment—done under the aegis of India’s first prime minister, Mr JL Nehru. Article 19 (2) places limits on the exercise of Article 19 (1) by explicitly stating that nothing in the sub clauses of Article 19 (1), shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clauses, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India.

Why did the group of 99 indulge in such sleight of hand? As we go through the contents of the statement, it becomes increasingly evident that the group was speaking, not on behalf of the poor and marginalised sections of society, but for a specific constituency within India, which, while professing and eulogising the democratic structure of India, uses those very tools of freedom to undermine the nation and seek its disintegration. The authors apparently had little desire to use their statement as “a corrective to the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged across the axes of income, gender, religion, caste and community” as noted in their statement. It was to promote the interests of a small vocal minority at the expense of the nation.

So we see this group coming out in support of all those who caused death, destruction and mayhem during the anti-CAA protests in Delhi. Even the seditious speech given by Sharjeel Imam at AMU, calling for cutting off India’s northeastern region from the rest of the country was considered by them as righteous. They defended the rights of the rioters who held Delhi to ransom in January 2020, but had not a word in support of the hapless citizens who had to undergo great suffering due to this unruly mob. The group was upset that some individuals with Maoist links were arrested for the Bhima-Koregaon violence in 2018, calling people like Sudha Bharadwaj, Shoma Sen, Gautam Navlakha and Anand Teltumbde as India’s finest social and human rights activists! And all this in the name of the poor!

They came out in support of Siddharth Varadarajan, founding Editor of The Wire, who is facing criminal charges. But not a word was written of the attempt to muzzle the press by a certain political party, simply because Arnab Goswami of Republic TV Network dared to call Sonia Gandhi by her maiden name. Evidently, it was not freedom of expression that this group is concerned about, but in promoting a specific agenda. And this comes out more clearly in the stance taken by this group on efforts to restore normalcy in J&K. They bemoan the curtailment of certain liberties of the citizens of the Union Territory but are silent on the fact that three decades of violence and terror caused by radical islamists and their foreign backers is finally being tackled, which necessitated certain strict measures being taken to restore normalcy. And again, while ostensibly speaking on behalf of the common citizens of J&K, their focus is not in return of normalcy to the Union Territory, but on the preservation of the status quo, which had been the causative factor for the growth of violence. More importantly, there was not one word in their statement for the real victims of terror in the Valley—the hapless Hindu minority, who suffered genocide at the hands of a radicalised majority and who are still living as refugees in a free India. Could there be a greater shame.

Part III of India’s Constitution dealing with Fundamental Rights needs to be zealously guarded, but we need to guard against hidden agendas too. As Shakespeare said in The Merchant of Venice, “The devil can cite scripture for his purpose. An evil soul producing holy witness is like a villain with a smiling cheek, a goodly apple rotten at the heart. O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!” These words need serious contemplation. As peter Drucker stated, “The most important thing in communication is hearing what isn’t said”. What has not been said by the group of 99, exposes their agenda. And that is really sad, as these people held important constitutional positions while in service. 

The Constitution of course, grants them that freedom, as it grants me the right to rebut them. My only request to them is to not hide behind the facade of promoting the interests of India’s hapless poor, but to speak upfront about their agenda. They would still be wrong, but at least they would not incur the sin of hypocrisy.

LECTURE: KARGIL VIJAY DIVAS-26 JULY 2020

This talk was delivered on 26 July 2020, by web cam to JKSC. Over a 100 participants attended.

Today is the 21st Anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas. We devote this day to commemorate the valour of the brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces, who in 1999, against impossible odds, evicted the enemy from the high mountains to which they had infiltrated—a feat which many thought was impossible to execute. 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while defending their motherland. Many more were wounded. To all the soldiers who took part in these operations, our respectful salute. To the gallant heroes who laid down their lives for the motherland, our profound gratitude. Your sacrifice will always be remembered in Golden Letters in the History of India. And to the mothers of the brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces, we can but Salute you for producing such brave sons.

So, what happened in the summer of 1999? 

It all started with a report from a shepherd, Tashi Namgyal. He was 36 years old, and had gone up into the mountains in search of his missing Yak. He belonged to village Gharkon, near the Batalik town, which is about 60 km from Kargil. The date was 3 May, 1999. While walking with his friend in search of the Yak on the Jubbar Langpa stream, he took out his binoculars to scan the mountains and what he saw amazed him. On the mountain top were groups of men in Pathan attire, digging bunkers. Some of the men he saw were armed. Seeing the way the men were dressed, he knew that they had come from across the Line of Control in POJK. leaving the search for his Yak for some other time, Tashi Namgyal came down and promptly informed the nearest post of the Indian Army. Once alerted, the Army got into action and found that the information given by Tashi Namgyal was indeed correct. And so preparations started to evict the infiltrators, who were actually men from the Pakistan military—the Northern Light Infantry, dressed as infiltrators. The Indian Army operation to evict the invaders was code named Operation Vijay. And, just short of three months later, the operation ended on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian Victory.

While information about the infiltrators became known to the Indian Army only in May 1999, the Pakistani operation to capture the heights of Kargil had started much earlier. The Pakistani plan was called Operation Koh Paima (Koh Paima means the one who climbs mountains) and it was conceived soon after General Pervez Musharraf was appointed the Pakistan Army Chief on 06 October 1998. The plan was formulated in complete secrecy, with only four people being involved in the planning process. Besides General Musharraf, there was his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Aziz Khan and the 10 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed. The fourth officer was Maj Gen Javed Hassan, who was made the force commander for Operation KP.

The plan involved occupying the heights around Kargil to cut off National Highway 1 (NH1) to Leh. Musharraf wanted to act quickly before India became too big for Pakistan. Pakistan thought that India would not escalate the issue as Pakistan had the nuclear shield. Strangely, Pakistan did not consider a defensive plan for holding on to the heights they occupied because they thought that the heights were so commanding that Indian troops would not be able to capture them. They also thought that international pressure would prevent India from fighting back. They thus launched their forces without artillery and logistic support. Unfortunately for Pakistan, all their assumptions proved to be wrong.

This was the time when peace talks between India and Pakistan were making great headway. India’s Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Lahore by bus in February 1999, but even so, the Pakistan military carried on with its preparations to occupy the heights in the Kargil Sector. This in effect meant occupying the heights around the Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk.

That historic visit of India’s Prime Minister took place on 19 February 1999 and at Lahore, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech where he said…

“Hum jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…”

But even as these famous words for peace were reverberating across the power corridors of the world, Pakistani troops of its Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, were already across the Line of Control, and had occupied some of the heights. They would continue their build up in the next two months in the mountain ranges overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships and the village of Turtuk, one of the northernmost villages of Ladakh. The aerial distance between Dras and Turtuk is just over a 100 kilometres and this is the place where all the major battles of the Kargil war were fought.

From Sonamarg, as we cross the Zojila Pass on the road to Leh, we enter the Dras and Mushkoh Valleys. This is perhaps one of the coldest inhabited places in the world, due to its wind chill factor. Many of the famous battles like the battle of Tololing, Tiger Hill, Batra Top and others were fought here during the 1999 Kargil War.

The Batalik sub-sector too saw some of the fiercest battles of the conflict, but these were at that time not covered in great detail because the press was not allowed to go to Batalik. According to Brigadier Devender Singh, the former commander of the Batalik Brigade, the battles fought in the Batalik sector were as tough if not tougher than the battles in Dras and Mushkoh Valleys. Here, the attacking troops had to march for three days from the road, just to reach the area of engagement and then launch the assault. The enemy in this sector had made deeper inroads over a wider area, which meant that there were many more heights to be conquered, and that too with fewer resources. And while Tololing and Tiger Hill are rightly classified as great battles won by India, we must not forget the battles of Khalubar, Jubar and Kukarthang which were fought in Batalik sector, over heights which ranged between 16,000 to 18,000 feet and which were equally great battles won by the Indian Army.

It must be remembered that before the war started, there was only one brigade comprising of three infantry battalions which was responsible to guard the sector between the Zojila Pass and Leh along the LoC - a stretch of about 300 km. The deployment hence was very thin as the terrain was very difficult and the need was not felt for more troops. The Indian posts along the LoC were evacuated before winter set in and the Pakistanis did likewise on their side of the LoC. The mountain heights here ranged between 14000 ft to 18000 ft and the winter heavy snowfall cut them off from the rest of the world.

The Pakistan Army took advantage of these shortcomings, especially the lack of Indian troops during winters, and intruded into Mushkoh, Dras, Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk sub-sectors, between Zojila and Leh. They crossed the LoC and intruded 4-10 km into Indian territory and occupied 130 winter-vacated Indian posts. Pakistan wanted to cut off the highway connecting Srinagar with Leh, thereby cutting off Ladakh and Siachen –– a move India didn’t expect. (This para is from economic times)

In the very early stages of the war, A six man patrol led by Capt Saurabh Kalia in the Kaksar sector to determine the whereabouts of the enemy, was ambushed and the officer was brutally tortured and killed. The officer, with his handful of men fought bravely till his ammunition ran out. Over a period of time, from the middle of May onwards, additional troops were pushed into the area and operations were started to evict the Pakistanis from the positions they had occupied. 

You all know of the heroism exhibited by Capt Vikram Batra. His famous quote, Yeh Dil Mange More, after he had captured one of the objectives was an expression of passion, grit and determination, to evict the enemy from the places he had occupied surreptitiously. It was a commitment to continue the battle till the very last enemy soldier was evicted from the sacred soil of India. He was Killed in Action (KIA) in his next operation, where the enemy was holding on very strongly, but Capt Batra’s courage and indomitable will ensured the position was captured before he succumbed to his injuries. He was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously.

And who can forget the courage and grit of young Manoj Pande who fought in the Batalik Sector. He led his platoon in the capture of Jubar Top and destroyed bunker after bunker till he was hit by machine gun fire and succumbed to his injuries. He was yet again another worthy winner of the Param Vir Chakra. In his personal diary he had written that if death strikes me before I prove my blood, I swear I will kill death. Such words from one so young makes us all proud to be Indians.

The stories of valour are galore. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar and Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav became living legends by their exploits in battle and both went on to win the Param Vir Chakra. Then we have the heroism of Capt Vijayant Thapar, who was awarded the Vir Chakra. Before going on his last mission, he writes a letter to his parents. I will be in heaven watching over you all when this letter reaches you he said. Then he writes that if he becomes a human again, he will again join the Army and fight for his nation. And even in these trying and testing times, Young Vijyant remembered a poor orphan girl, Rukhsana, whom he was helping. He asks his parents to continue to support that little girl. What better example of humanity can one give than this, that even in the midst of the greatest danger, Vijyant remembered to help a poor orphan girl whose parents had been killed by militants.

The stories of valour and heroism which flowed from the Kargil war are endless. If Bollywood were to make movies out of these exploits, every single movie would be a super hit. These young men were brave beyond compare and steadfast beyond the call of Duty. What more can any nation ask from its youth.

While the Infantry moved foot by bloody foot, to capture the heights, they were helped in no small measure by the Artillery. The Bofors guns proved their worth in gold, and enabled the infantry to capture their objectives by raining down hundreds of thousands of rounds on to the enemy positions. Approximately 5000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers, every day in the Kargil War, and this changed the tide of the battle. And on the day Tiger Hill was reclaimed, 9000 shells were fired. The Gunners indeed displayed remarkable grit and courage, especially all the forward Observation Officers, who were at all times with the leading assault elements of the Infantry.

The role of Air Power in Battle can also never be under estimated. The decision to use air power was taken on 25 May. Never before in military history had an air force engaged ground targets at heights as high as the Mountain peaks of Kargil. It must be remembered that the IAF had never exercised in such terrain before and now they were being asked to undertake extremely dangerous missions at these high altitudes as the enemy had stinger missiles. As the missiles had an operational ceiling of 28000 feet, the fighter aircraft perforce had to fly at 30000 feet, and that too along the LoC as the orders were clear that the LoC would not be crossed. By the first week of June, the Mirage 2000 aircraft with its precision guided munitions joined the MiG 21s and MiG 23s in the attack, using 1000 pound bombs fitted with laser designators. They effectively disrupted the enemy’s supply columns, blasted their defences, and provided valuable intelligence through reconnaissance sorties. About 6500 air sorties were flown of which the fighters flew about 1200 sorties of which 650 sorties were attack missions. This was truly an incredible feat in the high altitudes and besides causing severe damage to the enemy, they uplifted the morale of own troops and destroyed the morale of the enemy.

Ultimately, every single soldier and airman contributed to this great victory, which initially looked as being impossible to achieve. It was the courage and grit of the Indian soldier which made the impossible possible.

Now a word about he lessons learnt. The lessons from Kargil apply not just to India and to the Armed Forces, but to each of us also in our daily lives. 

The First lesson, in my view is never to trust the enemy. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee went on a peace mission and took a bus to Lahore. But at the very moment he was speaking of peace, the Pakistan Army was sending its soldiers to occupy the vacant heights in the Kargil Sector. It is true that we must make efforts to build better relations with others, including our enemies, but that does not mean closing our eyes to potential dangers which the enemy may lure us into. Sometimes, when we trust too much, complacency sets in. Just because the Prime Minister had made a bid for peace, was no reason to believe that peace would be achieved. After all, India has been living with the Pakistani problem fro decades and it was unlikely that a single visit could have changed Pakistani mindsets. Eternal vigilance is the price that has to be paid if we want peace on our borders and that is a lesson we all must learn. It applies to our daily lives too.

The second lesson pertains to the need to anticipate unlikely events, even if the probability of occurrence is very low. Prior to the Kargil infiltration, the Indian Army had carried out an exercise and war gamed the possibility of Pakistan carrying out such an action. It was considered that while such an action was possible, Pakistan would be foolish to carry out such an exercise as maintenance of troops in the mountains would be difficult and while Pakistan may achieve short term tactical success, it was bound to result in a strategic disaster. The assessment hence was that Pakistan will not undertake such a venture with all its attendant risks and the very high probability of failure. While the assessment was logical, it did not take into account the fact that the enemy’s action do not necessarily have to be logical. And it would have been prudent to at least cater for such an unlikely event. That means, in the winter months, on all clear days when helicopters could fly, the area should have been kept under continuous surveillance and the area should also have been patrolled more frequently. That would have enabled early detection. In our daily lives too, let us not confuse the improbable with the impossible. It is well to remember that human stupidity is capable of anything.  

The third lesson is the need to prepare for the worst case scenario. When the Kargil war started, both the Army and the Air Force were short of vital ammunition and other items. That is what prompted the then Army Chief to say that we will fight with what we have. A bit of forethought and planning at the level of Ministry ion Defence could have averted such a scenario form occurring. A reasonable amount of critical munitions, spares and equipment, which take a long time to procure must hence always be kept as reserve stock, to cater for such an eventuality, otherwise we may well be compromising our security.

The aspect of Intelligence failure was once again highlighted in the Kargil War. We were caught by surprise at the very scale of the operations launched by Pakistan. Now, all those troops could not have just come into the Kargil heights without preparation. They would have been collected in Gilgit Baltistan, trained, equipped and then sent across into India. All this would have generated a lot of activity within Gilgit Baltistan which our agencies should have picked up. The failure to do so proved to be very costly. It must be remembered that any action by the enemy requires heightened activity in peace time and it is important to pick up those signals. This is a vital part of Intelligence gathering which gives us inputs about enemy’s likely course of action.  

The fifth lesson which comes out of Kargil is the need for unity of effort. This implies total synergy within the armed forces, between the Armed Forces and all concerned government agencies, and within the nation as a whole to include each and every organisation and each and every citizen. It is not just the armies which go to war, but the whole nation which goes to war, so a united effort is essential to prosecute and win wars. There were certain weaknesses in this regard which were highlighted by the Kargil Review Committee, and many of them have now been addressed. An important reform made recently by the government is the appointment of the CDS, a step which was long overdue. The announcement to this effect was made by the Prime Minister in his Independence Day Speech last August and we have now seen one of the most vital defence reforms coming through. The next step will be making the country self sufficient for most of its defence needs and work towards that end is now in progress. 

Today is the information age and the media plays a vital role in war. The Indian media played an excellent role during the Kargil conflict and this was commented upon even by the Pakistanis who felt let down by their own media. The importance of having a free media is vital and we in India are fortunate to have a very strong and free media network.

There is an important Seventh lesson which we can also learn from the enemy’s actions. The Pakistani planners made a lot of assumptions about what the Indian reaction would be. All these assumptions turned out to be false. The Pakistanis did not cater for an alternate plan, should their assumptions be found to be wanting. So they did not prepare for a contingency that the Indian reaction would be swift and brutal and that India would not be cowed down either by world opinion or by Pakistani nuclear blackmail. Nawaz Sharif was given a preliminary briefing of the operation, which would have been sketch as early as 5 February 1999 in Skardo. This was just prior to the visit of India’s Prime Minister to Lahore where the Lahore declaration was signed. He could have given certain directives to the Army, but he did not do so. Later, on 17 May, he came to know that Pakistani regular forces were inside Indian territory across the LoC. Again he chose to keep quiet, perhaps assuming that things would not spiral out of control. This blindness in both the Pakistan Army and its political establishment is astounding. In the event, when the Pakistan Air Force officers were briefed about the operations in mid May, it was Air Commodore Abid Rao who prophetically quipped, After this Operation, it is going to be Martial Law or Court Martial. In the event it was Martial Law. The Seventh and Final Lesson then, for todays talk. We must never ever assume. Base your plans on reality and not on assumption.

India has come a long way from what we were in 1999, but there is still a great deal of work ahead of us to see that our nation is secure. The strength of a country depends on the strength of its people, the strength of its economy and the strength of its armed Forces. On this Kargil Vijay Divas, let us all solemnly pledge to make our nation strong and great and reclaim the glory that was once India’s in the comity of nations. With this words I end. Namaskar, Jai Bharat, Jai Hind.

GALWAN AND CHINESE EXPANSIONISM: INDIAN OPTIONS

Chinese intransigence across the LAC (Line of Actual Control) has been a constant feature of the India-China relationship for many years, but this year it has taken on an extremely ominous turn in Eastern Ladakh. The face off at Galwan on 15 June which led to the loss of 20 precious lives of the Indian Army, including that of Col B. Santosh Babu, the Commanding Officer of 16 Bihar is an inflexion point in the relationship between the two countries which has dramatically altered the status quo and which is perhaps the lowest point in the relationship after the 1962 war and the violent clashes which took place at Nathu La in 1967. The number of Chinese casualties is not known, though some press reports state that about 43 Chinese soldiers were also killed in the violent face-off that occurred. That the Chinese have been nibbling at Indian territory since long is well known and has given rise to the term ‘salami slicing’. This occurs because at various places the distance between the Indian held posts and the positions which are occupied by Chinese troops is very large. The intermediate gap between the two is patrolled by both sides to the extent  of what each perceives to be within its area. This has led to clashes in the past, though never to an extent where lives have been lost. But the Chinese, with better road communications are more advantageously placed and it is only now that India is playing a catch up game in building up its infrastructure.

The area in Eastern Ladakh under discussion extends from the Karakoram Pass, lying at an altitude of 18,176 feet, and which is a clearly identifiable marker as representing the boundary between India and East Turkestan (Xinjiang), to the Depsang Plains, the Galwan Valley, Area Hot Springs and the Pangong Tso. These are all high altitude areas, lying at altitudes ranging roughly between 16000 feet to 20000 feet. The LAC lies along these points, though it is neither demarcated nor delineated. No maps have been exchanged between the two sides, which specify what each country perceives to be as its side of the LAC. The Shyok River runs to the West of the LAC. Further West is the Siachen Glacier, which forms a rough triangle and lies in between the Karakoram Pass to its East and the Saltoro Ridge to its West. The Saltoro Ridge runs roughly northwards from NJ 9842. In 1949, in terms of the Karachi Agreement, the Ceasefire Line between India and Pakistan was delineated up to this map coordinate and the area ahead was simply stated as “thence north to the glaciers”. Under the 1972 Simla Agreement, the Ceasefire Line was converted into the LoC. The Saltoro Ridge runs northwards  from NJ 9842 towards Indira Col and the Sia Kangri massif. Further North, lies the Shaksgam Valley, a tract of about 2,700 square miles, which is a part of Ladakh illegally occupied by Pakistan and given to China by Pakistan in a 1963 Agreement between the two countries. This agreement of course is not recognised by India. The Saltoro Ridge lies at altitudes ranging between 18,000 feet to 23,000 feet, with the Siachen Glacier lying ti its East. Approaches to the Glacier from the West are through the Saltoro Ridge, which is held by India.

India has recently completed a road which runs from Darbuk to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO). At DBO, is an Indian airstrip, where heavy lift aircraft can land. To the North of the DBO lies the Karakoram Pass, at a distance of about 16 km. The road, called the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road, runs astride the Shyok River, past the confluence of the Shyok and Galwan rivers up to Murgo and then on to the Depsang Plains, finally terminating at the DBO airstrip. North of the Karakoram Pass lies East Turkestan, which has been taken over by China and is now called Xinjiang. To its East lies the Aksai Chin, an area illegally occupied by China in the 1950s and through which passes the strategically important road which connects Tibet to East Turkestan. This road is about 140 kms East of the Karakoram Pass at its nearest point.

India and China signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC on 7 September 1993. An Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC was signed on 29 November 1996. Another Agreement, reaffirming the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, was signed on 23 June 2003. And on 11 April 2005, the two countries signed the fourth Agreement, on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. Article I of the above states:

The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations. The two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. The final solution of the boundary question will significantly promote good neighbourly and friendly relations between India and China.

The 11 April Agreement also states: The Special Representatives on the boundary question shall continue their consultations in an earnest manner with the objective of arriving at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement, which will provide the basis for the delineation and demarcation of the India-China boundary to be subsequently undertaken by civil and military officials and surveyors of the two sides. 

In 2013, the two countries also signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA). Meetings of the Special Representatives have yielded no results and post the Galwan incident of 15 June, it is self evident that all the confidence building measures established post the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993 are dead. Events Since May 2020 have sent a clear signal that China is no longer interested in observing any of the protocols. The relationship stands broken and how the two countries will move forward from here remains a matter of conjecture. In any event, all the interlocking Agreements, from the Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993, to the BDCA of 2013, lie buried and as of now, have but academic interest.

That events would come to a boil at some time was perhaps on the cards as tactical indicators to that effect existed from quite some time. In the Depsang plains, China built a road as early as 2009, which connected Sumdo to Patrol Point 13. Subsequent years have seen Chinese incursions in Depsang leading to face-offs with Indian troops. In 2014, there was an incursion in Chumar and in 2017, a protracted face-off at Doklam on the Bhutan-Tibet border which lasted for 73 days. While the 2011 incursion was resolved by the military, all others required higher political intervention. The face-off at Pangong Tso in September 2019, which led to brawls becoming physical when Chinese troops attempted to block Indian patrols was a precursor of things yet to come.

Strategic indicators of China following a more muscular policy have also been on the anvil since long. Xi Jinping’s continuous exhortations to the PLA to be ready for war allied with structural reforms within the PLA to make it more combat efficient, China’s White Paper of 2019, and numerous articles coming out from China, seeking retaking of what China perceives to be its territory, are not just part of its ‘Three Warfares’ strategy, but a clear statement of future intent.

That China carries out an annual exercise in the Aksai Chin area opposite Eastern Ladakh was well known. The Indian Army too, carries out an exercise in its own area to match Chinese capability and to counter any potential threat that may arise. This year, The Indian Army exercise was called off due to the spread of the SARS CoV-2 virus that causes Covid-19. The Chinese PLA, on completion of its exercise, simply moved in and occupied positions in the Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Area Hot Springs and in Pangong Tso. This move was apparently pre-planned and obviously had approval from the highest political authority. India has thus been presented with a fait accompli. While China has made a limited pull back in the Galwan Valley, there appears to be little movement elsewhere, especially in the Depsang area and in Pangong Tso, where the PLA has even constructed bunkers.

India’s options remain limited as of now. Chinese incursions cannot be countenanced, but other than the use of force, there seems to be little likelihood of the Chinese vacating the areas that they have transgressed into, in violation of the border protocols. There is of course, the possibility of diplomatic or political initiatives leading to a change in the Chinese stance, but that appears remote as of now. Chinese actions have not been limited to the Himalayas but have also manifested in Hong Kong, where China is giving a go-by to the “One Country Two Systems” principle. It is getting aggressive over Taiwan, and may seek to regain the Island through military force. In the South China Sea (SCS), it is getting increasingly assertive, and has laid claims to practically the entire area through its 9 dash line, on specious claims, giving scant respect to the claims of some of the ASEAN countries. All this is an apparent bid towards seeking a bipolar status and being accepted as the second pole, along with the US.

Whether China has moved too early in its bid for world domination is a moot question which is yet to be answered. In all likelihood, the answer will be in the  affirmative. Chinese over-reach has already set in motion a counter reaction across the US and in India and also in some of the Western European capitals. How this manifests remains to be seen. In all likelihood, the Quad will in the near future become a security pact to guarantee free and open navigation in the Indo-Pacific. It will perhaps become a Quad plus, with the support of some of the rim countries in Southeast Asia. A cross Strait crisis or any unforeseen incident in the SCS could well lead to a war, with untold consequences and it is not clear whether China is ready for such a conflict or if the US and Europe have the stomach for war. The imponderables are many.

For India, the possibility of a full scale conflict across the Himalayas can no longer be ignored. Chinese actions do not stem from a need to guard its road linking Tibet to East Turkestan or of the need to dominate the DSDBO Road. The larger intent will remain taking over the entire Himalayan Range from Arunachal to Ladakh, to gain control over the waters emanating from them. China will keep nibbling away at Indian territory till it is militarily challenged and the time to throw that challenge is now. There will be costs to be paid, but if that is not done now, it is merely postponing the inevitable, as China is unlikely to desist from its chosen course of action. The key to a successful defensive battle in the Himalayas lies in dominating the skies over Tibet. It would require effective surveillance to gauge Chinese intentions and matching space and Network Centric Warfare capabilities. The time for procrastination is perhaps over. The nation needs to stand united as never before to face the challenges that lie ahead.

 

 

 

REMEMBERING THE KARGIL WAR

Today is the 21st Anniversary of Kargil Vijay Diwas. It is a day to remember the grit and valour of the Armed Forces who in 1999, against impossible odds, evicted the enemy from the high mountains to which they had infiltrated—a feat which many thought was impossible to achieve. 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while defending their motherland. Many more were wounded. We pay homage to our 527 brave hearts Killed in Action (KIA) while defending the motherland and SALUTE the courage and valour of all those who fought in those icy heights in very difficult high altitude terrain.

On 3 May 1999, a 36 year old shepherd, Tashi Namgyal, was the first to provide information to the Indian Army of the presence of armed personnel in the Batalik heights. Army patrols thereafter confirmed this information and while initially it was thought that these were infiltrators sent from across the LoC, subsequent events were to prove that they were regular soldiers of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry and personnel of Pakistan’s Special Operations Group. The Indian Army operation to evict the invaders was code named Operation Vijay. The operation ended about three months later, on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian Victory.

The Pakistani operation to capture the heights astride Kargil had started soon after General Pervez Musharraf had taken over as Pakistan’s army chief. The Operation, code named Operation Koh Paima (Op KP—the one who climbs mountains) was formulated in complete secrecy, with only four people being involved in the planning process—General Musharraf, his Chief of General Staff, Lt Gen Aziz Khan,  GOC 10 Corps Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed and Maj Gen Javed Hassan, who was nominated as the force commander for Op KP. The plan involved occupying the heights around Kargil to cut off National Highway 1 (NH1) to Leh. It was assumed by the Pakistani planners that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and world opinion would deter India from enlarging the scale of the conflict and that once the Pakistani military was in control of the heights, India forces would be unable to recapture them, thus altering the status quo in Pakistan’s favour. The plan was based on wrong assumptions and while it was tactically brilliant, it was strategically flawed. This led to Pakistani capitulation towards the end of July 1999.

India was perhaps lulled into complacency by the peace mission of the Indian Prime Minister when he journeyed to Lahore by bus on 19 February 1999 and where the Lahore Declaration was signed by the two countries. At Lahore, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech where he said…

“Hum jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…”

But even as these famous words for peace were reverberating across the power corridors of the world, Pakistani troops of its Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, were already across the Line of Control, and had occupied some of the heights. They would continue their build up in the next two months in the mountain ranges overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships and the village of Turtuk, one of the northernmost villages of Ladakh—a stretch in excess of 100 km as measured from point to point. India had once again been betrayed.

It must be remembered that before the war started, there was only one brigade comprising of three infantry battalions which was responsible to guard the sector between the Zojila Pass and Leh along the LoC - a stretch of about 300 km. The deployment hence was thin as the terrain was very difficult. The Indian posts along the LoC were evacuated before winter set in and the Pakistanis did likewise on their side of the LoC. The mountain heights here ranged between 14000 ft to 18000 ft and the winter heavy snowfall cut them off from the rest of the world. The Pakistan Army took advantage of these shortcomings, especially the lack of Indian troops during winters, and intruded 4-10 km into Indian territory in Mushkoh, Dras, Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk sub-sectors, between Zojila and Leh. They occupied some of the winter vacated posts as well as some unheld peaks, in their bid to sever Leh by cutting off the National Highway.

In the very early stages of the war, a six man patrol led by Capt Saurabh Kalia in the Kaksar sector to determine the whereabouts of the enemy, was ambushed and the officer was brutally tortured and killed. The officer, with his handful of men fought bravely till his ammunition ran out. Over a period of time, from the middle of May onwards, additional troops were inducted into the area to evict the Pakistanis from the positions they had occupied.

The battles fought in these high mountain ranges tested the mettle of the Indian soldier to the extreme. Every hill was fought for foot by bloody foot and victory was paid for in blood. This was a war which was beamed into the drawing room of nearly every home, uniting the whole nation with its Armed Forces in their fight against a vicious enemy. Every battle became etched in memory, and the battle for Tiger Hill, Batra Top, Tololing, khalubar, Jubar, Kukarthang and many others became household names. The nation had new heroes—Capt Vikram Batra and Lt Manoj Pandey were awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously for their courage beyond compare in the battle field. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar and Grenadier Yogender Singh Yadav became living legends by their exploits in battle and were also awarded the Param Vir Chakra. Many names became an inspiration for the whole country such as Capt Vijyant Thapa, Capt Haneef Uddin, Capt Neikezhakuo Kengurüse whose exploits did the country proud. They all sacrificed their lives fighting to defend the country. These young men were brave beyond compare and steadfast beyond the call of Duty. What more can any nation ask from its youth.

While the Infantry moved foot by bloody foot, to capture the heights, they were helped in no small measure by the Artillery. The Bofors gun proved its worth in gold, and enabled the infantry to capture their objectives by raining down hundreds of thousands of rounds on to the enemy positions. The Gunners indeed displayed remarkable grit and courage, especially all the forward Observation Officers, who were at all times with the leading assault elements of the Infantry. The Air Warriors too played a magnificent role. Never before in military history had an air force engaged ground targets at heights as high as the mountain peaks of Kargil. The feats of endurance by the IAF were legendary and played a major role in bringing the war to a swift close. Ultimately, every single soldier and airman contributed to this great victory, which initially looked as being impossible to achieve. It was the courage and grit of the Indian soldier which made the impossible possible.

The lessons learnt were many and encapsulated in the Kargil Review Committee Report, which was also put out in the public domain. Many of the shortcomings of the war have since been addressed, the most recent being the establishment of the post of Chief of Defence Staff. But he most important lesson that emerges is that eternal vigilance is the price we have to pay for our freedom. We must never be caught off guard again. (Published in IF Web on 26 July 2020).

FIVE FINGERS AND THE PALM

Soon after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed power in China, its Chairman, Mao Zedong, described Tibet as his right palm and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as its five fingers. Mao’s expansionist policies became evident when he annexed Tibet in 1950, and then devoted hs attention to dominating, if not taking over, the entire Himalayan range. Because the world was silent when China occupied Tibet, the CCP was emboldened to move towards the five fingers.

China made its first move towards Ladakh when it started construction of a 1200 km long road connecting East Turkestan (Xinjiang) with Western Tibet, of which 179 kms of the road passed through the Aksai Chin, which was part of Ladakh. China began construction of this road in 1951 and completed the same in 1957. Surprisingly, India’s political establishment as well as its intelligence agencies remained blissfully unaware of Chinese incursions into the Aksai Chin till the Chinese themselves publicly inaugurated this road and marked it on their maps. India found that it could do little to change the status quo, other than making weak feeble protests.

India’s post independence political leadership was, for some unfathomable reasons, enamoured with the Chinese ruling establishment and never for a moment thought that they had a potential enemy at their doorsteps. This lack of strategic comprehension of what national security demanded was in ample display in an incident which occured shortly after India achieved independence on 15 August 1947. General Sir Rob Lockhart, a British officer who was appointed as the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, took a strategic plan to the prime minister, asking for a government directive on the defence policy. Mr Nehru blew his top. “Rubbish,” he shouted, “total rubbish! We don't need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to meet our security needs”.

This lack of strategic thought was to cost India dearly. In 1950, China annexed the palm which Mao had spoken off and within a few years thereafter, they had sliced off a portion of the Ladakh finger—the Aksai Chin. As the world quietly acquiesced to an expansionist China, it continued with its plans to control the fingers. Thus was born the Chinese rationale of staking claims over the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, all the while keeping a surreptitious glance at the rest of Ladakh, where their focus was on Gilgit-Baltistan. This region was part of the Ladakh Wazarat during the Dogra rule but was illegally occupied by Pakistan post independence. In an agreement signed between Pakistan and China on 2 March 1963, Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley—an area of approximately 7000 square kilometres bounded by the Kun Lun Mountains in the north and the Karakoram peaks to the south, to China. Today, Chinese forays into Gilgit Baltistan, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has given China virtual control over this region.

Chinese actions in Eastern Ladakh and Sikkim in May-June 2020, their claims over Arunachal Pradesh, their recent forays in Nepal and their constant needling of Bhutan must be seen in the light of their long term aim to gain control over the entire Himalayan range. This gives China direct access to the waters which flow into the downstream countries, which in turn gives Beijing leverage over South Asia. At present, in the Eastern Himalayas, the Chinese control little water except for the  Yarlung Tsangpo (the name of the Brahmaputra River as it flows in Tibet). The river takes a U turn at its Eastern extremity as it circumvents the Namcha Barwa massif and enters Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang River. But the waters of the Tsangpo are just a small part of the total waters of the Brahmaputra River which eventually drain into the Bay of Bengal. Even if China were somehow to develop the technology to transfer the Tsangpo waters in a cost effective manner to its own parched lands, the impact on the downstream countries would not be significant as the catchment areas of the Brahmaputra River are the Southern slopes of the Eastern Himalayas. This explains Beijing’s motive for claiming Arunachal Pradesh.

Likewise, China is angling for influence and domination in Nepal and Bhutan and is seeking to exert pressure on India in Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh. Should China get control, it would facilitate dam construction and enable the regulation and flow of water to the downstream countries, forcing them to remain in China’s servitude. That appears to be China’s larger game plan for gaining control over the five fingers. In addition, the glacial waters which China hopes to get through this land grab would service its massive semi-conductor industries. A typical semiconductor manufacturing facility uses 2-4 million gallons of ultra-pure water per day. Eastern Ladakh, in addition, also provides China with an opportunity to shorten the loop of the BRI-CPEC sustaining Western Karakoram Highway via Kashgar and to connect a fresh alignment through the Karakoram Pass, shortening the present highway passing though East Turkestan by 1800 km.

China aims to be the sole power in Asia and the alternate pole to the US in the world.  Towards this end it seeks India territory in the Himalayan Range, which will provide  it great strategic advantage through control of water and shortening communication links. It is a nefarious plan which must be nipped in the bud. The surest way for India to protect the five fingers is to support a free and independent Tibet. With the palm as an independent entity, China is denied access to the Himalayan Range. An independent Tibet is a strategic necessity for India and for peace and stability in the sub-continent.

For India Foundation - Chintan.

FUTURE CONTOURS OF THE INDIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

The brutal assault by Chinese troops on Indian soldiers on the night of 15-16 June 2020 is an inflexion point in the relationship between the two countries with long term implications. Military actions carried out by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be tactical and localised, but they are orchestrated at the political level and are designed to deliver a message which has strategic ramifications. It is not by accident but by design that a series of border violations took place in Eastern Ladakh and in Sikkim in the month of May. That Nepal also put up claims at this time for a stretch of Indian territory that was clearly not in dispute also points at a possible Chinese hand, though the Nepalese context has been driven by local political considerations.

What could be the cause of Chinese belligerence? There is an opinion currently being expressed within the strategic community of India that Chinese actions are a result of internal dissidence, so an external threat environment is being created to keep the country united, or perhaps to enable the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to continue to maintain its vice like grip on the country and to perpetuate one party rule. But perhaps there are other factors too, which need consideration. China has not just opened up a front with India, but also with Japan and Taiwan, and with some of the ASEAN countries over claims in the South China Sea. With Japan, China has a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. China also claims sovereignty over Taiwan, a position which the Taiwanese government does not agree with. As of now, it has a trade dispute with the US, which has been ongoing for the last two years. So, are Chinese actions in opening up multiple fronts at the same time, a bid to establish China as the sole competitor to the United States? Is China throwing a gauntlet to the US and to the world? This possibility cannot be ignored.

In February, the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) flew fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan as part of what it claimed to be an exercise to test “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence has stated that in the month of June, Chinese military planes had crossed over the outer reaches of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), eight times. In April, a naval flotilla of five warships, led by China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning, sailed through the Miyako Strait between Japan and Taiwan, apparently signalling Chinese naval might in the region. And in the South China Sea, where China has laid claim, through its 9 dash line, to all of the waters therein, a Chinese vessel hit a Vietnamese boat near the Paracel Islands in April and captured its eight crew members along with two boats which came to its rescue. The Chinese lay claim to the Spratly Islands, that are also claimed by Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei and have established military and industrial outposts on the artificial islands that they have constructed in these disputed waters. Increasing unilateral actions by China indicates a disturbing trend which needs detailed analysis.

Post the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic across the world, an ever increasing clamour is gaining ground to make China accountable for the spread of the virus, as the Chinese government suppressed data about the origin and spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Wuhan, the capital city of the Hubei province of China. The pandemic has impacted on the Chinese economy too, adversely affecting the livelihood of millions of workers. This has been further compounded by deteriorating relations between the United States and China, which has both economic and strategic implications. Chinese claims to its unilateral nine-dash line in the South China sea and its claims over territories like the Senkaku Island are being resisted as this impinges on free and open navigation on the seas. Towards this end, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, also called QUAD), an informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, Australia and India, is viewed with concern by China as its increases Chinese vulnerability along the sea lanes of communication where a major part of China’s energy needs passes through the narrow Malacca Strait. Chinese aggressive behaviour is thus not merely to create an external threat to suppress internal dissension, but has other dimensions too.

In China’s strategic calculation, it posits that India is exploiting Chinese vulnerability and leveraging China’s weakness to make territorial gains in the disputed region. China claims the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the basis of the positions held on 7 November 1959, whereas India claims the LAC based on the positions held on 8 September 1962. China has since then built robust infrastructure with a network of roads coming up to the forward areas. The Indian response was muted, with hardly a road being built in the difficult mountainous region. This asymmetry has been consistently exploited by China. India’s attempts to bridge this gap since 2014 has made China uncomfortable, especially the construction of an all weather road from Darbuk to Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), the 255-km long Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road. Lying at altitudes ranging between 13,000 to 16,000 feet the road took almost two decades to construct, but its completion has great strategic significance as the Karakoram Pass is barely 15 kilometres to the Northwest of DBO and is connected by a road. China has constructed the G219 Highway, running East to West, and connecting Xinjiang via Tibet. The G219 Highway passes through India’s Aksai Chin, which was illegally occupied by China in the 1950s. From the Karakoram Pass, the G219 Highway is just over 100 kms to the North, and so, the completion of the DSDBO by India is viewed by China as a potential threat to the G219 and thereby to Chinese control over its restive Xinjiang region.

Aggressive moves by China in Eastern Ladakh could perhaps be tactical manoeuvres to gain positions of advantage to dominate the DSDBO road. This of course begs the question as to why China should seek to make some tactical gains which would antagonise India and is thus a strategically unwise decision, especially at a time when China is facing multiple challenges across the world. But China believes it has to stand up to India, whatever the cost. China does not seek clarity on the LAC, as the view from Beijing is that the two sides do not share the same historical records or perspectives and thus attempts to clarify the LAC will only result in more discord. The Chinese believe that a settlement of the issue can only be a political one, but they are in no hurry to do that either as ambiguity on the LAC has given China the leverage to continue advancing their claims, based on the ‘salami slicing’ tactics they have refined over the years.

India’s complete integration of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), through the abrogation of the operative provisions of Article 370 and the splitting of the state into two union territories—the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) in August 2019 also came as a rude shock to both Pakistan and China. Pakistan created terrorist groups such as the Jaish-E-Mohamed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahidin (HuM) on its soil and continues to nurture them as strategic assets and as instruments of its foreign policy to create terror and havoc within Kashmir and in other parts of India. However, with Article 370 becoming inoperative, many linkages through which Pakistan’s ISI operated within India stand broken, thus considerably degrading the potential of these terror groups to create unrest within Kashmir. This has left Pakistan extremely worried and flustered. In addition, statements emanating from the Indian political leadership that India will wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur Muzaffarabd from Pakistan’s illegal control has come as a further shock to Pakistan as far from regaining the Kashmir Valley, they now fear losing their illegally occupied territories. China too is concerned as it has the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—an over 60 billion dollar project running through Gilgit-Baltistan which would be in jeopardy if India wrests back that area. China is also concerned about claims made by Indian leaders to wrest back all territories of the erstwhile state of J&K which includes the Aksai Chin. That of course would cut China’s Xinjiang province as the G219 Highway passes through Aksai Chin. This too has perhaps emboldened China to seek positions in Eastern Ladakh which could dominate the Indian road axis leading on to the Karakoram pass.

China also feels it is in its interest to keep India bogged down in South Asia and thus undermine its global potential. What China seeks from India is neutrality in the US-China strategic competition. India demands a permanent settlement of the border, which perhaps could have as a first step, the demarcation of the LAC. However, in China’s conception, a permanent settlement of the border would be irreversible, but would not bind India to a neutral stance when Chinese interests are ranged against the US. China would hence not relinquish the leverage it has, for a strategic gain which is fungible. We can thus expect tensions to simmer between India and China in the years to come.

In such a scenario, what are India’s options? As India seeks to find its rightful place in the world, to include a seat at the high table, it cannot subordinate its interests to Chinese concerns. China on the other hand would do all that it can to keep India tied down to the backwaters of South Asia. In its quest for global dominance, it would not like to see a fellow competitor within Asia and so would continue to use its proxies such as Pakistan to keep India embroiled in low level-conflict on its western borders, while China keeps India engaged on the LAC. The default condition in the India-China relationship will thus remain a mix of wariness and suspicion at one end to subdued hostility at the other. This is what has to be managed, without getting into full scale conflict which will benefit neither country at this time.

For India, it is important to get its act together and use all the instruments of state power to keep China in check, whilst also addressing the constant needling and pinpricks emanating from Pakistan. The present crisis, which is still ongoing in Eastern Ladakh may spill over to other sectors in Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. India will have to handle each challenge with a firmness of resolve as was displayed in Doklam. The nation’s armed forces must thus be mentally prepared to ward off any threats that may come from land, sea or air and must be deployed accordingly.

On the diplomatic and political front, it is perhaps time to revisit some of the legacy policies in relation to China. There is a need to speak out against China’s human rights violations against the people of Hong Kong and the Uyghur of East Turkestan (Xinjiang). India also needs to revisit its stance on Taiwan and build a more robust relationship with that country. India’s policy on Tibet also needs to be tweaked. China should not get away with the idea that it can promote dissent within India and not face the consequences of such action. China’s use of psychological operations as part of its ‘Three Warfares Strategy,’ encompassing psychological warfare, public opinion warfare and legal warfare also needs to be countered with a well structured perception management campaign, which should also target the Chinese population. In addition, India needs to further bolster its partnerships with like minded countries for a regional security architecture and organisations like the QUAD need to be strengthened to ensure free navigation on the high seas. 

Chinese attempts to capture vital segments of the Indian market also need to be countered with appropriate legislation as well as with sensitising the masses on the pitfalls of using Chinese goods. The key sectors of concern are telecommunications and power, where no Chinese entry should be permitted on national security concerns. Such policies need to be announced upfront, leaving no ambiguity of interpretation, either within India or abroad. Alongside, India must make a determined push in future technologies through well funded research projects, especially in Artificial Intelligence and chip manufacturing capability. The private sector also has to be co-opted in a big way to exploit the talent India has in multiple fields. This would give the necessary impetus for technological advancement, but a suitable environment would have to be created for the same, through framing of legislation which is compatible to the needs of the corporate sector.

In terms of security, the nation needs to gear up its defence manufacturing capability. The public sector needs a total overhaul, especially the defence ordnance factories (OF) and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU). The OF are being corporatised but the management has to be freed of control by non-specialists and rules have to be framed which gives management adequate leeway to perform in line with the private sector. It is not talent that is in short supply but archaic rules and working procedures which inhibit both thought and growth. If India can produce a world class space and missile programme, there is no reason why it cannot produce state of the art fighter jets, warships, submarines, guns and tanks. India needs to be unshackled for its talent to flow and the private sector needs to come in, in a big way to support the defence effort. 

Finally, on issues of national importance, the nation must stand up as one. Bipartisan support to vital national issues must be the norm, rather than the exception. But that perhaps is a big ask. There is equal danger from the spoilers within the system as there are from enemies outside. How this challenge is addressed will also determine the pace of India’s rise as a leading power in the comity of nations.

Published in IF Journal, Vol 10, Issue 3