The Third Defining Moment in J&K

When India became Independent on 15 August 1947, the vast majority of princely states had signed the Instrument of Accession with India. Three states however had yet to do so—the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. Junagadh, a princely state in Gujarat with a near total Hindu majority had a Muslim ruler. A plebiscite conducted in February 1948 to determine the status of the state was almost unanimous, with over 99.95 percent of the electorate voting for accession to India. In Hyderabad, the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan ruled over a largely Hindu population. The atrocities heaped on the Hindu population forced the Indian government to use the military to liberate the state. This was achieved in a swift operation codenamed Operation Polo, which began on 13 September 1948 and concluded five days later on 18 September with the surrender of the Nizam's forces.

The situation in J&K was however more complex. The border state had two large population groups, both Hindus and Muslims with the latter having a larger majority. Before the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh could take a view on the accession of his state, armed Pakistani raiders, led by Pakistani army officers, invaded Kashmir in October 1947, barely two months after Independence. The Maharaja lacked the capacity to defend his kingdom from these attacks. There were just three battalions available for the defence of the Kashmir division, of which one battalion was at Srinagar, one at Domel and a third at Gilgit Agency. Of the four battalions south of Pir Panjal range, one each was located at Poonch, Rawalkot, Naushera and Mirpur. Some of these were mixed battalions with both Dogra and Muslim troops. Poor communications and the vast spread of the area meant that each battalion was really fighting an independent battle and could not depend on support from any one.

The Pakistani plan to take the state of J&K by force was codenamed "Operation Gulmarg," under the command of Brig (later Major General) Akbar Khan, a serving officer of the Pakistan army. A force of 7,500 tribals mixed with Pakistan army personnel began the offensive on 22 October, which was characterised by murder, loot and rape. The Muslim companies of the Maharaja's forces deserted their posts and joined the raiders, after shamefully killing their Dogra colleagues. By 26 October, the raiders were on the outskirts of Kashmir, when the Maharaja requested India's help and signed the Instrument of Accession. Next day, the first lot of troops from the Indian Army were flown in to Srinagar and the raiders were halted on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, they were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared on 31 December 1948. This was the first defining moment in the post-independence history of the state. At the time of the Ceasefire, Pakistan was in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control. But the fact that the raiders were stopped and pushed back despite unimaginable odds is a credit to the Indian Infantry, which since then, celebrates 27 October as Infantry Day. 

The second defining moment in the history of the state came with the onset of  radicalisation of Kashmiri Muslims. The process, which started in the mid sixties, had, by the mid seventies, picked up pace, eventually culminating in the genocide of the minority Hindu population in Kashmir in January 1990. This was perhaps the saddest moment in the history of the state, where the indigenous Hindu population which had been living here for over five millennia were forced to flee their homeland and seek refuge in other parts of India. The much vaunted "Kashmiriyat" - a blend of Hindu and Muslim traditions, was brutally killed at the altar of Islamic radicalism. The Indian Army was called in to restore order in the state and while the outward manifestation of peace has been restored, the challenge of eliminating terrorism in full still remains, largely because terrorism is fuelled and funnelled from across the border by Pakistan. The Indian Army hence remains deployed in the region, carrying out counter-terrorism operations. 

We are now in the midst of the third defining moment in the state, post-independence. On 5 August 1919, the Special Status given to the state was withdrawn by an Act of Parliament, passed by both the Houses. With the revocation, the state was also bifurcated into two Union Territories (UT), The UT of J&K and the UT of Ladakh, the former with a legislature and the latter without. This has perhaps been the most revolutionary piece of legislation in post-Independence history, designed to bring peace and normalcy to the state. 

Since the revocation, the state has seen a downward spiral of violence, but it will take some more time for peace to return fully to the UT. Importantly, incidents of stone pelting, hartals and attending the funeral of slain terrorists, which was a frequent occurrence since 1990, are now a thing of the past. The linkages which the Hurriyat Conference had with Pakistan have been considerably weakened as has the ability of this organisation to stoke violence in the UT. Abrogation of  the Special Status given to the former state of J&K is however not a panacea for peace. Many challenges still lie ahead for restoration of total normalcy. But without the revocation, peace in the region would have been but a chimera. There is no magic wand to negate the effects of over four decades of radicalisation, wherein even the states administrative machinery had been corroded. But the fact that the process has begun in real earnest brings forth, for the first time, the hope of total peace in the region. That will mark the beginning of the fourth phase of the defining moments in the history of J&K. Hopefully, this will come about by 2024.

INFORMATION WARFARE IN MODERN DAY CONFLICT

Introduction

The critical role that information plays in warfare is well known and has been adequately documented over millennia. In days of yore, rulers laid great stress on intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance as part of their war fighting philosophy. Kautilya’s magnum opus, Arthashastra, written about 2300 years ago, provides a detailed account of intelligence collection, processing, consumption, and covert operations, as indispensable means for maintaining and expanding the security and power of the state. In those times, extensive use was made of spies to gather information. That process continues till date.

The means used till about the beginning of the nineteenth century to deliver orders in the battlefield was through runners who would convey instructions and information from position to position and commander to soldiers in the midst of battle. Drums, horns, flags, and riders on horseback were some of the other methods the military used to send messages over distances. This has changed in modern times with the discovery and understanding of electromagnetic waves since the early nineteenth century. Today, advancements made in communication technology have radically altered the way we communicate with each other. The information revolution has been led by the ongoing rapid evolution of cyberspace, microcomputers, and associated information technologies. Alongside the rapid advancements made in communication technology, phenomenal developments have taken place in long range precision weapon systems. The merger of these technologies, when coopted into revised military organisations, structures and doctrine, has given rise to what is popularly called the RMA or Revolution in Military Affairs. This has led to the evolution of C4I2SR systems, an acronym for integrating Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4), Information, Intelligence (I2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) systems into a system of systems. This implies a group of functionalities and applications of a defence system to integrate weapon platforms with surveillance stations and decision making structures.

The Communication Revolution

 

We are living today in the information age. The shift from traditional industry, established by the industrial revolution, to an economy primarily based upon information technology, started sometime in the mid twentieth century. Also known as the digital age, the information age is characterised by the use of computers and smart phones, which has enabled individuals and organisations to communicate with each other and share information across a wide spectrum of requirements such as terrain mapping, weather forecasting, data transfer and a host of other applications. This has been made possible by positioning satellites in space, which communicate with earth stations to provide a host of facilities all across the globe in real time. Advancements in communication technologies also provide a host of military applications, enabling precision engagement of long distance targets and giving rise to the possibility of conducting military operations at the speed of thought. 

Information in the modern age is thus vital for all aspects of human endeavour, to include governance, business, agriculture, economy—practically every aspect of modern life. The digitisation of information based processes has led to practical applications in all forms of governance. As an example, in India, the 'Jan Dhan Yojana' scheme has led to financial inclusion for millions of households who earlier had no access to banking facilities. Launched in 2014, the scheme, now having completed eight years, has over 46 crore beneficiaries, whose deposits are in excess of Rs 1.73 lakh crore. Similarly, India's Covid vaccine programme was based on digital technology, through the digital platform, 'CO-WIN'.  This user friendly mobile app for recording vaccine data is working as a beneficiary management platform having various modules. Similarly, information based digital systems are presently being used for complex management systems and infrastructures involving the control of electric power, money flow, air traffic, oil and gas, and other information-dependent items. The security and effective operation of critical infrastructure in the energy, banking and finance, transportation, communication, and the Defense Industrial Base domain, rely on cyberspace, industrial control systems, and information technology that may be vulnerable to disruption or exploitation if adversaries attempt to damage them using Information Warfare techniques. This could potentially paralyse a nations functioning and hence the need to protect such systems becomes paramount. 

Information based systems also have tremendous military applications which are vital to a nation's war fighting potential. There would be a need to protect own networks which are required for command and control, precision target engagement over long distances, battlefield transparency, remote sensing, terrain mapping and a host of other military requirements. Protecting own information means and attacking those of the enemy are hence an essential component of modern day war-fighting. The latter operation involves both hard and soft kill options. As an example, the physical destruction of a satellite or earth stations would be part of the hard kill, whereas making systems unusable through non-kinetic means would form part of the soft kill options. Information Warfare thus deals with three major prongs: One, the denial and protection of information, two, the exploitation and ability to attack enemy information and data systems, (which also embraces electronic warfare) and three, deception by various means to include spoofing, imitation and distortion.

Besides the above, the fourth related field for information warfare involves the specific targeting of the minds of a select or indiscriminate audience, so as to influence the attitudes and behaviour patterns of large population segments into a favoured direction. This has become possible because digital technology has enabled the common citizen to receive and transmit information from multiple sources—a function which was earlier solely the preserve of the state and perhaps of a few large media houses. This democratisation of information has led to the ability to influence or shape the attitudes and perceptions of entire populations as part of a war fighting strategy. Also referred to as perception management, the aim, whether in war or peace, is to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups so as to achieve political or military objectives while preventing effective use of these activities by an enemy or adversary. Such operations could have tactical, operational or  strategic impact. 

A recent example of use of Information Warfare is the ongoing conflict in Russia, which began on 24 February 2022 and is still continuing. In the early stages of the war, the Russian military disabled or destroyed a large part of the electronic communication infrastructure of Ukraine, prompting Ukraine's President Zelenskyy to appeal to Elon Musk for help. Mr Musk immediately responded to the request by making his Starlink satellite services available to Ukraine, providing SpaceX's Starlink internet access service to the beleaguered nation. Starlink is currently providing critical communication lifeline to Ukraine's government, military and civilians despite persistent Russian bombing of traditional telecommunication infrastructures across Ukraine, serving as a vital communication line and complementing precarious traditional telecommunication infrastructures. As of September 2022, there were 23,000 Starlink terminals in Ukraine.

Strategic Imperatives

Perception management by most nations and their militaries revolve around the tactical and operational aspects with the limited aim of inducing enemy troops to surrender or to desert. The need is, however, for having a larger strategic focus within which the tactical and operational narratives must play a part. The US led information campaign aimed at undermining Communism during the Cold War is an apt example of a successfully conducted perception management campaign with a strategic focus. 

As Josef Joffe, editor of Die Zeit has written, “Unlike centuries past, when war was the great arbiter, today the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun”. Elaborating further, Joseph Nye states that bigger payoffs can be achieved by “getting others to want what you want”. Perception management operations can be one of the primary ways of achieving that objective. In the Indian context, an effective perception management strategy could lead to conflict resolution in a faster time frame in those areas afflicted by terrorism and insurgency. Insurgent and terrorist networks, in a sense could be likened to the demon Raktabīja, mentioned in Hindu scriptures. The demon was blessed with a boon that whenever a drop of his blood fell on the ground, a duplicate Raktabīja would be born at that spot. To finally kill the demon, Goddess Kali had to stretch her tongue all across the worlds to prevent the blood from spilling on the ground. In relation to insurgencies, this blood represents the public support that insurgents need to survive. Once separated from that support, insurgencies will wither and die. Perception management can be used effectively for that purpose.

It must however be understood that perception management is not a substitute for capability. As an example, in the absence of hard power, deterrence will not succeed, regardless of the effectiveness of the perception management campaign. In advertising terms, the product has to live up to its brand image, otherwise it will lose its credibility. This also implies that the actions of the Armed Forces while engaged in military operations must be in consonance with the perception management campaign and the strategic narrative must not be lost sight of. The strategic narrative remains focussed on end-term goal realisations while operational and tactical level narratives are more focussed towards the immediacy of the conflict situation. While the tactical and operational level narratives are important, they must not run counter to the long-term aims of the country. 

Conclusion

Information Warfare as a war-winning factor is not a new concept, having been extensively applied in battles over the past few millennia. But its modern day application is a product of advancements made in communication technology and long range precision weapon systems, along with a concept which is relatively new, which is shaping perceptions of an entire population through the social media, audio-visual networks and the print media. In the information age, the shaping and influencing of opinions of target populations can give handsome returns and can lead to conflict resolution on favourable terms. It is however not a stand alone concept and must be applied with other instruments of state power to achieve the desired results.

Published by the RSS

BOOK REVIEW: CONNECTING WITH THE MAHABHARATA History / Geography / Archaeology / Culture / Art

Authors: Neera Misra and Rajesh Lal

Book Review by Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch,

A phenomenon, now distinctly visible in India, bespeaks of a distinct desire amongst the populace to connect to one's roots. This reflects a push back against an agenda, fostered by foreign rulers over the last millennia, wherein the local belief systems of the Indian people were denigrated, distorted or sought to be destroyed. Indian scriptures were demeaned and portrayed as being medieval, backward, archaic and not in tune with modern times. This consistent attempt to destroy India's spiritual and cultural heritage was part of a construct to break the spirit of its people. It was a deliberate act, attempted by the sword during the period of muslim rule. The British, however, were more subtle. They overhauled the education system to create a body of Indians, who would, as enunciated by Thomas Babington Macaulay, be "Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect". The aim in both cases was to emphasise the superiority of the conquerors, to enable them to rule India in perpetuity. To do that, it was essential to create a sense of inferiority in the subjugated population through disassociating them from their roots. 

In the world view of the occupying powers, whether muslim or British, a whole race could be permanently enslaved if they could be forced or coerced to change their religion, their language and their culture. But despite the onslaught of a thousand years, the Indian civilisational ethos could not be subdued. The people fought back, even when the odds were immensely stacked against them That is why the Indic civilisation survived, despite repeated assaults on its very foundation. Today, while all other ancient civilisations have been swept away by the sands of time, the Indic civilisation stands tall and proud, unbroken, though battered a bit perhaps. But such an onslaught has left a void in the spiritual and cultural yearnings of the masses. The resurgence that we are now witnessing is a reflection of that deep-seated desire to know more about our heritage and our spiritual and cultural moorings from the indigenous lens and not as viewed and narrated by foreign invaders.

Consequent to such an indigenous upsurge, a scholarly body of literature has emerged over the years, encapsulating the depth of spiritual learnings from ancient times. This book, "Connecting with the Mahabharata" is one such body of work, immaculately researched and written with a free flowing elegance that is rarely seen in works of this nature. Towards that end, the authors, Ms Neera Misra and Air Vice Marshal Rajesh Lal, have crafted not just a book, but a veritable masterpiece. 

While the Mahabharata has always been a source of deep philosophical and spiritual learning, the valuable knowledge of our sacred Itihasa continued to be undermined, even post independence, by a range of authors who veered towards a virulent communist ideology. As they held the levers of power in the educational domain, they continued with such subjective history writing and in diluting Bharat's scriptural and spiritual heritage. In the western narrative, India's scriptural texts became mere works of poetry with a mythological construct and this fallacy was further reinforced post independence by historians who looked at Bharat from an ideological lens. The historicity of Ram and Krishna was hence suppressed, making it even more important now to correct centuries of misinterpretations and misperceptions about our sacred historical texts. And this is what this marvellous book sets out to do.

Set out in eight chapters, the opening chapter gives an overarching introduction to the Mahabharata. Chapter 2 is interesting as it brings forth the geographical context in which the Mahabharata is set. Bharatavarsha, as described in our scriptures, is the bow-shaped region extending from the Himalayas, South to the Oceans. The people who inhabited this region were indigenous and called Arya or the enlightened ones. This dispels the distortion brought about by the now discredited theory of the Aryan invasion. This chapter also gives an account of the term Yuga, as used by ancient Bhartiya scholars to describe various eras of ancient Bharata—Sat Yuga, Treta Yuga, Dvarpa Yuga and Kali Yuga. Mention is made of the geography of rivers and their tributaries as expounded in the Rig Veda, which also contain the rivers in which the Mahabharata story unfolds. The maps used to support the narrative are truly mesmerising, with history unfolding through the geography of the land.

The third chapter describes the political, socio-economic and cultural landscape of the larger expanse of Bharata, from which comes the term Mahabharata. The 18 Parvas or episodic parts of the Mahabharata are described in this chapter, once again with beautiful illustrations. Chapter 4 deals with the archaeological evidence in support of the authenticity of the Mahabharata. This covers a wide swathe, from Gandhara (present day Kandahar in Afghanistan) to Magadh in the east of India and gives a fascinating glimpse of the excavations made by stalwarts of the calibre of Shri BB Lal. The dating of the Mahabharata is covered in Chapter 6, which provides another fascinating account of the probable dates when the events as covered in the Mahabharata took place. This is important as it dispels the fake narrative which refers to Indian scriptures as mythology, lacking a historical context. The penultimate chapter deal with the Mahabharata in the arts while the final chapter covers the genealogy and roots of the Mahabharata family tree.

The book, brought forth as a coffee table book, is a unique work, written in elegant prose alongside breathtaking art work to go with the script. It serves to educate the reader of India's rich spiritual and scriptural heritage in a manner that is easily comprehensible. For a work of this magnitude, with such beautiful illustrations, it is modestly priced at Rs 1199, in hard cover. To all Indians who would like to get in touch with their roots, this is a book which they will be proud to possess. 

Chinese Aggressiveness in the Region: An Analysis

China's growing aggressiveness in recent years has much to do with China's self image and how its citizens perceive China's place in the comity of nations. While individuals have personality traits, a survey of a group of countries carried out over three years has suggested that a country too, can be said to have personality traits. With respect to China, this survey suggests that as a country, Chinese people exhibit two distinct traits. One, they have a deep, abiding belief in the ideals of humanism, encompassing altruism, compassion, and understanding. Two, the people showed a preference for order and organisation. They preferred certainty and thoroughness, and often judged success in terms of task accomplishment. On the macro level then, it appears that humanism and order are two traits valued by the Chinese people. 

So, if humanism and order constitute the personality of China, why is China perceived as an aggressive and volatile force? This is where the concept of a Nation’s character comes in. This refers to the shared beliefs or perceptions of personality characteristics common to members of a particular nation, both within the nation and outside it. This perception of China in the eyes of its own people and even outside of China is controlled by the Communist Party of China, the CPC, which founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is its sole ruling party.

Viewed through this lens, the personality of China is not congruent with its character. This has the potential to lead to internal unrest, protests and displeasure against the ruling dispensation. Hence, we see the heavy hand of propaganda inside and outside of China, by the CCP controlled outlets, trying to convince their own people and the outside world that a CPC run China, actually functions in terms of the Chinese personality and is humanistic, orderly and completes its projects in a timely manner, keeping the good of the people at heart. The ending of poverty in China is hence an important landmark, along with projects such as the One Belt one Road which are termed as China's humanistic and altruistic outreach. The crackdown on corruption can also be seen in a similar light. 

There is also a third characteristic which defines China and that is its sense of nationalism, grounded in the belief that China was once a great power and that it must regain that status. This sense of nationalism dates back to well before the establishment of the PRC, but it was the PRC which has, since 1949, promoted the narrative of the 'Century of Humiliation,' which is largely conceived as having begun with the first Opium War in 1839, in which the Royal Navy opened up China to Western capitalism, and ended in 1949, with the PRC coming to power in China. This discourse reiterates the humiliation of the Chinese people, the dismemberment of territory, the loss of sovereignty to foreign powers and domestic weakness and corruption. 

This sense of nationalism also drives China's foreign policy, with the PRC being sensitive to public concerns and taking into account popular nationalist sentiments. As an example, in 2012, when tensions arose over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese public boycotted Japanese products, linking the same to patriotism. There is a deep sense of hurt amongst the Chinese people of what happened after the Japanese Imperial Army seized Nanjing on 13 December 1937. For the next six weeks, the conquerors went on a rampage, killing all the Chinese soldiers who survived, which was against the canons of war. But worse, they murdered the civilian population, raped the women and pillaged and burnt the township. This massacre still weighs heavily on the Chinese consciousness. It is the Chinese public which is averse to the continuing Japanese practice of honouring of its WWII martyrs at the Yasukuni Shrine. This public vehemence at times outstrips even the hardliners within the PRC government, serving to push policy further toward hawkishness, with netizens criticising their own country’s policymakers for not being aggressive enough. And if China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is perceived to be undermining Chinese interests, then they too are subjected to ridicule by the public. Two factors indicate this trend. One, China's MFA receives calcium pills when the public feels their diplomats need to stiffen up their backbone—a popular choice of insult to indicate spinelessness. And two, in the online world, the MFA has garnered the unofficial nickname ‘the Ministry of Protests’ due to its tendency to do little more than issue denouncements of unfavourable international developments. It is this public pressure which has perhaps forced a change within China's diplomatic community, leading to what we now see as wolf warrior envoys.

With this as a background, let us look into Chinese aggressive policies astride its land borders as well as in the Western Pacific. Since early 1990s, while China was pursuing its economic and military growth agenda, it did not want its growth to be seen as threatening to its neighbours. So Beijing resorted to the rhetoric of its peaceful rise and was restrained in its foreign policy options. It engaged with regional multilateral organisations such as ASEAN, and with neighbouring states, using trade and investment deals to foster better relations. But as China grew in strength and clout, its foreign policy too has distinctly changed, with Beijing now focussed on aggressively promoting its core interests, getting more assertive with its neighbours and pushing back with greater confidence against the United States. Towards this end, China has not shied away from applying military and other coercive economic and diplomacy leverages to further its interests. That is why we see Beijing intensifying its construction activities on the artificial islands it has constructed in the South China Sea, and despite protests from the US and neighbouring states, continues with the construction of airstrips and other military facilities in these islands. In the economic sphere, China continues to intrude into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its neighbours to carry out fishing and oil exploration activities. With respect to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, and some other ASEAN countries, China is resorting to increased military activity, especially in the East China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits, as also in exerting economic and diplomatic pressure. These changes are reflective of a weakening uni-polar world order taking place concurrently with China's rise. China now feels it can push back against the U.S.-led international system, to promote a new international order.

It must be remembered here that China's rise took place in a uni-polar world. While unipolarity creates strong incentives for states to balance the unipole, there is a cost attached to such balancing which makes the challenger tread cautiously. As China grew in strength, it resorted to soft balancing, which is what we see playing out today. While not directly challenging the United States, it is using military and non-military means such as territorial denial and entangling diplomacy to delay, frustrate and undermine US policies. It desists from hard balancing which is reflected by military build up and military alliances, because of the high transaction costs involved. Hard balancing is easier to achieve in a bipolar or multi-polar environment but in a uni-polar environment, hard balancing would be viewed as revisionism and as a dangerous threat to international order. That is why Beijing, rather than confronting the United States directly, has fixed its attention to its own neighbourhood. In East Asia, while Beijing is confronted with the dominant position which the US occupies, because of China's strengthened economic and military capabilities, and because of the advantage that accrues to it from geography, it has greater confidence to do something about it. No rising power would want military bases and forward-deployed troops of its rivals next to one’s own borders. This is why China, with the growth of its economic and military might, seeks to control its immediate neighbourhood and is pushing back at US dominance. The quest for influence between the US and China in this region will thus continue to increase in intensity as time goes by. The imperative for the US, due to geographical distance from the region, will be to continue to expand its diplomatic, economic and especially military reach in the region. The Quad is but one manifestation of US efforts to keep China in check. 

But the real story is that a change is in the offing, though it may be many years distant from the present moment. Essentially, the uni-polar dynamics is weakening, and other dynamics are strengthening, presenting Beijing with a variable set of options in which it can manoeuvre in east Asia. For this, the CPC would rely on the support of its people, in the absence of which its ability to manoeuvre gets restricted. As of now, the Chinese sense of nationalism provides the necessary level of support to the CCP to pursue its agenda.

The Chinese strategy of promoting a narrative of a peaceful and non-threatening rise amongst its neighbours was predicated on US unipolarity. In the circumstances, a low profile approach was possible. With China's rise, its resistance to US power has also increased, though it still desists from carrying out hard balancing options. An example of resistance is the defensive measures that have been instituted by China against the most threatening elements of US military power such as China's Anti Area Access Denial (A2/AD) strategy. This encompasses the creation of artificial islands and militarising the same with airstrips, submarine pens, logistical support for its warships etc, along with adequate Air Defence cover, to push back against US naval and air power. It is a sea denial strategy, to restrict US military options in the Western Pacific, more specifically in the South and East China Sea. 

The show by China of its anti-ship ballistic missiles in its military parades is also designed to send a clear message to Washington that China has the capability to sink US aircraft carriers. By augmenting its A2/AD capabilities, China has raised the cost and the risks for the US to operate its aircrafts and ships close to China's near seas. China is also attempting to shape international developments by  increased activities in setting the agenda in multilateral organisations, without directly confronting the US. In a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in 2014, Xi Jinping, in his keynote address, sketched out a new security architecture for Asia. His advocacy for a new Asian based regional security cooperation architecture was obviously a challenge to the US role in regional security and was the first instance since the end of the Cold War that such an iteration had been made by a Chinese leader. In the economic sphere, China has responded to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to the US led regional free trade agreement, with Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The latter was concluded in 2020, albeit without India. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has to be seen in this light. To maintain its position, the US launched its pivot or rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration and now is invigorating the Quad. But the US strategy has been a bit incoherent, which has resulted in uncertainty in US allies and partners about the extent of US engagement and commitment. This is still playing out.

But internal power dynamics are also playing out in China, which could impact on the single party rule of the CPC. The four Chinese modernisations which have been underway over the last four decades have seen rapid economic development in China which has huge implications for Chinese society and its relationship with the CPC. The economic reforms which were initiated necessitated granting more space to Chinese entrepreneurs, which in turn has created a more diverse and active Chinese society, in which voices have emerged that are not shy of expressing opinions that are critical of developments within and outside China. The spread of communication technology and the increasing use of social media platforms has also produced societal change which could potentially challenge the CPC’s capacity to rule. This has increased the party leaderships proclivity with maintaining domestic control and legitimacy, even to the extent of using increasingly repressive methods to deal with the situation, if so required. At the same time, efforts by the CPC continue apace to seek support from the society to maintain the existing order. The support sought is no longer for ideological legitimacy but for performance, the commitment being to provide the Chinese people with higher standards of living, economic development, peace and stability as part of the social contract. This remains the main claim to legitimacy of the CPC led by Xi Jinping, but as expectations within Chinese society are rising, the leadership will continue to be tested in the years to come.

Chinese societal expectations are not just confined to economic concerns but to nationalists ambitions as well. As China grows, the yearning in society to regain its perceived past glory is all too evident. This growing nationalist sentiment will constrain Chinese foreign policy choices, forcing it on a more belligerent path and reducing room for manoeuvre. This was evident in the 2012 anti Japanese protests in China that flared up after Japan's nationalisation of three Senkaku Islands. The Chinese government termed the act as a "gross violation" of Chinese sovereignty over the territory, and hinted at taking military action, but did not go down that path. That may change, with heightened concerns among the CPC to meet people's demands. We now see nationalism in China projecting to Chinese claims in the surrounding seas, and being linked to the domestic legitimacy of Chinese ruling clique. The CPC will however have to balance out its foreign policy objectives with the consequences such policies may have on the Chinese economy. How the dynamics between the top-down nationalism and the bottom-up nationalism in China plays out remains to be seen, but the present leadership is seen to be less averse to risk-taking and in promoting a more uncompromising nationalism, to advance what are perceived to be China's legitimate claims. The construct here is based on a Chinese civilisational rejuvenation, drawn from its imagined glorious past, which gives it adequate scope to operate outside the confines of a straitjacketed ideology and also to expand its territorial reach. Such an approach is perforce more aggressive, which explains why Chinese diplomats are taking a stronger position on nationalist issues. We can thus expect to see more volatility on foreign policy issues in the coming years, especially with relation to Chinese claims on Taiwan. It must be noted here that President Xi Jinping is personally invested in the above narrative, to claim his place among the leading figures in the CPC pantheon.

The coming years will thus see greater belligerence from China, with increasing militarisation of both the South and East China Seas. Military confrontation, in all probability will be avoided, with China resorting to non-military methods to attain its territorial objectives and to achieve national rejuvenation. The ASEAN countries will attempt some form of rapprochement with China, on their respective claim lines, but Japan will in all probability dramatically increase its defence spending and seek parity with Chinese naval and air power in the Western Pacific. 

For India, we have the advantage of geography in the Indian Ocean Region, but would have to ensure an effective naval presence to guard our interests. The Quad serves India's security interests though it is not yet a security grouping. On India's border with Tibet, it is a conflict which India will have to fight alone, should the situation so arise, though help in the form of intelligence and logistic support will in all likelihood come from the US and others. The key factor in any war over the Himalayas will be cyber and space capability and control over the skies over the Tibetan Plateau. So long as India is prepared, China will be reluctant to undertake a military adventure which she may well lose. Internal stability, economic growth, military preparedness and astute diplomacy thus will be the essential components of India's response to Chinese belligerence.

Published in IFJ, Sep-Oct 2022

The Population Time Bomb: Impact on National Integration

Introduction

Population dynamics have an impact on a country's economic and strategic capabilities. Sparsely populated countries may face strategic challenges, but large populations are not necessarily a blessing. An unbridled population growth can greatly hinder the development process, besides adversely impacting on the environment.

An article published in 2011, on the implications and trends of India's demographic outlook, came out with estimates of what India's demography will look like in 2030. The article stated that as per UNDP projections, India’s population will exceed China’s by 2025, and that the crossover will in all probability occur well before that time, making India the most populous country in the world. This article was extremely prescient in its predictions, as India is set to overtake China's population sometime in 2023, but more ominously, the article has predicted that India's population by 2030 will be in the region of 1.5 billion people. Is this sustainable and can India afford to go down that path? What are the fissiparous tendencies that such a growth can have on Indian society? These questions need to be asked and more importantly, need to be addressed with urgency.

Population Growth over the last five decades: World Comparison

How has the world's population increased over the last five decades? Statistics from 1970 onwards indicate that the Western world has successfully kept a lid on  population growth. China too has been remarkably successful in controlling its population. However, most Asian and African countries have seen unprecedented population growth, which has hindered economic growth, created vast disparities between different economic groups, created water stress and food scarcity and led to fissures in society. All of these factors combined together have led to dismal standards of living for vast multitudes of people across the globe. Percentage increase in population over the last half century for 10 countries is given in Figure 1. 

The decadal growth rate of population also makes an interesting study (Figures 2 and 3). Both the US and France, over the last half century, have had a decadal growth of population below 10 percent for the period 1970-2020. This is true for most of the Western world. Low population growth has been a contributory factor to their ability to provide a high standard of living to their people and being classified as first world countries. China, which imposed a one child policy on its populace in September 1980 saw only a marginal decline in population growth for the first decade after the policy was introduced. The decade 1970-1980, prior to the introduction of the policy saw a decadal increase in population of 20.8 percent. In the first decade after the  implementation of the one-child policy (1980-1990), there was but a marginal decline, with decadal population growth at 17.7 percent. This indicates that the one-child policy was widely flouted by most residents. The next two decades saw decadal population growth dropping to below 10 percent, and for the decade 2010-2020, the population growth was just 5 percent. This is comparable to the population  growth in France, which saw a decadal population growth hovering between 4 to 6 percent for the five decades 1970-2020. The US has also maintained for the most part, decadal population growth under 10 percent for the last five decades.

In the Asian subcontinent, the situation has unfortunately spiralled out of control. In Pakistan, the decadal population growth has been in excess of 30 percent for each of the three decades 1970-2000. A marginal decrease has taken place post 2000, with decadal population growth reducing to 26 percent and 23 percent for the decades 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 respectively. In real terms, the population of Pakistan has increased 3.8 times in the last half century (1970-2020) and about seven times since the country achieved independence in 1947. This is clearly unsustainable. Bangladesh also has high decadal population growth, though their performance is far better than Pakistan. For the period 1970-1980, decadal population growth was 24 percent. This rose to 29.5 percent in the decade 1980-1990, which indicates that in the earlier decade following the Liberation War, large scale migration of population had taken place from Bangladesh to India. Thereafter, decadal population growth witnessed a slight decline with population growth at 24 percent. Since then, population control measures appear to have been more successful, with decadal population growth at   15.6 percent and 11.5 percent for the period 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 respectively. 

The statistics for India too are not very flattering and resemble to some extent the statistics of Bangladesh. The three decades 1970-2000 saw the decadal population growth hover between 26 percent and 21 percent. This is high and reflects a failure of the nations family planning programme. The decadal population growth dropped below 20 percent for the next two decades, touching 16.8 percent in 2000-2010 and falling further to 11.8 percent for the decade 2010-2020. This is still high though it now appears that India is closer to getting to grips with the problem. What remains of serious concern, however, is the wide variation in population growth between different parts of the country as also between different communities, which potentially can cause severe fissures in Indian society.

India and China: A Statistical Analysis

At times, when development or rather the lack of it is linked to excessive population growth, the nay-sayers promptly state that poor economic development is not due to unbridled population growth but due to socio-economic factors. Then they justify their assumption by giving a reference to China, quoting its spectacular economic growth despite it being the most populous country in the world. This is simply intellectual dishonest. Undoubtedly, poor socio-economic policies hinder economic growth, but unbridled population growth negates even the most pragmatic of economic policies and will invariably result in weakening poverty alleviation programmes. China's spectacular rise is a result of strict measures to restrict family size; had such measures not been taken, the picture in China would have been rather gloomy.  

A comparison of population data between India and China—the worlds two most populous countries is indeed instructive. Figure 4 shows the population of India and China from 1950 till 2020. China's population, which stood at 55.44 crore in 1950 had almost doubled over the course of the next three decades to 100 crore by 1980. This was when China began its family planning programme, with its one child policy. In 2020, 40 years later, Chin'a population stood at 143.93 crore, an increase of just under 44 percent. In comparison, for the period 1950-1980, China's population had increased a whopping 80 percent. Had China continued with such a high rate of population growth, it would have crossed the two billion level mark by now (figure 5). What would be the impact on China if it had another 600 million mouths to feed and look after, can only be speculated, but undoubtedly, China would have still been a third world country. As of now, while China's decadal population growth has reduced to single digits, it is still higher than most European countries.  

Now let us take a look at India. India's population stood at 37.63 crore in 1950. In terms of comparison, this is less than the present day combined population of Pakistan and Bangladesh. By 1980, India's population had surged to 69.89 crore, indication a growth of 85 percent. At this stage, India's and China's rate of population growth were almost similar. Over the next 40 years, the situation changed dramatically. In 2020, India's population stood at 138 crore, an increase of a staggering 97 percent! Had India been successful in controlling its population as China had done, its present population would have been just over one billion (Figure 5). With 400 million less people, unemployment in India would have been minimal, the cities would not be bursting, pollution levels would have been under control and in all likelihood, India would have been a middle income country.

Population Dynamics: Internal Fissures 

The population growth of India is an area of concern, but more ominous is the fact that this population growth is uneven and could potentially create serious fissures in society on two counts. The first is related to a Constitutional provision. Article 81 of the Indian Constitution lays down the distribution of seats to each state based on their population, while Article 82 provides for the readjustment of seats in the Lower House, after each census. This delimitation was suspended in 1976 till the 2001 census, primarily because the Southern states had achieved a higher degree of population control than the states in the North. This was again postponed to 2026 by the 84th Amendment. In the revised allocation, the Northern states would have got a larger share than the South, which effectively meant rewarding those states that were less effective in promoting small family norms.

Let us take the example of five northern states and five southern states to put the above issue in perspective. Based on population data, the Northern parts of the country have shown a higher rate of decadal population growth as compared to the Southern states which have achieved a certain measure of population stability. A readjustment of seats, carried out on the basis of Article 82 of the Constitution of India, could lead to a very serious North-South divide in the country, as the states which have a higher rate of population growth would stand to benefit in terms of seat share (Figure 6).

 

For the period 1970-2020, the population of five northern states viz. Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand and Rajasthan showed an increase in population of 178 percent. These states have a combined representation of 164 seats in Parliament as of 2019. Based on the above, in terms of the Constitution, these five states will get seats in proportion to their population increase. Their seat share thus increases by 178 percent to a total of 455 seats.

In the five southern states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, the states have a combined representation of 129 seats in Parliament as of 2019. The combined population of these five states increased by 102 percent over the period 1970-2020. Based on the population increase of 102 percent, their share of seats in the Lok Sabha would increase by 102 percent to give them a revised seat share of 260 seats. Based on percentage increase of population, the Southern states hence stand to lose significantly in representation in the Lower House while the Northern states, which faulted on population control measures, stand to gain.

Increasing seat share based on  proportional increase in population will hence disempower the South in comparison to the North, simply because they have carried out the required population control measures in a more effective manner than states in the Northern half of the country. This will create grounds for unrest with severe consequences. The solution hence would be to further defer the expansion, or to simply increase the number of seats in parliament in the same proportion as are currently existing. It must also be noted that even amongst the Southern states, population increase is not uniform as states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have fared far better than Karnataka.

 

Religious fault lines too are beginning to appear because of uneven growth of different religious groups. Data available till the 2011 census indicates decadal population growth of all religious groups has declined but the rate of decline is different for different religious denominations (Figure 7). For each of the decades from 1951-2011, the decadal growth of the Muslim population has been about 10 percentage points higher than non Muslims. In 2011, while the decadal growth rate of non-Muslims is veering towards the 10 percent decadal growth mark, decadal growth of Muslim population remains above the 20 percent decadal growth mark. In states like West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, UP and Assam, this is manifesting in societal tension which has the potential to lead to communal discord and splitting of communities on communal lines. Here too, as in the North-South divide, those religious groups which have been more effective in population control measures stand to lose out to those that have disregarded the same. Obviously, there is a need to implement strict family planning norms through a series of incentives and disincentives. The aim must be to get all groups to limit decadal population growth to between 0 and 5 percent. 

To conclude, India as of now is on a cusp, where the country can break out as a middle income country by 2047. This process will be greatly facilitated by the implementation of population control measures, uniformly across all strata of society and across the length and breadth of the country. This needs to be a priority call for India's polity and civil society, to preserve the unity and integrity of the nation, prevent fissiparous tendencies and for the economic welfare of all sections of India's population.

Published in the IFJ, Sep-Oct 2022

SPACE SECURITY: NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

In the history of warfare, the high ground has always provided a position of advantage over an opponent occupying lower ground as the observation provided over the battlefield enabled better situational awareness. In the modern battlefield, Space is the ultimate high ground. Today, space is getting increasingly democratised with the inflow of a myriad range of space applications, making the space sector a tool for global influence and diplomacy and space the fourth operational domain after land, sea and air. While control over the seas and the air was always considered as an essential element in power play, today it is the ability to exploit space to one's advantage which is the new game changer. Hence the race to achieve dominance in space.

Since ancient times, conflict has revolved around two principal facets which are essential for gaining victory. The first is situational awareness and the second is having the means to act on the knowledge so gained. This is the essence of warfare, which encapsulates all other facets of war fighting. The former involves battlefield transparency—that is having the knowledge of the location of friendly, hostile and neutral forces, their weapon and equipment holding, means of communication, and information about terrain and weather. The latter involves advanced technology giving one the capability to destroy or disrupt enemy assets with pin-point accuracy over long distances, using kinetic or non-kinetic means. Space capability enables both these aspects.

Technology has enabled interconnection of participants and the distribution of sensors on the battlefield at a reliability, continuity and data transfer rate never before imagined. When integrated with precision long range weapon systems, the lethality which can be achieved at the point of decision gave rise to the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Future conflict is moving towards this end as witnessed in the conflicts which have taken place over the last three decades in West Asia, Afghanistan and parts of Africa. Networks, however, do not alter the fundamental nature of warfare, but simply alters its character. So, while direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist, the network has enabled collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Mass is still useful, but it can leverage far greater precision. Because sensors can be linked to distant shooters, entire systems can be used to eliminate platforms rather than symmetric platform-on-platform engagements. 

As I stated earlier, networks are not a substitute for the fundamentals of warfare. They do, however, provide significant additive advantages. While warfare is progressing towards net centricity, in the Indian context, the linearity of the land battle with respect to conflict on the borders with Pakistan and China will remain a reality though the battle space will get extended in depth. A major concern for India will also be on the high seas, where the battle space is not confined to India's territorial waters, island territories and its EEZ but across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, also stretching on to the Pacific. On the land frontiers, Information Warfare, especially with respect to cyber attacks will transcend the linear space and assume an all encompassing character. In the context of sub-conventional conflict the zone of conflict will remain non-linear and will cover the entire affected population at large.

Warfare as we see it, will not be so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. There will be multiple threats which will have to be dealt with in real time, requiring great agility. In his pioneering work on the Origin of Species, Darwin postulated his theory of the survival of the fittest. In modern warfare we are looking at the survival of the agile. Agility hence will be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power has shifted to knowledge based real time actors. As we move towards self synchronisation of forces we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at electronic speed. ‘War at the speed of thought,’ is no longer outside the realm of what is possible though its actualisation is still far from the horizon. With greater availability of information at our fingertips we are also looking at information overload, and its consequences, but that is a far better situation to be in than to be in a state where there is a paucity of information. Space will impinge on the entire gamut of operations on land, sea and air and will play a major role in all aspects of future conflict.

The Threat

Let us take a look at a hypothetical war which takes place between India and China over the Himalayas. Whatever strategy China pursues to prosecute war, the opening round will be the launch of an aggressive high intensity information campaign. This is an ongoing process and takes place at all times, but its intensity increases when hostilities are imminent and thereafter continues for the duration of the conflict. The next step will be the launch of intense cyber attacks on both military and non-military targets. This requires exploiting space capabilities. Along with cyber attacks, we could well see the PLA launch precision missile attacks on military targets. These missiles will require terminal guidance which again will require space capabilities. We will see aerial combat to gain control over the skies over Tibet. Again, space assets will come into play. For the build up and concealment of forces, and for ground operations, the Chinese would be looking to exploit space for reconnaissance and communication. Every facet of war fighting will have enabling content from space. India will have to be prepared to respond accordingly. Space capabilities hence need to be developed to match what China can throw against India. A similar scenario can be painted for the Indian Ocean Region where Chinese naval and air assets will be in play. India must be in a position to match Chinese capability, both as a war winning strategy as well as a strategy of deterrence.

So, where does India stand in space capabilities. 

India's Space Programme

India's political leadership had the wisdom to visualise the benefits that could accrue to the country from space based assets. Consequently, the Indian Space Research Organisation was set up in 1969, barely a decade after the US had set up NASA in 1958. But there was an element of diffidence in India's space programme, a hesitation to use the power of space for India's defence—and so it was confined to civilian use only, and was focussed on development activities. Since the launch of India's first satellite, numerous satellites have been launched by India with applications for broadcasts, communications, weather forecasts, disaster management, Geographic Information Systems, cartography, navigation, telemedicine, distance education and the like. ISRO has also gone in for space expeditions like the moon probe—the Chandrayan 1 and 2 missions which took place in 2008 and 2019 and the Mangalyaan mission to Mars in 2014. Importantly, launch capabilities have also been developed. India presently has three launch sites: we have the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala, the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh and the Dr Abdul Kalam Island, about 150 km East of Bhubaneswar, off the coast of Odisha. India's first satellite the Aryabhata was completely designed and fabricated in India but was launched by a Soviet Kosmos-3M rocket from Kapustin Yar on April 19, 1975. This site is about 100 km East of Volvograd in Russia. Since then, India has launched a total of 135 satellites for its own use. Most of these were launched using Indian Launch vehicles. In addition, India has launched 345 satellites for 36 countries till date: truly, an outstanding feat.

The Launch vehicle used by India was the Satellite Launch Vehicle or the SLV and the Augmented SLV. These went through various upgrades and now the operational launchers are the PSLV, GSLV, GSLV Mk III and Sounding Rockets. For the future, India is looking at reusable launch vehicles. The Technology demonstration for such a vehicle was done in 2016 and at some point in the future, India will have commercially viable RLV technology. The RLV-TD is India's first uncrewed flying testbed developed for the Indian Space Research Organisation's Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstration Programme. It is a scaled down prototype of an eventual two-stage-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle. The RLVs use Scramjet Technology Engine — This is an Air Breathing Propulsion System.

GSLV with indigenous Cryogenic Upper Stage has enabled the launching of up to 2 tonne class of communication satellites. The next variant of GSLV is GSLV Mk III, with indigenous high thrust cryogenic engine and stage, having the capability of launching 4 tonne class of communication satellites. Sounding Rockets are smaller rockets from the Rohini series on suborbital and atmospheric flights for aeronomy and meteorological studies.

In essence, India's space programme has the capacity to make satellites indigenously, and launch them using indigenous launchers in the Low earth orbit (LEO), Medium earth orbit (MEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO) or in Geo-stationary orbit. Despite sanctions which were put on India after the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, India has persevered, and has even made the cryogenic engine which is extremely credible. In addition, India through GAGAN and IRNSS has made a significant breakthrough in navigation capability. GAGAN stands for GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation. This was launched in 2008 for the Airports Authority of India. GAGAN augments GPS signals over the Indian sub continent and is similar to the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) which is used by the US. Similarly, the European Union has EGNOS, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service as its Satellite-Based Augmentation System. 

The IRNSS which is the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System is a cluster of seven satellites over India in the Low Earth Orbit, and is more accurate than the GPS. It is called NavIC or Navigation by Indian Constellation. Both have dual use capability. GAGAN is dependent on GPS while NavIC is independent of GPS. 

Space as a Military Domain  

 

Once satellites were launched into space, there was a need felt for a space treaty. Consequently, a Treaty came about in 1967 called the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This is referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, 1967. 112 countries have signed this treaty, which forms the basis of international space law. The Treaty bans the weaponisation of space. This means that putting weapons of Mass Destruction in space is banned. It also prohibits military activities on celestial bodies and details legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. 

There is however great dichotomy in these rules as it does not ban use of space assets in warfare such as GPS. There is also no ban on anti satellite destruction from earth. Thus, satellites can be used to further a whole host of military objectives such as military intelligence of an adversary, pin-point targeting, military communications etc. Another point to be understood is that while the air space over a country is sovereign territory, there is no sovereignty attached to any part of outer space. As a general rule, anything above 100 kms from the earths surface is outer space, so when satellites in low earth orbit fly over any country, they can provide legal intelligence. The killing in Afghanistan of Zawahiri, the al Qaeda head, by a US Predator missile strike is a classic example of the manner in which space stands militarised. While the predator was flying in air space, the precision targeting came from GPS systems via satellites. There is thus a fine distinction between militarisation of space and weaponisation of space.

In the on-going Ukraine War, when Russia hacked the network that was providing the communication link to the Ukrainian front line troops, Elon Musk the private operator of StarX used his Starlink satellites to restore communication. Within a matter of days he set up over 500 ground terminals to restore the data links. Considering the utility of space for military purposes, India has now set up, in 2019, the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Prior to that, in 2013, for the first time, India launched a dedicated military satellite called GSAT-7 which was named Rukmini. This satellite covers a footprint of about 2000 nautical miles and is designed primarily to provide secure, real time communication links between the land establishments, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the Indian Navy. Five years later, GSAT-7A, also called Angry Bird, was launched in 2018 from Sriharikota, for the IAF. The satellite helps in boosting the connectivity between the ground radar stations, airbases and the airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) of the IAF. It also helps in satellite controlled operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which gives a great deal of reliability to the operations as compared to ground controlled operations. The Army will soon be getting its own dedicated communication satellite, the GSAT-7B. As of now, it shares 30 percent of GSAT-7A transponder capacity.

In 2020, the EMISAT was also launched through a PSLV launch for electromagnetic intelligence gathering. It has an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) package called Kautilya, which allows the interception of ground-based radar and also carries out electronic surveillance across India. This satellite circles the globe pole-to-pole, and is helpful in gathering information from radars of countries that have borders with India. India also has a RISAT 2BR1 synthetic aperture radar imaging satellite, which was launched in December 2019 from Sriharikota. Presumably, there are over a dozen Indian satellites which are dual use and have military applications.

A significant advancement in military capability was the successful test carried out in March 2019 of India's anti-satellite weapon. India is the fourth country in the world after the US, Russia and China to develop this capability. The significance in the Indian context is that such a capability will deter a hostile power from attempting to destroy Indian satellites as they could be faced with retaliatory measures.

Defence Space Agency

India established two new space agencies in 2019: the Defense Space Agency (DSA) and the Defense Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Existing military organisations such as the Defense Imagery Processing and Analysis Center and the Defense Satellite Control Center have now been merged into the DSA. The Agency formulates space strategy for the military with a focus on leveraging communications and reconnaissance satellites to integrate intelligence and firepower across the range of Indian military capabilities. The DSRO facilitates the development of civilian space technology for military purposes.

The DSA will probably be focussed on the Indian Ocean where China is increasing its influence and the Himalayas where there is increasing Chinese intransigence. On India's land border, satellite coverage would, at the very minimum, be required over the whole of Tibet and Xinjiang Province. As of now, India has limited satellites in the sky and military applications can be said to be in their infancy. To that extent, India is a much smaller player as compared to the US, Russia and China. However, with the space sector now being opened up to the private sector, we can expect to see in the coming years a quantum leap in space applications in the civil, commercial, and defence verticals. 

Chinese Space Capabilities

China on the other hand is aiming to be a global leader in space by 2050. In 2015, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), under which function all of China's military space assets. It is structured to engage in the information space, with emphasis on electronic countermeasures, network offence and defence and satellite management. Focus areas are on target acquisition, reconnaissance, navigation operations and electronic and cyber warfare and countermeasures. China aims to have a permanent space station by the end of this year, a lunar research base by 2036 and solar power satellite (SPS) transmission capability from geostationary orbit (GEO) by 2050. China also has its own navigation system, BeiDou. 

Indian Initiatives

Currently, India possesses more than a dozen military satellites. The Indian military also uses a variety of commercial satellites and those run by friendly foreign nations in its operations. Many of these are prohibitively expensive and carry the danger of service interruption in the event of emergencies. A heartening development now is the creation of Indian Space Association (ISpA), in October 2021, This is an apex industry body, which provides a platform to the private space industry and heralds the opening of the space sector to private entities. ISpA will be the collective voice of the Indian Space Industry, with an aim to create an enabling environment to strengthen the private industry in the Indian Space Sector. What ISpA hopes to do is to make India a global hub in all areas related to space technologies. It will energise business growth, interface with defence and security agencies and enhance international partnerships and cooperation in space. The entry of the private sector into space is a major initiative and will greatly enhance India's space capabilities. In essence, ISpA seeks to make India a global space manufacturing hub with participation of Indian private industry and startups and provide space based solutions both for the domestic and international market while also meeting the space aspirations of the security and strategic sector. Many startups have also entered the space sector despite the risks involved. The effective leveraging of the private sector can be a game changer and ensure that India catches up quickly with the big three in space. This would require financial support and continuous policy reforms to create an enabling climate.

Conclusion

Space is the frontier where the course of future war will be decided. It is crucial to aggressively improve defence space capabilities as part of the “militarization of space”. How this plays out over the next decade will determine India's relative standing in the comity of nations. Space assets are by nature dual use assets. India should not shy away from using them for the defence of the motherland. With this I conclude. Thank you, Jai Bharat, Jai Hind. I am open to questions now.

Q&A

Some in the Indian defence community have advocated for more drastic changes, such as creating a military space service akin to the Space Force in the United States. This would make protecting India’s expanding satellite network easier and set the stage for coercive measures against adversary networks. India is still well-positioned to benefit from its positive relations with Russia and the United States, the two most developed space powers in the world, even though it is still unclear whether India has the long-term technological and financial foundations required to support a separate space force.