SPACE SECURITY: NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

In the history of warfare, the high ground has always provided a position of advantage over an opponent occupying lower ground as the observation provided over the battlefield enabled better situational awareness. In the modern battlefield, Space is the ultimate high ground. Today, space is getting increasingly democratised with the inflow of a myriad range of space applications, making the space sector a tool for global influence and diplomacy and space the fourth operational domain after land, sea and air. While control over the seas and the air was always considered as an essential element in power play, today it is the ability to exploit space to one's advantage which is the new game changer. Hence the race to achieve dominance in space.

Since ancient times, conflict has revolved around two principal facets which are essential for gaining victory. The first is situational awareness and the second is having the means to act on the knowledge so gained. This is the essence of warfare, which encapsulates all other facets of war fighting. The former involves battlefield transparency—that is having the knowledge of the location of friendly, hostile and neutral forces, their weapon and equipment holding, means of communication, and information about terrain and weather. The latter involves advanced technology giving one the capability to destroy or disrupt enemy assets with pin-point accuracy over long distances, using kinetic or non-kinetic means. Space capability enables both these aspects.

Technology has enabled interconnection of participants and the distribution of sensors on the battlefield at a reliability, continuity and data transfer rate never before imagined. When integrated with precision long range weapon systems, the lethality which can be achieved at the point of decision gave rise to the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Future conflict is moving towards this end as witnessed in the conflicts which have taken place over the last three decades in West Asia, Afghanistan and parts of Africa. Networks, however, do not alter the fundamental nature of warfare, but simply alters its character. So, while direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist, the network has enabled collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Mass is still useful, but it can leverage far greater precision. Because sensors can be linked to distant shooters, entire systems can be used to eliminate platforms rather than symmetric platform-on-platform engagements. 

As I stated earlier, networks are not a substitute for the fundamentals of warfare. They do, however, provide significant additive advantages. While warfare is progressing towards net centricity, in the Indian context, the linearity of the land battle with respect to conflict on the borders with Pakistan and China will remain a reality though the battle space will get extended in depth. A major concern for India will also be on the high seas, where the battle space is not confined to India's territorial waters, island territories and its EEZ but across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, also stretching on to the Pacific. On the land frontiers, Information Warfare, especially with respect to cyber attacks will transcend the linear space and assume an all encompassing character. In the context of sub-conventional conflict the zone of conflict will remain non-linear and will cover the entire affected population at large.

Warfare as we see it, will not be so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. There will be multiple threats which will have to be dealt with in real time, requiring great agility. In his pioneering work on the Origin of Species, Darwin postulated his theory of the survival of the fittest. In modern warfare we are looking at the survival of the agile. Agility hence will be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power has shifted to knowledge based real time actors. As we move towards self synchronisation of forces we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at electronic speed. ‘War at the speed of thought,’ is no longer outside the realm of what is possible though its actualisation is still far from the horizon. With greater availability of information at our fingertips we are also looking at information overload, and its consequences, but that is a far better situation to be in than to be in a state where there is a paucity of information. Space will impinge on the entire gamut of operations on land, sea and air and will play a major role in all aspects of future conflict.

The Threat

Let us take a look at a hypothetical war which takes place between India and China over the Himalayas. Whatever strategy China pursues to prosecute war, the opening round will be the launch of an aggressive high intensity information campaign. This is an ongoing process and takes place at all times, but its intensity increases when hostilities are imminent and thereafter continues for the duration of the conflict. The next step will be the launch of intense cyber attacks on both military and non-military targets. This requires exploiting space capabilities. Along with cyber attacks, we could well see the PLA launch precision missile attacks on military targets. These missiles will require terminal guidance which again will require space capabilities. We will see aerial combat to gain control over the skies over Tibet. Again, space assets will come into play. For the build up and concealment of forces, and for ground operations, the Chinese would be looking to exploit space for reconnaissance and communication. Every facet of war fighting will have enabling content from space. India will have to be prepared to respond accordingly. Space capabilities hence need to be developed to match what China can throw against India. A similar scenario can be painted for the Indian Ocean Region where Chinese naval and air assets will be in play. India must be in a position to match Chinese capability, both as a war winning strategy as well as a strategy of deterrence.

So, where does India stand in space capabilities. 

India's Space Programme

India's political leadership had the wisdom to visualise the benefits that could accrue to the country from space based assets. Consequently, the Indian Space Research Organisation was set up in 1969, barely a decade after the US had set up NASA in 1958. But there was an element of diffidence in India's space programme, a hesitation to use the power of space for India's defence—and so it was confined to civilian use only, and was focussed on development activities. Since the launch of India's first satellite, numerous satellites have been launched by India with applications for broadcasts, communications, weather forecasts, disaster management, Geographic Information Systems, cartography, navigation, telemedicine, distance education and the like. ISRO has also gone in for space expeditions like the moon probe—the Chandrayan 1 and 2 missions which took place in 2008 and 2019 and the Mangalyaan mission to Mars in 2014. Importantly, launch capabilities have also been developed. India presently has three launch sites: we have the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala, the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh and the Dr Abdul Kalam Island, about 150 km East of Bhubaneswar, off the coast of Odisha. India's first satellite the Aryabhata was completely designed and fabricated in India but was launched by a Soviet Kosmos-3M rocket from Kapustin Yar on April 19, 1975. This site is about 100 km East of Volvograd in Russia. Since then, India has launched a total of 135 satellites for its own use. Most of these were launched using Indian Launch vehicles. In addition, India has launched 345 satellites for 36 countries till date: truly, an outstanding feat.

The Launch vehicle used by India was the Satellite Launch Vehicle or the SLV and the Augmented SLV. These went through various upgrades and now the operational launchers are the PSLV, GSLV, GSLV Mk III and Sounding Rockets. For the future, India is looking at reusable launch vehicles. The Technology demonstration for such a vehicle was done in 2016 and at some point in the future, India will have commercially viable RLV technology. The RLV-TD is India's first uncrewed flying testbed developed for the Indian Space Research Organisation's Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstration Programme. It is a scaled down prototype of an eventual two-stage-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle. The RLVs use Scramjet Technology Engine — This is an Air Breathing Propulsion System.

GSLV with indigenous Cryogenic Upper Stage has enabled the launching of up to 2 tonne class of communication satellites. The next variant of GSLV is GSLV Mk III, with indigenous high thrust cryogenic engine and stage, having the capability of launching 4 tonne class of communication satellites. Sounding Rockets are smaller rockets from the Rohini series on suborbital and atmospheric flights for aeronomy and meteorological studies.

In essence, India's space programme has the capacity to make satellites indigenously, and launch them using indigenous launchers in the Low earth orbit (LEO), Medium earth orbit (MEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO) or in Geo-stationary orbit. Despite sanctions which were put on India after the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, India has persevered, and has even made the cryogenic engine which is extremely credible. In addition, India through GAGAN and IRNSS has made a significant breakthrough in navigation capability. GAGAN stands for GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation. This was launched in 2008 for the Airports Authority of India. GAGAN augments GPS signals over the Indian sub continent and is similar to the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) which is used by the US. Similarly, the European Union has EGNOS, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service as its Satellite-Based Augmentation System. 

The IRNSS which is the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System is a cluster of seven satellites over India in the Low Earth Orbit, and is more accurate than the GPS. It is called NavIC or Navigation by Indian Constellation. Both have dual use capability. GAGAN is dependent on GPS while NavIC is independent of GPS. 

Space as a Military Domain  

 

Once satellites were launched into space, there was a need felt for a space treaty. Consequently, a Treaty came about in 1967 called the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This is referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, 1967. 112 countries have signed this treaty, which forms the basis of international space law. The Treaty bans the weaponisation of space. This means that putting weapons of Mass Destruction in space is banned. It also prohibits military activities on celestial bodies and details legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. 

There is however great dichotomy in these rules as it does not ban use of space assets in warfare such as GPS. There is also no ban on anti satellite destruction from earth. Thus, satellites can be used to further a whole host of military objectives such as military intelligence of an adversary, pin-point targeting, military communications etc. Another point to be understood is that while the air space over a country is sovereign territory, there is no sovereignty attached to any part of outer space. As a general rule, anything above 100 kms from the earths surface is outer space, so when satellites in low earth orbit fly over any country, they can provide legal intelligence. The killing in Afghanistan of Zawahiri, the al Qaeda head, by a US Predator missile strike is a classic example of the manner in which space stands militarised. While the predator was flying in air space, the precision targeting came from GPS systems via satellites. There is thus a fine distinction between militarisation of space and weaponisation of space.

In the on-going Ukraine War, when Russia hacked the network that was providing the communication link to the Ukrainian front line troops, Elon Musk the private operator of StarX used his Starlink satellites to restore communication. Within a matter of days he set up over 500 ground terminals to restore the data links. Considering the utility of space for military purposes, India has now set up, in 2019, the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Prior to that, in 2013, for the first time, India launched a dedicated military satellite called GSAT-7 which was named Rukmini. This satellite covers a footprint of about 2000 nautical miles and is designed primarily to provide secure, real time communication links between the land establishments, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the Indian Navy. Five years later, GSAT-7A, also called Angry Bird, was launched in 2018 from Sriharikota, for the IAF. The satellite helps in boosting the connectivity between the ground radar stations, airbases and the airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) of the IAF. It also helps in satellite controlled operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which gives a great deal of reliability to the operations as compared to ground controlled operations. The Army will soon be getting its own dedicated communication satellite, the GSAT-7B. As of now, it shares 30 percent of GSAT-7A transponder capacity.

In 2020, the EMISAT was also launched through a PSLV launch for electromagnetic intelligence gathering. It has an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) package called Kautilya, which allows the interception of ground-based radar and also carries out electronic surveillance across India. This satellite circles the globe pole-to-pole, and is helpful in gathering information from radars of countries that have borders with India. India also has a RISAT 2BR1 synthetic aperture radar imaging satellite, which was launched in December 2019 from Sriharikota. Presumably, there are over a dozen Indian satellites which are dual use and have military applications.

A significant advancement in military capability was the successful test carried out in March 2019 of India's anti-satellite weapon. India is the fourth country in the world after the US, Russia and China to develop this capability. The significance in the Indian context is that such a capability will deter a hostile power from attempting to destroy Indian satellites as they could be faced with retaliatory measures.

Defence Space Agency

India established two new space agencies in 2019: the Defense Space Agency (DSA) and the Defense Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Existing military organisations such as the Defense Imagery Processing and Analysis Center and the Defense Satellite Control Center have now been merged into the DSA. The Agency formulates space strategy for the military with a focus on leveraging communications and reconnaissance satellites to integrate intelligence and firepower across the range of Indian military capabilities. The DSRO facilitates the development of civilian space technology for military purposes.

The DSA will probably be focussed on the Indian Ocean where China is increasing its influence and the Himalayas where there is increasing Chinese intransigence. On India's land border, satellite coverage would, at the very minimum, be required over the whole of Tibet and Xinjiang Province. As of now, India has limited satellites in the sky and military applications can be said to be in their infancy. To that extent, India is a much smaller player as compared to the US, Russia and China. However, with the space sector now being opened up to the private sector, we can expect to see in the coming years a quantum leap in space applications in the civil, commercial, and defence verticals. 

Chinese Space Capabilities

China on the other hand is aiming to be a global leader in space by 2050. In 2015, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), under which function all of China's military space assets. It is structured to engage in the information space, with emphasis on electronic countermeasures, network offence and defence and satellite management. Focus areas are on target acquisition, reconnaissance, navigation operations and electronic and cyber warfare and countermeasures. China aims to have a permanent space station by the end of this year, a lunar research base by 2036 and solar power satellite (SPS) transmission capability from geostationary orbit (GEO) by 2050. China also has its own navigation system, BeiDou. 

Indian Initiatives

Currently, India possesses more than a dozen military satellites. The Indian military also uses a variety of commercial satellites and those run by friendly foreign nations in its operations. Many of these are prohibitively expensive and carry the danger of service interruption in the event of emergencies. A heartening development now is the creation of Indian Space Association (ISpA), in October 2021, This is an apex industry body, which provides a platform to the private space industry and heralds the opening of the space sector to private entities. ISpA will be the collective voice of the Indian Space Industry, with an aim to create an enabling environment to strengthen the private industry in the Indian Space Sector. What ISpA hopes to do is to make India a global hub in all areas related to space technologies. It will energise business growth, interface with defence and security agencies and enhance international partnerships and cooperation in space. The entry of the private sector into space is a major initiative and will greatly enhance India's space capabilities. In essence, ISpA seeks to make India a global space manufacturing hub with participation of Indian private industry and startups and provide space based solutions both for the domestic and international market while also meeting the space aspirations of the security and strategic sector. Many startups have also entered the space sector despite the risks involved. The effective leveraging of the private sector can be a game changer and ensure that India catches up quickly with the big three in space. This would require financial support and continuous policy reforms to create an enabling climate.

Conclusion

Space is the frontier where the course of future war will be decided. It is crucial to aggressively improve defence space capabilities as part of the “militarization of space”. How this plays out over the next decade will determine India's relative standing in the comity of nations. Space assets are by nature dual use assets. India should not shy away from using them for the defence of the motherland. With this I conclude. Thank you, Jai Bharat, Jai Hind. I am open to questions now.

Q&A

Some in the Indian defence community have advocated for more drastic changes, such as creating a military space service akin to the Space Force in the United States. This would make protecting India’s expanding satellite network easier and set the stage for coercive measures against adversary networks. India is still well-positioned to benefit from its positive relations with Russia and the United States, the two most developed space powers in the world, even though it is still unclear whether India has the long-term technological and financial foundations required to support a separate space force.

Chinese Aggressiveness in the Region: An Analysis

China's growing aggressiveness in recent years has much to do with China's self image and how its citizens perceive China's place in the comity of nations. While individuals have personality traits, a survey of a group of countries carried out over three years has suggested that a country too, can be said to have personality traits. With respect to China, this survey suggests that as a country, Chinese people exhibit two distinct traits. One, they have a deep, abiding belief in the ideals of humanism, encompassing altruism, compassion, and understanding. Two, the people showed a preference for order and organisation. They preferred certainty and thoroughness, and often judged success in terms of task accomplishment. On the macro level then, it appears that humanism and order are two traits valued by the Chinese people. 

So, if humanism and order constitute the personality of China, why is China perceived as an aggressive and volatile force? This is where the concept of a Nation’s character comes in. This refers to the shared beliefs or perceptions of personality characteristics common to members of a particular nation, both within the nation and outside it. This perception of China in the eyes of its own people and even outside of China is controlled by the Communist Party of China, the CPC, which founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is its sole ruling party.

Viewed through this lens, the personality of China is not congruent with its character. This has the potential to lead to internal unrest, protests and displeasure against the ruling dispensation. Hence, we see the heavy hand of propaganda inside and outside of China, by the CCP controlled outlets, trying to convince their own people and the outside world that a CPC run China, actually functions in terms of the Chinese personality and is humanistic, orderly and completes its projects in a timely manner, keeping the good of the people at heart. The ending of poverty in China is hence an important landmark, along with projects such as the One Belt one Road which are termed as China's humanistic and altruistic outreach. The crackdown on corruption can also be seen in a similar light. 

There is also a third characteristic which defines China and that is its sense of nationalism, grounded in the belief that China was once a great power and that it must regain that status. This sense of nationalism dates back to well before the establishment of the PRC, but it was the PRC which has, since 1949, promoted the narrative of the 'Century of Humiliation,' which is largely conceived as having begun with the first Opium War in 1839, in which the Royal Navy opened up China to Western capitalism, and ended in 1949, with the PRC coming to power in China. This discourse reiterates the humiliation of the Chinese people, the dismemberment of territory, the loss of sovereignty to foreign powers and domestic weakness and corruption. 

This sense of nationalism also drives China's foreign policy, with the PRC being sensitive to public concerns and taking into account popular nationalist sentiments. As an example, in 2012, when tensions arose over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese public boycotted Japanese products, linking the same to patriotism. There is a deep sense of hurt amongst the Chinese people of what happened after the Japanese Imperial Army seized Nanjing on 13 December 1937. For the next six weeks, the conquerors went on a rampage, killing all the Chinese soldiers who survived, which was against the canons of war. But worse, they murdered the civilian population, raped the women and pillaged and burnt the township. This massacre still weighs heavily on the Chinese consciousness. It is the Chinese public which is averse to the continuing Japanese practice of honouring of its WWII martyrs at the Yasukuni Shrine. This public vehemence at times outstrips even the hardliners within the PRC government, serving to push policy further toward hawkishness, with netizens criticising their own country’s policymakers for not being aggressive enough. And if China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is perceived to be undermining Chinese interests, then they too are subjected to ridicule by the public. Two factors indicate this trend. One, China's MFA receives calcium pills when the public feels their diplomats need to stiffen up their backbone—a popular choice of insult to indicate spinelessness. And two, in the online world, the MFA has garnered the unofficial nickname ‘the Ministry of Protests’ due to its tendency to do little more than issue denouncements of unfavourable international developments. It is this public pressure which has perhaps forced a change within China's diplomatic community, leading to what we now see as wolf warrior envoys.

With this as a background, let us look into Chinese aggressive policies astride its land borders as well as in the Western Pacific. Since early 1990s, while China was pursuing its economic and military growth agenda, it did not want its growth to be seen as threatening to its neighbours. So Beijing resorted to the rhetoric of its peaceful rise and was restrained in its foreign policy options. It engaged with regional multilateral organisations such as ASEAN, and with neighbouring states, using trade and investment deals to foster better relations. But as China grew in strength and clout, its foreign policy too has distinctly changed, with Beijing now focussed on aggressively promoting its core interests, getting more assertive with its neighbours and pushing back with greater confidence against the United States. Towards this end, China has not shied away from applying military and other coercive economic and diplomacy leverages to further its interests. That is why we see Beijing intensifying its construction activities on the artificial islands it has constructed in the South China Sea, and despite protests from the US and neighbouring states, continues with the construction of airstrips and other military facilities in these islands. In the economic sphere, China continues to intrude into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its neighbours to carry out fishing and oil exploration activities. With respect to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, and some other ASEAN countries, China is resorting to increased military activity, especially in the East China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits, as also in exerting economic and diplomatic pressure. These changes are reflective of a weakening uni-polar world order taking place concurrently with China's rise. China now feels it can push back against the U.S.-led international system, to promote a new international order.

It must be remembered here that China's rise took place in a uni-polar world. While unipolarity creates strong incentives for states to balance the unipole, there is a cost attached to such balancing which makes the challenger tread cautiously. As China grew in strength, it resorted to soft balancing, which is what we see playing out today. While not directly challenging the United States, it is using military and non-military means such as territorial denial and entangling diplomacy to delay, frustrate and undermine US policies. It desists from hard balancing which is reflected by military build up and military alliances, because of the high transaction costs involved. Hard balancing is easier to achieve in a bipolar or multi-polar environment but in a uni-polar environment, hard balancing would be viewed as revisionism and as a dangerous threat to international order. That is why Beijing, rather than confronting the United States directly, has fixed its attention to its own neighbourhood. In East Asia, while Beijing is confronted with the dominant position which the US occupies, because of China's strengthened economic and military capabilities, and because of the advantage that accrues to it from geography, it has greater confidence to do something about it. No rising power would want military bases and forward-deployed troops of its rivals next to one’s own borders. This is why China, with the growth of its economic and military might, seeks to control its immediate neighbourhood and is pushing back at US dominance. The quest for influence between the US and China in this region will thus continue to increase in intensity as time goes by. The imperative for the US, due to geographical distance from the region, will be to continue to expand its diplomatic, economic and especially military reach in the region. The Quad is but one manifestation of US efforts to keep China in check. 

But the real story is that a change is in the offing, though it may be many years distant from the present moment. Essentially, the uni-polar dynamics is weakening, and other dynamics are strengthening, presenting Beijing with a variable set of options in which it can manoeuvre in east Asia. For this, the CPC would rely on the support of its people, in the absence of which its ability to manoeuvre gets restricted. As of now, the Chinese sense of nationalism provides the necessary level of support to the CCP to pursue its agenda.

The Chinese strategy of promoting a narrative of a peaceful and non-threatening rise amongst its neighbours was predicated on US unipolarity. In the circumstances, a low profile approach was possible. With China's rise, its resistance to US power has also increased, though it still desists from carrying out hard balancing options. An example of resistance is the defensive measures that have been instituted by China against the most threatening elements of US military power such as China's Anti Area Access Denial (A2/AD) strategy. This encompasses the creation of artificial islands and militarising the same with airstrips, submarine pens, logistical support for its warships etc, along with adequate Air Defence cover, to push back against US naval and air power. It is a sea denial strategy, to restrict US military options in the Western Pacific, more specifically in the South and East China Sea. 

The show by China of its anti-ship ballistic missiles in its military parades is also designed to send a clear message to Washington that China has the capability to sink US aircraft carriers. By augmenting its A2/AD capabilities, China has raised the cost and the risks for the US to operate its aircrafts and ships close to China's near seas. China is also attempting to shape international developments by  increased activities in setting the agenda in multilateral organisations, without directly confronting the US. In a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in 2014, Xi Jinping, in his keynote address, sketched out a new security architecture for Asia. His advocacy for a new Asian based regional security cooperation architecture was obviously a challenge to the US role in regional security and was the first instance since the end of the Cold War that such an iteration had been made by a Chinese leader. In the economic sphere, China has responded to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to the US led regional free trade agreement, with Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The latter was concluded in 2020, albeit without India. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has to be seen in this light. To maintain its position, the US launched its pivot or rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration and now is invigorating the Quad. But the US strategy has been a bit incoherent, which has resulted in uncertainty in US allies and partners about the extent of US engagement and commitment. This is still playing out.

But internal power dynamics are also playing out in China, which could impact on the single party rule of the CPC. The four Chinese modernisations which have been underway over the last four decades have seen rapid economic development in China which has huge implications for Chinese society and its relationship with the CPC. The economic reforms which were initiated necessitated granting more space to Chinese entrepreneurs, which in turn has created a more diverse and active Chinese society, in which voices have emerged that are not shy of expressing opinions that are critical of developments within and outside China. The spread of communication technology and the increasing use of social media platforms has also produced societal change which could potentially challenge the CPC’s capacity to rule. This has increased the party leaderships proclivity with maintaining domestic control and legitimacy, even to the extent of using increasingly repressive methods to deal with the situation, if so required. At the same time, efforts by the CPC continue apace to seek support from the society to maintain the existing order. The support sought is no longer for ideological legitimacy but for performance, the commitment being to provide the Chinese people with higher standards of living, economic development, peace and stability as part of the social contract. This remains the main claim to legitimacy of the CPC led by Xi Jinping, but as expectations within Chinese society are rising, the leadership will continue to be tested in the years to come.

Chinese societal expectations are not just confined to economic concerns but to nationalists ambitions as well. As China grows, the yearning in society to regain its perceived past glory is all too evident. This growing nationalist sentiment will constrain Chinese foreign policy choices, forcing it on a more belligerent path and reducing room for manoeuvre. This was evident in the 2012 anti Japanese protests in China that flared up after Japan's nationalisation of three Senkaku Islands. The Chinese government termed the act as a "gross violation" of Chinese sovereignty over the territory, and hinted at taking military action, but did not go down that path. That may change, with heightened concerns among the CPC to meet people's demands. We now see nationalism in China projecting to Chinese claims in the surrounding seas, and being linked to the domestic legitimacy of Chinese ruling clique. The CPC will however have to balance out its foreign policy objectives with the consequences such policies may have on the Chinese economy. How the dynamics between the top-down nationalism and the bottom-up nationalism in China plays out remains to be seen, but the present leadership is seen to be less averse to risk-taking and in promoting a more uncompromising nationalism, to advance what are perceived to be China's legitimate claims. The construct here is based on a Chinese civilisational rejuvenation, drawn from its imagined glorious past, which gives it adequate scope to operate outside the confines of a straitjacketed ideology and also to expand its territorial reach. Such an approach is perforce more aggressive, which explains why Chinese diplomats are taking a stronger position on nationalist issues. We can thus expect to see more volatility on foreign policy issues in the coming years, especially with relation to Chinese claims on Taiwan. It must be noted here that President Xi Jinping is personally invested in the above narrative, to claim his place among the leading figures in the CPC pantheon.

The coming years will thus see greater belligerence from China, with increasing militarisation of both the South and East China Seas. Military confrontation, in all probability will be avoided, with China resorting to non-military methods to attain its territorial objectives and to achieve national rejuvenation. The ASEAN countries will attempt some form of rapprochement with China, on their respective claim lines, but Japan will in all probability dramatically increase its defence spending and seek parity with Chinese naval and air power in the Western Pacific. 

For India, we have the advantage of geography in the Indian Ocean Region, but would have to ensure an effective naval presence to guard our interests. The Quad serves India's security interests though it is not yet a security grouping. On India's border with Tibet, it is a conflict which India will have to fight alone, should the situation so arise, though help in the form of intelligence and logistic support will in all likelihood come from the US and others. The key factor in any war over the Himalayas will be cyber and space capability and control over the skies over the Tibetan Plateau. So long as India is prepared, China will be reluctant to undertake a military adventure which she may well lose. Internal stability, economic growth, military preparedness and astute diplomacy thus will be the essential components of India's response to Chinese belligerence.

Pakistan’s anti-India machinations in Sweden

The war in Ukraine has led to a complicated security situation in Europe, with some member countries of the European Union (EU), especially those from Eastern Europe, feeling the heat from the potential fallout of the war on their security environment. While the EU has responded to the crisis with a certain measure of unity, some countries have started taking additional measures to protect their national security interests. Towards that end, Sweden and Finland, which hitherto zealously guarded their neutrality, are now initiating measures to facilitate their entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Admission into NATO, however, happens by consensus. Turkey had threatened to veto the application of these two Nordic countries unless they address Turkish concerns with respect to Kurdish separatists, which Ankara believes are being harboured by both Stockholm and Helsinki—especially members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which has been designated by Turkey, US, UK, and dozens of other countries as a “terrorist” outfit. After hectic diplomatic parleys, Sweden and Finland agreed “to crack down on groups that Ankara deems national security threats, including [PKK], and its Syrian extension”. They also agreed not to impose any “embargo restrictions in the field of defense industry” on Turkey. Thereafter, on 28 June 2022, Turkey lifted its objections. A week later, on 5 July 2022, all the 30 NATO member countries signed the accession protocols for Sweden and Finland.

However, as per NATO procedures, the accession protocols have to be ratified by the parliaments of the respective member countries. President Erdogan of Turkey has once again seized the moment to veto the membership of the two Nordic countries if they “do not fulfil their promises to combat terrorism and extradite suspects”. To salvage the accession, Sweden has now started hobnobbing with Islamabad, Ankara’s all-weather friend and ally, hoping that Pakistan will use its good offices to influence Erdogan to soften his stand. But the Pakistanis, as payback, intend to use Sweden, which is seen by many as an influential human rights advocate at the international level, to malign India. Consequently, we are now witnessing increased activity of the Pakistani government and organisations backed by it, in trying to influence Swedish journalists and policymakers against India and Indian interests through its information warfare machine, based on lies and disinformation.

Pakistan considers Stockholm significant for pushing through its propaganda based information war against India and has begun a vicious anti-India campaign in Stockholm, as also in other world capitals, as part of the so-called Youm e Istehsaal (the Oppression Day), in connection with the anniversary of the constitutional rearrangement by India on 5 August 2019. The abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament has unnerved Pakistan, more so as normalcy has come in a big way in the Union Territory, after decades of Pakistani sponsored violence. As Pakistan continues to lose the plot in its attempts to destabilise J&K, it is indulging in a vicious propaganda campaign, trying to portray a wrong picture of the peace process in the UT, through disinformation and a cabal of lies. Pakistan feels doubly compelled to do this to divert the attention of its own people from the impending economic crisis they are facing, which may well lead to the break-up of that country.

In Stockholm, as part of its itinerary for 5 August, Pakistan is inviting “members of the Swedish parliament, media and human rights organizations” to feed them vicious propaganda about Jammu and Kashmir, including through letter-writing campaigns to the Swedish policymakers and policy-influencers by the Pakistani diaspora in Sweden. The pervasiveness of this campaign is demonstrated by the fact that it aims to target every arm of Swedish official life, from the host government to human rights organisations, academia, think tanks, local journalists, and civil society members. This has become a standard modus operandi of the Pakistani state, which is primarily responsible for keeping the conflict industry alive in Kashmir, by pushing the fake narrative of Indian oppression, especially in the western capitals, to malign India globally.

Pakistan has a history of using different platforms, including the United Nations, to export its false propaganda. It has funded academics, journalists, and government lobbyists to influence and mislead foreign governments, albeit unsuccessfully, against India. A 2021 detailed report titled “Kashmir Inc: A Conflict Industry” by DisInfo Lab has comprehensively exposed Pakistan’s machinations of sponsoring Kashmir-centric propaganda against India across many states through an intricate web of organisations, journalists, academics, and human rights groups, among others. It is ironical that Sweden, which purports to uphold human freedoms and democratic values, is bending its principles, and is accommodating Pakistan, simply to influence Turkey to support Swedish membership of NATO. This is evident by the manner in which Swedish policymakers and policy influencers are engaging with Pakistan. A communication from the Embassy of Pakistan in Stockholm indicates that some Swedish parliamentarians, funded by Pakistan, would likely rake up Kashmir at Pakistan’s behest in its parliament, raising questions and belittling the very integrity of this founding institution of democracy in Sweden. Additionally, by responding to these overtures from Pakistan, Stockholm appears hell-bent on straining its longstanding close relations with India “based on common values, strong business, investment and R&D linkages; and similar approaches to meet global challenges of peace & security and development”.

Should Sweden cave in to Pakistani machinations, it will likely adversely impact its relations with New Delhi. If the recent actions and position of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government are any indicators, the administration of Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson should tread carefully, for any negative campaign against New Delhi is likely to come with high diplomatic costs. The ball is in Sweden’s court.

https://thedailyguardian.com/pakistans-anti-india-machinations-in-sweden/

J&K Post Abrogation of Article 370: A Brighter Future Beckons

On 5 August 2019, the nation witnessed what can perhaps best be described as the passing of the most transformative piece of legislation since Independence by India's law makers, in both the Houses of Parliament. This historic legislation pertained to the abrogation of Article 35A and of the provisions of Article 370 of India's Constitution—which paved the way for normalcy to return to J&K after decades of terrorism, death, destruction and fear. Today, 5 August 2022 marks the completion of three years into this transformative journey; a journey on a road not hitherto traversed, a tryst once again with freedom, but this time within the ambit and protection of the Indian Constitution, signifying freedom in its truest sense. 

It was Article 370 which stultified the growth of J&K and prevented its emotional integration with the rest of the country. Why Article 370 was introduced into the Constitution, albeit as a temporary provision, is itself a matter of debate, but the more insidious legislation was the introduction of Article 35A into the Constitution in 1954, which empowered the J&K state’s legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and provide special rights and privileges to those permanent residents. This piece of legislation was added to the Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Introduced through the back door, bypassing India's Parliament, it was in that sense, a fraud committed on the Constitution. 

But not everyone was happy with the events that transpired on 5 August 2019. Pakistan was taken by surprise and is still reeling from the legislative shock, which was a body-blow delivered to its efforts to keep the region in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. But within India too, there were nay sayers, especially from amongst the radicalised segments of society. In an article published in Dawn, a Pakistani daily, in January this year, Mr AG Nororani, a Bombay based lawyer who has for long written on Constitutional issues, showed his bias and proclivity for partisan reporting when he opined that Kashmir is in flames and that the entire exercise of repealing the provisions of Article 370 was to give to J&K, a Hindu Chief Minister. Nothing could be more preposterous, but the bias is inherent in Noorani's belief that J&K can only have a Chief Minister from the Islamic faith. What happens then to India's secular Constitution? Has Noorani forgotten that India has had Muslim Chief Ministers in Maharashtra, Assam, Rajasthan, Bihar, Kerala and Manipur? This is what gives vibrancy to India's democracy and secular mindset. Noorani was also concerned with the removal of Urdu as the official language of J&K. But why should Urdu have been the official language of the state, when the people in the Valley spoke Kashmiri and the Jammu Division spoke Dogri and Hindi? That Noorani had a Muslim centric world view is apparent. As a lawyer, he held the view that Article 370 had acquired the status of a permanent fixture in India's Constitution and could not be modified or withdrawn! Really!

People like Noorani, since independence, have attempted to distort narratives to suit a particular ideology, propagating the worldview of the Left-Islamist combine. But Kashmir, after decades of violence is finally on the mend. This year has already seen a footfall of 1.06 crore tourists, with 55 to 60 flights into Srinagar each day. The hotels in the Valley are full to the brim, and getting a room requires booking months in advance. The inflow of tourists has been the highest ever, which is but one indicator of the rejection of violence by the local population and the return of normalcy. The Tricolour can be seen fluttering proudly from all government buildings, which was not the case earlier. In Srinagar itself, over 80 government departments have installed permanent Tricolour, which also flutters on 100 feet masts in Hari Parbat, Shopiyan, Gulmarg and Kupwara. The National Anthem is sung proudly now, and a visit today to Ghanta Ghar and Lal Chowk in Srinagar is a visible symbol of Naya Kashmir.

The success achieved in development initiatives has also been amazing. The performance of Panchayats, District Development Council and Municipal Corporations has been good resulting in better administration. There is a distinct improvement in the performance of youth in sports (Rowing, Taekwondo, Cricket, etc) at National and International levels and campaigns to clean the Jhelum River as well as the Dal, Wular and  Manasbal lakes are proceeding apace. 

On the security front, there is strong synergy between UT Administration, Security Forces and the Centre. There is a distinct public push back against the Gupkar group, JeI, APHC and against Pakistan supported terror groups, which has resulted in near zero incidences of stone pelting and bandh calls. Attempts by Pakistan and their backers in the Valley to engineer a seventh exodus of Kashmiri Hindus has been thwarted, which speaks well for the security situation in the Union Territory. 

It is true that J&K is yet not fully terror free, but great strides have been made over the last three years to achieve that goal. It is understandable that decades of violence would require greater time for complete healing to take place, and cannot be achieved in a short period of time, but the task would have been impossible to achieve had Article 370 still been in force. Terror related incidents have dipped by half over the last three years, and with the support of the local population, we can expect a return to total normalcy in the not too distant future. 

In his iconic poem, The Road Not Taken, Robert frost ends with these stirring lines: 

Two roads converged in a wood, and I,

I took the one less travelled by

And that has made all the difference. 

On 5 August 2019, the Indian Nation embarked on a journey in Jammu and Kashmir, on a road that had not been travelled in. And yes, that has made all the difference, because we are now witnessing, despite the many challenges still remaining, the dawn of a happier and brighter future for the people of India, and more so for the residents of Jammu and Kashmir. 

Commemorating Kargil Vijay Divas: Eternal Vigilance is the Key to Peace

On 26 July 2022, the 23rd anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, the nation gets together once again to pay homage and tribute to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who took part in that war. For those who had seen the war at close quarters, achieving victory against the enemy, ensconced at advantageous positions in the icy high-altitude mountains, seemed like 'Mission Impossible'. And to achieve what was thought of to be an impossible task, 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while 1363 were wounded. It was a victory won against all odds, but Mission Impossible was achieved.

Nasim Zehra,  a well-known Pakistani journalist and writer, in her book, From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan, has given a detailed expose of the role of the Pakistan Army in the planning and conduct of 'Operation Koh-e-Paima,' the name given to Pakistan's military misadventure in the Kargil sector. This misadventure had its roots in Pakistan's attempts to forcibly gain control over the Siachen Glacier, which India thwarted in 1984 by occupying the Saltoro Ridge, overlooking the Glacier. It was Pakistan's repeated failures to evict Indian troops from the Saltoro ridge that led to the assumption that if Pakistan occupied the heights around the  Kargil sector, overlooking the vital Leh-Srinagar road, they would be able to cut off Ladakh from the rest of India and avenge their humiliation in Siachen. In October 1998, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Koh-e-Paima, infiltrating small groups of soldiers into unoccupied territory across the Line of Control. By May 1999, they had established over 140 posts in the Kargil-Drass region. The Indian operations launched thereafter to evict the intruders was codenamed 'Operation Vijay,' the Operation ending on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian victory.

While we pay homage to the heroism and courage of the Indian soldier on this day, it would be equally appropriate to reflect on the lessons that the war in Kargil highlighted.  At the national level, there are seven important lessons which we would do well to remember. 

Blind Trust can be Fatal 

The first of these lessons is that blind trust can be fatal. The Indian military as well as intelligence agencies missed vital signs and made wrong assessments, primarily because a push for peace was being made in the political space by India's Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihar Vajpayee. In  his famous bus 'yatra' of 19 February 1999, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech at Lahore, where he spoke for peace. “Hum jung na hone denge ... Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda... Hum jung na hone denge…” were the words he used, but even as those stirring words were uttered on Pakistani soil, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, was already across the Line of Control, and had surreptitiously occupied some of the unoccupied heights, overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships. India's focus on peace blinded it to the prospect of a Pakistani betrayal, which was considered unthinkable in the prevailing bonhomie between the two countries. Pakistan thus achieved strategic surprise and was successful in the initial operations carried out by their army. We must never ever allow that to happen again. 

Expect the Unexpected 

The Indian Army had war-gamed the possibility of precisely such an occurrence as the intrusion of a vast body of Pakistan military personnel in small groups to occupy the heights overlooking India's vital national highway. Such an action was considered possible but was discarded due to the difficulty of maintaining a large body of troops in the mountains. It was also assessed that while such a course of action could lead to the enemy achieving short term tactical success, it was bound to result in a strategic disaster. The conclusion drawn from the assessment was faulty in that it presumed that the enemy would not undertake such a risky adventure which was doomed to failure. What was missed out was the fact that Pakistan has consistently made illogical deductions about India's capabilities and so it would have been prudent to at least cater for such an eventuality. An improbable occurrence must always be catered for, if the consequences of such an occurrence would be costly for the nation. It is not the job of the military to guess. It is its job to remain prepared at all times for all eventualities.

Higher Defence Planning

When the Kargil war started, both the Army and the Air Force were short of vital ammunition and other items. That is what prompted the then Army Chief to say that we will fight with what we have. This reflects a weakness in higher defence planning, primarily because in the Indian system, we have a bureaucracy that is interposed between the military leadership and the political authority. The bureaucracy controls the procurement process but remains unaccountable for its actions, while the military has the responsibility but not the power to do anything about it. While the office of the CDS has now been created, we need to go further in the reform process and like other modern armies, remove the bureaucracy completely as the middle-man interposed between the political authority and the military leadership.

The Intelligence Factor 

The induction of thousand of trained troops in small groups all across the Line of Control in the Drass, Kargil and Batalik sectors reflected a gargantuan failure on the part of India's intelligence agencies in failing to detect such intrusion. The induction of such a large force took place over many months and was common knowledge in the areas across the LoC. Such feverish activities should have been picked up but it is evident that India lacked suitable assets which could have provided adequate early warning. The Kargil War once again highlights the importance of both human intelligence as well as electronic and other means of gathering information, to include intelligence gathering by means of satellites.

Unity of Effort 

In the modern age, it is not just armies that go to war, but the nation as a whole, which implies unity of effort in prosecuting war. The Kargil Review Committee highlighted many of these weaknesses, some of which have been addressed, such as the creation of the office of the CDS. What is now needed is to make a big push for self sufficiency in defence production. This is being done through the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative, which needs to be further strengthened, streamlined and made user-friendly. While the political intent is clear, huge changes are required in mindsets, especially in the nation's bureaucracy and in the research and development organisations. To make this a truly integrated approach, the private sector has to play a major role and for this it requires a great deal of facilitation by both the military as well as the political authority.

Role of the Media 

The Indian media played an excellent role during the Kargil conflict and created a positive climate for the prosecution of war, both within the country as well as in the international arena. Press freedom contributes greatly to national security and must be preserved at all times.

The Seventh Lesson: Do not Assume 

The seventh lesson is from the stables of the enemy. They prosecuted the war on three fatal assumptions. One, the Indian Armed Forces will not be able to dislodge the encroachments made by the Pakistani troops as they were occupying the strategic heights on the Srinagar-let axis. Two, India would be restricted in its response as Pakistan was a nuclear armed state. And three, The international community would call an early halt to the war between the two nuclear armed neighbours, leaving Pakistan in possession of its ill-gotten gains. In reality, Pakistan was wrong in all three of the assessments so made. They under-estimated the will of India to fight for its land and for its people. That is a lesson which unfortunately still does not appear to have been learnt by Pakistan. And so India must be ready to deal with the Pakistani state as it currently is—hostile and bitterly opposed to India. Seeking friendship is not a mistake, but seeking friendship by keeping our eyes closed to reality will cost India dearly in the future. We must always be conscious of the real nature of the enemy.

Conclusion 

As we celebrate the 23rd Anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, let us bow our heads in gratitude to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who laid down their lives for their country. And in their honour and in their memory, let us resolve to make India strong and resilient, to face any challenges that the future may have to offer. And while doing so, let us remember, that eternal vigilance is the key to peace.

Published in Chintan: 26 July 2022

THERE CAN NEVER BE A LICENCE TO KILL

It is a sign of our times, especially in India with its 1.3 billion plus population, that each and every issue can be converted into a controversy that spills over into violence and destruction of property. The last decade, or most specifically since 2014 when the BJP led NDA registered a thumping victory in the national elections, certain vested interests who had lost power, deliberately started creating tensions in society to stoke such violence, at times with finances received from sources outside the country.

Communal tensions were repeatedly created on fake narratives, in a bid to divide communities. The falsehood spread on attacks on churches in 2015 is but a case in point. As also the isolated cases of attacks on cow smugglers that were blown out of proportion to create religious strife. Then there were attacks on economic entities, all of them justified on spurious premises. Protests against the Kudankulam power project and Sterlite Copper (both located in Tamil Nadu), as also protests against the Narbada dam in Gujarat are cases in point. Foreign entities had huge stakes in such protests, and funding for the same came from quarters inimical to India. More recently, we have seen protests against the CAA and the Farm Bills which disrupted normal life for many months at a stretch. There is a pattern in all such protests, an agenda which is dangerous and which needs to be addressed with all the might of the Indian state. Recently, even a military reform in the form of the Agnipath scheme led to violence and destruction of property. This was clearly motivated and organised.

It is in the above light that the recent controversy over the remarks of Ms Nupur Sharma have to be seen. In end May, a TV debate on the Shiva Lingam found at the Krishna Janambhumi turned into a slanging match in which a panellist referred to Lord Shiva in objectionable terms. In response, Ms Sharma, who was the spokesperson of the ruling BJP dispensation made comments about Islam that went way beyond her brief. The issue would probably have died down there, but a few groups took up the matter, leading to protests across India and in some of the Islamic countries in the Gulf. The BJP spokesperson was suspended on 7 June, but the protests continued.

The controversy over the comments made by the spokesperson refuses to die down. Here too, vested interests are fuelling the controversy. Death threats were issued to Sharma by radicalised groups and a host of cases were filed against her in opposition ruled states for creating religious discord. The people who filed complaints against Ms Sharma did not file cases against the panelist who was the initial provocateur. Street protests continued, with a tailor being murdered in Udaipur on June 28 for supporting Nupur. Another murder took place earlier on 21 June, when Umesh Kohle, a chemist was stabbed to death in Maharashtra's Amravati district for supporting Nupur in a FaceBook post. Numerous other people have received death threats merely for supporting Nupur, which activity is an infringement of their right to free speech.

The spate of criminal cases registered against Nupur Sharma from across the country got her to approach the Apex Court, with a prayer to club all the FIRs registered against her. The two-judge vacation bench of the Supreme Court rejected her appeal in a terse one line order on 01 July, and made scathing verbal comments against her, which set off a fresh round of controversy. 

Coming down heavily on Nupur Sharma, Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala faulted Sharma for “igniting emotions" and held her responsible for “what is happening” in the country. This prompted a group of Concerned Citizens to dash off an open letter on the issue, seeking repeal of these remarks. But there is a larger issue which is involved here, and these concerns ought not to be brushed aside.

I am not looking into the legal argument which is more a matter for trained and experienced lawyers. Of great concern is an issue equally fundamental. Can Nupur Sharma, because of her remarks, be held solely accountable for creating mayhem in the country? That belies the very nature of the radicalised mindset. It was sometime in the 1960s that radicalism started growing in Kashmir, which led to the tragic genocide of Kashmiri Hindus in 1990. This radicalisation, promoted by funds received from the Gulf countries, was not confined to Kashmir alone but encompassed many other parts of India and has now also  become a threat to those very countries which spread such a discourse, besides being a threat to India. So to castigate the former BJP spokesperson as the sole cause of violence in India was perhaps going a bit too far.

But the more worrying aspect of the obiter dicta is the interpretation being given to it by radicalised groups in the major minority community. They are claiming it to be a justification delivered by the Apex Court for the calls being given by some of these groups to behead Ms Sharma.This was surely far from the intent of the learned Justices who in open court commented on the former BJP spokesperson's appeal to club all cases filed across the country to a single court, given the security risk that she was facing. That the threat cannot be taken lightly is seen by the brutal murders committed by fanatics on those who supported Nupur Sharma in online posts. The effort of fringe groups to wrongly use any obiter dicta as a justification for committing heinous crimes must be condemned, including by the apex court.

Ian Fleming, the celebrated author and creator of James Bond, speaks of the Double-O prefix given to certain secret agents as the Licence to Kill. There is no and never can there be any  'licence to kill' by radicalised fringe elements in society.

The author is a retired major General of the Indian Army. He is currently, Director, India Foundation. Published in the Sunday Guardian, 10 July 2022.

AGNIPATH: TRANSFORMING THE ARMY

The ongoing war in Ukraine has thrown up a humungous list of lessons for militaries across the world. Undoubtedly, these will be studied, analysed and debated in the coming years to determine how future militaries should be structured, trained and equipped. While various facets of the Ukraine war were being discussed in military and think tank circles in India, the Armed Forces announced the roll out of Agnipath—a new policy document wherein both the procedure for enrolment of personnel in the Armed Forces as well as the terms and conditions of such service stand radically altered. In its breadth and scope, the policy is both transformational and revolutionary. That is why a furious debate is raging in the country on the pros and cons of such a policy. This is not an alarming development, but a natural reaction to a change in the status quo.

No reform can be painless. The nation has to bite the bullet and implement such reforms, if the long-term impact is beneficial. In the economic sphere, the implementation of GST went through a difficult birth, but now the nation is reaping the benefits which will only grow in the years to come. The abrogation of the special status given to J&K by both houses of Parliament on 5 August 2019 was another revolutionary reform in the political sphere, which is still playing out but the dividends of which are clearly visible in the political, social, economic and security domains in the newly formed Union Territory of J&K. Agnipath too, can be a huge game changer, but certain modifications may be required along the way. Fortunately, in the implementational phase, the policy will have very little impact on the Forces in the first four years after it is rolled out. So enough time is available to look into course corrections to make this transformational and revolutionary concept beneficial to the Armed Forces, to the soldier and to the nation. 

The scheme departs radically from past enrolment practises, as from now on, enrolment for the Armed Forces will only be through the Pan-India, merit based Agnipath scheme. Eligibility for enrolment is open to all Indian citizens in the age group of 17.5 to 21 years. A one time age waiver has been given for the current year wherein individuals up to the age of 23 years can apply, as no enrolment has taken place in the last two years due to the pandemic. Selected individuals, called Agniveers, will be required to serve for four years, which includes a six month training period. Thereafter, 25 percent will be retained in the military for permanent absorption, while the remaining 75 percent will be given a financial package which will assist them in either finding other means of employment or in becoming small scale entrepreneurs themselves. Through this, a vast pool of disciplined work force will be available to the nation. The Agniveers will be entitled to all the allowances of regular troops, to include risk and hardship allowance and death and disability pension. 30 percent of their monthly emoluments will go towards a lump sum gratuity that will be paid to them on completion of their contractual service. The government will contribute an equal portion, the net lump sum gratuity coming to Rs 11.7 lakh. This, combined with the individuals savings over four years, could be in the range of Rs 18- 22 lakh—an amount which is not unsubstantial for a 22-23 year old youth. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the selection of Agniveers for retention in the military.

The Challenges

Fears have been expressed on the motivational levels of youth who have but a four year tenure of service. There are also concerns about their standards of training. The war in Ukraine has shown limitations in the performance of Russian troops who, for the most part were conscripts with short service tenures. The Ukrainian military too, suffered from such infirmities. In the Indian context, individual training for Agniveers who are enrolled in the Armoured Corps, Mechanised Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and EME poses huge challenges which will need to be overcome. But the larger training challenge is group cohesion and functioning as part of a well oiled sub unit. This is particularly applicable to the combat arms and combat support arms. 

The Armed Forces are cognisant of these concerns and will look into measures to address them over the next few years. But more serious is the skewed impact on the age and service profile of soldiers over a 20 year period when the policy has totally matured. In this scenario, we are likely to have up to 60 percent of a unit in the below four year service bracket and only 40 percent in the bracket of 4-20 years service. This will throw up serious operational challenges to the combat arms.

The yearly burgeoning pension bill of defence pensioners has been one of the major reasons necessitating reforms in the military. A soldier, unlike his civilian counterpart, retires at an early age. This is necessary to keep a youthful profile of the Armed Forces. Over the years, this has led to the number of veterans exceeding the number of serving personnel, the ratio presently being in the region of 1:1.8 or thereabout. This will keep increasing over the years and may eventually be to the order of 1:2.5. Obviously, this will impact on force modernisation as a major chunk of defence expenditure gets consumed in revenue expenditure, leaving that much less for capital acquisitions. 

A Road Map for the Future

Can something be done to allay the concerns which have been expressed and at the same time, continue with the reform process? Certain actions have already been initiated, but the forces need to look outside the ambit of the personnel in uniform and integrate the reform process with a much wider set of reforms which would encompass the entire security architecture of the country. Three issues need consideration. One, the entire civilian work force needs to be included in the ambit of defence reforms. Two, the governance structure in the Ministry of Defence needs to be revamped and three, the security forces working under the ambit of the Ministry of Home Affairs needs to be co-opted into the military reform process. Let us look at the third aspect first.

The Sixth Central Pay Commission, in its recommendations made a strong pitch for the lateral movement of Defence Forces personnel into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The Commission was of the view that while a good compensation package is essential for the morale and quality of officers and men in the Defence Forces, the same will also, to a large extent, depend on those personnel being provided a life time career. The recommendations were not implemented, largely due to resistance by the CAPF in taking in personnel with different service profiles and seniority, which would impact the seniority and functioning of their existing cadre. These concerns cannot be easily brushed away, but a ready solution exists in the form of absorption of Agniveers. 

Presently, a large number of personnel are recruited in the CAPFs who have to be trained before they can be employed in various security agencies of the Ministry of Home Affairs such as the BSF, CRPF and the ITBP. In addition we have the paramilitary forces under the ministry—the Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard. What needs to be done is to make entry into these forces only through Agniveers. The twin problems of locating suitable trained manpower for induction into these forces and providing sufficiently long tenure for the Defence Forces personnel can be addressed in one stroke. The earlier hesitations which were expressed by the CAPF in taking in retired personnel from the defence forces into their organisations will no longer apply. These organisations will now get well trained and well disciplined personnel,  who are not only proficient in the use of weapons but also skilled in sub-unit level functioning which is required by these forces in combatting militancy, terrorism or other tasks. And these personnel are, on an average, just 23 years old. The CAPF also get substantial financial savings as they do not now have to budget for recruitment and training expenses. The Agniveers joining the CAPF get a life time career while the Armed Forces, get a more youthful profile. Such lateral absorption can take in about 30 percent Agniveers each year, which would be the average replacement requirement of the CAPFs retiring personnel.

In the Agnipath scheme, the civilian work force which numbers about 3.75 lakh personnel has been left out. This is the real tail of the military which needs serious reforms. A large part of this workforce is employed in the nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) and the 41 Ordnance factories which have now been reconstituted into seven fully government-owned corporate entities on the lines of DPSUs. Force effectiveness depends to some extent on the capability and ability of these production agencies in delivering cost effective quality products to the Armed Forces in a time bound manner. The entire civilian workforce should, therefore,  have been assessed in a performance audit as they are paid out of defence estimates and also consume about a quarter of the pension budget. While the issue of privatising most of these entities will have to confront political hurdles, the same would have to be done at some stage. In any event, the step taken by the government in dissolving the Ordnance Factory Board and merging the 41 Ordnance Factories into seven corporate entities, was, by itself, a major first step. If privatisation cannot be immediately done, then at least these entities should function under the ministry of Commerce and Industries and not under the Ministry of Defence, where they have a captive market. This reform, if done, will ignite competition and make them more accountable to the user. A performance audit of the DRDO would also be beneficial in determining whether the country is getting its money's worth in investing huge sums in this organisation. In terms of manpower, it is evidently overstaffed as compared to similar organisations in the West. This needs to be looked into and the flab cut. Perhaps the model to be emulated could be a mix of India's ISRO and the US DARPA, to see that the nations limited resources are used in the most efficient manner. 

We also need to look into the functioning of the Ministry of Defence itself, which has a very large civilian workforce. Agnipath is sought to be justified on the model of the militaries of the US, Israel and other Western democracies. In all these countries, there is no bureaucratic interface between the political authority and the military. Perhaps India should follow suit, as is the norm in all the countries of the world. This by itself, will save the exchequer a few thousand crore INR every year. The Railways has no bureaucratic interface and the military should follow suit.

Finally, a little tweaking of the Agnipath scheme will ensure its acceptability to all those who are currently opposing it. One, as mentioned earlier, recruitment to the CAPF should be only through Agniveers who have completed four years service.  Roughly, they would be able to take in about 30 percent of Agniveers each year. These individuals could be selected on a random basis to ensure that the CAPF get a fair mix. Two, for the Military, increase the service limit to six years and retain 40 percent. That would give a more balanced service profile, which eliminates infirmities which are envisaged with a shorter service tenure. Thirdly, only 30 percent of the Agniveers will now be required to be released to the environment. This is a smaller number to deal with. Some of these personnel would be desirous of leaving the military after completing their time. The others could be helped to settle down, where needed.

Conclusion

Agnipath has received a mixed response from the military community. There have been a few bouquets and a lot of brickbats but the underlying fact remains is that it is reform which is needed. The implementation details are the only issues which need to be ironed out. We can get into a win-win situation by making the system more holistic and by following a whole of nation approach, rather than just confining the policy to the uniformed fraternity of the Armed Forces. 

Published in the IFJ, 1 Sep 2022