LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN THE INFORMATION AGE

If you want to go east, don't go west.

                                    Ramakrishna.

Warfare is mutating. While conventional state on state conflict is not passé, future conflict will see increasing interventions by non-state actors, acting independently or supported by a state to achieve specific objectives. As we move into the information age, the future will bring forth fresh challenges in confronting a variety of military threats in an increasingly asymmetric world, with all its attending complexities. Leadership, as always will play a critical role in determining force effectiveness, but leaders will increasingly be confronted by challenges based on a changing environment. They would need to be trained and prepared accordingly.

The Environment

In their monumental work, ‘War and Anti War’, Alvin and Heidi Toffler posit a linkage with the stages of development of a society and the manner in which such societies conduct wars. As we move into the information age, greater emphasis will keep being placed on information as a weapon system and its impact on the environment of operations will have increasing relevance. Allied with this is the rapid pace at which technological advancements are taking place, enabling lethal engagement of targets at long ranges with precision, giving rise to the concept of network centric warfare (NCW). Applications of NCW in some form are visible in the conflicts presently taking place in Afghanistan and in the Levant. However, networks simply alter the character of warfare; they do not change its fundamental nature. Direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist but the network will enable collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Networks thus will remain additive and will not substitute for the fundamentals of warfare. 

The additive advantage of networks however, is significant as combatants in conflict, both now and in the future, besides having greater battlefield awareness, will also possess the means to deliver precision guided munitions at designated targets. Survival of the agile will thus be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In his book, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty first Century, Thomas P.M.Barnett observes that the future is not so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power shifts to knowledge based real time actors. As we move towards self-synchronisation of forces, we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at a far quicker pace than hitherto thought possible. Greater information availability comes with its own set of dilemmas in the form ‘information overload’. Analysis capability too is not endless and will increasingly be put under severe strain. The desire to have maximum inputs for decision making is a tempting proposition but will have to be tempered with the necessity of giving a decision in time. As time pressures become more acute we may well end up with ‘information decoherence’. We would also have to contend with the problem of ‘attention fragmentation’. Military leaders, like leaders in all walks of life need uninterrupted time to synthesise information from many different sources, reflect on its implications, apply judgment, and arrive at good decisions. The capacity and capability of commanders to take appropriate decisions in a timely manner will hence be a key attribute for the leaders of tomorrow.

The Leadership Challenge

Technology, while continuing to have great significance, cannot by itself provide solutions to all strategic and operational challenges. Success will, more often than not, be a result of the interaction between humans and technology. Leadership at the higher level would need an understanding and development of a broader worldview on the changes taking place in the domestic and international environment. While using the tools of technology, the approach to war fighting would need to be constantly refined, expanded and improved. This evolution is a function of strategic leadership. Failure to evolve could well lead to our forces being well prepared for the previous war, but hopelessly incapable of fighting future conflict.

In the Armed Forces, while the tactical level leadership remains outstanding, the same cannot be said of the leadership at the operational and strategic level, which remains tactical in its orientation and approach. The leadership challenge lies in creating an environment in which leaders with a strategic bent of mind will emerge. Skill sets required for strategic leadership would include facets like challenging the status quo, anticipating the challenges of a changing environment, interpreting multiple information flows, decisiveness and a focus on continuous learning. The information age demands leaders who can tolerate ambiguity, adapt to changing conditions and make decisions rapidly under stress. They should also have skills that are interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. 

Culture, too, impacts on the evolution of leaders. By definition, culture is a ‘repertoire of socially transmitted and intra-generationally generated ideas about how to live and make judgements, both in general terms and in regard to specific domains of life’. Social and political theorists have postulated that culture exerts a decisive influence on a people’s economic and political development. As an example, socialist economies produce a cultural milieu in which anti-market, anti-profit schooling and insider privilege have planted and frozen anti-entrepreneurial attitudes. People thus fear the uncertainties of the market and yearn for the safe tedium of state employment. Or they yearn for equality in poverty, a common feature of peasant cultures around the world. For the Indian Armed Forces, the cultural milieu of the country  will impact on the leadership traits of its officers. Here, let us examine the role of the family and of society.

The central role of family in Indian society establishes clear hierarchical relationships within the family and within society with close family ties often leading to nepotism. As the military is drawn from society, people joining the forces come with ingrained attitudes; many people thus do not view nepotism as a serious ethical aberration. Tendencies towards nepotism are transferred over time to the strong institutional bonding in the Army based on arm and service affiliations, regimental loyalties, school ties et al. While many frown at such behaviour, the numbers who would desist from taking advantage of such bonding to further their self-interest dwindles to a mere handful. This leads to some seeking postings under a ‘known’ superior with the possibility of earning reports based on factors other than merit and to favourable considerations in selections for promotions. The cycle is self-perpetuating and leads over time to increasing number of mediocre officers occupying senior positions in the military hierarchy.

Culture affects in other ways too. Unlike the West where children are encouraged to think and act independently, the Indian family structure promotes deference to the head of the family for even mundane decisions. This translates into deference to superior authority whether in the family or at school and later in life as an adult wherein even life choices are dictated by the desires and preferences of the elders. The custom of touching the feet of relatives and those in positions of authority is a direct outcome of such cultural constructs. Our schools also promote such a culture. Erroneous equation of such deference with respect and honour, results in a loss of individuality and leads to sycophancy, servility and obsequiousness. 

The hierarchical decision making structure of the Armed Forces also tend towards attitudes of unilateralism and could preclude consultative mechanisms. In progressive cultures, authority tends towards dispersion and horizontality whereas in static cultures authority is concentrated in vertical silos. This limits the narrative to individual views being the dominant input in the decision making process. Ingrained cultural attributes militate against effective decision-making and dilute leadership traits. The phenomenon of every decision being vetted at higher and higher levels of command is a fallout of such cultural attributes. This leads at times to ridiculous situations where decisions, which should rightly be taken at the level of colonel, find their way to three star Generals for approval. Play safe attitudes kill the leadership spirit, lead towards indecisiveness, promote mediocrity and sycophancy and hence need to be countered with an alternate narrative. There is hence a need to promote a counter culture within the military if desired leadership attributes are to be developed. 

The rise of Generation C will increasingly impact the environment and pose challenges to contemporary and future leadership.  This is the generation which is connected, communicating, content-centric, computerised, community oriented, always clicking – hence the name. In India, this generation, born after 1990, for the most part comes from an urban or suburban background. It is from this base that the future leadership of India’s Armed Forces will be drawn. This generation has grown up with the internet and mobile communications and is very familiar with technology. They will thus have an enormous impact on the way the Armed Forces function, as within a decade, they will form the core of its junior and middle level leadership. 

As we move towards greater digitisation in the Force, the increasing numbers of Generation C in leadership roles will start playing a more dominant role in military affairs. This will impact on the way information is transmitted and consumed. The linear set ups which are an essential ingredient of hierarchical systems will get more and more diffused as non linear information flows increase. Security issues arising form the same would need to be addressed. More importantly, we will increasingly witness a generation gap in the way this set of Generation C leaders function in relation to the rest. While the upper age limit of the digitally literate older generation will rise, they will remain far behind the junior and middle rung leadership dominated by Generation C in their digital behaviour and in terms of their ability to absorb, assimilate and employ technological tools.

Strategy for Change

The start point for promoting an alternate culture to nurture leaders of substance must begin at the roots. Here, we need to look firstly at the selection system where the Services Selection Boards (SSB) will be the lead players and then at our training academies – The National Defence Academy, The Indian Military Academy and the Officers Training Academy. These are the nurseries which will produce our future officers and so the greatest care and circumspection must be exercised here.

The SSB procedures perhaps need a relook. To claim that our selection system has stood the test of time and hence needs no change is denying the emergence of a changing aspirational India. Such review cannot be left to the DIPR (Defence Institute of Psychological Research), but must be led by the services themselves with inputs from leaders in the field encompassing multiple disciplines. The next step will to be nurture the selected lot in the training academies. Here we come up with inherent contradictions. The prayer at the National Defence Academy which all cadets recite at the morning muster parade cannot remain a mere recitation of words but must be converted into an actionable plan. The words are stirring, emphasising duty and honour to the country and to the Services. Ethical conduct is emphasised through the words…“awaken our admiration for honest dealing and clean thinking and guide us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong” and also… “endow us with the courage which is born of the love of what is noble and which knows no compromise or retreat when truth and right are in peril”, but this cannot remain simply a morning prayer. There must be an actionable plan to convert the words into a way of life which becomes second nature to the cadets. The aim must be to turn them into men of character and substance who will not flinch when upholding a principle. Undoubtedly the task is difficult for the cadets also have to be taught to obey orders without hesitation. How then are they to be taught to resist orders which are illegal and immoral? Who is to determine the same? These are the challenges to overcome; they would require a culture where openness is encouraged and space exists to oppose authority. There is then a need for a live conversation in our training establishments of ethics and values, where people hold each other responsible and accountable about whether they are really living the values – and this has to be internalised to become a part of Academy life. Creating this culture is the primary challenge. It means that cadets must have knowledge of alternatives, but still choose to stay within the bounds of ethical behaviour because it is important and inspires them. Making a strong commitment to bring such a culture to life is an essential part of ethical leadership. The ‘authority trap’ has to be avoided; this would require established and explicit ways for subordinates to ‘push back’ if a person thinks that something is ethically wrong and the values of the organisation are being eroded. The process of developing these mechanisms must be created in our training establishments. In due course of time, these will get transmitted to our units and establishments creating a unique army culture which could be emulated by the nation.

Another criticality lies in the selection of directing staff to these establishments. They must be men of exceptional honour and commitment, and the selection process to select them the most rigorous. Each person so selected must be able to walk the talk, whether he is the Commandant or the divisional officer.

The proliferation and increasing sophistication of communication, interaction and collaborative technologies and tools could perhaps lead to redefining the way the armed forces operate. The capability of Generation C to use technology must be exploited to change many of the antiquated ways in which the Armed Forces currently function. If the senior leadership has the wisdom to exploit this talent, it could well lead to a revolution in the way the Armed Forces are currently administered. The entire logistic management could be overhauled leading to greater efficiency, real time availability of material, decrease in manpower requirements, reduced costs and more importantly a reduced logistic footprint in all types of conflict situations.

Systems would have to be reworked, especially financial rules and regulations as increase in transparency levels could potentially lead to massive cost reductions in items purchased for the force. Current procedures in which financial advisors from the Indian Revenue Service are dominant players but remain unaccountable for the decisions they endorse will have to give way to alternate models where decisions can be taken in compressed time frames with total transparency. On the operational front, Generation C is already wired for taking on the requirements of NCW and needs only a guiding hand to propel it in the right direction. We are indeed living in exciting times. The future holds great promise for the Indian Armed Forces – the current Generation C. But a great deal of maturity and understanding would be required to let Generation C fulfil the role which their upbringing and circumstance have fortuitously given.

Institutionally, we also need to acknowledge that strategic information is now an essential element of combat analysis and combat power. Our training establishments need to rebalance from a competency based training approach towards an educative approach that involves cognitive learning. Within the Armed Forces, we need to develop and embrace an organisational culture of “lifelong learning” for leaders. Let us also keep in mind that leadership is all about decision-making. Sometimes, the choice is between ethical behaviour at the cost of personal advancement. What the leader chooses will be a product of his upbringing and conscience but the options lie in the ‘black and white’ domain. However, most choices will not be that simple. Difficulties arise when the options are between two courses, both having tremendous positive possibilities; or in having to choose one among a range of options, each having negative consequences. Sam Manekshaw, in his address to officers at the Staff College, Wellington spoke of five fundamental attributes of leadership - professional competence, justice, courage, loyalty and decisiveness. It is the last named quality however, which finally defines a leader. The ability to take a decision and accept full responsibility for one’s action will, in the ultimate analysis, define a person and what he stands for. Our ability to nurture such leaders, and place them in senior levels of command, remains the defining challenge of the day.

Note: This article was published in the USI Journal - Jan-Mar 2015. For footnotes, refer to the Journal.

THE AMBUSH IN CHANDEL DISTRICT: AN ANALYSIS

6 Dogra had completed their tenure in Manipur and were scheduled to move out shortly to their new location. The unit was deployed in the Chandel District of Manipur, and a convoy of four vehicles was moving on the Tengnoupal-New Samtal Road on 4 June 2015. It was a routine convoy movement. The road had been sanitised or so the unit believed. At least they had sanitised the portion that fell in their area of operational responsibility. The rest of the road was the responsibility of an Assam Rifles Battalion. 

Unknown to the unit, a group of militants had planned an ambush on that stretch of the road. The area was hilly, with thick undergrowth, which enabled the militants to lie well concealed and was  about 15 to 20 km from the Myanmar border, which enabled a quick getaway to a safe sanctuary after the operation was over. At about 9 a.m., the convoy was on a stretch of road between Paralong and Charalong villages, when the militants struck, firing Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and Lathode Grenades, followed by a deadly fusillade of automatic fire. This firing continued for about 10 to 12 minutes. The first vehicle carrying the quick reaction team and the next two vehicles carrying troops came into the killing zone of the ambush. The leading two vehicles suffered the maximum number of fatalities and the third vehicle suffered the maximum number of non fatal injuries. Of the 30 plus personnel travelling in these three vehicles, 18 were killed in action and 11 were wounded.

A lot has been said and written about his ambush. Indeed, it was the biggest attack on the Army in over a decade, and brought forth questions about operating procedures and drills. Some were quick to castigate the unit, alleging that Standard Operating Procedures had not been followed. There was a desire to be first with the news, a ‘breaking news’ moment with all the gory details, mostly conjecture and half truths. In the process, some fundamental issues remained unaddressed.

That the unit was not moving as per SOPs is not correct. The troop carrying vehicles had about 15 personnel each to include the driver and the co-driver. That meant that in the body of the vehicle, there were about 12 to 13 men. So obviously, the vehicles were not overloaded. 6 Dogra had sanitised their stretch of the road, so that was all right too. The Assam Rifles Battalion responsible for the stretch of road where the ambush took place had also confirmed that the road had been sanitised. How the ambush took place in a stretch of sanitised road is now being investigated and doubtless lessons will emerge. But reports stating that SOPs were not followed were patently false and were an attempt to inject some element of sensationalism into the incident and to find an immediate scapegoat for what was certainly a very serious loss to the Army, both in terms of casualties suffered and in credibility.

What got missed out however, was the counter ambush drill followed by the Army. The militants were many times more in number than the army jawans and they had the element of surprise with them. In the initial burst of fire, they had caused massive casualties to the Army personnel. What was left were a few injured personnel in the vehicles that were attacked. From here onwards, an adverse situation was retrieved and a massacre was averted. Despite the shock of the initial assault, the survivors fought back. This surprised the militants who did not expect any resistance at all. They had planned to kill the survivors by closing in on the vehicles and thereafter taking away all the weapons. That plan could not fructify. With fire being returned immediately on the militants, they found the going too tough to handle and left the scene in haste. Their commander, a 30 year old man called Rajabglung Kamei of Noney in Tamenglong district was killed and his body and weapon recovered. Another militant was killed and his body was found some distance from the ambush site. It appeared from radio intercepts that quite a few militants were injured of which two more are believed to have died later. This indicates a very high standard of training and discipline of the Army and undoubtedly must redound to the credit of the unit.    

But something did go wrong, else we would not have had 18 Indian soldiers killed. There perhaps were shortcomings in the road opening drills followed. That will be determined by the investigation. But looking at the situation from a different angle, what a road opening party does is to ensure that their are no IEDs placed on the road and after that it pickets the road to see that the road remains clear. In hilly terrain with thick forest cover, it is easy for a large group of men to lie concealed about a hundred yards off the road and move forward just before the ambush is to be sprung. In the ambush, there was no IED on the road, so the road opening party would have assumed all was clear. If the militants were hiding away from the road, it would be practically impossible to detect them. As the area to be covered is large, every nook and corner cannot be picketed, especially in an area where the entire stretch of road is a potential ambush site and the aim is to hit a vehicle by rocket fire. This, to all intents was what the ambush did. It did not use IEDs and initiated the attack by firing RPGs. A change in operating philosophy of road opening parties is hence called for and doubtless drills will be refined in the near future.

The attack was carried out by three groups. These were NSCN (K) (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)), The KCP, (Kangleipak Communist Party) and the militant Meitei KYKL  (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup). The NSCN (K) was formed in 1988 after a fallout between the Burmese-born S S Khaplang and the leaders of the NSCN (IM), Thuingaleng Muivah and Isaac Swu. For the last few years, the Khaplang Group, which is strong in Eastern Nagaland and in the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, has made inroads in Manipur, which is the stronghold of NSCN (IM). It withdrew from a declared ceasefire with India in March this year but continues to have a ceasefire with Myanmar.

‘Kangleipak’ is the Manipuri name for Manipur. There are about 30 factions of the KCP currently operating in Manipur. The smaller groups number just about 15 to 20 personnel; the larger groups go up to 100. Amongst the banned groups, the KCP splinter groups are considered mercenaries who can be hired to shoot at small-time shopkeepers, deliver extortion demands, plant IEDs on highways, attack non-locals, and kidnap for ransom.

The third militant group which carried out the attack was the KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup), formed in 1994 after the Oken faction of the UNLF, the Meiraba faction of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (Prepak), and the Ibo Pishak faction of the KCP came together. The KYKL has traditionally been close to the NSCN (IM).

The joint attack by the above groups, led by NSCN (K) was apparently a message by Khaplang to the Central Government that they were a strong force and not to be trifled with. The Centre is in talks with the NSCN (IM), but has generally ignored the Khaplang faction, which is its rival. The attack was meant to show that despite being based in Myanmar, the NSCN (K)’s sphere of influence and strike capability extended deep inside India. It was well planned and expertly executed, showcasing capability, intent and will. The group was well trained and operated almost to perfection in executing its task. It is fortunate that despite being taken by surprise and hit hard in the initial stages itself, the remaining personnel of 6 Dogra responded with speed, courage and guts to retrieve the situation after suffering the initial onslaught. 

Traditionally, militant groups in the Northeast represent tribal affiliations and exert influence over the areas they dominate and from which they receive their support. Over a period of time, income through taxes from their respective areas has expanded to the control over government contracts, affiliations with political entities, control over smuggling routes and day-to-day business activities. Now that the ‘K’ faction has carried out an ambush in an area where the PLA is powerful and where the NSCN (IM) has support, internecine warfare amongst them for influence could perhaps lead to greater instability in the region, further adding to security concerns. The NSCN (K) did not traditionally have an influence in the Chandel district of Manipur. The ambush indicates its desire to join forces with Meitei terrorist groups to have a greater say in the regional balance of power, especially in relation to the NSCN (IM). The growing capacity of militant groups, their ability to unite and forge a unified entity for operations, and the availability of safe havens in neighbouring Myanmar presage a worsening of the security situation and the need for appropriate response mechanisms.

While the NSCN (K), has shown its ability to spring an ambush with precision, the larger failure on the part of the security forces does not rest on the shoulders of the unit, but on the state police forces and the intelligence agencies. The RPG is a sophisticated tool of war and Indian agencies should have been tracking the movement of such weapons from their supply sources to India. The militants also used incendiary devices for the first time, which resulted in the vehicles catching fire. How and when they got access to such sophisticated munitions should have been known to the intelligence agencies. Within Manipur, it is evident that the intelligence units of the state were taken by surprise. Launching an operation of this nature would have required a great deal of intelligence and ground reconnaissance. The movement of a large body of militants too would have attracted some level of attention, which did not come to the notice of the state police forces. Evidently, ground level intelligence remains weak and is a cause for concern.

The army too needs to enhance its intelligence gathering capability in the Northeast through enhancing  electronic surveillance capability, improving language skills and laying emphasis on Humint. With the availability of sophisticated weaponry and communication devices with the militant groups, we could be looking at attacks from stand off ranges, to permit easier getaway by the militants as an antidote to future swift and firm responses as given by 6 Dogra. Finally, better intelligence sharing and analysis of available inputs could give the security forces the edge in countering militancy. A firm response across the border has already conveyed a message to all militant groups that they have no place to hide. But along with a firm military response, political initiatives too must proceed hand in hand to bring lasting peace to the region.

Published in the June July 2015 issue of SALUTE Magazine. 

COMBATTING LEFT WING EXTREMISM: NEED FOR A REALISTIC APPROACH

Introduction

The use of the term Naxalism has become synonymous with that of Maoist activities in India. All such activities are branded as Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The Maoist movement calls for a complete transformation of the political, social and economic system as existing in India. In its essence, it challenges the validity of the Indian Constitution and rejects the parliamentary system, seeking to replace it with a new social order. It draws its strength from existing weaknesses in society where certain vulnerable sections have been marginalised and exploited and thus can be penetrated and swayed by Maoist ideologues, who promise the people a fulfilment of their aspirations and a life of dignity and self respect. 

The Naxal movement has a relationship to communism. Karl Marx propounded that in order to fight feudalism and capitalism, “you must have a scientific philosophy and a sound theory, for a workers movement to be built up on a scientific basis”. In dealing with the problem of social change, Marx examined two concepts, the first dealing with the “Forces of production” and the second with the “Relations of production”. He was more interested in examining the military concepts of the social revolutionaries, which earlier lay in the domain of great political leaders, legislators and pioneering reformers. According to Marx, the social process would lead to revolution at a certain stage of development and the material productive forces of society would come in conflict with the existing relation of production. He emphasised that change could be brought out only by revolution and not by peaceful means. The Naxal ideology flows from this line of thought.

Lenin raised the Marxist revolutionary doctrine to a higher level while applying it to Russian conditions. He stressed the need for clarity as to the historical conditions that gave rise to war, the classes waging it and the ends to be achieved. In his work, “Socialism and War” Lenis went on to justify civil wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor class, by serfs against landowners and wage owners against bourgeoise as legitimate, progressive and necessary. Mao Ze Dong modified the theories of Marx and Lenin and adapted them to the conditions as existing in China. He found the Marxist theory of revolution being led by the industrial proletariat to be unsuited to Chinese conditions and used peasants as the major force to achieve the political objective. He also propounded the ‘United Front Theory’, observing that there was inevitable weakness in the efforts to make revolution, relying on the workers alone. It was necessary to also rally all possible revolutionary classes and strata in forming a revolutionary united front. To Mao, ‘unite’ meant forming a united front with the bourgeoise, while ‘struggle’ meant peaceful struggle without bloodshed with the bourgeoise, on matters of ideology, politics and organisation. This would turn to armed struggle when the time came to split with the bourgeoise. Such armed struggle was to be waged through guerrilla warfare. Such warfare required political military leadership and would pass through three phases, namely the Passive or Preparatory stage, the Strategic Defensive or Retreat and the Counter Offensive. The Indian Naxal movement draws its sustenance from Maoist thought. This understanding is essential if LWE is to be eradicated in India.

The Naxals

The Naxal movement was essentially an agrarian movement, which, post independence had influence in parts of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and certain other parts of the country. It lost its agrarian character after a clash between peasants agitating for land rights clashed with the police in a village called Bengai Jote in the Naxalbari Block of Siliguri district in West Bengal on 25 May 1967. Nine adults and two children were killed in police firing, subsequent to which the movement lost its agrarian character and became a militant movement. As per one of the local leaders of that time, ‘There is no peaceful way to establishing rights for the poor. The gun is where the answer lies’.  

Today, we have a number of Maoist groups, spread over the Eastern half of the Indian land mass, operating in parts of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Telangana and a couple of districts each in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The most prominent of these is the CPI (Maoist), formed in 2004 with the merger of two groups, the MCCI (Maoist Communist Centre of India) and PW (People’s War). The new organisation's ideological-political orientation is fully dominated by the MCC brand of Maoism.   

The social base of the movement varies in different states. At some places it comprises peasants with small or nil landholdings and to lesser extent middle peasants. At others, it consists of tribals. At still others it is an amalgamation of the above along with other marginalised sections of society. In caste terms, the base of the movement consists of lower and intermediate castes. This applies to the Hindu as well as Muslim communities. The leadership of the movement is largely from the upper castes and classes and to a large extent is Andhra Pradesh centric.  

To most of the common people who form part of the movement, the term Naxalite has come to represent a movement or struggle for basic rights. The testimonies convey an anti-system sentiment and suggest that the Naxalites have a fair idea of the important components of their struggle for basic rights as well as knowledge of their opponents - the government machinery, landlords, upper classes, big business houses and the like. In their self-identity, therefore, the Naxalites clearly see themselves as individuals who have chosen a path which clashes with the existing order. In their view, their struggle for basic rights has met with fierce opposition and condemnation which has turned their ‘right’ into a ‘wrong’ in the eyes of a large part of the world. They generally disassociate themselves from the wrongs that are commonly attributed to the movement to the extent that they may distance themselves from the term itself. They define who they are by who they are not and in so doing affirm the positive values of the Naxalite movement. 

At the lower levels, the ideological factor of Maoism is clearly missing. The migration of Telugu speaking people in the areas near the Godavari has also continued unabated and they have done in Bastar Division what they have done in Adilabad, Warangal, Khammam and East Godavari. They have swamped the tribal population, exploited them mercilessly and have reduced them to penury and second class citizenship in their ancient lands. And quite ironically it is from these that the nucleus of the Naxalite leadership has emerged. Though the Naxal movement is now almost entirely centred in the Adivasi homelands, one cannot but notice a disconnect between what the tribals seek and what the Naxalites provide. 

Few Adivasis have heard of Mao Zedong or care for what he stood for and did. The Naxalites on the other hand deify him. To them, China’s Chairman is ‘their Chairman’. Today, the entire greater homeland of the Koitur Gonds in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh is under the thrall of the Telugu speaking Naxalite leadership, which now has an increasingly symbiotic relationship with rapacious forest and Public Works department (PWD) contractors, and corrupt officialdom. 

An understanding of the ideological content of the Maoist movement as well as the social base of its core constituents must therefore be an essential first step if LWE is to eradicated form India. A lack of such understanding is perhaps a primary cause for its continuance, despite brave proclamations made periodically, by political leaders and defence and social analysts that LWE is declining. Neutralising the foot soldiers in ground offensives is but a palliative. Like a bad penny, the movement will spring up again, and will continue to do so till the ideological and social characteristics of the movement are understood and addressed. A three pronged approach is essential to achieve success. This would involve firstly, winning the ideological battle; secondly, breaking Maoist linkages and fronts and lastly, neutralising their military base. All actions would have to proceed concurrently.

The Battle for Ideology 

This is perhaps the least understood aspect by those responsible to halt and eliminate LWE from the country. In its essence, the battle is ideological. The tools used by Maoists may manifest in public mobilisation and violence but the central aim remains imposing a particular social order for governance. The Maoist movement is thus an antithesis to the nation’s democracy and its Constitution. The Maoists do not aim to split India but to change its nature of government through force, in accordance with Maoist philosophy that ‘power flows through the barrel of the gun’. That fundamental will not change. Those who continually call for and propagate the idea that the Maoist leadership can be brought in to the ambit of the democratic process are not cognisant of Maoist ideology and  thought. Talks with the Maoist leadership will not yield results, precisely for this reason. The Maoists may abjure violence for a short period of time in places of their choosing but that process is temporary and will be used more often than not to achieve short term tactical advantage in terms of regrouping their forces after a debacle or as part of a larger strategic design. 

For any worthwhile gains to be made, the ideological content of the movement has to be defeated. As an idea, the movement can only be defeated if it is supplanted by another idea and that idea perforce has to be the idea of Indian Democracy. But for that to happen, Indian democracy must be seen as a superior alternative, which means that democratic structures must work in delivering social good to society. This would encompass the entire gamut of deliverables such as creating forums where the voice of the people is heard, having effective justice delivery mechanisms, providing socio economic opportunities to the affected masses and providing basic facilities in terms of drinking water, roads, power supply, education, sanitation and health. All of these fall under the banner of ‘good governance’ and are common to all parts of the country, but assume greater relevance in areas affected by LWE. 

Political penetration is perhaps the best antidote to LWE. Wherever political parties hold sway, the voice of the people is heard and people have a forum to state their needs and vent their grievances. This space gets filled by Maoist activity when the state abjures its responsibility in the less populated and remote areas of the country. A decline in LWE in West Bengal can be attributed to political penetration of affected areas. People generally prefer choosing among a set of alternatives in the democratic system, as against the totalitarianism of the Maoists. Hence the democratic path offers a construct which is preferable to what Maoist ideologues offer. Off course, political parties would have to deliver, else they will be thrown out of power. Society is becoming increasingly aspirational, which places increasing responsibility on the state administration to deliver. In conditions where  political parties cease to perform or have limited reach, the area becomes fertile hunting ground for Maoists.

This highlights the importance of good governance. Justice delivery mechanisms and a sensitised administration and police force are perhaps the most potent weapons in the fight against LWE. Both the judiciary and the political leadership have to look closely into these aspects as part of a concerted effort at conflict resolution. However, it is not development alone that will deliver tangibles but attitudes and perceptions. An elderly villager, when asked by a visiting Deputy Commissioners in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, about what differentiated the Naxals from the government servants, gave a caustic reply. “We do not see much difference”, he said. “When your forest guards and police constables come here, they take our poultry and eye our women. The Naxals do likewise”. This is where the primary change is needed.

On the development front, there appears to be a lack of clarity on the long term strategy being adopted to tackle LWE. Interaction at the ground level brings home the truth that a long term vision for development is lacking and concerned officials are barely looking even one month ahead in terms of goal realisation. There is a need for a vision statement, both at the level of the Centre and the state, spelling out goals to be achieved. This must then be translated into a time bound long term perspective plan. The requirements must initially flow from the districts encompassing a period of 5 to 10 years. The plan should then be coordinated at the state level and issued as a directive to the districts. This directive must be unique to each district and must state the benefit that will accrue to the local population. The directive should encompass what is proposed to be achieved, the cost to be incurred, the resources that would be made available the time lines for completion. Unless such focus is brought in, the development effort will remain a mirage and the ideological battle will be far from being won.

The Linkages

Mao appreciated the necessity of forming united fronts to achieve the goal of revolution, believing rightly that the peasants by themselves would not be able to do so. The CPI (Maoist) document, titled ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution’, bases its core ideology on Mao’s teachings. It seeks to ‘creatively apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions prevailing in India’. The political strategy aims to… ‘develop progressive forces, win over fence sitters and isolate staunch opponents’, in order to defeat the state. This understanding is vital as it brings into focus, the role of various organisations in India which the Maoists use for their own purposes. By aligning themselves with such forces, through direct or indirect support, they propagate and strengthen their cause and give it further legitimacy.

The fronts alluded to comprise four classes; the proletariat, peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoise, and national bourgeoise. These can be broken down into Tactical United Front (TUF) and Strategic United Front (SUF). The former is formed with organisations that are opposed to the state for one reason or the other. A good example of this category is the People’s Democratic Front of India (PDFI), which was formed in July 2006 through the efforts of a Maoist front organisation known as ‘Revolutionary Democratic Front’ (RDF). The PDFI has amongst its members eminent personalities such as Medha Patkar, Nandita Haksar and SAR Geelani. Some of the organisations which form part of the PDFI are the Samyukta Sangram Committee (West Bengal), Indian Federation of Trade Unions, All India Federation of Trade Unions, Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, Daman Virodhi Manch (Orissa), Jharkhand Progressive Students Union –– an affiliate of the All India Radical Students Federation (AIRSF), etc. The emphasis in alignment is with educational establishments, NGOs and other establishments which could be used by the Maoists to further their cause. Here, the Party seeks to take advantage of the conflicts and contradictions within the ruling class, to achieve control over our vast resources and markets. They make use of each and every activist, many of whom may not even be aware that they are part of the broader plan of Maoists to sabotage the state. The aim is to create mass struggle through propaganda, agitation and action. Thus, Maoist involvement comes to the fore in the activities of student groups in the Jawahar Lal Nehru University, in the activities of environmentalists like Medha Patkar and even in civil movements such as the anti corruption campaign launched by Anna Hazare. The counter to such activities lies in an effective intelligence network and in formulating a counter perception management strategy, to give the target audience an alternate narrative. The SUF consists exclusively of Maoist mass organisations that are underground and operate in the base area/struggle area. The combined strength of these organisations is synergised to serve the cause of the revolution. They would need to be penetrated by own intelligence agencies.

In addition to the above, the Maoists have developed linkages with a number of foreign and Indian terrorist  and insurgent groups. These include Maoists of Nepal, militant groups operating in the northeast India, anti-Indian actors – state and non-state – based in Pakistan, and umbrella organisations at regional and global levels like Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), Friends of Indian Revolution (FOIR), International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organisations (ICMLPO) and International Communist Movement (ICM). These linkages are not only increasing in depth and quality, but also turning deadly. The counter strategy here is once again on neutralising threats though an effective intelligence apparatus.

Security Force Operations

This is the third triad in operations against LWE. While ideological, governance, intelligence and perception management issues play a pivotal role in addressing Maoist violence, no realistic solution can come about till such time as the military power of Maoist groups is neutralised. The most powerful of the militant groups, the CPI (Maoist) has in its Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), about 9000 to 12,000 hard core cadres, grouped into military companies, platoons, and special squads. Military companies, platoons, and even special guerrilla squads are equipped with AK 47/56 rifles, INSAS Rifles, LMGs, and mortars. 

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is the lead security agency, tasked to defang the PLGA and other military groups of the Maoists. A broad survey of security forces operation over the last decade throws up disturbing trends which are yet to be   addressed. The most disturbing aspect of SF operations is the abnormally  high rate of casualties suffered by the CRPF and local police forces in encounters with the Maoists. Statistical data from the South Asian Terrorism Portal reveals that for the five year period 2010-2014, the police force lost one man for each terrorist killed. This bespeaks of a very heavy rate of attrition on security forces which impacts negatively on their morale and will to confront the Maoists. But an analysis of encounters indicates an even more worrisome fact. In one on one encounters with the Maoists, the police forces have been bested most of the times. In many cases, when the police forces were ambushed, they did not return the fire, which enabled the Maoists to remove the weapons and equipment of the fallen policemen. This denotes tremendous weakness in leadership and training of the forces deployed in combating the Maoists in India’s heartland. 

Reports suggesting that the police forces suffered because they were out gunned by the Naxals lack credibility and are not substantiated by facts. After every major encounter, in which the police forces have suffered grievous loss, there is a renewed clamour for better weapons and equipment, improved protection gear and use of advanced technology for identifying and neutralising the Maoist cadre. This is for the most part uncalled for. Let us consider some of the demands made after each successful strike by the Maoists.

The issue of mine protected vehicles continues to crop up whenever a vehicle is blasted by an improvised explosive device. The use of such vehicles is however self defeating. Put simply, each vehicle can withstand a certain quantum of explosives. It is but a simple matter for the Maoists to increase the quantum of explosives in the improvised explosive devices (IED) they bury in the ground, to defeat at nominal cost nay such equipment that is bought. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE exploded an IED under an ICV (infantry combat vehicle), the explosion sending 30 tons of metal over 50 feet in the air. Vehicles with armour protection are useful against small arms but offer little protection against IEDs. Their use in combating the Maoists serves little purpose. When used, they become obvious targets and could be likened to metal coffins.

Another factor which repeatedly crops up is the demand for drones in seeking out and destroying the terrorists. After a Naxal attack in March 2014 in Chhattisgarh in which 15 policemen were killed, a leading national daily raised a rhetorical question on why the 200 million dollars worth of Israeli drones were not being used to track the movement of Naxals. This underlies a basic misunderstanding of the employment of drones. The Heron UAV in use in the services is useful to gain information in conventional operations. To combat LWE, it would be practically impossible to keep the entire length and breadth of the areas affected by LWE under constant surveillance. The UAVs required for total area coverage as well as the support infrastructure required would be colossal. Even so, the utility would remain doubtful. In the type of terrain that exits, there are obvious challenges to detection of small bands of lightly armed men and women using drone. Even if they were detected, the time required to process the information and pass it down to the local police for taking action is so large that the Maoists would have long left the scene by then. Medium Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) UAVs of the Heron class are this inherently unsuitable as a tool for tactical level operations against Naxals. Micro UAVs in the hands of operating troops would be more useful in such environments and that is where emphasis must be laid. The police forces need to be empowered at the tactical level. Better observation and communication devices and navigation tools with the operating forces would achieve far better results than upper end equipment more suited for conventional operations.

It needs reiteration that while technology is an enabler, the battle against the PLGA can only be won by police forces which are well led and well trained. This remains the Achilles heel of our operations. The leadership, drawn from police officers remains well below par for operations in the jungles. The training standards too remain a cause of concern. Unless these concerns are rectified, the PLGA will continue to get the better of our forces.

Conclusion

India cannot achieve its rightful place in the sun if a major portion of its land mass remains affected by extremist violence. The political leadership as well as the state administration tasked with addressing security concerns arising out of extremist violence needs to develop a holistic understanding of the Maoist philosophy, and then take steps to insulate the masses from the Maoists. Governance challenges need to be addressed through a time bound long term action plan, which should be monitored at the highest level in each state. Maoist linkages and fronts need to be broken through a concerted intelligence action plan. Finally, the police forces need to get their act together and provide the requisite training and leadership to our forces deployed in combatting LWE. Only through such an integrated model can we hope to overcome the challenges that face us. 

Published in CLAWS Journal - Summer 2015. For footnotes, refer to the CLAWS Journal. 

Required: A Different Paradigm for Operations for J&K

Elections have been held successfully in the state of J&K yet again, which indicates a yearning for peace among the residents of the state. The security climate has shown a marked improvement, with lower violence levels and a decrease in fatalities. On an equally positive note, the attrition suffered by terrorists remains high, and averages four terrorists killed to one Security Force (SF) personnel killed in action (KIA) for the period 2008 to 2012 and two terrorist killed for each SF KIA for the period 2013-2014. The actions taken by the SF to prevent infiltration appear to be successful, with reports suggesting that terrorists have not been able to make up the losses suffered by them, through infiltration from across the border. As per the IG Police (Kashmir), Mr Abdul Ghani Mir, only residual militancy prevails, and the major component of militants operating in the state are foreigners, with only a handful of local militants working with them. This has been done despite the fact that the terror infrastructure across the border remains intact and there is no let up on the part of the Pakistani state in trying to push terrorists through into India.

Politically, the situation holds great promise. While the three divisions of the state have voted differently, each has given a distinct mandate to the party of its choice. While this has thrown up a coalition government, whose two major constituents have ideological differences, this by itself may not be a negative attribute. On the contrary, compulsions of coalition politics, may help help to stabilise the state rather then splinter it further on regional fault lines. In the changed political and security environment, the terrorists would in all likelihood look into a change in strategy, through which a wedge could be created between the security forces and the public. Anti terrorist operations would perforce have to be handled with a higher degree of sensitivity to avoid collateral damage and this throws up a fresh set of challenges.

The death of two boys who were fired upon by troops when they refused to stop at a mobile vehicle check post, in Nowgam on 3 November 2014, saw widespread protests in the Valley. In a bid to douse public anger, the senior military leadership in the state apologised for the death of the two boys and started an inquiry into the incident. This however, was not viewed favourably by many in the army, who felt that the troops were only doing their duty. The first challenge then, is handling sensitive issues with a greater degree of finesse. The Nowgam incident had its repercussions on the next attack by militants on an administrative base of 31 Field Regiment in Baramula District on 5 December. In this attack, an officer and seven men were killed in action, prompting many comments in the social media, mostly ill informed. The Army reacted swiftly, killing all the militants, but a popular though fallacious story that went viral stated that the attack was made possible because the sentry did not stop the terrorist vehicle, for fear of action being taken against him. This was patently false, as the terrorists did not come in vehicles but sneaked through into the area on foot, taking advantage of the broken ground and the darkness, but it highlighted the impact which social media can have on the morale of troops operating in J&K. This is another challenge that would need to be addressed.

The tragic loss of Col MN Rai, the CO of 42 Rashtriya Rifles who was KIA, while offering a couple of terrorist holed up in a house, in a village about 30 km from Srinagar an opportunity to surrender., points to yet another challenge for the Army. The action by Col Rai exemplifies the front line leadership which has been the hallmark of the Army, but it underlines yet another danger. In an effort to avoid collateral damage, there will be a tendency among senior officers to personally supervise operations which in the context of the present situation in J&K is not desirable. This aspect would need to be addressed. While all loss of life must be prevented, the loss of senior officers must be prevented at all costs as success by terrorists to target the Army leadership, is a strong motivator for terrorists of all hues. 

What the Army needs is a revised strategy to move with the times. Terrorist propaganda as well as the efforts of some elements in civil society who remain ignorant of the real issues involved will continue to target AFSPA, which is simply an enabling law allowing the Army to operate in areas affected by militancy and terrorism. This has to be effectively countered through a focussed awareness campaign. It would be a good idea to select unit and formation commanders for posting to such areas, based on their known track record. It would be beneficial if such commanders were formally sensitised to the challenges of operating in the state before being posted in. Other initiatives could be cultivating local language skills by unit personnel, to enable better outreach. Instead of formal language training in military establishments, this could be done by making provisions at the unit level for hiring a local teacher for the purpose. Success needs to be measured on the basis of a units capability in restoring normalcy in an area, rather than on statistical evidence of terrorists neutralised. Such small steps could make a huge difference in strengthening the bonds between the public and their Army. At the national level, there is a need for a concerted and well directed perception management campaign to wean the public away from conflict. This needs to be conducted in concert with a focused economic development plan that can create jobs in the private sector. 

In the age of the electronic media, it is also important to send the right signals to the public at home and abroad. Presently, from the local police to the Central Armed Police Forces like the BSF and CRPF, all personnel are dressed in combat uniform, akin to the Army. This gives an impression of a militarised state. A change could perhaps be affected by giving the local police a distinct uniform and restricting the use of combat uniform exclusively for the Army. This would give the correct perspective of the local police handling security in the state, increase confidence levels of the local people in their own police forces and give a sense of pride and belonging to the police personnel. Likewise, the CAPF, must also don the khaki only, and not the combat dress worn by the Army. Only then can the reality of reduced Army presence in populated areas be also perceived to be so.    

J&K: SHAPING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Perception Management is increasingly being viewed as an essential tool to win the battles we are currently engaged in or are likely to face in the future. While shaping the information environment is not a substitute for hard power, its absence can diminish the result of hard fought success or amplify the impact of failure.   

Perceptions can be shaped through an understanding of the viewpoint of all stake holders involved. Today, the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun;  much bigger payoffs can be achieved by ‘getting others to want what you want’.  That is the essence of a successful perception management campaign. 

In counter insurgency or counter terrorism operations, a key component of perception management is the requirement to reach out to the hearts and minds of those people who directly or indirectly support the terrorist or who are simply sympathetic to the ‘cause’. At the strategic level, this would involve addressing causative factors through political, social and economic tools. Without this effort, a network can actually be defeated military, but still maintain support for the ‘cause’ whilst in a period of hibernation. At the operational level, activities which foment divisions within a terrorist network, undermine the morale of its members (particularly those on the fringe), and drive a wedge between the network and its support base will pay dividends. While direct action (military, law enforcement, intelligence, political, economic activities) will assist in this effort in the short term, long-term success will only come about when such support is withheld willingly because the people providing it have been convinced that it is no longer in their best interests to do so. 

With this as a backdrop, what should we do in the state of J&K? The situation has multiple complexities, especially when viewed in the context of identity, statehood and rights. Within J&K, perceptions vary in each of the three divisions of the state, the administration, the security forces and the political parties. An understanding of each viewpoint is essential to form a coherent and effective perception management campaign.

Objectives

While military force will remain an instrument to put pressure on the insurgent groups, the need to change mindsets is becoming increasingly relevant for conflict resolution. The end objective of a perception management plan would have to be considered at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, Perception Management operations would entail creating a belief in Indian democracy, promoting religious harmony and the idea of ‘Kashmiriyat’ and preventing the Islamisation of society. This would have to be dealt with by the Centre and the state government. Actions at the operational and tactical level would involve isolating the insurgents from the population support base, neutralising the support which social and other organisations give to the insurgents,  educating the public on the need for laws such as AFSPA and creating a bond between the Indian Army and the local populace. It is important at this stage to understand what perceptions currently exist in the state and then look at measures to affect a change in the same.

Perceptions of Stakeholders

In the Valley, a small group of hardline Kashmiri activists remain vocal in their dual demand of removing the Army from Kashmir and having a plebiscite to decide their future. In this, they echo the line propagated by Pakistan but are silent on the status of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Many people in the Valley view the Army as being overly aggressive when moving around in public areas. They feel that the soldiers on the ground (as defined separately from the officers) operate from a position of permanent suspicion when it comes to dealing with locals and this reflects in their public dealing. It appears that ground troops who come in contact with the civilian population apparently lack communication and inter-personal skills and this facet militates against improving relations with the public. There is also a widespread belief that cases of human rights abuses from 1990 till date have not been addressed by the Army or the government. There is also a sense that troops do not exhibit adequate sensitivity while dealing with the citizens, especially women, children and the aged, when carrying out search operations or other activities. The humiliation felt by the common citizen when Army personnel or police personnel barge into their homes and ask for their identity cards is quite marked and enhances feelings of alienation. In the context of identity, this feeds the ‘we’ and ‘them’ syndrome. Many people are of the view that the problem with the Indian Army is a lack of a sense of belonging and viewing the Kashmiris as not being part of the country. As attitudes get hardened on both sides, the population too starts looking on the Army as ‘foreigners’, thus, contributing to the cycle of mistrust between the two. Many also feel that Army personnel from South India look upon Kashmir as a foreign country and question the need for their being deployed there. Some are of the view that the problem calls for a political solution and unless the same is found, the question of the presence of the Army becoming acceptable in Kashmir and in the Kashmiri speaking areas of the state does not arise.

The military, however, is also perceived by many in the Valley as defending Kashmir from external powers and as being successful in reducing cross-border infiltration. Opinions, however, vary from place to place and with different interest groups. Unlike in the early 1990s, the presence of the Army now receives support, primarily due to initiatives taken by its leadership over the last few years. Other factors include declining militancy, a yearning for peace, positive impact of Sadbhavana projects and the Army’s role in providing assistance in times of calamities. Many people now speak of “an evident change in the attitude of Army soldiers everywhere in the area”. 

The people from Jammu and Ladakh Divisions have vast differences in perception with their brethren in Kashmir. There are no separatist tendencies but intra-state conflicts of interest exist which require political resolution. Most are related to economic and development issues; the people here feel that the bulk of development funds go to the Kashmir region at their expense. 

Within the government, there is a feeling that Army actions undermine the authority of the civil administration. There is a feeling that the Army needs to be sensitised to the culture and mental landscape of the people who live there. There is also a feeling that CI/CT operations should increasingly be conducted by the CAPf and that the Army should be on the border only and should not administer or be seen to administer civilian areas. There is also a perception that hardline Muslim leaders in Kashmir are trying to ‘Islamise’ the state, and they view the Army’s role as necessary to maintain stability and fight against religious extremism. They consider the problem in Kashmir as having nothing to do with ‘Azadi’ but being essentially a movement towards rapid Islamisation of the state, killing in the process every semblance of ‘Kashmiriyat’. That the state has remained with India and still maintains a secular character is mainly because of the Army which should be facilitated to a greater extent in performing its duties in Kashmir. 

Army personnel generally have a very high sense of ‘self-image’ and of working for the ‘country’. They believe that barring some aberrations, most personnel are conscious of their constitutional responsibilities while combating terrorism and insurgency and take care to see that the human rights of the local people are respected. Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) is viewed positively as a factor which is essential for conflict resolution. The contemporary situation is encouraging and all stakeholders must provide the healing touch and commitment to vastly improve matters. While the Army perceives that it has achieved the military objective of constraining the militancy, it is less sanguine about the political processes, which it feels have not capitalised on the military’s success or kept pace with it. 

Perceptions on Image Makeover 

It is apparent that a need exists for an image makeover, as far as the Armed Forces in J&K is concerned. It is important to always bear in mind the fact that when the Army is acting in Kashmir, it is not only perceived as the Army, but the ‘Indian Army’. All actions involving interactions with people are ascribed to India/Centre/Union and hence impact on the overall situation of the state. They must therefore be carefully conducted. What then must the State and the Army do, to have an image makeover? Ten points are given below, which if implemented could have a positive impact.

Firstly, the Army needs to be sensitive to, and understand the cultural and sociological aspects of the people they are tasked to protect. This will give the requisite human touch and improve relations considerably. Train of its soldiers on communication and inter-personal skills, especially those who come in contact with the public will go a long way in improving the Army’s image. . 

As the situation of the early nineties no longer exists, a reduced Army footprint would go a long way in improving relations and reducing hostility. Allied with this is the need to retain a separate identity. As of now, it is difficult to distinguish Army jawans from central armed police forces personnel, as they are dressed alike. The police forces must not wear military uniforms as it gives a wrong impression to the public. 

Thirdly, justice, against abuse of powers must not only be done but seen to be done to restore public confidence in the Army. Swift action must be taken against erring personnel and the same must be well publicised. The Army, as is well known, is swift in punishing defaulters, but for some reasons, its actions are not publicised. This must change as perceived injustice inflames the people and enables political forces to manipulate the youth, thus, fuelling the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

Fourthly, it is absolutely necessary to have good relations with the state bureaucracy. It will be useful to engage with the new ‘panches' and ‘sarpanches’, care being to see that such action is  not perceived as obtrusive by the civil administration. The bonhomie in civil-military relations, thus, visible, will go a long way in building a positive image. 

Sadbhavana has created goodwill for the Army, but has limited utility. In the words of the former  Chief Minister of J&K, Mr. Omar Abdullah,  “A lot of goodwill and rapport depends upon the actions of the local commanding officers and troops on the ground. Sadbhavana is a good project, but you put a good CO on the ground without Sadbhavana and he’ll show better results”. The importance of selecting the right COs for posting in such areas hence cannot be overstated. 

Sixthly, the Army needs to develop structures for peace building and be empathetic to the problems of a society brutalised by violence between the state and non-state actors. Gender sensitivity, with special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence will go a long way in nurturing confidence and trust in the local population.

Seventhly, the Army must learn to use the media as a force multiplier. It is important to not only speak the truth, but to be the first with the news so that a distorted picture does not emerge. It must be understood that perceptions once created are difficult to remove. First impressions are generally the ones which remain in the public consciousness and this fact must be understood. The Army must shed its reluctance and fear of the media and must also accept that all news may not be favourable as we have a free and robust media.

The state government needs to alter its approach to security and change the design of the stability system. It could look into ‘Stability units’ to build coherence between disparate elements of governance and public security, which could have both mediating and enabling qualities to link the public with governance. This inter alia could include security and public safety needs, delivery of socio-economic programmes and enabling public access to the justice system as well as security apparatus. 

Next, the civil administration in the state has to be strengthened. Once a civil administration which is accountable is in place, the Army’s role will reduce and this will pay political and peace dividends. The weakness in the delivery system is glaring and must be overcome. Lastly, the alienation dilemma must be solved. This could be done by establishing and institutionalising the dialogue process with civil society. As insurgency is now in remission, perhaps mediation groups could be established at the brigade level to inform communities on the role of the Army and its legal accountability procedures. This could also serve as a point for interaction to redress civilian grievances. Institutionalised dialogue among the state, the military, the public and conflict transformation experts in the public domain would be an important step in improving the image of the Army.

Prerequisites for a Perception Management Campaign

The role of the Army must remain confined to operational and tactical aspects only which will assist the Army in its operations against the insurgents. The image makeover of the Army should pertain to the force being perceived as the people’s Army – an Army which the local people can look up to.

Themes must be prepared and executed at the corps level and the end state required to be achieved for each target segment must be clearly enunciated. Themes would be different for the three divisions of J&K. Even within Kashmir, themes would have to target segments and not be uniform for all. Dissemination must be done through multiple means and must be continuous. It must be based on truth. Under no circumstances can anything be done which will hit at the credibility of the Army.

Capabilities too have to be real otherwise the projection of deterrence will not succeed. The strategic narrative must not be lost sight of while formulating a perception management campaign. The strategic narrative is focused on end term goal realisations while operational and tactical level narratives are more focused towards the immediacy of the conflict situation. While the tactical and operational level narratives are important, they must not run counter to the long term aims of the country. In future conflict, perception management will play an increasingly important role. The concept must hence be understood and should be coopted into all military plans.