NAVARATRI

Commentary by Sri Swami Krishnananda

Navaratri is one of the great Hindu festivals. As the name implies, this festival is celebrated for nine days in which God is adored as Mother. A period of introspection and purification, Navaratri is traditionally an auspicious time for starting new ventures. During this period, Durga, Lakshmi and Saraswati are worshipped as three different manifestations of Shakti or Cosmic energy.

 The festival of Navaratri has a very deep spiritual significance. It represents the march of the human soul from bondage to eternal liberation. The march of the soul is dramatic, a beautiful, sonorous, musical advent and is described in Hindu Scriptures in ‘The Devi-Mahatmya’, in majestic Sanskrit prose. The realisation of this freedom is the dramatic aspect of the great worship of the Divine Mother during the nine days of Navaratri, culminating on the tenth day in Dassehra, which depicts the victory of good over evil.

The march of the human soul to liberation as described in the Devi-Mahatmya takes place in three stages of three days each. In the first stage, Adi-Sakti awakes Maha-Vishnu who was asleep, so that he may destroy the original demoniac forces, Madhu and Kaitabha. In the second stage the same Sakti manifests Herself as Maha-Lakshmi and overcomes Mahishasura and Raktabija. In the last stage, Maha Saraswati destroys Sumbha and Nisumbha. The final victory is achieved on the tenth day and is celebrated as Vijaya-Dashmi. That is the day where one masters the forces of nature and achieves oneness with the Divine.

The first three days of Navaratri are devoted, in psychological terms, in overcoming desire, anger and greed. In the Devi-Mahatmya, the demons Madhu and Kaitabha represent greed, anger and desire, which have to be overcome. Both Madhu and Kaitabha emerged out of the dirt in the ear of Vishnu. These demons represent the lower powers of nature, which are seen as dirt, (Mala) hindering the march of the human soul to freedom. This dirt represents desire (Kama), Anger (Krodha) and Greed (Lobh). The significance of regarding them as dirt is that they cover the consciousness in such a way that it appears to be not there at all. Just as a thin glass covered with black tar cannot be seen, so also the soul cannot march to freedom till the consciousness is revealed. The first three days of Navaratri is hence devoted to worship of Goddess Durga to enable us to slay the demons Madhu and Kaitabha and enable the emergence of consciousness. In the Bhagavad-Gita, the Lord tells us (Chapter III, Verse 37) that it is desire and anger born of rajas, which is the foulest enemy on earth. The root cause of compulsive desire is the Nature-instigated delusive duo of desire and its corollary of anger, or frustrated desire. Desires are silken threads of material pleasures, which the spider of habit continuously spins around the soul to form the cocoon of ignorance. The soul must manage to cut through this stifling cocoon of ignorance to reemerge as the butterfly of omnipresence.

 Once the dirt is removed, the onward march of the soul has to overcome ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, the tossing of the mind. The next three days of Navaratri are devoted to worship in order to overcome ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, represented in the Devi-Mahatmya by the demons Mahishasura and Raktabija.

 The demon Mahishasura was an inexhaustible opponent as he had the ability to change his form. Sometimes he is an elephant, in an instant he has changed his form to a bull and then again to something else making it virtually impossible to subdue him. In a similar manner, the mind is difficult to subdue as every minute it changes its form and refuses to be still. When subdued in one form, it reemerges in another. The more we try to oppose ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, the greater will be its manifestation in some other form. This is much like the demon Raktabija whose every drop of blood could bring forth another demon like him. When the Blessed Goddess severed the head of Raktabija, each droplet of blood, which fell on the ground, created another demon and soon there were millions of demons, which had to be slain. As there was no end to this process, the Goddess invoked Maha-Kali, who spread her tongue across the world. Now, when the demons heads were severed, the blood fell on Kali’s tongue and thus all the demons were annihilated. In a similar manner, we have to adopt the technique of sucking out the very roots of desire and not merely chop of its branches. Otherwise, desires will take various forms like Mahishasura. Desire is not an outward form or an action. It is a tendency of the mind, an inclination of consciousness. This then is the nature of ‘Vikshepa Sakti’ the distraction tossing and turning of the mind, which is the second stage of opposition to overcome in the march of the soul to freedom.

 Ancient masters have told us that while ‘Karma Yoga’ can remove ‘Mala’ or dirt of the psychological structure by unselfish and dedicated service, Vikshepa or distraction of the mind can be removed only by worship of God, by ‘Upasana’. While Karma removes Mala, Upasana removes Vikshepa. After this we enter the third stage of the march of the soul to liberation, and here we encounter the greatest opposition of all, ‘Ajnana’ or ignorance. Ignorance is a subtler opposing power than either Mala or Vikshepa. The Devi-Mahatmya tells us that the three gunas, namely Tamas, Rajas and Sattva have to be subdued. While Mala represents Tamas, Vikshepa represents Rajas and Sattva represents the truth. We always praise Sattva and regard it as a very desirable thing. But it is still an obstacle, much akin to a transparent glass that is placed between us. We have to get through the glass to comprehend and touch the reality that lies beyond. While one can have a vision of reality, looking through the glass, its comprehension lies beyond our reach. It is hence an obstacle to be overcome which acts in a double form; as complacency or satisfaction with what has been achieved and an ignorance of what lies beyond. Too often does the seeker get deluded that the goal has been achieved. These two aspects of Sattva are indicated by the demons, Sumbha and Nisumbha. They have to be overcome by the power of higher wisdom, which is Maha-Saraswati.

Action, contemplation and knowledge are the three stages through which we have to pierce through the veil of Prakriti or the three gunas. The festival of Navratari thus celebrates the dance of the cosmic spirit, in its supernal effort at self-transcendence. Maha-Kali is invoked to destroy the demons Madhu and Kaitabha. The Blessings of Maha-Lakshmi are sought to overcome the demons Mahishasura and Raktabija. And finally Maha-Saraswati is invoked to rid us of the demons Sumbha and Nisumbha. Thus, transformation takes place across the whole range of Prakriti from Tamas to Rajas, from Rajas to Sattva and from Sattva to Supreme Vijaya, mastery in the Absolute, God realization.

All our scriptures, Puranas and Epics, all our ceremonies and celebrations, all our festivals thus have this spiritual connotation, a significance which is far transcendent to the outer rituals which is involved in their performance. Every thought, every aspiration, every ritual and every duty of ours, every action that we perform automatically becomes a spiritual dedication of the soul, for the sake of this one single aspiration which it has been enshrining in itself from eternity to eternity. It is always a song of the soul.

So through the worship of Maha-Kali, Maha-Lakshmi and Maha-Saraswati we worship Mula-Prakriti, Adi-Sakti in her cosmic dance-form of transformation, prosperity and illumination. Through the worship of Maha-Kali, a person breaks the barrier of Tamas and becomes a master and a progressive soul commanding all powers and getting everything that is desired. Through the Worship of Maha-Lakshmi, we break the barrier of Rajas and achieve enlightenment. And finally, through the worship of Maha-Saraswati we break the barrier of Sattva and achieve self-realisation. Thus the festival of Navaratri is in reality a presentation of the cosmic dance form to teach the path a soul must take to achieve total liberation. It shows the path from opposition to prosperity, from prosperity to enlightenment and from enlightenment to self-realisation, culminating in total victory, Vijaya Dashami on the tenth day of the festival.   

LESSONS FROM THE 1965 WAR

No war takes place in a vacuum. There are indicators strewn all over, but the rhetoric of peace sometimes blinds decision makers to the possibility of conflict. Such indeed was the case in 1965. The hyperbole that emanated from Pakistan in the early sixties was of such decibels that it should have set the alarm bells ringing in South Block. A cursory look at the content of their media - both radio and print should have caused India to sit up and take notice, but for some unfathomable reason, war with Pakistan was never considered as a serious possibility. That represents the first lesson of the 1965 war - both political and military. Pay heed to what the enemy is saying - and prepare accordingly. Today, when Pakistan talks of using nuclear weapons against India, it cannot be construed as bluff and bluster. The antidote must be readied now, to include signalling of resolve and intent, as much as development of capacity and capability.

Preparedness for war is a long drawn process. No nation is ever able to maintain a hundred percent readiness rate. But the capacity to reach that level within a set period of time must be aimed for. The early sixties were a period of rejuvenation for Pakistan. They were getting stronger economically through beneficial alliances with the West, which led to the flow of great economic and military assistance. India was reeling from the 1962 debacle and internally, its economy was poor, wheat was being imported from the US, and there were myriad agitations taking place in the country, from the language agitation in Tamil Nadu to insurgency in the Northeast, a restive Punjab, agitating for Punjabi Suba and increased dissonance in Jammu and Kashmir, for a variety of reasons. Geopolitically, Pakistan had all the major powers aligned with it, or at lease not overtly hostile to it. India, was not so fortunately placed. A perceived Indian weakness was the trigger which led to war. Which brings home the second lesson. A strong military is the best antidote to war. This again is a function of capacity, capability and will. Politically, the lessons were well learnt as India went in for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union, which enabled India to successfully pursue operations in East Pakistan in 1971, leading eventually to the birth of Bangladesh. But militarily, the lessons, though known, are far from being addressed. We still have a weak military industrial complex, the government run research institutes and defence production facilities continuously underperform, hollowness within the Services, especially in the Army and Air Force is high, and we are today, the worlds largest importers of defence equipment. This opens up the country to foreign pressures and forced compromises and is an aspect which need to be urgently addressed. While the present government is cognisant of and sensitive to the issues involved, and the Prime Minister no less, has embarked on an ambitious ‘Make in India’ campaign, the road ahead is long and arduous and will require dramatic changes in the functioning of the Ministry of Defence and other organs of the government of India.

A brief overview of the war makes it easy to compartmentalise it into various stages. Operations in Kutch, in April 1965, Operation Gibraltar, launched by Pakistan in August, Grand Slam launched by Pakistan on 1 September, and then the Indian counter offensives on night 5/6 September and 8 September, called Operations Riddle and Nepal respectively. And to complete the picture, a counter launched by Pakistan in Khem Karan - Operation Mailed Fist on 8 September.

India was unfortunately surprised at each stage. We were caught unaware at Kutch, which should have forced us to raise our guard. We did not do so and were surprised again in J&K when thousands of infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line (CFL) on 1 August, as part of Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar. To add salt to our festering wounds we were surprised yet again when Pakistan launched Grand Slam on 1 September in Chhamb. Divine providence and incompetence of the Pakistan military prevented the fall of Akhnur, which lay exposed and was open to capture that very day itself. We were surprised for the fourth time with the sudden appearance of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division in Kasur. This constituted serious drawbacks in our external intelligence collection methodology, which persist till date. The Army too, missed obvious signals and was repeatedly surprised. Serious lacunae still exist in our intelligence set up, as reflected by Kargil in mid 1999. While efforts are being to made towards this end, much more needs to be done towards integrating the efforts of various agencies and introducing at least some levels of accountability in the system. 

The operational and tactical level also threw up a host of lessons which have applicability today.

Foremost is the need to be mentally and physically prepared for war. In 1965, there was a feeling which existed throughout the field army, that there would be no war. Despite Kutch, despite Gibraltar, despite Grand Slam, units on the ground were not sure whether they would actually go to war or not. This constitutes a very serious failure of command, especially at the level of brigade and above. Ultimately, when units were pushed into battle, they were not mentally prepared for war. The imperatives for secrecy were such that troops which went into battle on the first day, on night 5/6 September, went in hopelessly unprepared, lacking briefing and a clear concept of what was expected of them. The enemy was certainly surprised, but the advantage was frittered away in a lack of direction - a result of commanders at division level and below, not being clear about their tasks or the end state objectives to be achieved. It however redounds to the credit of the units and formations that they still performed creditably, despite the limitations faced by them.

The 1965 war was fought in silos, with no worthwhile integration taking place in operational plans between the Army and the Air Force. It was apparent that both sides were fighting their own war, independent of each other, leading to a lack of synergy in operations. This proved to be costly and constitutes yet another important lesson of the 1965 war - the necessity to bring forth the total combat power of a country against an adversary. We are still far from achieving that goal, despite mouthing platitudes on such issues. The aspect of integrating the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ though a Chief of Defence Staff is repeatedly stressed, but action on that front remains slow due to a host of factors, not least being resistance within the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ themselves. This would require political will to pull through, much on the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, of the United States. 

Administratively, the field army was ill prepared for war. It seem surprising that units and formations went into battle, including the famous 1 Armoured Division, without adequate maps of the area. These were peace time issues which unfortunately were not addressed. It continues to be India’s Achilles heel even today as our experience of Operation Pawan and other out of area contingencies shows. The Survey of India comes under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and much greater integration is required in its functioning with the armed forces. The Armed Forces too, need to be more proactive in projecting their demands well in time.

It also seems surprising that troops went into battle in the plains without anti tank weapons. The 106 mm anti tank gun was made available to troops of 4 Infantry Division only on 7 September 1965. Why this was not done in the months leading up to the war indicates severe administrative lapses at senior levels of command. Communication equipment was also deficient/ unreliable, which seriously impacted the conduct of operations. A lot of these deficiencies stand rectified today, but it needs to be emphasised that communications at the ground level, need to be reliable and foolproof. Preparation for war takes place during peace time and commanders need to hone their administrative skills to avoid such lapses.

Finally, a word about leadership. At the tactical level, the leadership was commendable. That continues to be the state today. At the operational level, the leadership exhibited was weak and vacillating. Even today, the focus in the military is not so much on winning the war, as ensuring that we do not lose. A more offensive orientation in senior military leadership is required. In 1965, we missed many opportunities to exploit success. XI Corps operations could have exploited the success achieved in the opening stages of the offensive when Dograi was captured. There were other fleeting opportunities during the war which were not seized. The biggest failure in offensive operations was however the stalling of 1 Corps operations on 8 September. Boldness shown on that day could have led to the defeat of the Pakistan army, but the momentum was allowed to lapse due to faulty appreciation of ground realities. That opportunity was not to come again. Herein lies the challenge for the Armed Forces. While we continue to produce outstanding tactical commanders, very few come up to the level of acumen as displayed by Lt Gen. Sagat Singh in 1971. That needs to change.

Overall, the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces is something which the nation can be proud off. But  we would do well to remember, that going to war is a complete national effort. The wherewithal to fight long drawn out battles must come from within the country, which means that we have to concentrate on building capacities, capabilities and skills. These are long term efforts, but only through such proficiency will we be in a position to prosecute and win wars. Most importantly, the existence of military capability, remains the best antidote to war.

Published in SALUTE Magazine, Aug-Sep, 2015

An analysis of 1965 Indo-Pak War

A study of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan makes for interesting reading, but more importantly, even fifty years later, holds important lessons for the country. 

The war was brought on by Pakistan’s intransigence and failure to accept the fact that the accession of the state of J&K to India was final and could not be undone.  To keep the Kashmir issue alive in the international arena, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the Kashmir Publicity Committee in 1964. It was this committee that first mooted the proposal to President Khan, to send Pakistani army personnel, disguised as infiltrators into J&K, to create an uprising in the state, which would then be followed up by a quick offensive by the Pakistani army to capture the strategic township of Akhnur. President Khan and his army chief, General Musa, initially demurred, as they felt that such a move could lead to a full scale war with India. However, In April 1965, Ayub Khan gave the go ahead for these operations despite his army chief still having reservations on the subject. Consequently, in August 1965, about 8000 to 10,000 infiltrators crossed over into J&K to create a mass uprising in the state in an operation codenamed Gibraltar.

Though the Indian Army was initially taken by surprise, it reacted swiftly and with firmness and by the end of the month, most of the infiltrators were either killed or captured. The few that remained, were thoroughly demoralised and by mid-September had exfiltrated back to Pakistan. The operations conducted by 19 Infantry Division also resulted in the capture of the strategic Hajipir Pass on 28 August 1965, which gave India a direct link between Poonch and Uri. the capture of the Hajipir Pass also cut off the major ingress routes into J&K. While Gibraltar had been defeated, Pakistan continued with the second part of its plan, which envisaged the capture of Akhnur in an operation codenamed ‘Grand Slam’. 

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan carried out a surprise attack on Chhamb. At this time, the defences in Chhamb were held by 191 Infantry Brigade. The brigade had four battalions, two of which were deployed in the Kalidhar  ranges, one on the ceasefire line (CFL) in the plains sector and the fourth battalion around the Mandiala heights near Chhamb. Beyond Chhamb, upto Akhnur, there were no forces available to guard positions in depth. For this operation, Pakistan used two armoured regiments to spearheaded an attack launched by an infantry division and supported by the fire of over a 100 artillery guns. 

Despite the overwhelming superiority of the Pakistani forces, which outnumbered the Indians by more than six times, the defenders put up a staunch resistance. Though the lone battalion holding defences along the CFL was overrun, the depth defence held out and the Pakistanis could not cross the Munawar Wali Tawi that day. That night, Indian forces withdrew in good order to take up defences in Akhnur. On 2 September, Pakistan occupied Chhamb as the Indian forces had withdrawn the previous night. Here, they made the strategic blunder of waiting for two days before resuming the offensive. By that time, Indian troops had taken up defences in Jaurian and also in the Fatwal ridge, which prevented the enemy from capturing Akhnur. 

To relieve pressure on Akhnur, India launched operations against Pakistan across the International Border (IB) on 6 September. This forced the Pakistanis to pull back their forces in the Akhnur sector as Indian offensives threatened the Pakistani townships of Lahore and Sialkot. 

Indian offensive operations in the Lahore sector were carried out by XI Corps, on three axes, to threaten Lahore. These operations were launched on 6 September with mixed results. In the Khem Karan Sector, the attacks launched by 4 Infantry Division were beaten back by the Pakistanis, with heavy losses to own troops. On 8 September, Pakistan launched a counter attack with its 1 Armoured Division, with the avowed aim of capturing Amritsar and Delhi. In a heroic defence put up by the troops of 4 Indian Division, from 8 to 10 September 1965, in the fields astride the villages of Asal Uttar and Chima, more than a 100 Pakistani tanks were destroyed. This was a serious body blow to Pakistan which now had no capability left to carry out offensive operations. This was the place where CQMH Abdul Hamid was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for gallantry in operations, for single handedly destroying a large number of enemy Patton tanks, before he himself was killed by enemy tank fire.

The Indian offensive in the Sialkot sector started on 8 September, with an advance by India’s 1 Corps, but did not achieve much headway initially. Thereafter, it was resumed on 11 September and the township of Phillora was captured. This area saw some of the heaviest tank battles since World War 2, in which the enemy’s 6 Armoured Division suffered very heavy casualties. However, India could not capture the strategic township of Chawinda, which would have enabled the Indian forces to completely destroy Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division. When the ceasefire took effect on 23 September, Indian was in possession of vast amounts of Pakistani territory, but the Pakistan Army had not been defeated. However, India had achieved its wartime aim of protecting Jammu and Kashmir from aggression and in destroying a major part of the enemy’s offensive potential.

An analysis of the war throws up many shortcomings, which India would do well to heed. the first of these was the failure of intelligence. India was surprised by Operation Gibraltar, launched on 1 August and again by Grand Slam launched on 1 September. We also did not know that Pakistan had raised a new armoured division which very nearly proved disastrous for us in Asal Uttar. This reflects a critical weakness in gathering external intelligence, which has been repeated in 1971 and later in Kargil. It is evident that India’s external intelligence agencies need to be revamped, otherwise we are likely to be surprised again.

Another weakness was in wartime preparations leading up to the war. There were critical shortages of basic requirements needed to prosecute war. The attacking troops did not have maps of the area, communication equipment was poor, many infantry battalions were still holding the outdated .303 rifle, anti tank guns were not available upto authorisation, and vehicles with the units were in short supply. In Asal Uttar, the 106 mm recoilless guns were made available to the units only on 7 September, just a day before Pakistan launched an attack! It was the sheer grit of the Indian Army which saved the day, but such callousness needs to be overcome. The problem areas that need to be addressed lie in the Ministry of Defence. Here, bureaucrats wield power without accountability and the Services have to shoulder responsibility without power. It is imperative that integration of military personnel in the Ministry of Defence takes place at the earliest, as recommended by various committees formed by the government. That we have still failed to do so points to a very serious lacuna in our defence preparedness, which may cost the country dearly in any future conflict.

Another major weakness was the total lack of integration in war plans between the Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each Service prosecuted its war independently, which resulted in lack of synergy in operations. This lacuna too needs to be overcome through institutionalising mechanisms for joint operations. A step has been made by creating the Integrated Defence Staff, but we have to go much further than this and create the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, who shall be the single point advisor to the Raksha Mantri, as is the norm in all modern militaries across the world. Resistance by the Services will have to be overcome by firm directions from the political authority.

Finally, we need to ponder why Pakistan took the gamble of carrying out offensive operations in August and early September, knowing fully well that this could lead to war with India. Simply put, they perceived India to be militarily weak. This was the time when Pakistan was equipped with modern military hardware from the West and its economy was robust and growing steadily. India, on the other hand was recovering from the after-affects of the 62 war with China and was beset with internal problems in the Punjab, J&K, Tamil Nadu and in parts of Northeast India. It was Pakistan’s belief that a quick offensive would give them disproportionate gains and that in the event of an all out war, the world body would call an early end to hostilities. Pakistani miscalculation led to war. 

Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. Let us therefore, remain prepared at all times.

Published in Organiser, Sep 13, 2015.

EMPOWERING THE SMALLER PLAYERS

An incident related by Lt Gen Baljit Singh, a veteran gunner officer that took place as far back as 1974 comes to mind when analysing the role that the MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises) can play in realising the national goal of ‘Make in India’. He was then commanding a SP Artillery Regiment equipped with the ABBOT Field Gun. At that time, recalls the General, 11 of the 18 Guns in his Regiment were declared "out of action” for want of replacements for the electric diode that activated the firing mechanism. This status prevailed for over a year as their was an embargo in the warranty clause that they could not use any derivatives and the spares had not been bid for in the contract. The regiment took the initiative of stripping the circuit and finding a replacement from the Bangalore electronic market for a mere Rs 20/- per piece. The guns were made functional and they all fired successfully in the Annual Practice Camp which was overseen by a Gunnery Instructor who reported that “All 18 guns fired to perfection on all ten days.”

The above incident simply highlights the fact that great capability exists within the country to manufacture a vast amount of equipment and spares required by the armed forces, which as of now is being imported. Let us now take a look at the more recent experiences of an Indian entrepreneur, Mr Sanjay KA, Director CbS. His firm indigenously developed in a period of two months, a ‘high technology engineering component’, which was being imported by one our defence ordnance factories in the hundreds at a price of Rs 30,000/- per piece. In a chance meeting with one of the defence GMs, the latter waxed eloquently on the ‘Make in India’ focus being given by the government to defence equipment. In the course of the discussion, the GM apprised Sanjay of a particular equipment being imported and casually enquired whether such a component could be developed in India, on a ‘No Cost, No Commitment’ (NCNC) basis. Sanjay took a sample and gave him the product within two months, of course on a NCNC basis. This was tested by the ordnance factory and found to be totally suitable. The cost of the equipment was a mere 7000/- which was less than 25 percent of the imported cost and the head of the ordnance factory gave a letter of appreciation to the firm for indigenously developing a high technology product in two months, which was being imported in large numbers. The firm has not taken any money for its prototype nor has it been given any order, but that is not the purpose of relating this incident. It is simply to highlight the fact that a great deal of talent is still lying untapped within the country, which if exploited could give great impetus to the ‘Make in India’ thrust, reduce foreign exchange outgo, increase employment and as importantly, strengthen the defence industrial base of the country.

As of now, India is mindlessly importing hundreds of defence related components which can easily be developed and manufactured by the MSMEs. A question that can legitimately be asked is ‘what prevents Indian industry from manufacturing such equipment on its own’? Apparently, the answer is rather mundane. Indian industry does not know what is required by the user. There is thus a need to make the information available through web sites, display rooms, regular exhibitions, interactions with industry, etc. The government must publicly disclose the information related to parts and components being imported (obviously, without intimating the end use), to enable Indian industry to become a player in India’s defence growth. In all probability, for many of the components, core capability already exists to manufacture such products of similar if not enhanced and superior quality. Only if private industry knows what is needed, will it be in a position to produce the same. As of now, in the name of secrecy and national security, Indian industry is not aware of what is required. The only people to benefit from such a situation is obviously the import agents, most of whom know how to tweak the system to their advantage. Thereafter, if the equipment is suitable and cost effective, there must be a commitment to buy the same. This would require a change from NCNC to NCFC - No Cost Full Commitment.

As of now, the Directorate of Indigenisation in the Army Headquarters compiles information pertaining to imports. However, this pertains only to direct imports. The Directorate has no mechanism to capture the imports by ordnance factories (OFs) and defence public sector undertakings (DPSU). Obviously, something needs to be done to provide all information in a format conducive for taking business decisions i.e. grouped for electronics, rubber parts, machined components etc. with approximate annual requirement and target price. This falls within the purview of the MGO’s Branch, which should take corrective action.

A suggestion given by Mr Nalin Kohli, President, Association of Small & Medium Knowledge Industries and Member, National MSME Board, is that the principles that apply to ‘Make Procedure’, should apply to indigenisation contracts also. In the former, (where only large companies can participate), two important principles are incorporated. First, 80 percent of the development cost is borne by the Government and second, there is an assured initial order/s. As of now, revenue purchases are governed by Defence Purchase Manual, which has a provision for paying 80 percent of development cost but there is no provision for an assured order. However, even the provision for a 80 percent development cost has not been used even once. Mr Kohli suggests that if make principles are incorporated in indigenisation orders and made applicable to MSMEs doing development work for armed forces, ordnance factories and PSUs, it could lead to a sharp increase in the indigenous content of defence procurement.

Evidently then, if MSMEs have to come into their own, they need conducive policies which will enable growth. There is an information vacuum which must be filled, to at least let industry know what is required. That is the first step. Once Indian industry is aware of what the defence sector needs and is provided information of the components that are being imported, it would be in a position to step in to fulfil the requirements. But that is only the first step. There must be firm commitments to buy the products, once they are found to be of the requisite quality and of reasonable cost, otherwise there is no incentive for the manufacturer to invest his time and resources. The government could also step in with financial assistance for the development of components for which policies must be framed.

From the user point of view, quality control is of prime importance. Replacing imported items with indigenous manufacture is only worthwhile if the items perform to the desired standards. The Army has had bad experience of indigenised components manufactured by ordnance factories and that acts as a dampener, besides losing confidence in own products. A recent report in the Financial Express states that US defence major Boeing has terminated a contract with state-run Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) for component supplies to the former’s war and commercial planes being inducted into the Indian Navy. This decision of Boeing came after repeated reminders to HAL about its “poor quality” of production. Evidently, better strategies are required by India’s policymakers in order to bolster the order books of defence PSUs.

Finally, MSMEs do not have the clout of large companies. It is important that they collectively address the issues that concern them, and also use the MSME Ministry in the Government of India to act as an evangelist. We are at a defining point in our history where the nation has a political leadership that is focused on taking the nation forward. It is now for the other players to also do their bit in this effort.

Published in SALUTE Magazine - JUL-Aug 2015

Looking Back at the 1965 War

In the early hours of 6 September, 1965, exactly half a century ago, three divisions of India’s XI Corps, crossed the International Border in Punjab and in pitch darkness, moved towards the Ichhogil canal. The news was flashed across the world, with newspaper headlines of 6 September announcing, “Indian Army Crosses into Pakistan–Indian Forces in Vicinity of Lahore.” The second Indo-Pak war had begun.

Why did India and Pakistan go to war in the Autumn of 1965? A conflict was not in the interest of either country and no major world power wanted an escalation of tensions in this part of the world. Yet, for the perceptive observer, the signs of conflict were all to visible and apparent.

This was the time when the cold war was at its zenith. Pakistan had astutely sided with the West and in return had received economic and military assistance, ostensibly to fight communism, but covertly to be used in its struggle against India. Pakistan played its cards with panache and finesse, and in the process, bolstered its economic and military capability with aid from the western powers. This gave Pakistan the wherewithal to wage war. At the same time, India was hampered by a slow growth rate and internal turmoil. The debacle suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 had left deep scars in the national psyche and consequently, India in the early sixties, was at a low ebb, economically and militarily. India’s perceived weakness was seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to wrest Kashmir from India by force. However, as India was in the process of augmenting her military capability, policy makers within Pakistan veered to the view that this window of opportunity was limited in time.

In early 1964, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the ‘Kashmir Publicity Committee’, to keep the Kashmir issue alive. From this committee emerged a plan in February 1965 to engineer a revolt in J&K, by sending armed infiltrators to foment violence. This was to be followed with a quick military thrust to capture the strategic Indian township of Akhnur. The underlying hope was that this would lead to the state of J&K, falling like a ripe plum into Pakistani hands. The plan was however shelved as both President Khan and his army chief, General Musa were apprehensive of such action leading to a full scale war with India. Two months later, Ayub had a change of heart and gave his assent to the plan, though his army chief still demurred.

The Pakistani plan consisted of two components. The first, code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’, envisaged the infiltration of thousands of regular and irregular troops dressed as Kashmiri guerrillas into Jammu and Kashmir, to create an uprising in the state. The Pakistan army would then move in to capture Akhnur. While President Ayub Khan was not unaware of the possibility of his actions leading to an all out war with India, he veered around to the view that India was unlikely to expand the area of conflict. The weapons received by Pakistan from the West gave Pakistan’s military both a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Indians. If India did expand the conflict, international opinion would bring the war to a swift closure. By then Kashmir, would be in Pakistani hands. The events however, did not unfold in the manner envisaged by Pakistan’s top brass.

Pakistani attempts to destabilise India in Operation Gibraltar in August 1965 were foiled. Much to Pakistani’s chagrin, the local people did not rise in revolt against the Indian state, but actively supported the Indian army in neutralising the infiltrators. Pakistan also went on to lose the strategic Hajipir Pass to an Indian offensive, which sealed the routes of ingress of the infiltrators into J&K. Pakistan then launched Grand Slam on 1 September but a plucky Indian defence and incompetent Pakistani leadership prevented Akhnur from falling into enemy hands. However, to relieve pressure from this sector, India was forced to extend the conflict across the IB. All the premises on which Pakistan had based its design to capture J&K were thus reduced to nought.

Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. That is the lesson which India would do well to remember.

This article was published in the Pioneer, 7 September 2015.

Combatting Cross Border Terrorism: Need for a Doctrinal Approach

The use of force or threat of use of force must flow from national policy goals and objectives. In the Indian context, for a country struggling to find its soul from centuries of foreign domination, the primary strategic objective would of necessity, remain the human development of its people, which in turn would require a durable peace. The national approach to conflict must hence aim, first and foremost, to deterrence and dissuasion to enable peace. In the event of conflict, the aim must be for early conflict resolution, with adequate conflict control mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of escalation. War capability must encompass both the capacity and the will to wage war. It would require a well-trained and equipped force to meet such national policy objectives.

All sovereign states pursue their perceived national interest. At the apex level, a nation’s vital interests would encompass matters pertaining to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and security of its people. In India, all three of these stand effectively challenged today by non-state actors. While most of these non-state actors have come up on indigenous narratives, some are promoted, propped or supported by nation states inimical to India. This has given rise to internal conflict in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), parts of Northeast India and in the hinterland where Maoist violence has spread to many districts. In the above internal security paradigm of India, conflict is promoted in the state of J&K, by the active support given by Pakistan to various terrorist organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and others. These organisations have their bases in Pakistan where they are trained, financed and equipped to carry out terror strikes not only in J&K but in other parts of the country as well. The violence which started in J&K in the late eighties and which continues until date, as also terror strikes across various parts of India are a result of such support. 

The Threat to India

Pakistan’s interference in J&K started soon after independence when it sent armed raiders to wrest the state by force. Timely action by the Indian state, through employment of the Army, threw out the raiders beyond the present Line of Control, but that has not prevented Pakistan from continuing with its efforts to seize the state by force. Pakistani politicians have consistently advocated hard line and confrontational policies against India over the Kashmir issue. This led to the second India Pakistan War in September 1965, when Pakistan again sent armed infiltrators into J&K in an operation codenamed “Gibraltar”. The infiltrators hoped to create a local uprising against the Indian state as a prelude to the Pakistan Army moving in and annexing J&K by force. The early detection and neutralisation of these infiltrators however put paid to such Pakistani hopes. India also retaliated by widening the conflict through offensive operations across the International Border into the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Perturbed at this development, Pakistan’s then foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in a fiery speech delivered at the UN Security Council condemned India for aggression and declared his nation’s intent to "fight for a thousand years".

Gen Zia-ul-Haq, in a sinister well thought out strategy to “bleed India through a thousand cuts” gave form to Bhutto’s promise of a thousand year war. The provocative statements of both Bhutto and Zia are not mere rhetoric; they remain at the core of Pakistani ideology and are the raison d’être for its existence. Zia’s policy took shape after he had deposed Bhutto in a coup in July 1977, assuming the office of President of Pakistan a year later on 16 September 1978. Realising that Pakistan could no longer wrest Kashmir from India by force after the disaster of the 1971 war which led to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, he embarked on a new policy to promote terrorism within India through “a thousand cuts” in Kashmir. Cross-border terrorism started in the eighties with Pakistan pushing in armed and well-trained groups of terrorists into India, maintaining at the same time that terrorism was the “freedom struggle” of the people of Kashmir and Pakistan had no hand in it beyond providing moral support. But the truth tumbled out when a director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence told the Pakistan National Assembly that the ISI had been sponsoring such support in Kashmir.

Zia’s tenure as head of state from 1977 to 1988 was a period of Islamic ferment in Pakistan brought on by the unequivocal emphasis given by him to Islamising the state. In 1987, during the latter half of the Zia years, the Dawat-ul-Irshad Markaz was established by Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, both professors from the Engineering University at Lahore, spurred no doubt by the impact of the Zia years. The third founding father was Abdullah Azam, an Arab from the International Islamic University, Islamabad. Azam died two years later, killed in a bomb blast in Peshawar. The Dawat-ul-Irshad Markaz (since renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) is an adherent to the principles of Sunni Wahhabism and seeks primarily to establish a universal Islamic caliphate with a special emphasis on recovering all lands that were once under Muslim rule. This explains its focus on India as the country’s achievement in becoming an economically dynamic, multi-ethnic, and secular democracy remains an affront to its vision of a universal Islamic caliphate. There was no dearth of volunteers, funding and state support for the Dawat-ul-Irshad and the organisation’s desire to engage simultaneously in tableegh (preaching) and jihad (armed struggle) found manifestation in different ways from the moment of its founding. The LeT was formed as the armed wing of Dawat-ul-Irshad. The latter continues to receive considerable support from its state patron Pakistan and its principal intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Moreover, India’s growing counterterrorism collaboration with the United States and the West in general deepened the incentives for LeT-ISI collaboration.

Besides the Lashkar-e-Taiba, other formidable jihadi organisations, which receive support from Pakistan’s ISI, are Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which also functions as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ). The focus of the LeT and JeMis on India, especially on annexing Kashmir, while the SSP/LeJ/ASWJ conglomerate aims to eliminate Shiism by systematically killing the Shiites. The leadership of all these organisations is based in Pakistan’s Punjab province, but they have an all Pakistan presence.

It is thus self-evident that a variety of jihadi organisations based in Pakistan and supported by the state have a specific anti-India agenda. The purpose of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was to inspire jihadism among the world’s Muslims. When conflict was imposed on Kashmir, Saeed focused his nascent organisation on promoting terror in the state of J&K, and in the process, earned the support of the ISI, as also the continued support of the Saudi backers who had helped him establish the group in the first place. The fact that the state continues to support anti India elements is evident by the fact that the chief minister of Pakistan’s Punjab province, soon after coming to power, in his budget for 2010-11, allotted Rs 86 million to the JuD, defying the ban on the organisation by the federal government. The JuD, it must be remembered is the very organisation that was involved in the horrific Mumbai attacks and Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist who was caught alive was trained at Muridke. The JuD sees India’s rapid growth as an impediment to its core objective of recovering the “lost Muslim lands” en route to their creation of its Islamic caliphate. It remains a core belief among Pakistani jihadis that India must be destroyed, this view also receiving state patronage. It was Hafiz Saeed who declared in a 1999 interview “jihad is not about Kashmir only… Today, I announce the break-up of India, Insha-Allah. We will not rest until the whole [of] India is dissolved into Pakistan.” This thought process remains ingrained in the jihadi psyche, as evidenced by recent utterances of Saeed. While the purpose of this article is not to trace the role of Pakistan based jihadi organisations in cross border terrorism, it is important to understand that the Pakistani state treats such organisations as their strategic assets and will continue to support them. Speaking at a seminar in New Delhi in October 2011, UK Bansal, Secretary (Internal Security) in the Union Home Ministry stated "This (Jihadi) brand of terrorism is primarily sponsored by our neighbouring country in the west whose... policy is to conduct war against India by all other means and bleed us through a thousand cuts. This naturally includes the targeting of anything...with a view to damaging, degrading or destroying the engines of economic growth and critical centres of power and strength of our country."India needs to find suitable response mechanisms to prevent and motivate the state of Pakistan to desist from providing such support.

The Need for a Doctrine

The threat to India is self-evident, despite Pakistani protestations to the country. India’s response to Pakistani support to jihadi groups led its military to formulate its Proactive Doctrine, the genesis of which lay in events that occurred post the attack by Pakistan sponsored terrorists on India’s Parliament on 13 December 2001. India’s response to such a blatant attack on the very temple of democracy was to mobilise its forces along the Western border as a precursor to taking punitive action against Pakistan. The code name given to this mobilisation was “Operation Parakaram”, but the long lead-time taken to mobilise forces for conventional conflict eventually denied India the opportunity of using them. This brought home the need to reduce the lead time required to initiate hostilities, giving rise in due course to the “Proactive Doctrine” of the Indian Army, also referred to by many, though incorrectly, as the “Cold Start Doctrine”. 

The “Proactive Doctrine” has been remarkably successful and Pakistan is yet to come up with an appropriate response, despite conducting a series of exercises over the last few years. This amply brings out the importance of a doctrinal approach to war fighting. It is perhaps credible to assume that Pakistan’s approach to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional conflict reflects in large measure its inability to counter the Indian doctrine. However, this has not dissuaded Pakistan from continuing to support cross border terrorism from within its territory against India, albeit at a lower scale, to what some in the Pakistan establishment believe to be within India’s ‘threshold limits’. We hence need to enmesh an additional element in the existing “Proactive Doctrine” to make it expensive if not impossible for Pakistan to use terrorism for political and ideological ends. As stated succinctly by the late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “We need to ask ourselves whether we have evolved a credible doctrine to successfully counter Pakistan’s strategic doctrine of sub-conventional war (through terrorism) under the nuclear umbrella acquired by 1987.”

As of now, we have partial capability only. Enough to deter attacks of the type on India’s Parliament and the Mumbai attacks in September 2008 but not enough to deter continued support by Pakistan to militant groups based in its territory. India’s strategy to defeat Pakistan’s proxy war remains mired in defensive actions against terrorists after they cross over into India. The construction of a fence against Pakistan was no doubt a commendable achievement that has helped impose a heavy cost on terrorists infiltrating into India. But the flow has by no means stopped, primarily because the Pakistan Army, which actively assists the jihadis, is not penalised for the support it provides. We need a clearly enunciated doctrine, which can inflict the requisite degree of pain to make the Pakistan military desist from providing such support.

American and Soviet Experience

A Doctrine is simply a set of principles or practices applied to a particular situation, region, or government. Clearly enunciated and backed by capacity to execute, doctrines form an effective foreign policy tool. In the US, American presidents tend to set foreign policy doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine enunciated in 1823, was the first major presidential foreign policy doctrine wherein President Monroe made it clear that America would not allow European colonies to further colonise in the Americas or interfere with independent states. Four score years later, in 1904, President Roosevelt issued a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that significantly altered America's foreign policy by stating that the US would not allow for European colonisation of Latin America and would act to help stabilise economic problems for struggling Latin American nations. "Big stick diplomacy" also came into play, the Doctrine stating… "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere may force the United States to the exercise of an international police power."

Post the Second World War, the Truman Doctrine enunciated on March 12, 1947, led to American policy of containment to try to stop the fall of countries to communism and to halt the expansion of Soviet influence. The Carter Doctrine enunciated on January 23, 1980 aimed at countering the Soviet Union’s attempts to consolidate a strategic position that would pose a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. The doctrine stated that…“America would see an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region ... as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The Reagan Doctrine moved from simple containment to more direct assistance to those fighting against communist governments and is widely believed to have helped in bringing about the fall of the Soviet Union. In more recent times, the Bush Doctrine was enunciated in response to the tragic events of terrorism that occurred on September 11, 2001.

American Presidents thus set out foreign policy agendas through doctrines. These change as circumstances, which necessitated them end, or change. The Soviet Union too, resorted to enunciating foreign policy through the doctrinal prism. In 1968, the Brezhnev Doctrine called for the use of Warsaw Pact forces to intervene in any Eastern Bloc nation, which was seen to compromise communist rule and Soviet domination, either by trying to leave the Soviet sphere of influence or even moderate its policies. The Soviet crushing of the Prague Spring movement in Czechoslovakia was an application of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

A Doctrine for India

The threat to India from cross border terrorism is real. Regardless of the political dispensation in Pakistan, this threat is unlikely to recede. If anything, given the extent to which Pakistani society has radicalised, the support being extended to terrorist groups inimical to India will only increase. There is thus a need for clear enunciation of foreign policy in dealing with cross border terrorism. Like the presidential doctrines of the US and Soviet era, India needs to express its concern as also its resolve to fight cross border terrorism in doctrinal terms. Pakistani troops deployed along the line of control continue to host terrorists and assist them in every way possible. Recent incidents such as the killing of Indian soldiers along the line of control and the dastardly attack on an army unit in Samba will not cease unless the cost to the Pakistani military is raised to the extent that it is forced to desist from exercising such support. This then must be set out in clear doctrinal terms.

The foreign policy doctrine with respect to cross border terrorism must be enunciated either by the Prime Minister as the executive head of the government or by the President of India as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of India. In terms of doctrine, it could be spelt out as under:

Internal Security of India is a vital national concern. Infiltration of armed terrorists into India from across the western borders directly impinges on India’s national security concerns and will be resisted by all means available to the country to include the use of armed force. Support given by military units deployed opposite Indian Territory in any form whatsoever to such terrorist groups will be considered a hostile act impinging on India’s vital interests and will be responded to appropriately, to include the use of military force.

Once Indian foreign policy imperatives with respect to cross border terrorism are enunciated in clear doctrinal terms, the responsibility devolves on the Ministry of Defence and the Indian Military to create both the capacity and the capability to execute the doctrine. As stated earlier, India’s current strategy is based on a defensive mindset where infiltrators are intercepted after they come into our territory and then dealt with through force. The erection of the border fence remains a part of this defensive policy. While the terrorist crossing over into India are being addressed by the Indian Army, there is no corresponding cost to the Pakistan Army which is providing logistic and other support including suppressive fire on Indian positions to assist terrorists in the crossing. The cost to India is high while the cost to Pakistan remains minimal. This needs to be reversed by imposing a heavy cost on the adjacent Pakistani military posts that are perceived to be supporting the terrorists. A national doctrine enunciated either by the Prime Minister or the President of India would thereafter need to be supplemented by a military doctrine to implement national policy directives in pursuance of India’s vital national interests. 

The Military Doctrine

A heavy cost must be imposed on the Pakistan military if cross border terrorism is to cease. The essence of the doctrine must aim at imposing such exceptionally high and unbearable cost to the point of completely annihilating those hostile military posts that are perceived or believed to have provided support to terrorists infiltrating across the Line of Control. This punishment must be delivered in near real time to have the requisite degree of impact. It would hence be essential to have the capacity and capability to operate against specified targets across the line of control, in short duration punitive strikes. The ability to carry out such strikes consistently over time and space can give to India the punitive edge to deter Pakistan from continuing with its existing policy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’. 

There is an obvious risk of escalation in this approach, but the onus for that must lie on the adversary, the doctrine advocating additional degrees of punishment for each added act of provocation. In this expression of will to defend ourselves through military capability, talks for the political resolution of conflict could proceed alongside. However, each attempt by the adversary to escalate the conflict must be met by a more severe response to maintain the credibility of the doctrine. This would require the calibrated use of force on multiple targets, both on the front line and in depth positions, in punitive strikes to achieve policy objectives without the need or the necessity to hold on to territory.

The framing of such a doctrine is outside the purview of this paper, but the Indian Armed Forces and more specifically the Indian Army, must be provided with the requisite wherewithal in terms of military capability to exact unacceptably high costs on the adversary and force it to desist from providing such support. A review of existing organisational structures would need to be undertaken, to fulfill both the Army’s requirement for conventional conflict as well as provide it teeth to carry out swift offensive actions against any act of terrorism emanating from foreign soil. The essence of the strategy is imposing costs on the handlers and supporters of terrorists, especially those deployed along the line of control, till such time as they realise that providing such support is no longer in their interest to do so.

What then are the capabilities required by the Indian Army? We are essentially looking at enhancing capability in battlefield transparency, firepower and manoeuvrability. These capabilities would need to be boosted manifold to ensure real time surveillance over the border and delivery of firepower at the target in the quantity desired. While the hostile military post supporting the terrorists would need to be completely destroyed to convey the message of deterrence, the Army would need to be prepared for hostile retaliatory action. This in turn would need to be countered by swift attacks on multiple targets, till escalation control is achieved. 

In terms of organisation, the Army would need to be equipped with drones, attack and utility helicopters, precision guided munitions, missiles and greater quantum of field artillery. National capabilities with respect to border surveillance would need to be enmeshed into the structure to ensure real time battlefield surveillance. The 22 Apache attack helicopters along with the 145 M-777 ultra-light howitzers being purchased by India from the US could be usefully employed along the LOC to achieve this capability. These guns will give a much-needed fillip to Indian Army’s firepower capability, by making up the voids as also giving the Army a qualitative edge. The manoeuvre element in terms of attack and utility helicopters will also greatly enhance capability, once these platforms are integrated into the Indian Army’s organisational structure at the Corps level, along with armed and unarmed UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). Speed is an essential component of modern warfare and quick decision-making and force cohesiveness is a vital component of that process. Legacy attitudes, which have inhibited the integration of attack and utility helicopters into the Indian Army, must be shed else we lose a decisive and potent edge in fighting across the spectrum of conflict.

The psychological value of targeting only those hostile posts that support cross border terrorism cannot be over-emphasised. Once the policy gets implemented, there would be a natural reluctance on the part of hostile elements to provide support to terrorists as it could lead to their own annihilation. Even if support were provided, it would be with increasing reluctance. Implementation of the doctrine would hence require very high capability in intelligence gathering and in surveillance capability to target only those that provide such support.

Conclusion

The importance of doctrine cannot be overstated. The proactive doctrine of the Indian Army achieved deterrence at a particular level and has contributed to maintaining peace. However, a new doctrine is required now to counter cross border terrorism. In the present vitiated state of relations between India and Pakistan, where the latter is bent on promoting cross border terrorism in India as part of state ideology, a doctrinal statement of intent at the highest political level would need to be stated to defeat Pakistan’s nefarious designs. It would then be left to the military to formulate its own doctrine to give teeth and intent to the national doctrine. It is well to remember, that at times, the surest path to peace comes from capability to extract a heavy price from those intent on waging war.

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM

Published in CLAWS Journal Winter 2013. For footnotes, refer to the CLAWS Publication.

LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN THE INFORMATION AGE

If you want to go east, don't go west.

                                    Ramakrishna.

Warfare is mutating. While conventional state on state conflict is not passé, future conflict will see increasing interventions by non-state actors, acting independently or supported by a state to achieve specific objectives. As we move into the information age, the future will bring forth fresh challenges in confronting a variety of military threats in an increasingly asymmetric world, with all its attending complexities. Leadership, as always will play a critical role in determining force effectiveness, but leaders will increasingly be confronted by challenges based on a changing environment. They would need to be trained and prepared accordingly.

The Environment

In their monumental work, ‘War and Anti War’, Alvin and Heidi Toffler posit a linkage with the stages of development of a society and the manner in which such societies conduct wars. As we move into the information age, greater emphasis will keep being placed on information as a weapon system and its impact on the environment of operations will have increasing relevance. Allied with this is the rapid pace at which technological advancements are taking place, enabling lethal engagement of targets at long ranges with precision, giving rise to the concept of network centric warfare (NCW). Applications of NCW in some form are visible in the conflicts presently taking place in Afghanistan and in the Levant. However, networks simply alter the character of warfare; they do not change its fundamental nature. Direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist but the network will enable collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Networks thus will remain additive and will not substitute for the fundamentals of warfare. 

The additive advantage of networks however, is significant as combatants in conflict, both now and in the future, besides having greater battlefield awareness, will also possess the means to deliver precision guided munitions at designated targets. Survival of the agile will thus be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In his book, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty first Century, Thomas P.M.Barnett observes that the future is not so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power shifts to knowledge based real time actors. As we move towards self-synchronisation of forces, we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at a far quicker pace than hitherto thought possible. Greater information availability comes with its own set of dilemmas in the form ‘information overload’. Analysis capability too is not endless and will increasingly be put under severe strain. The desire to have maximum inputs for decision making is a tempting proposition but will have to be tempered with the necessity of giving a decision in time. As time pressures become more acute we may well end up with ‘information decoherence’. We would also have to contend with the problem of ‘attention fragmentation’. Military leaders, like leaders in all walks of life need uninterrupted time to synthesise information from many different sources, reflect on its implications, apply judgment, and arrive at good decisions. The capacity and capability of commanders to take appropriate decisions in a timely manner will hence be a key attribute for the leaders of tomorrow.

The Leadership Challenge

Technology, while continuing to have great significance, cannot by itself provide solutions to all strategic and operational challenges. Success will, more often than not, be a result of the interaction between humans and technology. Leadership at the higher level would need an understanding and development of a broader worldview on the changes taking place in the domestic and international environment. While using the tools of technology, the approach to war fighting would need to be constantly refined, expanded and improved. This evolution is a function of strategic leadership. Failure to evolve could well lead to our forces being well prepared for the previous war, but hopelessly incapable of fighting future conflict.

In the Armed Forces, while the tactical level leadership remains outstanding, the same cannot be said of the leadership at the operational and strategic level, which remains tactical in its orientation and approach. The leadership challenge lies in creating an environment in which leaders with a strategic bent of mind will emerge. Skill sets required for strategic leadership would include facets like challenging the status quo, anticipating the challenges of a changing environment, interpreting multiple information flows, decisiveness and a focus on continuous learning. The information age demands leaders who can tolerate ambiguity, adapt to changing conditions and make decisions rapidly under stress. They should also have skills that are interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. 

Culture, too, impacts on the evolution of leaders. By definition, culture is a ‘repertoire of socially transmitted and intra-generationally generated ideas about how to live and make judgements, both in general terms and in regard to specific domains of life’. Social and political theorists have postulated that culture exerts a decisive influence on a people’s economic and political development. As an example, socialist economies produce a cultural milieu in which anti-market, anti-profit schooling and insider privilege have planted and frozen anti-entrepreneurial attitudes. People thus fear the uncertainties of the market and yearn for the safe tedium of state employment. Or they yearn for equality in poverty, a common feature of peasant cultures around the world. For the Indian Armed Forces, the cultural milieu of the country  will impact on the leadership traits of its officers. Here, let us examine the role of the family and of society.

The central role of family in Indian society establishes clear hierarchical relationships within the family and within society with close family ties often leading to nepotism. As the military is drawn from society, people joining the forces come with ingrained attitudes; many people thus do not view nepotism as a serious ethical aberration. Tendencies towards nepotism are transferred over time to the strong institutional bonding in the Army based on arm and service affiliations, regimental loyalties, school ties et al. While many frown at such behaviour, the numbers who would desist from taking advantage of such bonding to further their self-interest dwindles to a mere handful. This leads to some seeking postings under a ‘known’ superior with the possibility of earning reports based on factors other than merit and to favourable considerations in selections for promotions. The cycle is self-perpetuating and leads over time to increasing number of mediocre officers occupying senior positions in the military hierarchy.

Culture affects in other ways too. Unlike the West where children are encouraged to think and act independently, the Indian family structure promotes deference to the head of the family for even mundane decisions. This translates into deference to superior authority whether in the family or at school and later in life as an adult wherein even life choices are dictated by the desires and preferences of the elders. The custom of touching the feet of relatives and those in positions of authority is a direct outcome of such cultural constructs. Our schools also promote such a culture. Erroneous equation of such deference with respect and honour, results in a loss of individuality and leads to sycophancy, servility and obsequiousness. 

The hierarchical decision making structure of the Armed Forces also tend towards attitudes of unilateralism and could preclude consultative mechanisms. In progressive cultures, authority tends towards dispersion and horizontality whereas in static cultures authority is concentrated in vertical silos. This limits the narrative to individual views being the dominant input in the decision making process. Ingrained cultural attributes militate against effective decision-making and dilute leadership traits. The phenomenon of every decision being vetted at higher and higher levels of command is a fallout of such cultural attributes. This leads at times to ridiculous situations where decisions, which should rightly be taken at the level of colonel, find their way to three star Generals for approval. Play safe attitudes kill the leadership spirit, lead towards indecisiveness, promote mediocrity and sycophancy and hence need to be countered with an alternate narrative. There is hence a need to promote a counter culture within the military if desired leadership attributes are to be developed. 

The rise of Generation C will increasingly impact the environment and pose challenges to contemporary and future leadership.  This is the generation which is connected, communicating, content-centric, computerised, community oriented, always clicking – hence the name. In India, this generation, born after 1990, for the most part comes from an urban or suburban background. It is from this base that the future leadership of India’s Armed Forces will be drawn. This generation has grown up with the internet and mobile communications and is very familiar with technology. They will thus have an enormous impact on the way the Armed Forces function, as within a decade, they will form the core of its junior and middle level leadership. 

As we move towards greater digitisation in the Force, the increasing numbers of Generation C in leadership roles will start playing a more dominant role in military affairs. This will impact on the way information is transmitted and consumed. The linear set ups which are an essential ingredient of hierarchical systems will get more and more diffused as non linear information flows increase. Security issues arising form the same would need to be addressed. More importantly, we will increasingly witness a generation gap in the way this set of Generation C leaders function in relation to the rest. While the upper age limit of the digitally literate older generation will rise, they will remain far behind the junior and middle rung leadership dominated by Generation C in their digital behaviour and in terms of their ability to absorb, assimilate and employ technological tools.

Strategy for Change

The start point for promoting an alternate culture to nurture leaders of substance must begin at the roots. Here, we need to look firstly at the selection system where the Services Selection Boards (SSB) will be the lead players and then at our training academies – The National Defence Academy, The Indian Military Academy and the Officers Training Academy. These are the nurseries which will produce our future officers and so the greatest care and circumspection must be exercised here.

The SSB procedures perhaps need a relook. To claim that our selection system has stood the test of time and hence needs no change is denying the emergence of a changing aspirational India. Such review cannot be left to the DIPR (Defence Institute of Psychological Research), but must be led by the services themselves with inputs from leaders in the field encompassing multiple disciplines. The next step will to be nurture the selected lot in the training academies. Here we come up with inherent contradictions. The prayer at the National Defence Academy which all cadets recite at the morning muster parade cannot remain a mere recitation of words but must be converted into an actionable plan. The words are stirring, emphasising duty and honour to the country and to the Services. Ethical conduct is emphasised through the words…“awaken our admiration for honest dealing and clean thinking and guide us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong” and also… “endow us with the courage which is born of the love of what is noble and which knows no compromise or retreat when truth and right are in peril”, but this cannot remain simply a morning prayer. There must be an actionable plan to convert the words into a way of life which becomes second nature to the cadets. The aim must be to turn them into men of character and substance who will not flinch when upholding a principle. Undoubtedly the task is difficult for the cadets also have to be taught to obey orders without hesitation. How then are they to be taught to resist orders which are illegal and immoral? Who is to determine the same? These are the challenges to overcome; they would require a culture where openness is encouraged and space exists to oppose authority. There is then a need for a live conversation in our training establishments of ethics and values, where people hold each other responsible and accountable about whether they are really living the values – and this has to be internalised to become a part of Academy life. Creating this culture is the primary challenge. It means that cadets must have knowledge of alternatives, but still choose to stay within the bounds of ethical behaviour because it is important and inspires them. Making a strong commitment to bring such a culture to life is an essential part of ethical leadership. The ‘authority trap’ has to be avoided; this would require established and explicit ways for subordinates to ‘push back’ if a person thinks that something is ethically wrong and the values of the organisation are being eroded. The process of developing these mechanisms must be created in our training establishments. In due course of time, these will get transmitted to our units and establishments creating a unique army culture which could be emulated by the nation.

Another criticality lies in the selection of directing staff to these establishments. They must be men of exceptional honour and commitment, and the selection process to select them the most rigorous. Each person so selected must be able to walk the talk, whether he is the Commandant or the divisional officer.

The proliferation and increasing sophistication of communication, interaction and collaborative technologies and tools could perhaps lead to redefining the way the armed forces operate. The capability of Generation C to use technology must be exploited to change many of the antiquated ways in which the Armed Forces currently function. If the senior leadership has the wisdom to exploit this talent, it could well lead to a revolution in the way the Armed Forces are currently administered. The entire logistic management could be overhauled leading to greater efficiency, real time availability of material, decrease in manpower requirements, reduced costs and more importantly a reduced logistic footprint in all types of conflict situations.

Systems would have to be reworked, especially financial rules and regulations as increase in transparency levels could potentially lead to massive cost reductions in items purchased for the force. Current procedures in which financial advisors from the Indian Revenue Service are dominant players but remain unaccountable for the decisions they endorse will have to give way to alternate models where decisions can be taken in compressed time frames with total transparency. On the operational front, Generation C is already wired for taking on the requirements of NCW and needs only a guiding hand to propel it in the right direction. We are indeed living in exciting times. The future holds great promise for the Indian Armed Forces – the current Generation C. But a great deal of maturity and understanding would be required to let Generation C fulfil the role which their upbringing and circumstance have fortuitously given.

Institutionally, we also need to acknowledge that strategic information is now an essential element of combat analysis and combat power. Our training establishments need to rebalance from a competency based training approach towards an educative approach that involves cognitive learning. Within the Armed Forces, we need to develop and embrace an organisational culture of “lifelong learning” for leaders. Let us also keep in mind that leadership is all about decision-making. Sometimes, the choice is between ethical behaviour at the cost of personal advancement. What the leader chooses will be a product of his upbringing and conscience but the options lie in the ‘black and white’ domain. However, most choices will not be that simple. Difficulties arise when the options are between two courses, both having tremendous positive possibilities; or in having to choose one among a range of options, each having negative consequences. Sam Manekshaw, in his address to officers at the Staff College, Wellington spoke of five fundamental attributes of leadership - professional competence, justice, courage, loyalty and decisiveness. It is the last named quality however, which finally defines a leader. The ability to take a decision and accept full responsibility for one’s action will, in the ultimate analysis, define a person and what he stands for. Our ability to nurture such leaders, and place them in senior levels of command, remains the defining challenge of the day.

Note: This article was published in the USI Journal - Jan-Mar 2015. For footnotes, refer to the Journal.