Thursday, March 25, 2021

Pakistan’s Peace Overtures: Tread with Caution

In a discussion between the DGMOs (Director General of Military Operations) of India and Pakistan, over their established telephone hotline, which presumably took place on 22 February 2021, a ceasefire was agreed to between the two countries, effective from midnight 24-25 February 2021. A joint communique issued by the two sides stated…“In the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders, the two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence”. The wording had just the right amount of ambiguity to mean different things to different people, but for India, it is hoped that it reflects the change in attitude by the present government, which has made it clear that the only outstanding issue with Pakistan is its sponsorship of terror and its illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad.


An event of this magnitude was well beyond the pay scale of the two Generals concerned, so obviously, the top leadership of both countries would have been in the loop. The Pakistan National Security Advisor, Mr Moeed Yusuf, in a tweet denied any back-channel diplomacy between him and Indian National Security Advisor, Shri Ajit Doval for the ceasefire announcement, describing such reports as “baseless”. In an audio statement issued to journalists in Islamabad, he stated that the agreement on the ceasefire was the outcome of “behind-the-scenes” contacts and “more roads will open” in the future. He however did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts.


On 18 March 2021, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa, in his address at the second day of the Islamabad Security Dialogue, made a strong pitch for peace with India stating, “…we feel that it is time to bury the past and move forward”. In his inaugural address on the opening day of the Dialogue, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan Niazi called for establishing ‘civilised neighbours’ like relations with India and resolving the outstanding disputes through dialogue. This was in sharp contrast to the shrill statements made over the last two years by Niazi and members of his cabinet against Prime Minister Modi and India. This gives rise to the question: Is there a change of heart in the Pakistani establishment, or is this mere tactical posturing?


Let us first address the issue of whether there has been a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. On the positive side, since February 25, when the ceasefire once again came into effect, there have been no instances of cross border firing along the Line of Control (LoC), nor has any case been reported of cross border infiltration by terrorist groups from Pakistan. A meeting of the Indus Water Treaty Commissioners is also on the anvil after a hiatus of two years which is all to the good. But beyond that, nothing much seems to have changed within the Pakistani political and security establishment. Pakistan has not abandoned its policy of using terrorism as an instrument of statecraft, and it continues to maintain and support terrorist groups within its soil, for use as its strategic assets.


Given the above, it is surprising that some analysts are waxing eloquently on the ‘thaw’ that has taken place in the frosty relations between the two countries. In a surreal manner, they believe that  a love-fest is in the air and that soon, diplomatic relations would be restored, summit meetings would take place and there would be much greater people to people contact. This may be what Pakistan is hoping for, but it  is not something which the Indian leadership will blindly rush into, unless Pakistan shows visible and credible evidence that it has closed its terror camps and hands over to India for trial, those terrorist leaders it shelters, who have carried out terror attacks on Indian soil.


There is no gainsaying the fact that peace would give welcome dividends to both countries. But desirable outcomes are often held hostage to vested interests within Pakistan—in this case, the Pakistan army. Peace with India will erode the very raison d’etre of the Pakistan army and its role in controlling the levers of power within Pakistan. They will not allow that to happen. Dismantling the terror structure network within Pakistan, created as strategic assets, will cause serious blowback, with a high degree of possibility that such groups may then  turn against the Pakistani state itself. This becomes all the more plausible, seeing the manner in which Pakistani society has been radicalised over the last four to five decades and has been fed a continuous and viral hate-India diet. It would be delusional to expect a common Pakistani, who believes that killing the ‘kafir’ is a duty enjoined on him by his religion, to suddenly develop a love for India. That remains the preserve of a very small minority in Pakistan, who still retain rational thought.


Why then, this charade of peace? Three reasons are apparent. One, Pakistan is in an unholy mess as far as its economy is concerned, and is on course to becoming a failed state. Peace with India would give the country’s leadership a better chance to pull their economy out of the rut. Two, Pakistan stands isolated on the world stage as a sponsor of terror, and besides China and a handful of other countries finds no takers for its cause. They have been placed on the grey list by the FATF and while they have evaded being placed on the black list, they are keen to come out of the grey list, which too has economic consequences. Three, the Pakistan Army is finally having to bear the consequences of its actions in promoting terror within India due to the firm response by the Indian Armed Forces. It is gradually coming to the conclusion that bearing such cost over a long period of time, especially with an unstable Afghanistan on its western flank, is unsustainable. 


What we are witnessing is a tactical pause by Pakistan, the peace-offering being a mere charade—no better than a poisoned chalice. Pakistan’s past performance does not enthuse us with any hope that this time around, peace will be the outcome. While past performance cannot with certitude be a measure of future response patterns, in the case of Pakistan, whose society has been overtly radicalised, and whose military holds the levers of power regardless of which political party within Pakistan forms the government, Pakistan’s future response can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty. India, while being open to the peace overture, needs to tread cautiously. There must be no change in the government’s stance, that talks and terror cannot go hand in hand. Pakistan will have to close its terror factory and hand over all wanted terrorists to India, if it truly desires peace. As such an outcome is unlikely, peace will remain a chimera.

Published in Chintan: 26 March 2021


Thursday, March 11, 2021

Talk at CENJOWS Seminar - 9 March 2021

 Thank you Gen Srivastava, for giving me this platform to share some of my thoughts with this very distinguished audience on the CPEC, Gwadar and Balochistan - the game plan.


We have seen the freedom movement in Balochistan play out since 1948, albeit with different levels of repression by the Pakistani state. But what we are seeing now is perhaps one of the most vicious elements of suppression of a people by the security forces of Pakistan. It would be worth dwelling why this is happening and how the future is likely to unfold.


Let me begin with a small anecdote. On 19 October 1977, the Corps of Engineers set off on a historic boat voyage in a small sailing boat, the Albatross, from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas in Iran. The crew of three halted at Karachi and from there sailed along the Makran coast to Iran. They crossed Gwadar by night and were surprised that hardly any lights were visible, though so much had been heard about its strategic importance. The complete lack of fishing activity along the long coastline also mystified them.

The truth of the matter really was that Gwadar remained undeveloped for a very long time till President Pervez Musharraf approached the Chinese in 2001 and they got on board to build the deep sea port. Pakistani fears were amplified after the Kargil War, and they wanted a second port in case Karachi was blockaded by India. 

The first phase of the port was completed in 2007 after a delay of three years, but the movement of cargo was limited, Karachi remaining the main port for trade purposes. Things changed dramatically post 2015, when Xi Jinping launched his Belt and Road Initiative of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor was the crowning jewel.

The CPEC is not really a commercial concern. Nor is the route likely to be used an alternate energy supply route in case of closure of the Malacca Straits. The reasons for the CPEC have more to do with GeoPolitics rather than Geo Economics. China’s objective has perhaps more to do with its desire to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean Region, to balance India - what some call geo strategic balancing. Chinese presence in Gwadar also gives them access to the nearby Strait of Hormuz as a point of influence. In any case, if Malacca is closed, the Chinese can move further south to the Sunda and Lombok passageways, though at a slightly higher cost. The Gwadar project is hence for the Chinese military. It is estimated that half a million Chinese professionals will be settled in Gwadar by the end of 2022, and that Gwadar will be used as military base. This has caused great concern to the local Baloch, who fear becoming a minority in their own homeland. 


There are also Chinese concerns regarding their investment in the CPEC, as it passes through Gilgit Baltistan which is Indian territory, illegally occupied by Pakistan. Post the revocation of the provisions of Article 370 and splitting the state into two union territories, the Chinese concern over the future of CPEC has been heightened. The announcement by Pakistan on 1 November 2020, to grant Gilgit Baltistan the status of a full province has perhaps been done under Chinese prodding, to protect their commercial interests. Post the elections held in the same month, and which were won by the ruling PTI, there is the possibility that the region may be declared as the fifth province of Pakistan. What impact this will have on Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir remain to be seen but the Chinese are hoping that it will lead to a permanent settlement of the border dispute between India and Pakistan, and this will secure their commercial interests.


Finally we have Chinese fears about the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who are fighting for an independent East Turkestan. This is the occupied region of Xinjiang, which the Chinese are ruling by brute force. The activities of the ETIM have merged with that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, making the situation more volatile for the Chinese. Allied with this is the future of Afghanistan, in the event of a total US withdrawal from the region. This could well plunge Afghanistan into instability, with consequences for all other countries in the region.


In this backdrop, I will now give my assessment on certain scenarios that may play out.


Let me start with the possible future of Balochistan. The likelihood of the Baloch people getting independence appears bleak. The situation cannot be compared to what happened in Bangladesh in 1971. For starters, Bangladesh or the then East Pakistan was totally surrounded by India, and the battlefield was isolated. This hampered the actions of the Pakistan military, but was conducive for the operations carried out by the Mukti Bahini and later, by the Indian Armed Forces. The population of Bangladesh was more than the population of then West Pakistan, and suppressing a people’s movement of such proportions was a virtual impossibility for the Pakistan army.

Balochistan has a small population - about 1.2 crore, which is about 5  percent of the total population of Pakistan. However, it comprises about  40 percent of the area of Pakistan. The Baloch is 52 percent of the population, with the Pashtuns accounting for 36% and others the remaining 12%. With these statistics, it appears a virtual impossibility for Balochistan to become an independent entity, unless there is external aid. 

Here, geopolitics comes into play. The two foreign neighbours of Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. Iran has a restive Baloch population in its Sistan-Balochistan province and will not fan the flames of independence in Balochistan. Similarly, Afghanistan has a large Baloch population bordering Balochistan and it will do nothing to fan the flames of Baloch separatism for its own interests. India does not have a land border, so can de precious little to assist the people in their just demands.  


On the flip side, however, the Pakistan military will be unable to regain total control of the area, precisely for the same reasons. Insurgency in Balochistan will hence continue unabated in the region, with varying levels of violence.


CPEC will remain disturbed and will require protection. As of now, over 30,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in its protection and this level of commitment will only increase in the days to come. The economic miracle that Pakistan is hoping for from the CPEC is not likely to materialise, considering the volatile security situation that prevails over much of Pakistan. Added to that is the bleak economic situation of Pakistan, which is worsening by the day. High inflation, coupled with low growth, increasing joblessness and an ever growing population adds to the cocktail of poor governance within the country.


Gwadar, in my view, will at some point of time, be taken over by the Chinese, who will use it as a naval base. Such a scenario, to my mind is at least a decade in the horizon and things may change by then. But the Indian security establishment needs to factor in growing Chinese presence in the area and build its naval assets accordingly. 


What can change the above hypothesis is an implosion within the Pakistan military or a rapprochement taking place between India and Pakistan on the one hand and the warring Afghan groups on the other. An India-Pak rapprochement does not suit the Pakistan military narrative as their place in the Pakistani governance structures will come under question. In Afghanistan, the Taliban will not settle for anything less than total control over the country and the present establishment will not be willing to meekly surrender. So the possibility of a civil war looms large in the country. But stranger events have taken place, so peace, though unlikely, is not an outcome that can be ruled out. 


The Pakistan military can implode, if the levels of radicalisation within the rank and file cross the tipping point. As of now, the Pakistan military is stable, but an implosion within the military could have possible fallouts in the further bifurcation of the country. A possible scenario could be a tie up between Sindh and Balochistan for an independent state. Together, it is a viable proposition. 


The options for India remain limited. Whatever commitment the Govt of India gives to the people of Balochistan must be on a long tern basis and should be sustainable. It should continue to support an Afghan peace process which is Afghan owned and Afghan led. And it should concentrate on increasing its economic and military might, to remain a relevant player in future. 


Thank you. Jai Bharat, Jai Hind







 


 

Wednesday, January 13, 2021

Valour, Courage and Righteous Conduct: The Sine Qua Non of the Indian Army

When India became independent in 1947, Gandhi’s charisma and his philosophy of Ahimsa (non-violence), which had been imbibed by the Congress Party which assumed power, led some people in authority to believe that India would no longer need an army to defend herself. That bit of myopic wishful thinking ended almost as soon as it had begun, for soon after Independence, India was plunged into its first war with Pakistan, when the Pakistan army, in the guise of armed raiders attacked Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. That was the first call to duty for the Army in the newly independent India and the men in olive greens came out with flying colours in heroically saving the Valley and pushing back the Pakistani forces to roughly the positions held today by both countries and now called the Line of Control.

Besides fighting the war, the army also escorted convoys of fleeing Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. Many soldiers laid down their lives in protecting their brethren from imminent death at the hands of the marauding Muslim mobs in Pakistan. The escorts were small groups, sometimes just 20 to 30 men, but they unflinchingly faced the marauders who were in the thousands and executed what can only be described as the most incredible evacuation in strife torn areas. And in all this, their personal conduct was unimpeachable.


When the first Indo-Pak war was fought in 1947-48, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army was General Sir Robert Lockhart who served from 15 July 1947 till the end of the year. He was relieved by another British officer, General Sir Roy Bucher, who in turn served for just over a year and handed over the reins of the Indian Army to Lt Gen KM Cariappa, on 15 January 1949. General Cariappa thus became the first Indian Chief of the Indian Army and to mark this momentous occasion, 15 January is celebrated every year as Army Day. Over the years, the military leadership has honed the Indian Army into a force capable of tackling internal and external threats, out of area contingencies, natural disasters and calamities and in providing aid to the civil authority, when called upon to do so.


In valour, the Indian soldier is second to none—an inheritance from ancient times. In 326 BCE, Alexander, one of the greatest conquerors of all times, after vanquishing the mighty Persian Empire, set his eyes on conquering India. But at the banks of the river Jhelum, he met with the steely resolve of Porus, a minor Indian King, who stopped the mighty emperor in his tracks. That resolve of steel is till aglow in todays Indian Army, which rightly is held in high esteem across the world. But along with courage and valour, the Indian Army is known for its righteous conduct—a tradition carried over from the time of the Ramayana and Mahabharata.


Be it the four wars which India has fought—three with Pakistan and one with China, or its continuous engagement in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CICT) operations, both within and beyond India’s frontiers, or even the numerous United Nations peace keeping missions that the Army has been engaged in, the conduct of the Indian Army has only drawn applause and acclaim across the world. Writing on this aspect of the Indian Army after the Liberation War of 1971, the well-known Pulitzer winning journalist, Sydney Schanberg, commented in the New York Times, that “I never saw them do a thing wrong not even when they saw just how bestial the enemy had been.” That one line sums up the high ethical standards of the Indian Army, despite grave provocation by some of its adversaries. 


While operating in Sri Lanka in Operation Pawan, the local population reposed total faith and trust in the Indian Army. I had the privilege to serve with my unit for two years conducting CICT operations, and at all times, the Indian troops deployed in Sri Lanka retained the trust of the local Tamil and Sinhala population as well as of the Sri Lankan Government and security forces—A commendable achievement indeed. Is it any surprise then, that despite continuous operations in J&K over the last three decades, the Army is held in the highest esteem amongst the local population in the Union Territory of J&K. The same can be said of the Army’s operations in the Punjab, and in North East India. Its reputation in the various UN peace-keeping missions it has been engaged in is unmatched and speaks volumes of the Indian soldier.


The Army of today is in many ways different from the Army of yesteryears. It has better firepower and mobility and is well equipped to handle the modern battlefield, especially in terms of communications and battlefield transparency. But what has not changed is its core characteristics of valour and courage, along with a high sense of moral purpose. 


Today, as the nation celebrates the Army Day, the Indian Army continues to maintain vigil on the borders with both its hostile neighbours, in extremely difficult terrain and weather conditions. The external threats are menacing with perpetual Chinese provocation in Eastern Ladakh and  a hostile and belligerent Pakistan not letting up in its proxy terror war against India. But the nation is at peace, because they have their Army to defend them. An Army with a tradition of valour and a very strong moral compass. That is what makes the Indian Army a truly remarkable and unbeatable force.

Chintan - 15 Jan 2021

Saturday, January 9, 2021

Modernising the Military within Budgetary Constraint

IntroductionIndia’s defence budget has generally been in the range of 2 to 3 percent of its GDP. This includes the expenditure on pensions. Since 2009, defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has shown a decline (Figure 1). In terms of actual expenditure, however, there has been a year on year increase in the defence budget, as indicated by the graph (Figure 2). While the increase in defence expenditure over the ten year period 2009-2019 has doubled, in real terms it only reflects a marginal increase when inflation is taken into account.  


Figure 1

Figure 2





India’s military modernisation has not kept pace with the requirements of the force, largely due to budgetary constraints. To make up for decades of neglect in a short time frame is a Herculean task, especially as additional budgetary support is unlikely to be made available. There is a view in defence circles, more so in think tanks,  that the defence expenditure should be increased to a minimum of four percent of the GDP for at least one decade, to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, but that outcome is unlikely to come about. The expenditure on defence, as a percentage of the total Union Budget is about 15 percent, and any further increase can only be at the cost of other sectors, which are equally vital for the welfare of the country. Either other means would have to be found to augment the budget or ways and means have to be found to optimise what is available.


With limits on what can be spent on defence, we need to look at optimising efficiencies. A great deal can be achieved through a radically different approach to the indigenisation effort, better and faster decision making for defence acquisitions, and through revitalising defence manufacturing, both in the public and private sector.


Indigenisation


Technology is an enabler, and this is one field where India has to push hardest. As of now, India is behind the technological curve in many defence related fields, and has to play the catch up game. A dual approach is required. One, getting to world standards in existing technologies and two, getting on board, as far as future technologies are concerned.


India’s space programme is a success story and this needs to be replicated in other sectors. The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), also called NavIC, (Acronym for Navigation with Indian Constellation) is now operational and has been recognised as a component of the World-Wide Radio Navigation System (WWRNS) by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). NavIC covers India and an area 1500 kms around it and provides accurate real-time positioning and timing services. This has both military and civil applications. The US Congress formally acknowledged India’s NavIC global navigation satellite system (GNSS) to be an “allied system” in its finalised 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The US military and government users can now utilise NavIC along with the US Global Positioning System (GPS), QZSS, and Galileo. Presumably, it will also allow similar privileges for India’s military and government to formally utilise GPS. The advantages are huge. More importantly, the commercial applications are immense, which can offset the cost of the establishment, and over time become a profitable venture. Niche technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics , must hence be modelled on the lines of ISRO.


Another success story is in missile development. India has developed a range of strategic and conventional missiles, under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, which began in the 1980s. Despite being put under sanctions in 1989 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which led to the denial of certain technologies, India successfully developed indigenously all the restricted components denied to it by the MTCR. While certain missiles are still being imported by India, like the Russian, French and Israeli BVRAAMS (Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missiles), these will soon be replaced by missiles made in India like the Astra, which is already fitted on the Su 30 Mk 1 aircraft and are now being tested on the Tejas. With export curbs on weapons and platforms being eased, India hopefully will start exporting advanced weapon systems like Tejas, helicopters and missiles, to achieve the target set by the Prime Minister of weapons exports of USD 5 billion by 2025. To this can be added small arms which have a wide market. Export of the recently inducted Joint Venture Protective Carbine (JVPC), which is now being introduced into service could be considered.


Decision Making


Decision making on defence deals in India has been slow and tardy which has exponentially raised the cost of military equipment and delayed acquisition of critical systems. The saga of the Rafale fighter aircraft is a case in point, wherein after years of effort, the deal was scrapped at the last moment in 2014. Later, it was left to Prime Minister Modi to make an executive decision to buy 36 aircraft off the shelf, as a strategic imperative. Time delays and cost overruns have cost the nation dearly, both in terms of operational capability as well as financial outflows. Unfortunately, the Rafale case is not an exception, but rather the norm in defence acquisitions.


In the Army’s modernisation process, the artillery is finally looking up. But here too, we have seen many twists and turns which have led to exponential increase in costs and impacted on operational capability. The Bofors scam saw the supplying Swedish firm being blacklisted in India. But the gun itself was an excellent piece of equipment which later proved its worth in the Kargil War. India had paid for the technology transfer and had the blueprints to manufacture the gun, but failed to do so. It took three decades before the Army got to acquiring the next gun for the artillery—the M777 Howitzer from the US. This was folly of the highest order. Had we manufactured the gun in the 1980s itself, it would have hastened the modernisation of the artillery by at least two decades at a much lower cost. We must not repeat such follies again. The manufacture of an advanced version of the gun, called Dhanush is only now under production and the Army has placed an order for 114 guns.


The army’s search for a 155 x 52 mm Towed Howitzer finally culminated a decade back in two vendors vying for the same. Israels’ Elbit for its ATHOS 2052 howitzer and the French Nexter, for its Trajan gun. Elbit was in partnership with Bharat Forge and Nexter with Larsen and Toubro. In 2019, Elbit won the contract. But in the meantime, DRDO had also got in the act and made the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), which is currently under the last stages of trials and has 95 percent indigenous content. For manufacture of ATAGS, the DRDO is partnering with Bharat Forge Limited, Mahindra Defence Naval System and Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division.


There appears to be a lot of confusion in the thought process, both in the artillery directorate and in the MoD, over the way ahead. We have two guns now, the indigenous ATAGS being priced at Rs 15 crore and the ATHOS at 10.5 crore, with Bharat Forge a partner in both. Faster decision making would have resulted in India already having a few hundred howitzers from Elbit, and the indigenous manufacture of the same could have started by now. This is one area which needs great reform. A time bound acquisition procedure is an imperative and we need to build the eco-system for the same.


The second is the productivity factor of the public sector work force. While it is appreciated that certain costs must have been sunk in by DRDO in research and development of ATAGS, it cannot lead to such a wide price differential. The same occurred also in the Rafale fighter aircraft deal, wherein the fighter jets to be manufactured in India were projected at a higher cost than the ones bought in full built condition from Dassault. The figure below gives a comparison carried out ten years ago between a private sector company (Ashok Leyland) and a public sector company (Vehicle Factory Jabalpur) in terms of cost and worker productivity. The situation across the board is not too dissimilar, and calls for great reforms in the public sector entities and in the working of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB).



Indicator

VFJ

AL

VFJ

AL


2008-2009

2008-2009

2009-2010

2009-2010

No of Employees

4809

11938

4368

13,662

Output per Employee

0.15

0.49

0.17

0.50

Per unit cost of Employee

3.83

1.04

4.79

1.04



An Acquisition Methodology


A look into advanced weapon systems and platforms acquired recently or which are in the process of being acquired indicates that huge budgetary support is required for the same. The S 400 deal with Russia comes at a cost of Rs 40,000 crore. The deal for 36 Rafale fighter jets from France cost India Rs 59,000 and weapon acquisitions from the US, largely for attack helicopters, strategic lift aircraft and artillery guns also came at a heavy price. Add to this the acquisition of missiles and other weaponry from Israel and the overall cost of defence imports gives a very grim picture. Reversing this trend will take time but that would depend on developing indigenous manufacturing capability in multiple sectors.  


It would be worth considering buying into technology for creating an eco-system which at present does not exist. An example is in the aviation sector. Brazil’s Embraer was up for sale and Boeing was in talks with them for the last two years for purchase of 70 percent shares of the entity for USD 4.2 billion. The deal however fell through in April 2020. What happens if India was to get into such a deal and buy out the Embraer which manufactures single aisle aircraft. As of now, Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL), a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), is the only major entity in the country in the aviation sector. For the aviation industry to come of age in India, the country needs to build its own passenger aircraft. So, if an Indian corporate acquires Embraer, backed by the government, it would give a huge boost to the aviation sector. Government support would be required to make it a leveraged buyout (LBO), enabling the banks to be the lenders for the deal. By 2040, India would need at least 2,300 such aircraft, at a cost of USD 320 billion. Indigenous manufacture would create tremendous economic opportunities as well as an indigenous eco-system as also provide strategic benefits. Starting from scratch to build such aircraft would take decades of effort and would mean diverting precious resources to the effort. LBO’s is an option India must seriously consider. We would need to change our operating methodology to execute such deals which can give great payoffs over a period of time. Buy outs can be considered for other sectors too, like semiconductor manufacturing. This involves front-end fab manufacturing and the back-end assembly, including packaging and testing. India has done well in design and verification for the semiconductor industry. However, it continues to import 100% of the chips, memory and display. The cost of imports of semiconductor chips alone is a staggering USD 10-12 billion every year.


Conclusion

While financial outlays are important, much can be achieved in military modernisation though improved acquisition procedures, informed decision making, improved productivity of the public sector work force, co-opting the private sector in a big way in the manufacturing process and by creating a business friendly eco-system. We also need to shed our ideological chains with respect to exports of weapons and platforms. Thankfully, this process has begun. Most importantly, we need to have a clear vision of the future and plan accordingly. Much can still be achieved with what we have, should we set our minds to do so.

Saturday, January 2, 2021

The Blue in India’s Flag

India’s Flag is oft called the Tricolour, for its three horizontal stripes in colours of saffron, white and green. But what is often missed is the fourth colour in the flag—the blue wheel in the centre. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made reference to this, in an address he delivered at the commissioning of the ‘Barracuda’ in Mauritius on 12 March 2015. Referring to the blue wheel, he said, “To me, the blue chakra or wheel in India’s flag represents the potential of the blue revolution, or the ocean economy”.

The Barracuda—a 1,300-tonne offshore patrol vessel (OPV) built by Garden Reach Shipyard & Engineers (GRSE), was the first warship ordered by a foreign country from an Indian shipyard. In his address at the commissioning of the ‘Barracuda,’ Prime Minister Modi sketched out India’s vision of the Indian Ocean. He spoke of the criticality of the Indian Ocean to the future of the world, and stated that all would prosper when the seas were safe, secure and free for all. The vision he articulated contained five key elements. These were:

  • India will do everything to safeguard its mainland and islands and defend its interests. Equally, India will work to ensure a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region.
  • India will deepen economic and security cooperation with her friends in the region, especially her maritime neighbours and island states and will  continue to build their maritime security capacities and economic strength.
  • Deepen mutual understanding on maritime challenges and strengthen our collective ability to address them through regional mechanisms for maritime cooperation.
  • Seek a more integrated and cooperative future in the region that enhances the prospects for sustainable development for all.
  • The primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean rests on those who live in the region. However, India recognises the fact that there are other nations around the world with strong interests and stakes in the region and India is deeply engaged with them.

From the above, emerged the acronym SAGAR or Security and Growth for All in the Region, which has become the fulcrum of India’s vision in the Indian Ocean and in the wider Indo-Pacific region. It is a tool for India’s development, and towards that end, this shared marine space would need to be protected. In a sense, this represents a transition in the Indian thought process, which for long has thought of itself as a continental power, but now also sees itself through a maritime lens.


Indian history records a long maritime tradition, covering a period of over five millennia. As far back as 2500 BCE, the Harappans built tidal docks at Lothal for berthing and servicing ships, and were perhaps the first in the world to do so. India’s strong naval tradition finds reference in her sacred scriptures, as also in Kautilya’s Arthashastra and in other texts. The Chola empire saw the zenith of ancient Indian sea power, but with the decline of the Cholas towards the end of the 13th century, Indian sea power declined. The Arabs gradually edged out the Indians from the sea faring trade and were themselves sidelined when the Portuguese came on the scene and assumed control of the seas in the early sixteenth century. There was a brief period which saw the resurgence of Indian sea power with the rise of the Marathas. Maharaja Shivaji had started creating his own navy, which reached the zenith of its power under the command of notable admirals like Sidhoji Gujar and Kanhoji Angre. But with the death of Angre, Maratha naval power declined.


An interesting aspect to be noted is the co-relation of India’s economic prosperity and its control of the seas. As India lost control of the seas, external forces entered to rule over the land, which in turn led to India’s economic decline. Post independence, the Indian security establishment had its focus on the land borders, as India had inimical neighbours. But now, maritime trade is becoming a key indicator in India’s growth story. And hence the need for a vibrant Ocean policy, emphasising the need to keep the sea lanes free, safe and secure for all.


Soon after assuming office for the second term in May 2019, the Narendra Modi-led government set a target of taking the economy to USD 5 trillion over the next five years. This was a daunting and an ambitious undertaking, but given that the fundamentals of the economy were strong, it was not something which could not be achieved. The pandemic caused by Covid 19, a virus that emanated from China, will certainly delay the timelines by perhaps another three to four years, so we could be looking at 2028 to achieve the laid down target. But a more important point to note is that to achieve the target, greater dependence has to be on the blue economy, which conceptualises the oceans as “shared development spaces”.


The World Bank has defined Blue Economy as the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihood and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health”. India’s development effort will increasingly be dependent on the Blue Economy and the Oceanic space thus becomes vital for India. According to the Ministry of Shipping, around 95% of India's trading by volume and 70% by value is done through maritime transport. India’s Sagarmala programme is designed to promote port-led development in the country through harnessing India's 7,500 km long coastline, 14,500 km of potentially navigable waterways and strategic location on key international maritime trade routes. A total of 189 projects have been identified for modernisation of ports involving an investment of Rs 1.42 trillion (USD 22 billion) by the year 2035. Peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is hence a key requirement for India’s development agenda.


Growing Chinese naval and air power in the South China Sea and its expansionist designs in the region, have understandably raised concerns, not only amongst the ASEAN countries, but also among other regional powers, primarily the US, Japan, Australia and India. China’s ‘nine dash line’ is being unilaterally imposed on China’s smaller neighbours, in utter disregard to the UN Conventions. Evidently, there is a need to push back against Chinese expansionism and towards a rule based order. 


The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, popularly called the Quad—an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India, is at present being maintained by semi-regular summits, information exchanges and military drills between member countries. There is a need to formalise the Quad and make it agenda and rule based, to prevent Chinese hegemony in the region. This would encourage some if not all the ASEAN countries to join the grouping, which will likely also see the United Kingdom, France and some other European nations coming in. 


A united effort is required to check Chinese expansionism, especially as the UN appears to be singularly ineffective in this regard. India must play a leading role towards that end, confronted as she is by Chinese hegemonist attitudes in its northern and Eastern borders. This is better done sooner rather than later, otherwise the world may well witness another moment, where lack of decisive action when required, led to the Second World War. Keeping the sea lanes of communication safe, secure and free for all, as stated by Prime Minister Modi, must hence be a priority not only for India, but for all who value peace and freedom.

Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Why Macron's Plan to Tame Islam Will Fail - by Mark Durie

https://www.meforum.org/61858/why-macron-plan-to-tame-islam-will-fail?goal=0_086cfd423c-e1da221963-33708581&mc_cid=e1da221963&mc_eid=1a35181d6f


On October 2, President Emmanuel Macron delivered a "Fight Against Separatism" speech to the French parliament, announcing stricter measures to crack down on the growing influence of what he called "radical Islamism" among France's Muslim minority, proportionally the largest in Western Europe. This ideology, he said, has "a proclaimed, publicised desire, a systematic way of organising things to contravene the Republic's laws and create a parallel order, establish other values, develop another way of organising society which is initially separatist, but whose ultimate goal is to take over [the Republic] completely."


Macron's proposals include abolishing home-schooling, closing down independent schools, devoting more resources to policing and courts, bringing community language teaching under the control of the state, restoring policing in Muslim-majority zones, which he acknowledges has been let slide, reversing ghetto­isation, preventing radical takeovers of Muslim organisations, and rolling back sharia creep, such as the public cafeterias which now offer only halal-compliant menus, and the separation of sexes in public swimming pools.


One of the examples Macron gave is that the use of sub-contractors to deliver public services has led to sharia restrictions being imposed on the public against government policy. For example, sub-contracted Muslim bus inspectors on public buses have been refusing admission to women if their clothing does not meet their sharia-informed expectations. Macron calls such practices "forced radicalisation." Another proposal is that recipients of government grants will be required to sign up to secularism contracts.


Islamic Education


The most ambitious feature of Macron's October 2 speech is his plan to change the way Islam is organised in France, making it more compatible with the Republic's values. Whilst conceding that "it is not the state's job to structure Islam," Macron wants the state to help build a Muslim-led training body, funded by a tax on pilgrims to Mecca, which will allow France to establish "a form of Islam in our country that is compatible with Enlightenment values." This, he hopes, will lead to an Islam which "can peacefully coexist with the Republic, respecting all the rules of separation [of religion and state] and calming all voices." In essence he wants Muslim citizens to be French first, and followers of Islam second.


Macron intends to achieve this by two means. One is to cut back foreign influence, by closer regulation of foreign funding and ending the importation of imams from other countries. At present around 300 imams move to France each year from Turkey, Morocco and Algeria. The other means is to set up an institute to train French Muslims as clerics inside France, under the supervision of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). These measures, Macron hopes, will mould French Muslims into loyal republicans.


Macron also proposes to promote greater understanding of Islamic faith and culture through investing in higher education and research: "We must, very clearly, re-invest, on a massive scale, in the field of social sciences, history, understanding of civilisations." Macron wants to prevent debates about Islam from becoming "ideological and exclusively political ... I want France to become a country where we can teach the thinking of Averroes, Ibn Khaldun, to be a country that excels in the study of Muslim civilisations." In support of this, Macron announced a grant of ten million euros to the Foundation for Islam in France.


France's 1905 Law on the Separation of the Churches and State prohibits the government from interfering in the internal affairs of religions, including by providing finance. This is a limitation Macron must work around, for in reality he wants to re-direct the path of French Islam. The 1905 law was established to regulate the relationship between the state and Christian churches, but its application has been extended to cover the state's relationship with all religions, including Islam.


In Islamic law, there is a principle that if a ruler establishes Islam, he must be obeyed. This potentially allows Muslim states to control mosques directly. Muslim states can use this control to promote radicalism or to inhibit it. For example, in Turkey, imams are appointed by the state, which also mandates that they be trained at state-controlled institutions, and the Turkish government has been driving a program of re-Islamisation of Turkey using, among other means, the imams under its control. In contrast, the 1905 French law prevents the state from exerting such control over mosques, and in any case, from the perspective of Islamic law, it would not be open to Muslims to allow a mosque to come under the control of a secular state.


Across Europe, many universities teach Christian theology, and after 9/11, some Western governments, including Germany, Holland, the UK and France, attempted to influence Islam in their countries by setting up university imam-training programs. Imported imams had been found to be conduits for radicalisation of the young, and governments had come to realise that most imams being brought in from Muslim countries lacked familiarity and sympathy with the culture and values of their new country.


Although a flood of new funding became available in the years after 9/11 to establish university Islamic seminary programs, such programs failed in their objective of influencing the course of Islamic theology in the mosques. Very few graduates of these centres have ended up pursuing careers as imams, and the centres themselves have abandoned the attempt to provide imam training, some closing and some being quietly transitioned into university Islamic Studies programs. This has created more academic positions for Muslim scholars and potentially hastened the Islamisation of knowledge, but has done nothing to limit radicalisation in mosques. The project to establish university-based, state-funded seminary programs failed for several reasons. The most fundamental problem is that Muslims inevitably perceive these programs to be attempts by infidel states to control and divert Islam from its correct course. This entirely valid perception invalidates the program in the eyes of those who employ imams.


One of the functions of an imam is to provide guidance on issues to do with Islamic law. For Muslims to submit to an imam's guidance they must be able to place their trust in his piety and knowledge. By definition, non-Muslims are considered to be "astray" from the rightly guided path of Islam, so an institution set up and influenced by a secular state to train imams, with an agenda to influence Islam towards secular values, will never be trusted by pious Muslims. From a traditional Islamic perspective, the credibility of someone's credentials as a religious scholar or teaching lies, not in the university degrees they hold, but in the reputation of their teachers for piety and religious knowledge. A Muslim scholar-in-formation traditionally acquires knowledge by sitting at the feet of qualified teachers, and receiving an ijazah (licence) from each one. The ijazah will include a scholarly chain of transmission of the knowledge gained from teacher to teacher, stretching back centuries, often to the companions of Muhammad. A degree in Islamic Studies from a secular university will not command the same authority.


At the same time, if it were not for security concerns, no Western government would have been offering to fund the education of imams. This obvious fact also invalidates state-sponsored seminary programs, because those Muslims who do not sympathise with acts of terror will not countenance any suggestion that Islam can be held responsible for self-styled jihadis' heinous acts. This rejection of responsibility for acts of violence is apparent in the expressions of outrage from around the Muslim world about President Macron's defence of freedom of speech. None of the protesters who are incensed by Macron can accept that France is under threat from Muslim violence. Even when Muslims are killing innocent French citizens in atrocious ways, what enrages Muslims in other countries is the perceived victimisation of Muslims.


Muslims will also assume that a state-funded program of imam-training will come under the close scrutiny of the Security Services, which is another reason to distrust it. Another consideration is the reality of foreign control over European mosques. In Holland, more than half the mosques are funded, and their imams appointed, by the Turkish state, and in the UK more than half the mosques are controlled by the Pakistan-based Deobandi movement, and most of the rest are Salafist or Balrevis, both of which are movements which are controlled from outside Britain. Such mosques will not surrender their pulpits to university-trained “imams."


President Macron's proposal to task the CFCM with training imams could avoid some of the problems associated with university-level imam training. However, it still runs the risk of being considered a thinly veiled attempt by the state to influence Islam—which of course it is. Another problem is that the CFCM is not at all a theologically liberal or secular-minded organisation, and it cannot be taken for granted that the imams it produces will embrace the values of secularity and the Republic.


Islam and Secularism


In Macron's Western and indeed post-Christian understanding of secularity, religion is a personal, individual affair, and to follow a religion is an expression of individual freedom. By this reckoning, religion belongs in the home and in the church or mosque, not in public life. Thus Macron revealingly said in his October 2 speech, "If spirituality is a matter for the individual, secularity [laïcité] concerns us all." Not so in Islam. In Islam spirituality is not merely a matter for the individual. Rather, religion is integral to politics: gaining power for Islam is the responsibility of all Muslims, and establishing the religion of Islam is the whole reason for an Islamic state's existence.


A fundamental problem with Macron's renewal program lies in a difference between Islam and Christianity, namely that the very idea of secularity is alien to Islam. The principle of the separation of church and state rests on biblical foundations. It was noteworthy that Marine Le Pen quoted a phrase of Jesus Christ in her recent speech against Islamism, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and render to God the things that are God's" (Mark 12:17). Nothing like this exists in Islam: everything is Allah's, and the core of Islam is about the exertion of power in service of Allah. As Bernard Lewis repeatedly pointed out, classical Arabic did not even have the language to make the distinction between church and state, sacred and profane, spiritual and temporal, and ecclesiastical and secular. Such terms entered Arabic via the writings of Arabic-speaking Christians.


In the West, secularism as a political ideology arose in response to long-standing struggles between spiritual and temporal authorities. These struggles took place in a Christian theological milieu which considered these two to be distinct. The separation of church and state was deployed to prevent the state from using religion to reinforce its authority, and to prevent the church from using state power to enforce its doctrines. That such mutual exploitation could be seen as a problem in the first place arises from the biblical contrast between the "kingdom of this world" and the "kingdom of God." However, from an Islamic perspective, the whole point of the state is to impose Islam.


What this means in practice is that Islam sees religion and political power as inseparable. To establish Islam means to establish an Islamic public order, including the imposition of sharia, and to impose sharia requires access to power. This means that an inclination to seek such power, and for it to prevail, is hard-wired into the DNA of Islam. This is reflected in Sura 3:110, which defines the mission of the Muslim community, namely to command and forbid: "You are the best people raised up for mankind. You command what is right and forbid what is wrong, and you believe in Allah," and in Sura 9:33 which states that Islam's destiny is to prevail over other religions, "It is he [Allah] who sent his Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth [Islam] to make it prevail over every religion."


Islamic Separatism


In addition to all this, Macron greatly underestimates the extent to which the theological characteristics of the Islamism he deplores are in fact integral to Islam. He was troubled in his October 2 speech by what he considers to be a trend to separatism in Muslim communities. He partly blamed this on past public government policy failures, which allowed immigrants to become isolated in the banlieues. Nevertheless, the will to separate is a part of orthodox Islamic spirituality, and because Islam does not separate the temporal from the spiritual, the separation Muslims seek is not merely spiritual, but political and cultural.


In classical Islamic jurisprudence it was forbidden for Muslims to live outside of an Islamic state for more than a few days at a time. This prohibition is particularly strong in the Maliki school of jurisprudence practised in the north-west of Africa, which is the dominant form of Islamic law practised in France. The duty to migrate into Islamic territory goes back to Muhammad, who said it must apply until the day of resurrection. Today a vast influx of Muslims into Western nations has effectively over-ridden this principle, and considerable efforts have been made by Muslim scholars in recent years to accommodate Islamic "minority jurisprudence" to the reality of Muslim minorities who have settled permanently outside the House of Islam. Over recent decades, statement after statement by eminent orthodox Muslims has advised Muslim immigrants living in Western lands that they must keep themselves separate from the surrounding culture, and not prefer it to Islamic culture.


For example, in 1985, the Washington-based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) invited the newly formed International Fiqh (jurisprudence) Academy (IFA) of the OIC (now the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation) to determine whether it is lawful in Islam for Muslims to become naturalised citizens of non-Muslim nations. Apparently this was quite a hot potato, and the IFA chose not to publish a formal answer, but it did gather opinions from some of the most eminent Muslim scholars of the day.


One of the opinions was provided by Judge Muhammad Taqi Uthmani, a Pakistani jurist, permanent member of the IFA, and counted the most influential Muslim in the world in the 2020 edition of The Muslim 500: The World's 500 Most Influential Muslims. Uthmani is the spiritual leader of the Deobandi movement, which controls most of the mosques in the UK. Uthmani's answer to the IIIT question was that naturalisation is absolutely forbidden if the nationalised Muslim's intention is to advance their new nation, be proud of it, or resemble its people in practical ways (such as in clothing or cultural conventions). This conclusion was so obvious, Uthmani said, that "there is no need to give evidence" for it. Yet this is exactly what Macron is asking of French Muslims: that they should be transformed into loyal and proud citizens, adopting and conforming themselves to the values of the Republic.


The Islamic principle of separateness is based on verses of the Koran, as well as traditions of Muhammad in which he instructed Muslims to keep apart from infidels, and not to like them or imitate them. Thus, in his response to the IIIT's question about naturalisation, Shaykh Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Salami, the Grand Mufti of Tunisia, cited the Koranic verse, Sura 5:51: You who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians as friends [allies or guardians]. They are friends of each other. Whoever of you takes them as friends is already one of them. Surely God does not guide the people who are evildoers.


The principle of separateness is expressed in the well-known Arabic phrase al-wala' wa-l bara' fī Allāh, which means "loyalty and disavowal for Allah," and is often translated as "loving and hating for Allah's sake." This means holding fast to and loving what is pleasing to Allah and accords with his laws, and keeping separate from and hating what Allah dislikes and is not in accord with his laws. Muhammad said, "Truly the strongest grasp on faith is that you love for the sake of Allah and that you hate for the sake of Allah."


The rejection of the non-Muslim other is also grounded in many verses of the Koran which speak critically of the kuffar (infidels) and urge Muslims not to associate with them, for example Sura 60:4, which advocates enmity towards non-Muslims: There was a good example for you in Ibrahim [Abraham], and those who were with him, when they said to their people, "Surely we are free of you and what you serve instead of God. We repudiate you, and between us and you enmity has shown itself, and hatred forever, until you believe in God alone.”


Sheikh Shady Alsuleiman, president of the Australian Council of Imams since 2016, when asked in November 2002 whether al-wala' wa-l bara' is a part of Islamic faith, replied that it is "obviously a part of [our] belief" and its meaning is that Muslims are obligated to give allegiance to Islam and to Muslims, and not have allegiance to the kuffar nor follow their ways. Then the sheikh began to discuss the duty to migrate. He observed that Muhammad's command not to live among the kuffar was a policy for Medina, when Muslims were strong, not for Mecca, when Muslims were weak. Today, he said, Muslims do not hold power, and there is not even any genuinely Islamic country for them to migrate to: the implication is that Muslims must accustom themselves to living among infidels and under their authority. He also observed that if Muslims communicate hatred to non-Muslims, no one would convert to Islam. Sheikh Shady concluded that, as long as Muslims are "in a state of weakness ... we can't implement the rulings of strength." The clear implication is that until they have power, Muslims must accustom themselves to accepting life under non-Muslim dominance, and the open manifestation of rejection of the infidel awaits the hoped-for but not yet realised political ascendancy of Islam.


This reply is interesting as much for what it does not say as for what it does say. Alsuleiman does not disavow al-wala' wa-l bara', but moderates its application, on pragmatic grounds. He understands that this a sensitive subject. As long as Muslims are vulnerable and dependent for their security upon others, proclaiming this teaching is risky as it could incite hostility against Muslims and inhibit the spread of Islam. It must be emphasised that Sheikh Shady is an orthodox Muslim cleric, not a Salafi. Is he an "Islamist"? Perhaps not, at least, not as long as Islam is politically weak. Nevertheless, his remarks show that disavowal of non-Islam is integral to his faith, not an aberration, and it is only in view of their vulnerability due to lack of political power that he advises Muslims not to manifest hostility to the surrounding culture.


Another theological trend which stands in the way of Macron's program is Islam's tendency to treat groups of people, defined on religious grounds, as collectives with starkly delineated moral qualities. The Koran treats believers and non-believers as groups with contrasting attributes: Muslims are righteous and the kuffar are inherently hostile and intent on destroying Islam. Attacks on Christians and Jews in and outside churches and synagogues demonstrate the principle of collective culpability. Such collectivist thinking was also on show when the former prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, tweeted in response to President Macron that "Muslims have a right to be angry and kill millions of French people for the massacres of the past." He explained that "since you have blamed all Muslims and the Muslims' religion for what was done by one angry person, the Muslims have a right to punish the French." In other words, if the slaughter of a French schoolteacher gives Macron the right to criticise Islam, then Muslims also should be afforded the right to punish the citizens of France for what Macron said. It is all about the collective.


Macron's underestimation of the challenge of Islam is apparent when he takes Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Ibn Khaldun to be names to conjure with. These two scholars from the past are meant to stand for all the great Muslim thinkers whose wisdom should be taught in French schools, as part of a grand project to gain a "better understanding of the civilisations that coexist on our soil." In reality, if they were alive today, both Averroes and Ibn Khaldun would be considered Islamists. Ibn Khaldun criticised the separation of religion and politics in Christianity, proudly observing that "in the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission and the [obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force." In contrast, the weakness of Christianity, he asserted, is that Christian rulers are not "under obligation to gain power over other nations, as is the case with Islam."


For all his commentaries on Aristotle, Ibn Rushd was an orthodox Sunni jurist who affirmed the obligation of an Islamic state to wage war against non-believers to spread Islam: "According to the majority of scholars, the compulsory nature of the jihad is founded upon [the Koranic verse] 'Fighting is prescribed for you, though it is distasteful to you'" (Sura 2:16). He also wrote, in agreement with Ibn Khaldun, "Why wage war? The Muslim jurists agree that there are two purposes [for Muslims] to fight the People of the Book [Christians and Jews] ... it is either for conversion to Islam or exacting tribute." So much for defensive jihad.


The irony is that Macron was right about the need to understand these scholars and their message. The French do need to gain a better understanding of the foundations of Islamic civilisation, if only to better appreciate that the theological roots of Islamism can be found in the orthodox mainstream of Islam itself. Then they might come to understand how difficult and even fantastical is the project Macron is envisaging, to lead French Islam through an Enlightenment, and at the same time to inspire Muslims and non-Muslims to "love the Republic again," together. This is a policy grounded in denial. It is blind to the reality that the French doctrine of laïcité presupposes a particular understanding of "religion" and its distinctness from politics, which arose from a cultural context shaped by the Bible. Islam is something else, and the French policy of laïcité is ill-equipped to contain and manage Islam's mode of being, with its all-encompassing social, cultural and political claims.


Macron wants French Islam to embrace the (biblical) idea of separation of church and state. Ironically, he wants to transform Islam for the sake of laïcité. For its part, French Islam wants the state to allow it to enforce its own dogma of separation, namely the separation of Islam from non-Islam, and Muslims from non-Muslims.


Macron was right to discern that Islamists want to be separate in order, eventually, to take over completely, but although there is much that France can do to contain this ambition, Macron cannot preach freedom of religion to Muslims and at the same time expect them to voluntarily limit their religious horizons to the kind of private, individual piety that he approves of. Let France enforce its laws upon its citizens, but do not expect French Muslims to voluntarily submit to an "Enlightenment" which many of them will rightly discern is contrary to their deeply held religious beliefs and values.


Conclusion


Some measures in Macron's proposals are long overdue, such as shutting down unregistered religious schools, limiting the entry of foreign-trained imams, limiting the enforcement of sharia upon the French public, greater regulation of foreign financing, and closer monitoring of mosques. Macron is also right to identify radical political Islam, or "Islamism," as a threat to the Republic. That too little has been done for too long to counter this threat is because the problem has been ignored, misunderstood and denied. The frog has been slowly cooking for a long time, and now it wants to jump out of the pot!


Regrettably Macron, even as he attempts to shore up France's resolve, has misunderstood the depth and extent of the problem. Some of his proposed measures can no doubt help strengthen France's grasp on its secularity, and he is right to focus on the key role of imams in advancing the separation of Islamisation, but his hope of "forging a type of Enlightenment Islam in France" will prove to be a vain one. French Muslims will not allow Islam to be patronised by being turned into a client of the secular state. They will discern the hypocrisy of trying to interfere in Islam for the sake of upholding a separation between church and state.


Mark Durie is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum, founding director of the Institute for Spiritual Awareness, and a senior research fellow of the Arthur Jeffery Centre for the Study of Islam.