India - China Relations: Deal with a Measure of Pragmatism

Much has been written on the possible future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Will India and China be partners? Or, are they unavoidable rivals? Some, like the late Bharat Verma, visualised an intransigent China which, sooner rather than later, would attack India - a throwback to the 1962 conflict which rankles India but which, surprisingly, is not much talked about in China. The optimists, on the other hand, promote the concept of ‘Chindia’ - a term coined by Goldman Sachs, suggesting that both India and China could jointly create a new world order. In April 2005, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called the economic cooperation between the two countries as the ‘two pagodas of hardware and software’, some were ready to believe that the statement reflected a deep rapprochement between the two countries which could give rise to a new Asian trade and power bloc. Both these viewpoints appear to be oversimplifications, reflecting long held fears and hopes in equal measure.

In the Preface to his book ‘India’s China Policy’ (Indiana University Press, 1962), P. C. Chakravarti wrote: “The key to Sino-Indian relations lies hidden in the soil of Tibet. It is on the rocks of the Roof of the World that our friendship with China will flourish or flounder”. Written in 1961, the premise of the author still appears to be valid. The unresolved border and territorial dispute between the two countries that led to the conflict in 1962 and the refuge given by India to the Dalai Lama, are issues which continue to bedevil relations between the two countries. Chinese sensitivity on the question of Tibet is well known, China being wary of any type of support being given to the independence movement in Tibet. To these historical legacies have been added Chinese plans for hydrographical projects on the Yarlung Tsang Po river, Chinese concerns over the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement deal and the increasing military cooperation between India and the USA, which China perceives as being directed at isolating China. On the Indian side, Chinese support to Pakistan - especially in the field of nuclear and missile technology and the strategic nature of its partnership with that country – have led many Indian defence analysts to believe that the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India is being done at the behest of China. This is to ostensibly confine India to the backwaters of South Asia and prevent its emergence as a dominant player in world affairs, in conformity with a Chinese saying that ‘one mountain cannot hold two tigers’!

In 1954, the Indian leadership believed that Sino-Indian relations could be conducted with ‘mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non aggression, mutual non interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit’. Thus was signed the Sino Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954, relating to trade and other contacts between ‘the Tibet region of China and India’. This was also called the Panchsheel Treaty. The ink had hardly dried on these admirable sentiments when acrimony broke out between the two countries on what constituted the border, and of border violations by each side. Real politics is devoid of sentiment as rightly stated by Dr Buchanan-Hamilton, who when advising Lord Hastings against the occupation of Nepal, pointed out that ‘a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace’ (Papers Respecting the Nepaul War - The Administration of the Marquis of Hastings in India, India House Library, Page 45). A newly independent India had yet to learn that lesson.

The border issue remains intractable, even after nineteen rounds of talks, the latest being held in April 2016 amid growing discord between the two nations over Beijing blocking India’s bid to get JeM chief Masood Azhar banned by the UN. This is hardly surprising. The dispute is both a border dispute as well as a territorial dispute, with China occupying the Aksai Chin area and also laying claims to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The origins of the dispute were not created by the present disputants, the dispute having originated under Manchu China and Imperial Britain, against the backdrop of the ‘great game’ of the nineteenth century between Russia and Britain. Today, India and China are trying to solve a problem which their imperialist predecessors found either insoluble or undesirable to solve. The narrative on both sides has reinforced legacy attitudes, which makes acceptance of any position well nigh impossible.

Rather than attempting to solve the problem, it may be more prudent to simply freeze the issue for future generations to solve. In the interim, both sides could look into the possibility of delineating the positions held by each side on the ground with exchange of maps, and without any prejudice to the claims of either side. Even this limited course of action has little traction with the Chinese, making any further headway impossible. The Chinese have nothing to lose by keeping the issue open as they have the military muscle to hold on to the areas they are currently in occupation of. These they consider to be ‘de facto resolved issues’. Negotiation for the Chinese implies seeking an adjustment of the areas they lay claim to, which is not just the Tawang tract but the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Obviously, India cannot accede to this. The larger danger for India lies in the growing military asymmetry with China. As of now, India can effectively ensure against a Chinese military adventure to forcibly take its claimed areas. Within a decade from now, the military situation may tilt so drastically in Beijing’s favour that she could be tempted to resolve the issue through the use of force. That situation can be guarded against by ensuring adequate military capability to defend Indian interests. Diplomacy can only take us that far.

The river waters issue is much hyped, and often misunderstood. It is true that China is building dams at the Great Bend in the Yarlung Tsang Po river; but a deeper understanding of the issues is required. Firstly, as of now, there is no technology available to take the waters of the Tsang Po river to other parts of China. Secondly, and more importantly, is the fact that the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, as they enter India to become the Siang river, constitute just a small percentage of total water flows in the Brahmaputra basin. The average discharge of the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India is just about 1980 cumec. This increases to 16,240 cumec as the river enters Assam to form the Brahmaputra. This is mostly due to the very high levels of precipitation within the catchment areas in India and Bhutan. So the water issue is not about the Chinese attempting to divert the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, but the possible impact of what could happen if the waters are dammed and released suddenly. India needs to have an agreement with China on information sharing of water flows in the Yarlung Tsang Po, which could subsequently be followed up with a treaty.

Transparency in data sharing and the development of required data matrix is the ultimate necessity. With the association of basin neighbours, India and China should organise such a Core Data Agency (CDA). In the meantime, India should, on its own, keep regular tabs on the water inflow from the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India to form the Siang river and thereafter, periodically monitor flow levels all along the course of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. Satellite imagery of the area will also keep India abreast of the ground situation with respect to water flows and construction activities on the Yarlung Tsang Po.

The Tibet issue and the status of the Dalai Lama are of serious concern to China. The Dalai Lama remains the honoured guest of India, and this is a situation not to the liking of the Chinese. Most Tibetans are not prepared to accept Chinese sovereignty, and the struggle within Tibet, though largely peaceful, simmers and could take a violent turn. What were to happen after the passing away of the present Dalai Lama? That is a question which worries the Chinese, as they seek ways and means to put their own nominee as the next Dalai Lama. While India has not allowed the Dalai Lama to carry out political activities in India, his very presence poses a threat to the Chinese, as he is seen as a symbol of Tibetan resistance. Some observers see the Chinese claims over the Tawang tract as a ploy to ensure that the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama does not come from Tawang, which is the seat of one of the sacred Buddhist monasteries. How this pans out in the future will impact ties between India and China.

China remains concerned about the strategic partnership developing between the USA and India, just as India is concerned about the close strategic embrace of Pakistan by China that is perceived to be aimed against India. While the key to the India-China relationship does lie on the soil of Tibet, geopolitical realities also play a significant role towards that end. Today, Sino- Indian politics go far beyond their mere bilateral significance. While India is too big a player to be the willing handmaiden of any particular power bloc, the fact remains that it suits US interests to leverage India as a counterweight against China. To that extent, both US and Indian interests stand aligned against what is perceived to be an increasingly assertive China on the world stage. While continuing with enhancing the security component of its relationship with the US, India would continue to develop its relations with China through cooperation on the economic front as well as on issues which affect both countries in the international arena.

China however, is unlikely to let go of its support to Pakistan, despite the fact that such support could have a negative impact on China’s restive Xinjiang province. The much hyped China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) should, however, not cause too many sleepless nights in New Delhi. The internal security situation in Pakistan – especially the movement within Baluchistan for independence, the ongoing conflict against the Taliban in FATA, and the various ethnic and sectarian conflicts that Pakistan is plagued with – all work against the fruition of the envisaged corridor. It would be in India’s interest to extend moral and diplomatic support to the people of Baluchistan, which would serve Indian interests in obviating the China-Pak strategic axis.

Equally worrying for India as of now, is the presence of a large number of Chinese personnel, many of whom are from their military, in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of POK. Reports emanating from the region point to demographic changes being made in the area, with a large number of Sunni settlers from the Punjab coming into the region, altering both its ethnic and sectarian demography. India would do well to extend its support to the indigenous people of the region, to preserve their lifestyle and culture.

In the final analysis, India needs a measure of pragmatism in its policy of dealing with China. Increased trade flows do not by themselves lead to an absence of conflict. The excellent personal rapport developed between the Indian Prime Minister and his Chinese counterpart, while useful, is also not a guarantor of peace. That comes about through hard power. India will need to develop its economic and military might to safeguard its vital national interests. Militarily, it is vital that India maintain adequate deterrent capability in the oceans as well as over the Tibetan skies. That is the guarantor of peace.

Note: Published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol 11, No 1 - Jan-Mar 2016.

THE BATTLE OF SARAGARHI

Beneath Saragarhi's ruined walls,

They found a fitting grave;

For Saragarhi bears the fame,

They gave their lives to save.

What does ‘Honour, Courage and Sacrifice’ mean to a soldier. Perhaps there is no better way of explaining these words than in the telling of the epic battle of Saragarhi, which was fought on 12 September, 1897 during the Tirah campaign of 1897-1898.

Tirah is a mountainous tract of country, inhabited mainly by the Afridi and Orakzai tribesman. A harsh place, it is embroiled even today in bloody conflict, though now it forms part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. At that time, this region was a part of British India and was home to a multitude of battle-hardened tribes for centuries. This was the period when the Russians were trying to make inroads into the continent via Afghanistan and the British, in response, made several incursions into Afghanistan to stop this adventurism by the tribes allied to Russia. The rivalry between Russia and Britain, played out over Afghanistan was popularly called the ‘Great Game’. To contain and keep the tribes in check the British manned a series of posts along the Hindu Kush ranges. These posts had in earlier times been constructed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh during the hey days of the Sikh empire and after its decline, these were taken over by the British for the same purpose.

To enable the smooth flow of trade via the Khyber Pass and prevent tribal raids, the British Indian Government paid a subsidy to the Afridi tribesman. In addition, they also maintained a regiment, composed entirely of Afridis, at the Khyber pass. That notwithstanding, the troops had to be ever vigilant against constant raids and skirmishes by the local tribesman. The arrangement put up by the British remained reasonably successful for the 16 years it was in operation. However, in 1897, the tribes rose in revolt against the British. To suppress the revolt, The British Indian Government launched the Tirah expedition under the command of General Sir William Lockhart in the latter part of 1897. Five companies of 36 Sikh, which had been raised on 20 April 1894 under the command of Col J. Cook, were sent in August 1897, under Lt Col John Haughton, to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These troops were stationed at Samana Hills, Kurag, Sangar, Sahtop Dhar and Saragarhi. 

In the tribal uprising, the tribals captured all the posts in the Khyber held by their own countrymen, and attacked the forts on the Samana Range near the city of Peshawar. During the first week of September, the Afridi and Orakzai tribesmen also launched a number of attacks on Fort Gulistan and Fort Lockhart, which too had earlier been constructed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Elements of 36 Sikh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Haughton, which had been moved to the area, had been successfully repelling these attacks from the tough, hardy Pashtuns. Fort Lockhart was located on the Samana Range of the Hindu Kush mountains. Situated a few miles away from Fort Lockhart, was Fort Gulistan, on the Sulaiman Range. Due to the forts not being visible to each other, Saragarhi was created midway, as a heliographic communication post. Saragarhi Post was thus nothing more than a small signalling station situated on a barren, wind-blown hill-slope between Fort Lockhart and Fort Gulistan.

Despite repeated attempts, the tribesman could not breach either Fort Lockhart or Fort Gulistan. So, on September 12, 1897, they changed their strategy and attacked Saragarhi instead, aiming to cut off the vital communication link between the two forts. The Pathan attack plan was simple. The tribesman would block the entry of reinforcements, which could come to the aid of Saragarhi and thereafter attack the post with full strength. By the morning of 12 September, the tribesman were in position, and were simply raring to go. At this time, Saragarhi was being guarded by a detachment of Sikhs. It was providential that the post had been reinforced just a day earlier, and now comprised of Havildar Ishar Singh, and 20 other ranks.

On the morning of 12 September, when Havildar Ishar Singh peered through the binocular from the watch tower of his post, he was rudely awakened by the sight that met his eyes. Far in the distance, columns upon columns and row upon rows of Pathans were advancing to his post, waving their swords and guns menacingly. The dust cloud kicked up by the thousands of horses was of such intensity that it partially blocked the rays of the sun. With a grim determination, Havildar Ishar Singh, readied his men for the battle - a battle that was to resound in the annals of military history as a feat of collective heroism, unparalleled in the history of the fighting arms.

Sepoy Gurmukh Singh, the detachment signaller, then went up an elevated mound to set up his heliograph and sent the first of many signals to Fort Lockhart.

“Enemy Approaching the Main Gate. Need Reinforcements.”

But there were no reinforcements forthcoming, for as Lt Col Haughton soon found out, the enemy had effectively blocked all routes from where aid could come.

“Unable to break through. Hold Position” was the terse message that was flashed from Fort Lockhart to the beleaguered troops at Saragarhi.

“Understood”, was the response flashed back by Gurmukh Singh. The fate of the post at Saragarhi was thus sealed. Haughton could do nothing but watch from Fort Lockhart, the events unfolding before his eyes. He counted at least 10 enemy standards (each representing 1,000 tribesmen) facing the 21 soldiers from 36 Sikh.

In the Saragarhi post the bugle was sounded and in a flash the troops formed up two line abreast, one row in a squatting firing position and the other standing as per the bugle’s tone. The troops were equipped with the Martini Henry breech loading rifle, which at that time was the standard British infantry rifle. They had first entered service with the British Army in 1871 and quickly became their mainstay. The Sikhs had only recently received these rifles, after all the British units were equipped, replacing the venerable Enfield. Capable of firing ten .303 calibre rounds a minute, it proved to be more than a match to the antiquated muzzle loading rifles possessed by the tribesmen. Bur mere superiority of the rifle was no match for the hordes that confronted Ishar Singh.

The defenders now stood ready to face the advancing enemy. Ten thousand soldiers of the enemy against just 21 of the defenders. Though the rifle had an effective range of 600 yards, Havildar Ishar Singh held his fire, allowing the enemy to come closer, the better to deal with them.

“Fire”, he yelled, when the enemy was just 250 yards from the post. The massed fire effect was deadly and the leading lot of the enemy crumpled to the dust. 

“Reload”, ordered Ishar and then the next volley was fired. But the enemy was not to be halted and the following lots of the enemy continued to advance towards the post.  

“Reload and Fire at Will”, ordered Ishar Singh and a hail of bullets soon followed the command. The ding dong battle continued till the first wave of attacks was beaten back and the enemy forced to regroup. However, the manual breech loading rifle had to be cocked every time to shoot, which was time consuming. The first wave of the enemy had fallen, but there were countless waves behind them. It would be but a matter of time before the hordes were at the gate.

The Pathans now changed their strategy, and approached the post from two directions., one towards the main gate and the other towards the gap at the fort. To counter the charging enemy, Havildar Ishar Singh gave his next set of commands.

“Squatting Soldiers to the Left, Standing Soldiers to the Right…QUICKLY…QUICKLY.

The highly disciplined soldiers followed the orders like clock work and once again the enemy attack was repulsed. This level of resistance was not expected by the tribesman and so they tried a different tack. With casualties on their side mounting, they offered the defenders favourable terms to surrender. This off course was rejected with contempt by the Sikhs. They were well aware of the atrocities committed against captured soldiers by the Pashtun or Afghani tribesmen. Castration, mutilation and skinning captured soldiers alive was one of the many ways tribal leaders instilled fear and control. The Pasthun were fierce warriors just like the Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army but lacked the chivalry aspect of the warrior ethos. In a poem titled “The Young British Soldier”, Rudyard Kipling had written these immortal lines:

“When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,

And the women come out to cut up what remains,

Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains.”

The enemy now reformed and resumed his attack on the hapless Sikhs, watched all along by their commanding officer from Fort Lockhart. All the while, Sepoy Gurmukh Singh continued flashing messages to the Fort, apprising them of the latest situation. Wave after wave came upon the defenders, who however, stoutly refused to either budge or flinch. The death toll on the enemy kept mounting, but their supply of manpower was endless. The defenders, however could not replace their losses and by noon were down to just ten men. After many unsuccessful attempts, the tribesman finally managed to breach one of the walls. By this time the battle, observed from the fort, had raged for the better part of the sunlit hours. With the enemy now in the inner perimeter, a determined Ishar Singh ordered his troops to fall back into the inner layer of Saragarhi, while he distracted and held the attackers at bay — another classic delaying tactic. After fierce and brutal hand-to-hand combat, Ishar Singh was killed, and the enemy now came into the inner perimeter, where the last phase of fighting took place. Each man stood up to be counted, and fought on till there was no breath left in him to fight. Finally, only one man, Sepoy Gurmukh Singh remained. At 1530 hours, Gurmukh passed his last message to Fort Lockhart.

“Closing down the wireless.” Request Permission to fix bayonet and fight the enemy.

Permission was accorded and Gurmukh packed his equipment into a leather bag, fixed his bayonet and prepared to take on the enemy from the strong room. One soldier, alone against thousands. With the Sikh battle cry, “Jo Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal (Victory belongs to those who recite the name of God with a true heart)” on his lips, he took on the enemy, and reportedly killed about 20 Pashtuns, before he was killed, the Pashtuns having to set fire to the post to eliminate him. And then a deep quiet descended on the post, even the gods acknowledging the feat of heroism, rarely witnessed in the annals of military history.

Having destroyed Saragarhi, the Afghans turned their attention to Fort Gulistan, but they had been delayed too long, and reinforcements arrived there in the night of 13-14 September, before the fort could be conquered. Thus ended this epic saga - a feat of resistance, unparalleled in history. When the relief party finally arrived at Saragarhi, there were over 600 dead Afghans and 21 soldiers of the 36th Sikhs. Of the six hundred enemy dead, some would have been the result of artillery fire in the retaking of the post. The Afghans themselves stated that they had lost about 180 killed and many more wounded during the engagement against the 21 Sikh soldiers. But for just 21 men, to have held off thousands of the enemy tribesman for over seven hours, was in itself a remarkable feat of gallantry, achieved earlier only in the classic battle of Thermopylae, fought between a Greek alliance and the Persian Empire in 480 BCE.

When informed of this feat, Britain’s Parliament interrupted proceedings and rose to give a standing ovation to these 21 valorous soldiers — all of them Indians, all of them Sikhs — for what was undoubtedly a tremendous act of collective bravery, and one of the greatest ‘last-stands’ in military history. The collective courage of the 21 Sikh soldiers moved Queen Victoria so much that her majesty decreed that due to conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity beyond and above the call of duty displayed by the 21 soldiers, all of them shall be awarded the Indian Order Merit (IOM) posthumously. IOM is the highest award for bravery given to colonial troops and it was equivalent to the British Victoria Cross. This was the only time in history of warfare where each soldier who took part in the same battle was given the highest award. 

ROLL OF HONOUR

1.  Havildar Ishar Singh (No 165)

2.  Naik Lal Singh (332)

3.  Lance Naik Chanda Singh (546)

4.  Sepoy Sundar Singh (1321)

5.  Sepoy Ram Singh (287)

6.  Sepoy Uttar Singh (492)

7.  Sepoy Sahib Singh (182)

8.  Sepoy Hira Singh (359)

9.  Sepoy Daya Singh (687)

10.  Sepoy Jivan Singh (760)

11.  Sepoy Bhola Singh (791)

12.  Sepoy Narayan Singh (834)

13.  Sepoy Gurmukh Singh (814)

14.  Sepoy Jivan Singh (871)

15.  Sepoy Gurmukh Singh (1733)

16.  Sepoy Ram Singh (163)

17.  Sepoy Bhagwan Singh (1257)

18.  Sepoy Bhagwan Singh (1265)

19.  Sepoy Buta Singh (1556)

20.  Sepoy Jivan Singh (1651)

21.  Sepoy Nand Singh (1221)

The breached wall of Saragarhi, after it was recaptured.

NAVARATRI

Commentary by Sri Swami Krishnananda

Navaratri is one of the great Hindu festivals. As the name implies, this festival is celebrated for nine days in which God is adored as Mother. A period of introspection and purification, Navaratri is traditionally an auspicious time for starting new ventures. During this period, Durga, Lakshmi and Saraswati are worshipped as three different manifestations of Shakti or Cosmic energy.

 The festival of Navaratri has a very deep spiritual significance. It represents the march of the human soul from bondage to eternal liberation. The march of the soul is dramatic, a beautiful, sonorous, musical advent and is described in Hindu Scriptures in ‘The Devi-Mahatmya’, in majestic Sanskrit prose. The realisation of this freedom is the dramatic aspect of the great worship of the Divine Mother during the nine days of Navaratri, culminating on the tenth day in Dassehra, which depicts the victory of good over evil.

The march of the human soul to liberation as described in the Devi-Mahatmya takes place in three stages of three days each. In the first stage, Adi-Sakti awakes Maha-Vishnu who was asleep, so that he may destroy the original demoniac forces, Madhu and Kaitabha. In the second stage the same Sakti manifests Herself as Maha-Lakshmi and overcomes Mahishasura and Raktabija. In the last stage, Maha Saraswati destroys Sumbha and Nisumbha. The final victory is achieved on the tenth day and is celebrated as Vijaya-Dashmi. That is the day where one masters the forces of nature and achieves oneness with the Divine.

The first three days of Navaratri are devoted, in psychological terms, in overcoming desire, anger and greed. In the Devi-Mahatmya, the demons Madhu and Kaitabha represent greed, anger and desire, which have to be overcome. Both Madhu and Kaitabha emerged out of the dirt in the ear of Vishnu. These demons represent the lower powers of nature, which are seen as dirt, (Mala) hindering the march of the human soul to freedom. This dirt represents desire (Kama), Anger (Krodha) and Greed (Lobh). The significance of regarding them as dirt is that they cover the consciousness in such a way that it appears to be not there at all. Just as a thin glass covered with black tar cannot be seen, so also the soul cannot march to freedom till the consciousness is revealed. The first three days of Navaratri is hence devoted to worship of Goddess Durga to enable us to slay the demons Madhu and Kaitabha and enable the emergence of consciousness. In the Bhagavad-Gita, the Lord tells us (Chapter III, Verse 37) that it is desire and anger born of rajas, which is the foulest enemy on earth. The root cause of compulsive desire is the Nature-instigated delusive duo of desire and its corollary of anger, or frustrated desire. Desires are silken threads of material pleasures, which the spider of habit continuously spins around the soul to form the cocoon of ignorance. The soul must manage to cut through this stifling cocoon of ignorance to reemerge as the butterfly of omnipresence.

 Once the dirt is removed, the onward march of the soul has to overcome ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, the tossing of the mind. The next three days of Navaratri are devoted to worship in order to overcome ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, represented in the Devi-Mahatmya by the demons Mahishasura and Raktabija.

 The demon Mahishasura was an inexhaustible opponent as he had the ability to change his form. Sometimes he is an elephant, in an instant he has changed his form to a bull and then again to something else making it virtually impossible to subdue him. In a similar manner, the mind is difficult to subdue as every minute it changes its form and refuses to be still. When subdued in one form, it reemerges in another. The more we try to oppose ‘Vikshepa Sakti’, the greater will be its manifestation in some other form. This is much like the demon Raktabija whose every drop of blood could bring forth another demon like him. When the Blessed Goddess severed the head of Raktabija, each droplet of blood, which fell on the ground, created another demon and soon there were millions of demons, which had to be slain. As there was no end to this process, the Goddess invoked Maha-Kali, who spread her tongue across the world. Now, when the demons heads were severed, the blood fell on Kali’s tongue and thus all the demons were annihilated. In a similar manner, we have to adopt the technique of sucking out the very roots of desire and not merely chop of its branches. Otherwise, desires will take various forms like Mahishasura. Desire is not an outward form or an action. It is a tendency of the mind, an inclination of consciousness. This then is the nature of ‘Vikshepa Sakti’ the distraction tossing and turning of the mind, which is the second stage of opposition to overcome in the march of the soul to freedom.

 Ancient masters have told us that while ‘Karma Yoga’ can remove ‘Mala’ or dirt of the psychological structure by unselfish and dedicated service, Vikshepa or distraction of the mind can be removed only by worship of God, by ‘Upasana’. While Karma removes Mala, Upasana removes Vikshepa. After this we enter the third stage of the march of the soul to liberation, and here we encounter the greatest opposition of all, ‘Ajnana’ or ignorance. Ignorance is a subtler opposing power than either Mala or Vikshepa. The Devi-Mahatmya tells us that the three gunas, namely Tamas, Rajas and Sattva have to be subdued. While Mala represents Tamas, Vikshepa represents Rajas and Sattva represents the truth. We always praise Sattva and regard it as a very desirable thing. But it is still an obstacle, much akin to a transparent glass that is placed between us. We have to get through the glass to comprehend and touch the reality that lies beyond. While one can have a vision of reality, looking through the glass, its comprehension lies beyond our reach. It is hence an obstacle to be overcome which acts in a double form; as complacency or satisfaction with what has been achieved and an ignorance of what lies beyond. Too often does the seeker get deluded that the goal has been achieved. These two aspects of Sattva are indicated by the demons, Sumbha and Nisumbha. They have to be overcome by the power of higher wisdom, which is Maha-Saraswati.

Action, contemplation and knowledge are the three stages through which we have to pierce through the veil of Prakriti or the three gunas. The festival of Navratari thus celebrates the dance of the cosmic spirit, in its supernal effort at self-transcendence. Maha-Kali is invoked to destroy the demons Madhu and Kaitabha. The Blessings of Maha-Lakshmi are sought to overcome the demons Mahishasura and Raktabija. And finally Maha-Saraswati is invoked to rid us of the demons Sumbha and Nisumbha. Thus, transformation takes place across the whole range of Prakriti from Tamas to Rajas, from Rajas to Sattva and from Sattva to Supreme Vijaya, mastery in the Absolute, God realization.

All our scriptures, Puranas and Epics, all our ceremonies and celebrations, all our festivals thus have this spiritual connotation, a significance which is far transcendent to the outer rituals which is involved in their performance. Every thought, every aspiration, every ritual and every duty of ours, every action that we perform automatically becomes a spiritual dedication of the soul, for the sake of this one single aspiration which it has been enshrining in itself from eternity to eternity. It is always a song of the soul.

So through the worship of Maha-Kali, Maha-Lakshmi and Maha-Saraswati we worship Mula-Prakriti, Adi-Sakti in her cosmic dance-form of transformation, prosperity and illumination. Through the worship of Maha-Kali, a person breaks the barrier of Tamas and becomes a master and a progressive soul commanding all powers and getting everything that is desired. Through the Worship of Maha-Lakshmi, we break the barrier of Rajas and achieve enlightenment. And finally, through the worship of Maha-Saraswati we break the barrier of Sattva and achieve self-realisation. Thus the festival of Navaratri is in reality a presentation of the cosmic dance form to teach the path a soul must take to achieve total liberation. It shows the path from opposition to prosperity, from prosperity to enlightenment and from enlightenment to self-realisation, culminating in total victory, Vijaya Dashami on the tenth day of the festival.   

LESSONS FROM THE 1965 WAR

No war takes place in a vacuum. There are indicators strewn all over, but the rhetoric of peace sometimes blinds decision makers to the possibility of conflict. Such indeed was the case in 1965. The hyperbole that emanated from Pakistan in the early sixties was of such decibels that it should have set the alarm bells ringing in South Block. A cursory look at the content of their media - both radio and print should have caused India to sit up and take notice, but for some unfathomable reason, war with Pakistan was never considered as a serious possibility. That represents the first lesson of the 1965 war - both political and military. Pay heed to what the enemy is saying - and prepare accordingly. Today, when Pakistan talks of using nuclear weapons against India, it cannot be construed as bluff and bluster. The antidote must be readied now, to include signalling of resolve and intent, as much as development of capacity and capability.

Preparedness for war is a long drawn process. No nation is ever able to maintain a hundred percent readiness rate. But the capacity to reach that level within a set period of time must be aimed for. The early sixties were a period of rejuvenation for Pakistan. They were getting stronger economically through beneficial alliances with the West, which led to the flow of great economic and military assistance. India was reeling from the 1962 debacle and internally, its economy was poor, wheat was being imported from the US, and there were myriad agitations taking place in the country, from the language agitation in Tamil Nadu to insurgency in the Northeast, a restive Punjab, agitating for Punjabi Suba and increased dissonance in Jammu and Kashmir, for a variety of reasons. Geopolitically, Pakistan had all the major powers aligned with it, or at lease not overtly hostile to it. India, was not so fortunately placed. A perceived Indian weakness was the trigger which led to war. Which brings home the second lesson. A strong military is the best antidote to war. This again is a function of capacity, capability and will. Politically, the lessons were well learnt as India went in for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union, which enabled India to successfully pursue operations in East Pakistan in 1971, leading eventually to the birth of Bangladesh. But militarily, the lessons, though known, are far from being addressed. We still have a weak military industrial complex, the government run research institutes and defence production facilities continuously underperform, hollowness within the Services, especially in the Army and Air Force is high, and we are today, the worlds largest importers of defence equipment. This opens up the country to foreign pressures and forced compromises and is an aspect which need to be urgently addressed. While the present government is cognisant of and sensitive to the issues involved, and the Prime Minister no less, has embarked on an ambitious ‘Make in India’ campaign, the road ahead is long and arduous and will require dramatic changes in the functioning of the Ministry of Defence and other organs of the government of India.

A brief overview of the war makes it easy to compartmentalise it into various stages. Operations in Kutch, in April 1965, Operation Gibraltar, launched by Pakistan in August, Grand Slam launched by Pakistan on 1 September, and then the Indian counter offensives on night 5/6 September and 8 September, called Operations Riddle and Nepal respectively. And to complete the picture, a counter launched by Pakistan in Khem Karan - Operation Mailed Fist on 8 September.

India was unfortunately surprised at each stage. We were caught unaware at Kutch, which should have forced us to raise our guard. We did not do so and were surprised again in J&K when thousands of infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line (CFL) on 1 August, as part of Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar. To add salt to our festering wounds we were surprised yet again when Pakistan launched Grand Slam on 1 September in Chhamb. Divine providence and incompetence of the Pakistan military prevented the fall of Akhnur, which lay exposed and was open to capture that very day itself. We were surprised for the fourth time with the sudden appearance of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division in Kasur. This constituted serious drawbacks in our external intelligence collection methodology, which persist till date. The Army too, missed obvious signals and was repeatedly surprised. Serious lacunae still exist in our intelligence set up, as reflected by Kargil in mid 1999. While efforts are being to made towards this end, much more needs to be done towards integrating the efforts of various agencies and introducing at least some levels of accountability in the system. 

The operational and tactical level also threw up a host of lessons which have applicability today.

Foremost is the need to be mentally and physically prepared for war. In 1965, there was a feeling which existed throughout the field army, that there would be no war. Despite Kutch, despite Gibraltar, despite Grand Slam, units on the ground were not sure whether they would actually go to war or not. This constitutes a very serious failure of command, especially at the level of brigade and above. Ultimately, when units were pushed into battle, they were not mentally prepared for war. The imperatives for secrecy were such that troops which went into battle on the first day, on night 5/6 September, went in hopelessly unprepared, lacking briefing and a clear concept of what was expected of them. The enemy was certainly surprised, but the advantage was frittered away in a lack of direction - a result of commanders at division level and below, not being clear about their tasks or the end state objectives to be achieved. It however redounds to the credit of the units and formations that they still performed creditably, despite the limitations faced by them.

The 1965 war was fought in silos, with no worthwhile integration taking place in operational plans between the Army and the Air Force. It was apparent that both sides were fighting their own war, independent of each other, leading to a lack of synergy in operations. This proved to be costly and constitutes yet another important lesson of the 1965 war - the necessity to bring forth the total combat power of a country against an adversary. We are still far from achieving that goal, despite mouthing platitudes on such issues. The aspect of integrating the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ though a Chief of Defence Staff is repeatedly stressed, but action on that front remains slow due to a host of factors, not least being resistance within the Ministry of Defence and the three Service HQ themselves. This would require political will to pull through, much on the lines of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, of the United States. 

Administratively, the field army was ill prepared for war. It seem surprising that units and formations went into battle, including the famous 1 Armoured Division, without adequate maps of the area. These were peace time issues which unfortunately were not addressed. It continues to be India’s Achilles heel even today as our experience of Operation Pawan and other out of area contingencies shows. The Survey of India comes under the Ministry of Science and Technology, and much greater integration is required in its functioning with the armed forces. The Armed Forces too, need to be more proactive in projecting their demands well in time.

It also seems surprising that troops went into battle in the plains without anti tank weapons. The 106 mm anti tank gun was made available to troops of 4 Infantry Division only on 7 September 1965. Why this was not done in the months leading up to the war indicates severe administrative lapses at senior levels of command. Communication equipment was also deficient/ unreliable, which seriously impacted the conduct of operations. A lot of these deficiencies stand rectified today, but it needs to be emphasised that communications at the ground level, need to be reliable and foolproof. Preparation for war takes place during peace time and commanders need to hone their administrative skills to avoid such lapses.

Finally, a word about leadership. At the tactical level, the leadership was commendable. That continues to be the state today. At the operational level, the leadership exhibited was weak and vacillating. Even today, the focus in the military is not so much on winning the war, as ensuring that we do not lose. A more offensive orientation in senior military leadership is required. In 1965, we missed many opportunities to exploit success. XI Corps operations could have exploited the success achieved in the opening stages of the offensive when Dograi was captured. There were other fleeting opportunities during the war which were not seized. The biggest failure in offensive operations was however the stalling of 1 Corps operations on 8 September. Boldness shown on that day could have led to the defeat of the Pakistan army, but the momentum was allowed to lapse due to faulty appreciation of ground realities. That opportunity was not to come again. Herein lies the challenge for the Armed Forces. While we continue to produce outstanding tactical commanders, very few come up to the level of acumen as displayed by Lt Gen. Sagat Singh in 1971. That needs to change.

Overall, the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces is something which the nation can be proud off. But  we would do well to remember, that going to war is a complete national effort. The wherewithal to fight long drawn out battles must come from within the country, which means that we have to concentrate on building capacities, capabilities and skills. These are long term efforts, but only through such proficiency will we be in a position to prosecute and win wars. Most importantly, the existence of military capability, remains the best antidote to war.

Published in SALUTE Magazine, Aug-Sep, 2015

An analysis of 1965 Indo-Pak War

A study of the 1965 War between India and Pakistan makes for interesting reading, but more importantly, even fifty years later, holds important lessons for the country. 

The war was brought on by Pakistan’s intransigence and failure to accept the fact that the accession of the state of J&K to India was final and could not be undone.  To keep the Kashmir issue alive in the international arena, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the Kashmir Publicity Committee in 1964. It was this committee that first mooted the proposal to President Khan, to send Pakistani army personnel, disguised as infiltrators into J&K, to create an uprising in the state, which would then be followed up by a quick offensive by the Pakistani army to capture the strategic township of Akhnur. President Khan and his army chief, General Musa, initially demurred, as they felt that such a move could lead to a full scale war with India. However, In April 1965, Ayub Khan gave the go ahead for these operations despite his army chief still having reservations on the subject. Consequently, in August 1965, about 8000 to 10,000 infiltrators crossed over into J&K to create a mass uprising in the state in an operation codenamed Gibraltar.

Though the Indian Army was initially taken by surprise, it reacted swiftly and with firmness and by the end of the month, most of the infiltrators were either killed or captured. The few that remained, were thoroughly demoralised and by mid-September had exfiltrated back to Pakistan. The operations conducted by 19 Infantry Division also resulted in the capture of the strategic Hajipir Pass on 28 August 1965, which gave India a direct link between Poonch and Uri. the capture of the Hajipir Pass also cut off the major ingress routes into J&K. While Gibraltar had been defeated, Pakistan continued with the second part of its plan, which envisaged the capture of Akhnur in an operation codenamed ‘Grand Slam’. 

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan carried out a surprise attack on Chhamb. At this time, the defences in Chhamb were held by 191 Infantry Brigade. The brigade had four battalions, two of which were deployed in the Kalidhar  ranges, one on the ceasefire line (CFL) in the plains sector and the fourth battalion around the Mandiala heights near Chhamb. Beyond Chhamb, upto Akhnur, there were no forces available to guard positions in depth. For this operation, Pakistan used two armoured regiments to spearheaded an attack launched by an infantry division and supported by the fire of over a 100 artillery guns. 

Despite the overwhelming superiority of the Pakistani forces, which outnumbered the Indians by more than six times, the defenders put up a staunch resistance. Though the lone battalion holding defences along the CFL was overrun, the depth defence held out and the Pakistanis could not cross the Munawar Wali Tawi that day. That night, Indian forces withdrew in good order to take up defences in Akhnur. On 2 September, Pakistan occupied Chhamb as the Indian forces had withdrawn the previous night. Here, they made the strategic blunder of waiting for two days before resuming the offensive. By that time, Indian troops had taken up defences in Jaurian and also in the Fatwal ridge, which prevented the enemy from capturing Akhnur. 

To relieve pressure on Akhnur, India launched operations against Pakistan across the International Border (IB) on 6 September. This forced the Pakistanis to pull back their forces in the Akhnur sector as Indian offensives threatened the Pakistani townships of Lahore and Sialkot. 

Indian offensive operations in the Lahore sector were carried out by XI Corps, on three axes, to threaten Lahore. These operations were launched on 6 September with mixed results. In the Khem Karan Sector, the attacks launched by 4 Infantry Division were beaten back by the Pakistanis, with heavy losses to own troops. On 8 September, Pakistan launched a counter attack with its 1 Armoured Division, with the avowed aim of capturing Amritsar and Delhi. In a heroic defence put up by the troops of 4 Indian Division, from 8 to 10 September 1965, in the fields astride the villages of Asal Uttar and Chima, more than a 100 Pakistani tanks were destroyed. This was a serious body blow to Pakistan which now had no capability left to carry out offensive operations. This was the place where CQMH Abdul Hamid was awarded the Param Vir Chakra for gallantry in operations, for single handedly destroying a large number of enemy Patton tanks, before he himself was killed by enemy tank fire.

The Indian offensive in the Sialkot sector started on 8 September, with an advance by India’s 1 Corps, but did not achieve much headway initially. Thereafter, it was resumed on 11 September and the township of Phillora was captured. This area saw some of the heaviest tank battles since World War 2, in which the enemy’s 6 Armoured Division suffered very heavy casualties. However, India could not capture the strategic township of Chawinda, which would have enabled the Indian forces to completely destroy Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division. When the ceasefire took effect on 23 September, Indian was in possession of vast amounts of Pakistani territory, but the Pakistan Army had not been defeated. However, India had achieved its wartime aim of protecting Jammu and Kashmir from aggression and in destroying a major part of the enemy’s offensive potential.

An analysis of the war throws up many shortcomings, which India would do well to heed. the first of these was the failure of intelligence. India was surprised by Operation Gibraltar, launched on 1 August and again by Grand Slam launched on 1 September. We also did not know that Pakistan had raised a new armoured division which very nearly proved disastrous for us in Asal Uttar. This reflects a critical weakness in gathering external intelligence, which has been repeated in 1971 and later in Kargil. It is evident that India’s external intelligence agencies need to be revamped, otherwise we are likely to be surprised again.

Another weakness was in wartime preparations leading up to the war. There were critical shortages of basic requirements needed to prosecute war. The attacking troops did not have maps of the area, communication equipment was poor, many infantry battalions were still holding the outdated .303 rifle, anti tank guns were not available upto authorisation, and vehicles with the units were in short supply. In Asal Uttar, the 106 mm recoilless guns were made available to the units only on 7 September, just a day before Pakistan launched an attack! It was the sheer grit of the Indian Army which saved the day, but such callousness needs to be overcome. The problem areas that need to be addressed lie in the Ministry of Defence. Here, bureaucrats wield power without accountability and the Services have to shoulder responsibility without power. It is imperative that integration of military personnel in the Ministry of Defence takes place at the earliest, as recommended by various committees formed by the government. That we have still failed to do so points to a very serious lacuna in our defence preparedness, which may cost the country dearly in any future conflict.

Another major weakness was the total lack of integration in war plans between the Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each Service prosecuted its war independently, which resulted in lack of synergy in operations. This lacuna too needs to be overcome through institutionalising mechanisms for joint operations. A step has been made by creating the Integrated Defence Staff, but we have to go much further than this and create the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, who shall be the single point advisor to the Raksha Mantri, as is the norm in all modern militaries across the world. Resistance by the Services will have to be overcome by firm directions from the political authority.

Finally, we need to ponder why Pakistan took the gamble of carrying out offensive operations in August and early September, knowing fully well that this could lead to war with India. Simply put, they perceived India to be militarily weak. This was the time when Pakistan was equipped with modern military hardware from the West and its economy was robust and growing steadily. India, on the other hand was recovering from the after-affects of the 62 war with China and was beset with internal problems in the Punjab, J&K, Tamil Nadu and in parts of Northeast India. It was Pakistan’s belief that a quick offensive would give them disproportionate gains and that in the event of an all out war, the world body would call an early end to hostilities. Pakistani miscalculation led to war. 

Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. Let us therefore, remain prepared at all times.

Published in Organiser, Sep 13, 2015.

EMPOWERING THE SMALLER PLAYERS

An incident related by Lt Gen Baljit Singh, a veteran gunner officer that took place as far back as 1974 comes to mind when analysing the role that the MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises) can play in realising the national goal of ‘Make in India’. He was then commanding a SP Artillery Regiment equipped with the ABBOT Field Gun. At that time, recalls the General, 11 of the 18 Guns in his Regiment were declared "out of action” for want of replacements for the electric diode that activated the firing mechanism. This status prevailed for over a year as their was an embargo in the warranty clause that they could not use any derivatives and the spares had not been bid for in the contract. The regiment took the initiative of stripping the circuit and finding a replacement from the Bangalore electronic market for a mere Rs 20/- per piece. The guns were made functional and they all fired successfully in the Annual Practice Camp which was overseen by a Gunnery Instructor who reported that “All 18 guns fired to perfection on all ten days.”

The above incident simply highlights the fact that great capability exists within the country to manufacture a vast amount of equipment and spares required by the armed forces, which as of now is being imported. Let us now take a look at the more recent experiences of an Indian entrepreneur, Mr Sanjay KA, Director CbS. His firm indigenously developed in a period of two months, a ‘high technology engineering component’, which was being imported by one our defence ordnance factories in the hundreds at a price of Rs 30,000/- per piece. In a chance meeting with one of the defence GMs, the latter waxed eloquently on the ‘Make in India’ focus being given by the government to defence equipment. In the course of the discussion, the GM apprised Sanjay of a particular equipment being imported and casually enquired whether such a component could be developed in India, on a ‘No Cost, No Commitment’ (NCNC) basis. Sanjay took a sample and gave him the product within two months, of course on a NCNC basis. This was tested by the ordnance factory and found to be totally suitable. The cost of the equipment was a mere 7000/- which was less than 25 percent of the imported cost and the head of the ordnance factory gave a letter of appreciation to the firm for indigenously developing a high technology product in two months, which was being imported in large numbers. The firm has not taken any money for its prototype nor has it been given any order, but that is not the purpose of relating this incident. It is simply to highlight the fact that a great deal of talent is still lying untapped within the country, which if exploited could give great impetus to the ‘Make in India’ thrust, reduce foreign exchange outgo, increase employment and as importantly, strengthen the defence industrial base of the country.

As of now, India is mindlessly importing hundreds of defence related components which can easily be developed and manufactured by the MSMEs. A question that can legitimately be asked is ‘what prevents Indian industry from manufacturing such equipment on its own’? Apparently, the answer is rather mundane. Indian industry does not know what is required by the user. There is thus a need to make the information available through web sites, display rooms, regular exhibitions, interactions with industry, etc. The government must publicly disclose the information related to parts and components being imported (obviously, without intimating the end use), to enable Indian industry to become a player in India’s defence growth. In all probability, for many of the components, core capability already exists to manufacture such products of similar if not enhanced and superior quality. Only if private industry knows what is needed, will it be in a position to produce the same. As of now, in the name of secrecy and national security, Indian industry is not aware of what is required. The only people to benefit from such a situation is obviously the import agents, most of whom know how to tweak the system to their advantage. Thereafter, if the equipment is suitable and cost effective, there must be a commitment to buy the same. This would require a change from NCNC to NCFC - No Cost Full Commitment.

As of now, the Directorate of Indigenisation in the Army Headquarters compiles information pertaining to imports. However, this pertains only to direct imports. The Directorate has no mechanism to capture the imports by ordnance factories (OFs) and defence public sector undertakings (DPSU). Obviously, something needs to be done to provide all information in a format conducive for taking business decisions i.e. grouped for electronics, rubber parts, machined components etc. with approximate annual requirement and target price. This falls within the purview of the MGO’s Branch, which should take corrective action.

A suggestion given by Mr Nalin Kohli, President, Association of Small & Medium Knowledge Industries and Member, National MSME Board, is that the principles that apply to ‘Make Procedure’, should apply to indigenisation contracts also. In the former, (where only large companies can participate), two important principles are incorporated. First, 80 percent of the development cost is borne by the Government and second, there is an assured initial order/s. As of now, revenue purchases are governed by Defence Purchase Manual, which has a provision for paying 80 percent of development cost but there is no provision for an assured order. However, even the provision for a 80 percent development cost has not been used even once. Mr Kohli suggests that if make principles are incorporated in indigenisation orders and made applicable to MSMEs doing development work for armed forces, ordnance factories and PSUs, it could lead to a sharp increase in the indigenous content of defence procurement.

Evidently then, if MSMEs have to come into their own, they need conducive policies which will enable growth. There is an information vacuum which must be filled, to at least let industry know what is required. That is the first step. Once Indian industry is aware of what the defence sector needs and is provided information of the components that are being imported, it would be in a position to step in to fulfil the requirements. But that is only the first step. There must be firm commitments to buy the products, once they are found to be of the requisite quality and of reasonable cost, otherwise there is no incentive for the manufacturer to invest his time and resources. The government could also step in with financial assistance for the development of components for which policies must be framed.

From the user point of view, quality control is of prime importance. Replacing imported items with indigenous manufacture is only worthwhile if the items perform to the desired standards. The Army has had bad experience of indigenised components manufactured by ordnance factories and that acts as a dampener, besides losing confidence in own products. A recent report in the Financial Express states that US defence major Boeing has terminated a contract with state-run Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) for component supplies to the former’s war and commercial planes being inducted into the Indian Navy. This decision of Boeing came after repeated reminders to HAL about its “poor quality” of production. Evidently, better strategies are required by India’s policymakers in order to bolster the order books of defence PSUs.

Finally, MSMEs do not have the clout of large companies. It is important that they collectively address the issues that concern them, and also use the MSME Ministry in the Government of India to act as an evangelist. We are at a defining point in our history where the nation has a political leadership that is focused on taking the nation forward. It is now for the other players to also do their bit in this effort.

Published in SALUTE Magazine - JUL-Aug 2015

Looking Back at the 1965 War

In the early hours of 6 September, 1965, exactly half a century ago, three divisions of India’s XI Corps, crossed the International Border in Punjab and in pitch darkness, moved towards the Ichhogil canal. The news was flashed across the world, with newspaper headlines of 6 September announcing, “Indian Army Crosses into Pakistan–Indian Forces in Vicinity of Lahore.” The second Indo-Pak war had begun.

Why did India and Pakistan go to war in the Autumn of 1965? A conflict was not in the interest of either country and no major world power wanted an escalation of tensions in this part of the world. Yet, for the perceptive observer, the signs of conflict were all to visible and apparent.

This was the time when the cold war was at its zenith. Pakistan had astutely sided with the West and in return had received economic and military assistance, ostensibly to fight communism, but covertly to be used in its struggle against India. Pakistan played its cards with panache and finesse, and in the process, bolstered its economic and military capability with aid from the western powers. This gave Pakistan the wherewithal to wage war. At the same time, India was hampered by a slow growth rate and internal turmoil. The debacle suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 had left deep scars in the national psyche and consequently, India in the early sixties, was at a low ebb, economically and militarily. India’s perceived weakness was seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to wrest Kashmir from India by force. However, as India was in the process of augmenting her military capability, policy makers within Pakistan veered to the view that this window of opportunity was limited in time.

In early 1964, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the ‘Kashmir Publicity Committee’, to keep the Kashmir issue alive. From this committee emerged a plan in February 1965 to engineer a revolt in J&K, by sending armed infiltrators to foment violence. This was to be followed with a quick military thrust to capture the strategic Indian township of Akhnur. The underlying hope was that this would lead to the state of J&K, falling like a ripe plum into Pakistani hands. The plan was however shelved as both President Khan and his army chief, General Musa were apprehensive of such action leading to a full scale war with India. Two months later, Ayub had a change of heart and gave his assent to the plan, though his army chief still demurred.

The Pakistani plan consisted of two components. The first, code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’, envisaged the infiltration of thousands of regular and irregular troops dressed as Kashmiri guerrillas into Jammu and Kashmir, to create an uprising in the state. The Pakistan army would then move in to capture Akhnur. While President Ayub Khan was not unaware of the possibility of his actions leading to an all out war with India, he veered around to the view that India was unlikely to expand the area of conflict. The weapons received by Pakistan from the West gave Pakistan’s military both a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Indians. If India did expand the conflict, international opinion would bring the war to a swift closure. By then Kashmir, would be in Pakistani hands. The events however, did not unfold in the manner envisaged by Pakistan’s top brass.

Pakistani attempts to destabilise India in Operation Gibraltar in August 1965 were foiled. Much to Pakistani’s chagrin, the local people did not rise in revolt against the Indian state, but actively supported the Indian army in neutralising the infiltrators. Pakistan also went on to lose the strategic Hajipir Pass to an Indian offensive, which sealed the routes of ingress of the infiltrators into J&K. Pakistan then launched Grand Slam on 1 September but a plucky Indian defence and incompetent Pakistani leadership prevented Akhnur from falling into enemy hands. However, to relieve pressure from this sector, India was forced to extend the conflict across the IB. All the premises on which Pakistan had based its design to capture J&K were thus reduced to nought.

Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. That is the lesson which India would do well to remember.

This article was published in the Pioneer, 7 September 2015.