ON THE CUSP OF CHANGE

When viewed in a historical context, the year 2016 will perhaps be remembered as the year where change was attempted for the first time from the status quo mindset that has consumed India since Independence. For the Armed Forces, the past year has seen many positive developments and some downsides too, but the process of change is visible, though it is still a work in being.

Three issues merit attention. The first of these pertain to operational issues, the second pertain to the acquisition process and the third to the state of relations between the military and India’s bureaucracy.

Operationally, there has been a distinct change in India’s response options to the war by other means that is being waged by Pakistan against India using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The surgical strike was but a reflection of a more robust approach being taken to address issues that have bedevilled India’s response to Pakistani intransigence. Many defence analysts, this writer included, have long felt the need for increasing the cost to the Pakistan Army exponentially for supporting terror groups, thereby forcing Pakistan to act in a more responsible manner. It is no one’s case that just one strike will motivate Pakistan to follow a more rational path. The Pakistan military’s pride was hurt by the surgical strike and it was only to be expected that they would retaliate. With their nuclear bluff being called, Pakistan found that its only option was to continue with using terrorists to attack Indian Army posts. This does not signify a failure of  India’s offensive gambit, but perhaps speaks of its success.

The proactive response to Pakistani terror must now be renewed with greater force on the Line of Control (LC), without pause. The possibility of escalation remains, but that is the price that the nation will have to pay if retribution to the Pakistan military is to be effective. The Army must not get into a besieged mentality but must dominate its surroundings and ensure that armed attackers are eliminated before they are in a position to strike. This could lead to collateral damage at times. The military leadership must hold the hands of its units in such cases and simultaneously, sensitise the political leadership of the same. Post demonetisation, the terrorist groups are on the back foot and over time, will find sustenance difficult. This must be exploited to eliminate such groups from Indian soil.

The acquisition process is now getting streamlined with faster decision making and an increased focus on the Make in India campaign. The attempt towards indigenisation are still small baby steps, but they represent a forward movement, which earlier was conspicuous by its absence. The forces too must look for indigenous solutions, else India’s fledgling defence industrial base will never take off. The Tejas aircraft and Indian ship building represent important steps in this direction but much more needs to be done, especially in terms of making the DPSU’s, Ordnance Factories and the DRDO, more accountable and responsive to user needs. 

The state of relations between the military and India’s bureaucracy remains abysmal, largely a product of legacy attitudes wherein the babus continue to spare no effort in denigrating the Forces. Why the defence force are denied space in the decision making process remains a mystery, with India being perhaps the only democracy in the world where such practises obtain. The babus in the MoD lack expertise to advise on defence matters, yet they are vested with complete financial and decision making powers without being held accountable for the same. That accountability continues to rest on the shoulders of the military’s leadership, sans the financial and decision making powers. Such a paradoxical situation will sooner rather than later invite disaster. It is time that the entire MoD is revamped and staffed with at least 50 percent officers from the Armed Forces, with the post of defence secretary and secretary defence production being held by four star ranked officers from the Armed Forces. The CDS will come about in the New Year, but that by itself is not enough. Unless the rules of business are changed and the primacy of the bureaucrat is removed, India’s defence structure will remain compromised.

We are at the cusp of change for the first time since Independence. The tide is flowing, but will we take it at the proverbial flood, which leads on to fortune? Or will we let the opportunity go by, and stagnate? The future beckons and is exciting. Happy Reading and a Very Happy New Year to all our readers.

Editorial- SALUTE Mag; Nov Dec 2016

WHAT MAKES A SOLDIER FIGHT: The Challenge of Operating in J&K

2016 has been a tumultuous year for the Indian Army deployed in J&K. The challenge ironically came from a growing perception that normalcy was setting in and the role of the Army required to be re-calibrated to facilitate the normalisation process. How this was to come about was not defined, but a general perception that trickled down to the rank and file was that nothing should be done that could vitiate the atmosphere and which could potentially lead to alienating the people in the Kashmir Valley. Herein lay the flaw. The assumption, though not stated, implied that a major contributing factor to alienation was the presence and actions of the Indian Army. Remove that, and voila, peace and tranquility would return. By laying the onus of a return to peace on the men in uniform, causative factors were brushed aside, and the insidious role played by terror groups, their supporters from across the border and fifth columnists operating from inside the state and in other parts of the country was glossed over. Also overlooked was the role of the political class and the state administration in the entire process.

Peace in the Kashmir Valley as indeed in the whole state of J&K will remain a chimera for a host of reasons, not least of which is the fact that a peaceful J&K state does not fit in with the larger aims of Pakistan and its military. Kashmir is not the core dispute between India and Pakistan as is generally stated and believed. That core is ideological, going back to the events in history that led to the creation of Pakistan as a separate country for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Kashmir is but a symptom of the larger malaise that afflicts Pakistan’s polity and its military leadership. It defines itself as the antithesis of India and in that sense, Pakistan is what India is not. If the two countries were to live in peace, then the question - why partition, would be difficult to answer. Are the two nations condemned by history to live in a state of constant friction and hostility? That is the fundamental issue which policy makers in India and its military leadership need to confront and address. Pakistan will continue to keep the pot boiling in J&K. The challenge is to keep the population of J&K, immune to such influence. 

Like other states in the Indian Union, J&K too has had its share of poor governance, corrupt administrators and self serving politicians. While such factors have contributed to the spread of terrorism in the state, they are neither primary nor causative factors.  Had this been so, we would have seen a similar influx of violence in many other parts of the country. Violence in the state of J&K is more a product of instigation by forces inimical to the state and a vitiated political discourse. The threat is from deliberate fomentation of violence by foreign backed terrorist groups who are supplied weapons, explosives and money by their cross border handlers to carry out their nefarious designs and who are also trained and indoctrinated in safe havens across the border. Threats also emanate from a focused campaign to indoctrinate the people through propaganda and imposition of an alternate ideology which is inimical to the idea of a secular state. The latter is the more dangerous and insidious, as it poison’s the minds of the youth through a surreptitious network that has infiltrated into the states education system, sections of the print and audio visual media, government offices and into its religious edifice - the mosques. The psychological dimension of subversion of society also needs urgent address, along with measures to eliminate violence, stabilise the polity, improve justice delivery and ensure an efficient administration. As of now, the state suffers from multiple infirmities, and it is in such an environment of fear and distrust that the Indian Army has been operating. Since Independence, the Army has played a sterling role in the state, and has been very active in the last three decades in combatting terror supported from across the border. What India faces is not a proxy war by Pakistan but a war by other means emanating from that country. That is the prime reason why normalcy is yet to return to the state. Internal fault lines aggravate the situation further. The Army has successfully kept the situation under control but a total return to normalcy would require synchronised efforts of multiple organs of the state to play their part in sync with security force operations. That is still a work in being and hence the challenge faced by the Army is immense. In such an environment, we need to revitalise the capability and capacity of the military to ensure stability till a durable peace returns to the state.

In his ‘Mann ki Baat’ of 26 November, the Prime Minister stated “When the entire country stands with our jawans, their strength increase 125 crore times.” This is a truism which is oft forgotten. The support a soldier receives form the nation contributes in great measure to his morale and enables him to  perform, well over his abilities. Sadly, this support is conspicuous by its absence, both in India’s polity and in its administrative network, over long stretches of time. The row over AFSPA is but a manifestation of this malaise. AFSPA is neither the cause of violence, nor of its continuation. It is simply an enabling provision to permit the Army to effectively discharge its duties. But it becomes a handy tool for various inimical groups to demonise the Army and disparage the work it does in most trying and difficult circumstances. 

In conventional conflict, the whole nation stands as one behind its Armed Forces. All the wars that the nation has fought in since Independence stand testimony to the above observation, the Kargil war being the most recent expression of national will against an external enemy. But in long drawn out insurgencies and in wars conducted by other means, such as the current conflict in J&K, such support is not always forthcoming. In some cases, there are voices raised in the country supporting the terrorists, as happened in the prestigious environs of the Jawahar Lal University in February 2016, and later also in the Jadavpur University in  Kolkatta. What then compels the Indian soldier to fight, despite a perceived lack of support from the nation he is committed to defend? The reputed historian, S.L.A. Marshall, in his book, “Men Against Fire” was remarkably prescient in his observation when he stated: “I hold it to be of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade…He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily.”

Indeed, the primary motivation of men in battle is related to strong group ties and the desire of not letting their buddy down. Another noted research paper by Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz also showed similar results among Germany’s Wehrmacht soldiers who fought on even as Berlin fell. This primary motivation is as true today as it was in the great World Wars. The US validated this truth yet again in a study carried out in Iraq on what motivated soldiers to fight. The paper, published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute in 2003 validated the popular belief that unit cohesion is a key issue in motivating soldiers to fight. What makes men fight is hence a product of unit cohesion, esprit de corps and strong bonds of loyalty to one’s comrades in arms and the unit one belongs to.

This has been the Indian experience too. The ‘izzat’ of the ‘paltan’, unit cohesion and strong bonding makes a soldier persevere, despite the most formidable odds. The saga of Lance Naik Hanumanthappa Kopad, who was rescued alive after being buried 25 feet in an avalanche for five days at minus 50 degrees Celsius, in the Siachen Glacier, reflects that spirit. The nation mourned when the brave heart passed away after being evacuated to the Command Hospital at Delhi, but the sheer grit in surviving such odds galvanised the whole nation. While the courage and fortitude of the soldier was commendable, equally commendable was the will of his commanding officer and all ranks of the battalion, who continued with the rescue efforts in extremely hostile terrain and weather conditions, despite knowing that medically, the chance of finding a survivor were nil. It is this spirit instilled in the fighting soldier that imbues him with the will to fight. He will fight for his comrades, because he knows that his comrades will fight for him. The larger cause is the nation, but the immediate context is survival, the izzat of his paltan and the desire to stand up for his comrades, knowing fully well that his comrades will always stand up for him.

Imbuing such spirit in the rank and file of the Armed Forces is a product of regimentation. Simply stated, the ethos of the unit requires each man to ensure that his unit or sub unit is the very best that can be. No sacrifice is big enough to uphold the honour and good name of the unit. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, as the Army Chief succinctly stated this in his address to the Gentleman Cadets in the Passing out Parade of the Indian Military Academy. “You are required to ensure the security of your country” he said. “Should you have to fight, you must fight to win. There are no runner’s up in war”. That desire to win is the cutting edge of every unit’s ethos.

It is regimentation that builds up the will to win, to conquer and persevere against all odds. Regimentation gives the individual the responsibility for the success of the unit and for preserving its honour. That is why he is ready to die to protect his comrades. And as his comrades are similarly inclined, the soldier gets the confidence that his back is also being protected. He thus trusts his colleagues with his life, just as they trust him with theirs. The third factor is trust in the military and political leadership and faith in the national aim. This is vital both in war and in long drawn out anti insurgency and anti terrorism campaigns. But this faith and trust is not something that can be taken for granted. It has to be nurtured, else, like everything else, it can decay and wither over time, with negative consequences for the Army and for the nation. It is this aspect that remains worrying in the ongoing war by other means which Pakistan is waging against India in Jammu and Kashmir.  

The war against terror being waged in J&K has been ongoing for nearly three decades and is not likely to terminate any time soon. In 2015, India witnessed the fourth highest number of terrorist incidents globally as indicated in the Statistical Appendix of US Country Report on Terrorism 2015. Civilian and security forces fatalities were 181 and 155 respectively, in 2015. The figures for 2016 are slightly higher, at 191 civilian fatalities and 173 security forces fatalities. Of these, 84 security forces fatalities have taken place in J&K alone. The environment of operations is thus difficult, but soldiers still persevere because of the strong regimental traditions and unit ethos. However, certain incidents in the recent past have the potential to erode the confidence of the rank and file in its leadership - both political and military. That is a cause for concern. 

Mistakes invariably will be committed by troops on the ground, which obviously must be investigated and analysed to learn the appropriate lessons.  How such incidents are dealt with however, requires a great deal of sensitivity and finesse to avoid an adverse impact on the morale and confidence of troops. An incident in November 2014 where a mobile check post of the Army fired on a car which did not stop is a case in point. The incident led to the death of two and injury to two more persons, all of whom were later found to be teenagers. The uproar over the killing of innocent schoolchildren is understandable, but the immediate reaction by the Army, (perhaps on political considerations) that the guilty Army personnel will be dealt with, sent a wrong message to the rank and file. How was guilt established without even a cursory investigation? Why was it made so public? Could not there have been better means to inform the public and assuage their anger? Regardless of the fact that the troops in this incident acted in good faith or otherwise, to arbitrarily condemn them as guilty broke that trust which a soldier has placed in his superiors. The larger fear of such breach in faith is that troops will prefer inaction rather than aggressively pursue a line which may have negative consequences for them, should things go wrong.

It is important that the morale of soldiers is maintained at any cost. Adverse occurrences need to be dealt with through skilful perception management which, while assuaging public sentiments, does not cause damage to military morale. At this all important cusp in the developing situation in J&K, it must also be ensured that the offensive spirit is not sacrificed in an attempt to reach a quick peace. This will lead to a siege mentality where troops will stay confined to their areas of operation, and will seek to avoid combat when they do venture out. In the process, we will see a resurgence in terrorist activity which for the moment has been effectively contained. 

It is also important for the state to get its act together. A revamping of the state’s administration and improvement in the criminal justice system is a crying need and must be taken up urgently along with steps to check the mushrooming of Madrasas that preach a virulent Wahhabi discourse. Many school’s too have been infiltrated which now propagate Wahhabism and which is putting a death knell into the ‘Kashmiriyat’ that was the state’s tradition. The Army on its part must continue with offensive operations, and must learn to handle flak when things go wrong. The road ahead is long and slippery, but it would be a test of the military’s leadership at all levels. The Army has no option but to persevere and come out with flying colours.

For CLAWS Journal, Spring 2017.

THE YEAR THAT WAS

In many respects, 2015 can be considered as a watershed year. Just two decades ago, in 1995, India suffered about 4000 fatalities, in incidents related to terrorist violence and insurgencies. That high dropped to 1212 fatalities in 2005, and further dropped to just over 700 fatalities in 2015, of which 379 fatalities pertained to terrorists killed by the security forces. This indeed is a remarkable turnaround by the security forces and the Indian state. From the previous year itself, the fatalities have declined by close to 30 percent, making 2015 by far the most peaceful year in India, in decades. There were 175 civilian fatalities in terrorist violence throughout the country in 2015, of which 88 were in LWE affected areas. This marks a turning point in the war against terror, which must be exploited through political means to bring about lasting peace.

The social media as a counterpoint to the mainstream media has resulted in democratising information at a scale never seen before, which can but augur well for the country. Information today is all pervasive, and thankfully, is no longer the sole preserve of the government or the big corporate, though they continue to exercise great influence on its content and disbursement. Just as the fourth estate acts as a check on the government and its functioning, the social media has levelled the playing field by putting into public domain, what the fourth estate is loathe to do. While the social media too has its pitfalls, over time, balance will set in which is a positive for the India growth and development story. We are living in the age of information, and information today is power. Democratisation of information has put that power, or at least a semblance of it, firmly in the hands of the people. This is a lesson the armed forces must take note of, as future conflict will have information at its core.

The change of government at the Centre in 2014, has heralded a change in decision making, which at last has picked up pace after a decade of inertia. The political authority has shown its intent in pushing through proposals for fast tracking growth, which has been reflected through 2015. That is indeed a cause for cheer. The instruments of governance however, continue to be a cause for concern, as India’s bureaucracy is wedded to its old slothful ways of delaying decisions and avoiding accountability. Reinvigorating the bureaucracy remains a challenge, which still remains rooted to working with twentieth century mindsets to confront the challenges of the twenty-first century.

On the defence preparedness front, the Make in India programme is making headway, albeit slowly. While the progress is slow, it appears that defence reforms are back on track, though resistance by certain self interest groups and the general inertia of the bureaucracy threaten to derail the system, with the old approach of licence-manufacture, continuing to find resonance in the corridors of power.

There is no alternative for India but to design and manufacture our defence needs at home, if we wish to see ourselves free from the clutches of foreign military vendors. Screwdriver technology, as showcased by the Defence Public Sector Units is not indigenisation, regardless of the spin put out on it by those heading such organisations. Indian design, development and manufacture must be the keystone for the defence sector, which by itself can improve the nations GDP by a point or two, besides enhancing the country’s technological base and providing employment to millions. The challenges are many, but a concerted effort by the political authority, in sync with the Armed Forces, the public sector and the private sector, can deliver the requisite end result. That will remain the defining challenge for 2016. Happy New Year and Happy Reading.

Published in SALUTE Dec2015-Jan2016

India - China Relations: Deal with a Measure of Pragmatism

Much has been written on the possible future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Will India and China be partners? Or, are they unavoidable rivals? Some, like the late Bharat Verma, visualised an intransigent China which, sooner rather than later, would attack India - a throwback to the 1962 conflict which rankles India but which, surprisingly, is not much talked about in China. The optimists, on the other hand, promote the concept of ‘Chindia’ - a term coined by Goldman Sachs, suggesting that both India and China could jointly create a new world order. In April 2005, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called the economic cooperation between the two countries as the ‘two pagodas of hardware and software’, some were ready to believe that the statement reflected a deep rapprochement between the two countries which could give rise to a new Asian trade and power bloc. Both these viewpoints appear to be oversimplifications, reflecting long held fears and hopes in equal measure.

In the Preface to his book ‘India’s China Policy’ (Indiana University Press, 1962), P. C. Chakravarti wrote: “The key to Sino-Indian relations lies hidden in the soil of Tibet. It is on the rocks of the Roof of the World that our friendship with China will flourish or flounder”. Written in 1961, the premise of the author still appears to be valid. The unresolved border and territorial dispute between the two countries that led to the conflict in 1962 and the refuge given by India to the Dalai Lama, are issues which continue to bedevil relations between the two countries. Chinese sensitivity on the question of Tibet is well known, China being wary of any type of support being given to the independence movement in Tibet. To these historical legacies have been added Chinese plans for hydrographical projects on the Yarlung Tsang Po river, Chinese concerns over the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement deal and the increasing military cooperation between India and the USA, which China perceives as being directed at isolating China. On the Indian side, Chinese support to Pakistan - especially in the field of nuclear and missile technology and the strategic nature of its partnership with that country – have led many Indian defence analysts to believe that the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India is being done at the behest of China. This is to ostensibly confine India to the backwaters of South Asia and prevent its emergence as a dominant player in world affairs, in conformity with a Chinese saying that ‘one mountain cannot hold two tigers’!

In 1954, the Indian leadership believed that Sino-Indian relations could be conducted with ‘mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non aggression, mutual non interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit’. Thus was signed the Sino Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954, relating to trade and other contacts between ‘the Tibet region of China and India’. This was also called the Panchsheel Treaty. The ink had hardly dried on these admirable sentiments when acrimony broke out between the two countries on what constituted the border, and of border violations by each side. Real politics is devoid of sentiment as rightly stated by Dr Buchanan-Hamilton, who when advising Lord Hastings against the occupation of Nepal, pointed out that ‘a frontier of seven or eight hundred miles between two powerful nations holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace’ (Papers Respecting the Nepaul War - The Administration of the Marquis of Hastings in India, India House Library, Page 45). A newly independent India had yet to learn that lesson.

The border issue remains intractable, even after nineteen rounds of talks, the latest being held in April 2016 amid growing discord between the two nations over Beijing blocking India’s bid to get JeM chief Masood Azhar banned by the UN. This is hardly surprising. The dispute is both a border dispute as well as a territorial dispute, with China occupying the Aksai Chin area and also laying claims to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The origins of the dispute were not created by the present disputants, the dispute having originated under Manchu China and Imperial Britain, against the backdrop of the ‘great game’ of the nineteenth century between Russia and Britain. Today, India and China are trying to solve a problem which their imperialist predecessors found either insoluble or undesirable to solve. The narrative on both sides has reinforced legacy attitudes, which makes acceptance of any position well nigh impossible.

Rather than attempting to solve the problem, it may be more prudent to simply freeze the issue for future generations to solve. In the interim, both sides could look into the possibility of delineating the positions held by each side on the ground with exchange of maps, and without any prejudice to the claims of either side. Even this limited course of action has little traction with the Chinese, making any further headway impossible. The Chinese have nothing to lose by keeping the issue open as they have the military muscle to hold on to the areas they are currently in occupation of. These they consider to be ‘de facto resolved issues’. Negotiation for the Chinese implies seeking an adjustment of the areas they lay claim to, which is not just the Tawang tract but the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Obviously, India cannot accede to this. The larger danger for India lies in the growing military asymmetry with China. As of now, India can effectively ensure against a Chinese military adventure to forcibly take its claimed areas. Within a decade from now, the military situation may tilt so drastically in Beijing’s favour that she could be tempted to resolve the issue through the use of force. That situation can be guarded against by ensuring adequate military capability to defend Indian interests. Diplomacy can only take us that far.

The river waters issue is much hyped, and often misunderstood. It is true that China is building dams at the Great Bend in the Yarlung Tsang Po river; but a deeper understanding of the issues is required. Firstly, as of now, there is no technology available to take the waters of the Tsang Po river to other parts of China. Secondly, and more importantly, is the fact that the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, as they enter India to become the Siang river, constitute just a small percentage of total water flows in the Brahmaputra basin. The average discharge of the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India is just about 1980 cumec. This increases to 16,240 cumec as the river enters Assam to form the Brahmaputra. This is mostly due to the very high levels of precipitation within the catchment areas in India and Bhutan. So the water issue is not about the Chinese attempting to divert the waters of the Yarlung Tsang Po, but the possible impact of what could happen if the waters are dammed and released suddenly. India needs to have an agreement with China on information sharing of water flows in the Yarlung Tsang Po, which could subsequently be followed up with a treaty.

Transparency in data sharing and the development of required data matrix is the ultimate necessity. With the association of basin neighbours, India and China should organise such a Core Data Agency (CDA). In the meantime, India should, on its own, keep regular tabs on the water inflow from the Yarlung Tsang Po as it enters India to form the Siang river and thereafter, periodically monitor flow levels all along the course of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. Satellite imagery of the area will also keep India abreast of the ground situation with respect to water flows and construction activities on the Yarlung Tsang Po.

The Tibet issue and the status of the Dalai Lama are of serious concern to China. The Dalai Lama remains the honoured guest of India, and this is a situation not to the liking of the Chinese. Most Tibetans are not prepared to accept Chinese sovereignty, and the struggle within Tibet, though largely peaceful, simmers and could take a violent turn. What were to happen after the passing away of the present Dalai Lama? That is a question which worries the Chinese, as they seek ways and means to put their own nominee as the next Dalai Lama. While India has not allowed the Dalai Lama to carry out political activities in India, his very presence poses a threat to the Chinese, as he is seen as a symbol of Tibetan resistance. Some observers see the Chinese claims over the Tawang tract as a ploy to ensure that the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama does not come from Tawang, which is the seat of one of the sacred Buddhist monasteries. How this pans out in the future will impact ties between India and China.

China remains concerned about the strategic partnership developing between the USA and India, just as India is concerned about the close strategic embrace of Pakistan by China that is perceived to be aimed against India. While the key to the India-China relationship does lie on the soil of Tibet, geopolitical realities also play a significant role towards that end. Today, Sino- Indian politics go far beyond their mere bilateral significance. While India is too big a player to be the willing handmaiden of any particular power bloc, the fact remains that it suits US interests to leverage India as a counterweight against China. To that extent, both US and Indian interests stand aligned against what is perceived to be an increasingly assertive China on the world stage. While continuing with enhancing the security component of its relationship with the US, India would continue to develop its relations with China through cooperation on the economic front as well as on issues which affect both countries in the international arena.

China however, is unlikely to let go of its support to Pakistan, despite the fact that such support could have a negative impact on China’s restive Xinjiang province. The much hyped China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) should, however, not cause too many sleepless nights in New Delhi. The internal security situation in Pakistan – especially the movement within Baluchistan for independence, the ongoing conflict against the Taliban in FATA, and the various ethnic and sectarian conflicts that Pakistan is plagued with – all work against the fruition of the envisaged corridor. It would be in India’s interest to extend moral and diplomatic support to the people of Baluchistan, which would serve Indian interests in obviating the China-Pak strategic axis.

Equally worrying for India as of now, is the presence of a large number of Chinese personnel, many of whom are from their military, in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of POK. Reports emanating from the region point to demographic changes being made in the area, with a large number of Sunni settlers from the Punjab coming into the region, altering both its ethnic and sectarian demography. India would do well to extend its support to the indigenous people of the region, to preserve their lifestyle and culture.

In the final analysis, India needs a measure of pragmatism in its policy of dealing with China. Increased trade flows do not by themselves lead to an absence of conflict. The excellent personal rapport developed between the Indian Prime Minister and his Chinese counterpart, while useful, is also not a guarantor of peace. That comes about through hard power. India will need to develop its economic and military might to safeguard its vital national interests. Militarily, it is vital that India maintain adequate deterrent capability in the oceans as well as over the Tibetan skies. That is the guarantor of peace.

Note: Published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol 11, No 1 - Jan-Mar 2016.