Commemorating Kargil Vijay Divas: Eternal Vigilance is the Key to Peace

On 26 July 2022, the 23rd anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, the nation gets together once again to pay homage and tribute to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who took part in that war. For those who had seen the war at close quarters, achieving victory against the enemy, ensconced at advantageous positions in the icy high-altitude mountains, seemed like 'Mission Impossible'. And to achieve what was thought of to be an impossible task, 527 brave soldiers of the Indian Armed Forces made the supreme sacrifice while 1363 were wounded. It was a victory won against all odds, but Mission Impossible was achieved.

Nasim Zehra,  a well-known Pakistani journalist and writer, in her book, From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan, has given a detailed expose of the role of the Pakistan Army in the planning and conduct of 'Operation Koh-e-Paima,' the name given to Pakistan's military misadventure in the Kargil sector. This misadventure had its roots in Pakistan's attempts to forcibly gain control over the Siachen Glacier, which India thwarted in 1984 by occupying the Saltoro Ridge, overlooking the Glacier. It was Pakistan's repeated failures to evict Indian troops from the Saltoro ridge that led to the assumption that if Pakistan occupied the heights around the  Kargil sector, overlooking the vital Leh-Srinagar road, they would be able to cut off Ladakh from the rest of India and avenge their humiliation in Siachen. In October 1998, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Koh-e-Paima, infiltrating small groups of soldiers into unoccupied territory across the Line of Control. By May 1999, they had established over 140 posts in the Kargil-Drass region. The Indian operations launched thereafter to evict the intruders was codenamed 'Operation Vijay,' the Operation ending on 26 July 1999, with a total Indian victory.

While we pay homage to the heroism and courage of the Indian soldier on this day, it would be equally appropriate to reflect on the lessons that the war in Kargil highlighted.  At the national level, there are seven important lessons which we would do well to remember. 

Blind Trust can be Fatal 

The first of these lessons is that blind trust can be fatal. The Indian military as well as intelligence agencies missed vital signs and made wrong assessments, primarily because a push for peace was being made in the political space by India's Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihar Vajpayee. In  his famous bus 'yatra' of 19 February 1999, Mr Vajpayee made his historic speech at Lahore, where he spoke for peace. “Hum jung na hone denge ... Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda... Hum jung na hone denge…” were the words he used, but even as those stirring words were uttered on Pakistani soil, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry, in the guise of infiltrators, was already across the Line of Control, and had surreptitiously occupied some of the unoccupied heights, overlooking the Dras Valley, Kargil and Batalik townships. India's focus on peace blinded it to the prospect of a Pakistani betrayal, which was considered unthinkable in the prevailing bonhomie between the two countries. Pakistan thus achieved strategic surprise and was successful in the initial operations carried out by their army. We must never ever allow that to happen again. 

Expect the Unexpected 

The Indian Army had war-gamed the possibility of precisely such an occurrence as the intrusion of a vast body of Pakistan military personnel in small groups to occupy the heights overlooking India's vital national highway. Such an action was considered possible but was discarded due to the difficulty of maintaining a large body of troops in the mountains. It was also assessed that while such a course of action could lead to the enemy achieving short term tactical success, it was bound to result in a strategic disaster. The conclusion drawn from the assessment was faulty in that it presumed that the enemy would not undertake such a risky adventure which was doomed to failure. What was missed out was the fact that Pakistan has consistently made illogical deductions about India's capabilities and so it would have been prudent to at least cater for such an eventuality. An improbable occurrence must always be catered for, if the consequences of such an occurrence would be costly for the nation. It is not the job of the military to guess. It is its job to remain prepared at all times for all eventualities.

Higher Defence Planning

When the Kargil war started, both the Army and the Air Force were short of vital ammunition and other items. That is what prompted the then Army Chief to say that we will fight with what we have. This reflects a weakness in higher defence planning, primarily because in the Indian system, we have a bureaucracy that is interposed between the military leadership and the political authority. The bureaucracy controls the procurement process but remains unaccountable for its actions, while the military has the responsibility but not the power to do anything about it. While the office of the CDS has now been created, we need to go further in the reform process and like other modern armies, remove the bureaucracy completely as the middle-man interposed between the political authority and the military leadership.

The Intelligence Factor 

The induction of thousand of trained troops in small groups all across the Line of Control in the Drass, Kargil and Batalik sectors reflected a gargantuan failure on the part of India's intelligence agencies in failing to detect such intrusion. The induction of such a large force took place over many months and was common knowledge in the areas across the LoC. Such feverish activities should have been picked up but it is evident that India lacked suitable assets which could have provided adequate early warning. The Kargil War once again highlights the importance of both human intelligence as well as electronic and other means of gathering information, to include intelligence gathering by means of satellites.

Unity of Effort 

In the modern age, it is not just armies that go to war, but the nation as a whole, which implies unity of effort in prosecuting war. The Kargil Review Committee highlighted many of these weaknesses, some of which have been addressed, such as the creation of the office of the CDS. What is now needed is to make a big push for self sufficiency in defence production. This is being done through the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative, which needs to be further strengthened, streamlined and made user-friendly. While the political intent is clear, huge changes are required in mindsets, especially in the nation's bureaucracy and in the research and development organisations. To make this a truly integrated approach, the private sector has to play a major role and for this it requires a great deal of facilitation by both the military as well as the political authority.

Role of the Media 

The Indian media played an excellent role during the Kargil conflict and created a positive climate for the prosecution of war, both within the country as well as in the international arena. Press freedom contributes greatly to national security and must be preserved at all times.

The Seventh Lesson: Do not Assume 

The seventh lesson is from the stables of the enemy. They prosecuted the war on three fatal assumptions. One, the Indian Armed Forces will not be able to dislodge the encroachments made by the Pakistani troops as they were occupying the strategic heights on the Srinagar-let axis. Two, India would be restricted in its response as Pakistan was a nuclear armed state. And three, The international community would call an early halt to the war between the two nuclear armed neighbours, leaving Pakistan in possession of its ill-gotten gains. In reality, Pakistan was wrong in all three of the assessments so made. They under-estimated the will of India to fight for its land and for its people. That is a lesson which unfortunately still does not appear to have been learnt by Pakistan. And so India must be ready to deal with the Pakistani state as it currently is—hostile and bitterly opposed to India. Seeking friendship is not a mistake, but seeking friendship by keeping our eyes closed to reality will cost India dearly in the future. We must always be conscious of the real nature of the enemy.

Conclusion 

As we celebrate the 23rd Anniversary of Kargil Vijay Divas, let us bow our heads in gratitude to the brave soldiers of India's Armed Forces who laid down their lives for their country. And in their honour and in their memory, let us resolve to make India strong and resilient, to face any challenges that the future may have to offer. And while doing so, let us remember, that eternal vigilance is the key to peace.

Published in Chintan: 26 July 2022

THERE CAN NEVER BE A LICENCE TO KILL

It is a sign of our times, especially in India with its 1.3 billion plus population, that each and every issue can be converted into a controversy that spills over into violence and destruction of property. The last decade, or most specifically since 2014 when the BJP led NDA registered a thumping victory in the national elections, certain vested interests who had lost power, deliberately started creating tensions in society to stoke such violence, at times with finances received from sources outside the country.

Communal tensions were repeatedly created on fake narratives, in a bid to divide communities. The falsehood spread on attacks on churches in 2015 is but a case in point. As also the isolated cases of attacks on cow smugglers that were blown out of proportion to create religious strife. Then there were attacks on economic entities, all of them justified on spurious premises. Protests against the Kudankulam power project and Sterlite Copper (both located in Tamil Nadu), as also protests against the Narbada dam in Gujarat are cases in point. Foreign entities had huge stakes in such protests, and funding for the same came from quarters inimical to India. More recently, we have seen protests against the CAA and the Farm Bills which disrupted normal life for many months at a stretch. There is a pattern in all such protests, an agenda which is dangerous and which needs to be addressed with all the might of the Indian state. Recently, even a military reform in the form of the Agnipath scheme led to violence and destruction of property. This was clearly motivated and organised.

It is in the above light that the recent controversy over the remarks of Ms Nupur Sharma have to be seen. In end May, a TV debate on the Shiva Lingam found at the Krishna Janambhumi turned into a slanging match in which a panellist referred to Lord Shiva in objectionable terms. In response, Ms Sharma, who was the spokesperson of the ruling BJP dispensation made comments about Islam that went way beyond her brief. The issue would probably have died down there, but a few groups took up the matter, leading to protests across India and in some of the Islamic countries in the Gulf. The BJP spokesperson was suspended on 7 June, but the protests continued.

The controversy over the comments made by the spokesperson refuses to die down. Here too, vested interests are fuelling the controversy. Death threats were issued to Sharma by radicalised groups and a host of cases were filed against her in opposition ruled states for creating religious discord. The people who filed complaints against Ms Sharma did not file cases against the panelist who was the initial provocateur. Street protests continued, with a tailor being murdered in Udaipur on June 28 for supporting Nupur. Another murder took place earlier on 21 June, when Umesh Kohle, a chemist was stabbed to death in Maharashtra's Amravati district for supporting Nupur in a FaceBook post. Numerous other people have received death threats merely for supporting Nupur, which activity is an infringement of their right to free speech.

The spate of criminal cases registered against Nupur Sharma from across the country got her to approach the Apex Court, with a prayer to club all the FIRs registered against her. The two-judge vacation bench of the Supreme Court rejected her appeal in a terse one line order on 01 July, and made scathing verbal comments against her, which set off a fresh round of controversy. 

Coming down heavily on Nupur Sharma, Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala faulted Sharma for “igniting emotions" and held her responsible for “what is happening” in the country. This prompted a group of Concerned Citizens to dash off an open letter on the issue, seeking repeal of these remarks. But there is a larger issue which is involved here, and these concerns ought not to be brushed aside.

I am not looking into the legal argument which is more a matter for trained and experienced lawyers. Of great concern is an issue equally fundamental. Can Nupur Sharma, because of her remarks, be held solely accountable for creating mayhem in the country? That belies the very nature of the radicalised mindset. It was sometime in the 1960s that radicalism started growing in Kashmir, which led to the tragic genocide of Kashmiri Hindus in 1990. This radicalisation, promoted by funds received from the Gulf countries, was not confined to Kashmir alone but encompassed many other parts of India and has now also  become a threat to those very countries which spread such a discourse, besides being a threat to India. So to castigate the former BJP spokesperson as the sole cause of violence in India was perhaps going a bit too far.

But the more worrying aspect of the obiter dicta is the interpretation being given to it by radicalised groups in the major minority community. They are claiming it to be a justification delivered by the Apex Court for the calls being given by some of these groups to behead Ms Sharma.This was surely far from the intent of the learned Justices who in open court commented on the former BJP spokesperson's appeal to club all cases filed across the country to a single court, given the security risk that she was facing. That the threat cannot be taken lightly is seen by the brutal murders committed by fanatics on those who supported Nupur Sharma in online posts. The effort of fringe groups to wrongly use any obiter dicta as a justification for committing heinous crimes must be condemned, including by the apex court.

Ian Fleming, the celebrated author and creator of James Bond, speaks of the Double-O prefix given to certain secret agents as the Licence to Kill. There is no and never can there be any  'licence to kill' by radicalised fringe elements in society.

The author is a retired major General of the Indian Army. He is currently, Director, India Foundation. Published in the Sunday Guardian, 10 July 2022.

AGNIPATH: TRANSFORMING THE ARMY

The ongoing war in Ukraine has thrown up a humungous list of lessons for militaries across the world. Undoubtedly, these will be studied, analysed and debated in the coming years to determine how future militaries should be structured, trained and equipped. While various facets of the Ukraine war were being discussed in military and think tank circles in India, the Armed Forces announced the roll out of Agnipath—a new policy document wherein both the procedure for enrolment of personnel in the Armed Forces as well as the terms and conditions of such service stand radically altered. In its breadth and scope, the policy is both transformational and revolutionary. That is why a furious debate is raging in the country on the pros and cons of such a policy. This is not an alarming development, but a natural reaction to a change in the status quo.

No reform can be painless. The nation has to bite the bullet and implement such reforms, if the long-term impact is beneficial. In the economic sphere, the implementation of GST went through a difficult birth, but now the nation is reaping the benefits which will only grow in the years to come. The abrogation of the special status given to J&K by both houses of Parliament on 5 August 2019 was another revolutionary reform in the political sphere, which is still playing out but the dividends of which are clearly visible in the political, social, economic and security domains in the newly formed Union Territory of J&K. Agnipath too, can be a huge game changer, but certain modifications may be required along the way. Fortunately, in the implementational phase, the policy will have very little impact on the Forces in the first four years after it is rolled out. So enough time is available to look into course corrections to make this transformational and revolutionary concept beneficial to the Armed Forces, to the soldier and to the nation. 

The scheme departs radically from past enrolment practises, as from now on, enrolment for the Armed Forces will only be through the Pan-India, merit based Agnipath scheme. Eligibility for enrolment is open to all Indian citizens in the age group of 17.5 to 21 years. A one time age waiver has been given for the current year wherein individuals up to the age of 23 years can apply, as no enrolment has taken place in the last two years due to the pandemic. Selected individuals, called Agniveers, will be required to serve for four years, which includes a six month training period. Thereafter, 25 percent will be retained in the military for permanent absorption, while the remaining 75 percent will be given a financial package which will assist them in either finding other means of employment or in becoming small scale entrepreneurs themselves. Through this, a vast pool of disciplined work force will be available to the nation. The Agniveers will be entitled to all the allowances of regular troops, to include risk and hardship allowance and death and disability pension. 30 percent of their monthly emoluments will go towards a lump sum gratuity that will be paid to them on completion of their contractual service. The government will contribute an equal portion, the net lump sum gratuity coming to Rs 11.7 lakh. This, combined with the individuals savings over four years, could be in the range of Rs 18- 22 lakh—an amount which is not unsubstantial for a 22-23 year old youth. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the selection of Agniveers for retention in the military.

The Challenges

Fears have been expressed on the motivational levels of youth who have but a four year tenure of service. There are also concerns about their standards of training. The war in Ukraine has shown limitations in the performance of Russian troops who, for the most part were conscripts with short service tenures. The Ukrainian military too, suffered from such infirmities. In the Indian context, individual training for Agniveers who are enrolled in the Armoured Corps, Mechanised Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and EME poses huge challenges which will need to be overcome. But the larger training challenge is group cohesion and functioning as part of a well oiled sub unit. This is particularly applicable to the combat arms and combat support arms. 

The Armed Forces are cognisant of these concerns and will look into measures to address them over the next few years. But more serious is the skewed impact on the age and service profile of soldiers over a 20 year period when the policy has totally matured. In this scenario, we are likely to have up to 60 percent of a unit in the below four year service bracket and only 40 percent in the bracket of 4-20 years service. This will throw up serious operational challenges to the combat arms.

The yearly burgeoning pension bill of defence pensioners has been one of the major reasons necessitating reforms in the military. A soldier, unlike his civilian counterpart, retires at an early age. This is necessary to keep a youthful profile of the Armed Forces. Over the years, this has led to the number of veterans exceeding the number of serving personnel, the ratio presently being in the region of 1:1.8 or thereabout. This will keep increasing over the years and may eventually be to the order of 1:2.5. Obviously, this will impact on force modernisation as a major chunk of defence expenditure gets consumed in revenue expenditure, leaving that much less for capital acquisitions. 

A Road Map for the Future

Can something be done to allay the concerns which have been expressed and at the same time, continue with the reform process? Certain actions have already been initiated, but the forces need to look outside the ambit of the personnel in uniform and integrate the reform process with a much wider set of reforms which would encompass the entire security architecture of the country. Three issues need consideration. One, the entire civilian work force needs to be included in the ambit of defence reforms. Two, the governance structure in the Ministry of Defence needs to be revamped and three, the security forces working under the ambit of the Ministry of Home Affairs needs to be co-opted into the military reform process. Let us look at the third aspect first.

The Sixth Central Pay Commission, in its recommendations made a strong pitch for the lateral movement of Defence Forces personnel into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The Commission was of the view that while a good compensation package is essential for the morale and quality of officers and men in the Defence Forces, the same will also, to a large extent, depend on those personnel being provided a life time career. The recommendations were not implemented, largely due to resistance by the CAPF in taking in personnel with different service profiles and seniority, which would impact the seniority and functioning of their existing cadre. These concerns cannot be easily brushed away, but a ready solution exists in the form of absorption of Agniveers. 

Presently, a large number of personnel are recruited in the CAPFs who have to be trained before they can be employed in various security agencies of the Ministry of Home Affairs such as the BSF, CRPF and the ITBP. In addition we have the paramilitary forces under the ministry—the Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard. What needs to be done is to make entry into these forces only through Agniveers. The twin problems of locating suitable trained manpower for induction into these forces and providing sufficiently long tenure for the Defence Forces personnel can be addressed in one stroke. The earlier hesitations which were expressed by the CAPF in taking in retired personnel from the defence forces into their organisations will no longer apply. These organisations will now get well trained and well disciplined personnel,  who are not only proficient in the use of weapons but also skilled in sub-unit level functioning which is required by these forces in combatting militancy, terrorism or other tasks. And these personnel are, on an average, just 23 years old. The CAPF also get substantial financial savings as they do not now have to budget for recruitment and training expenses. The Agniveers joining the CAPF get a life time career while the Armed Forces, get a more youthful profile. Such lateral absorption can take in about 30 percent Agniveers each year, which would be the average replacement requirement of the CAPFs retiring personnel.

In the Agnipath scheme, the civilian work force which numbers about 3.75 lakh personnel has been left out. This is the real tail of the military which needs serious reforms. A large part of this workforce is employed in the nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) and the 41 Ordnance factories which have now been reconstituted into seven fully government-owned corporate entities on the lines of DPSUs. Force effectiveness depends to some extent on the capability and ability of these production agencies in delivering cost effective quality products to the Armed Forces in a time bound manner. The entire civilian workforce should, therefore,  have been assessed in a performance audit as they are paid out of defence estimates and also consume about a quarter of the pension budget. While the issue of privatising most of these entities will have to confront political hurdles, the same would have to be done at some stage. In any event, the step taken by the government in dissolving the Ordnance Factory Board and merging the 41 Ordnance Factories into seven corporate entities, was, by itself, a major first step. If privatisation cannot be immediately done, then at least these entities should function under the ministry of Commerce and Industries and not under the Ministry of Defence, where they have a captive market. This reform, if done, will ignite competition and make them more accountable to the user. A performance audit of the DRDO would also be beneficial in determining whether the country is getting its money's worth in investing huge sums in this organisation. In terms of manpower, it is evidently overstaffed as compared to similar organisations in the West. This needs to be looked into and the flab cut. Perhaps the model to be emulated could be a mix of India's ISRO and the US DARPA, to see that the nations limited resources are used in the most efficient manner. 

We also need to look into the functioning of the Ministry of Defence itself, which has a very large civilian workforce. Agnipath is sought to be justified on the model of the militaries of the US, Israel and other Western democracies. In all these countries, there is no bureaucratic interface between the political authority and the military. Perhaps India should follow suit, as is the norm in all the countries of the world. This by itself, will save the exchequer a few thousand crore INR every year. The Railways has no bureaucratic interface and the military should follow suit.

Finally, a little tweaking of the Agnipath scheme will ensure its acceptability to all those who are currently opposing it. One, as mentioned earlier, recruitment to the CAPF should be only through Agniveers who have completed four years service.  Roughly, they would be able to take in about 30 percent of Agniveers each year. These individuals could be selected on a random basis to ensure that the CAPF get a fair mix. Two, for the Military, increase the service limit to six years and retain 40 percent. That would give a more balanced service profile, which eliminates infirmities which are envisaged with a shorter service tenure. Thirdly, only 30 percent of the Agniveers will now be required to be released to the environment. This is a smaller number to deal with. Some of these personnel would be desirous of leaving the military after completing their time. The others could be helped to settle down, where needed.

Conclusion

Agnipath has received a mixed response from the military community. There have been a few bouquets and a lot of brickbats but the underlying fact remains is that it is reform which is needed. The implementation details are the only issues which need to be ironed out. We can get into a win-win situation by making the system more holistic and by following a whole of nation approach, rather than just confining the policy to the uniformed fraternity of the Armed Forces. 

Published in the IFJ, 1 Sep 2022