Population ControlAddressing the Core Issue: Reducing Population

The debate on the impact of population growth essentially centres around two contrary views. The Malthusian view is predicated on the proposition that human population grows in geometric progression whereas food supply grows in arithmetic proportion. Food supply will hence run out, giving rise to the need to curtail population growth. Malthus believed that high rates of population will permanently condemn societies to a perpetual state of under development. This theory received the support of economists such as JS Mills and JM Keynes. Karl Marx, however, gave a contrary view, which was supported by sociologists. Marx stated that the widespread poverty and misery of the working class people was not due to an eternal law of nature as propounded by Malthus but to the misconceived organisation of society and by the unequal distribution of the wealth and its accumulation by capitalists.

The debate essentially revolves around four key issues:

Do small families improve the prospects of children.

Is a rapidly growing population detrimental to economic growth?

Is high fertility a result of low income and poverty?

Is rapid population growth a symptom, rather than a cause, of poor economic performance?

Food shortages, of which Malthus expressed concern have been largely overcome by advances in science and improved agriculture. However, this does not take away from the fact that larger populations require greater consumption, which stresses the environment, pollutes the atmosphere and causes environmental degradation, which is already causing concerns to people across the globe.

The population of the world, which stood at around 2.6 billion in 1950, took just 37 years to nearly double to 5 billion in 1987, adding an additional 2.4 billion people to the planet. The next billion was added in just 12 years, making the world’s population touch the 7 billion mark in 1999. By 2050, the world’s population is expected to increase to 9.7 billion, and peak at a round 11 billion by 2100.

In the Indian subcontinent, an examination of the populations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, between independence in 1947, to the present times, reveals that the population of India increased fourfold during this period. The population of Pakistan, for the same period, increased seven times and Bangladesh, six times. In India, the rate of population increase was not uniform, increasing about six times among the Muslim population and three times among the rest. There is a view that the unbridled growth of population in India and in other parts of the world has adversely impacted development initiatives to reduce poverty and has also led to substantive environmental degradation.

In her book, Building the Population Bomb (Oxford University Press, 2021), Emily Klancher Merchant states that overpopulation has been blamed for everything from climate change to poverty. She however posits that it is not population growth but global socio-economic inequality and environmental degradation that are the causative factors and that society incorrectly blamed a "population bomb” for problems that had other causes. “A wrong diagnosis,” she avers, produces ineffective solutions. In this, she echoes the Marxian viewpoint.

That is perhaps an oversimplification of a problem which has multiple dimensions, but Ms Merchant is not the only one who believes that reducing poverty will ipso facto, lead to a reduction in population. In their book, ‘Population and Development, Dennis Ahlburg and Robert Cassen note that, while it is believed that more rapid population growth increases poverty by reducing real wages, the relationship with poverty is ‘neither obvious nor well established’. They question the assumption that an increase in the labour force necessarily reduces wages, but caution that the relationship between population and poverty varies considerably across regions, countries, growth sectors and policy environments.

In a study carried out, examining the link between population and per capita income growth and poverty, a case study of Uganda is instructive. Uganda achieved reasonable economic growth while also experiencing high population growth. However, the evidence garnered in the study also suggested that “the currently high population growth puts a considerable break on per capita growth prospects in Uganda”. The study further went to state that high population growth led to low achievement in poverty reduction, which concomitantly, made it very difficult to make substantial improvements in poverty reduction and per capita growth.

There is no gainsaying the fact that unbridled population growth hinders poverty alleviation programmes, attenuates consumption and waste and has a negative impact on societies and the worlds eco-system. The examples of South Korea and Taiwan—two countries which have successfully controlled population growth, are instructive in this regard. Both these countries have seen rapid increases in per capita incomes as birth rates declined, giving them a positive demographic dividend.

There is a need to control population growth through policy initiatives through expanding education and health care, especially for the girl child, and on implementing voluntary family planning programmes. This can succeed, as seen in an experiment conducted in the Matlab region of Bangladesh, in a controlled population group, a portion of which was provided with free services and supplies, home visits by well-trained female family-planning workers, and comprehensive media communication. The programme also had an outreach to husbands, village heads and religious leaders to obviate any backlash from the male population. The results indicated a substantial decline in fertility rates—1.5 percent— between the targeted population and the non-targeted population in the controlled area. This shows that family planning programmes can succeed in conservative societies. Other countries such as Iran and Rwanda too have shown similar results.

Over the years, based on empirical data, a causal relationship has been established between rising prosperity and declining fertility. Both East Asia and some countries of South East Asia are examples of this trend that as incomes rise, fertility tends to fall and between national income growth and falling birth rates as also between family incomes and fertility. Improved economic conditions, therefore, do lead to a decline in birth rates. But for the converse to hold true, would require good governance models. In any case, the debate should now focus on both aspects: Good governance and taking measures to reduce the birth rates. Both should go hand in hand, simultaneously. 

India should lay emphasis on population control measures that are enlightened and in the interest of women. Improved education and health care for the girl child, better and improved access to reproductive health control, a concerted media campaign on the need and necessity for small families, sensitising religious and local leaders on the issue and making them part of the programme, are some of the initiatives which could be taken. Alongside, must be legislation to encourage the small family norm, through incentives and disincentives. The recent bill passed in parliament, bringing the age of marriage of girls on parity with boys to 21 years is a welcome step. 

The resources of the earth are limited and population control is the need of the hour. This is also in conformity with the goals as laid down by the United Nations. While population trends are not explicitly mentioned in the SDGs, but several of the SDGs are directly or indirectly related to future demographic trends. As humans are the only polluters in the planet, restricting their unbridled growth must remain the core issue for India and the world.

Published in IFJ, 1 January 2022

REMEMBERING THE LIBERATION WAR ON ITS GOLDEN JUBILEE

Today, on 16 December 2021, we commemorate the Golden Jubilee of Vijay Divas—the Liberation War. This is also a time to introspect and remember all those who fought for freedom and pay homage to those who laid down their lives and who were wounded in action in this war.

The perfidy of the West Pakistan dominated ruling elite in refusing to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman after he had won the elections in 1970 was the final straw that led him to declare independence. And to suppress the surge in Bengali nationalism, the Pakistan military began the infamous ‘Operation Searchlight’ at the stroke of midnight on 25 March 1971, resulting in the worst genocide in modern times. Over the next nine months, the Pakistan military killed over three million Bengalis and raped over two million women.

Brutality, unfortunately, has been the lexicon of the Pakistan army, ever since Pakistan came into existence. It started with the rape and killing of innocents in Kashmir in October 1947 and then continued with the murder, abduction and rape of  civilians in Balochistan during the first, second and third Baluch resistance movements in 1948, 1958 and 1962-1969 respectively. The US and the West maintained a quiescent silence, overlooking the barbarity of the Pakistan military, simply because Pakistan was, to them, a frontline state in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The genocide of the hapless Bengalis was thus a continuation of Pakistan military brutality which was ingrained in their psyche. They knew that they could get away and the world would remain a silent spectator, sacrificing human rights and dignity on the altar of political expediency. It is a sad fact of history that even after the defeat of the Pakistan military in 1971, the perpetrators of genocide were not tried for crimes against humanity. That is why Pakistan continues to remain a troubled state and is embroiled with myriad insurgencies. The Pakistan military has never been held accountable for  its actions.

Over ten million people crossed over to India as refugees and from among their ranks were formed the Multi Bahini, which was raised and trained in India and from which rose a resistance movement. The Multi Bahini constantly harassed the Pakistan military, leaving them no respite and forcing their units to disperse. By mid November, the Indian Army was fighting alongside the Mukti Bahini, after receiving orders to capture weakly held BOPs and secure lodgement areas to establish the Bangladesh government on its soil to gain political credibility and mileage.

The Mukti Bahini's initial operations along the border set the stage for the offensive operations of the Indian Armed Forces, which began on the night of 3-4 December 1971. Moving on four thrust lines against the Pakistani defence network which comprised three infantry divisions plus a large number of Wings of East Pakistan Rifles and West Pakistan Rangers, the operations culminated in 13 days with the surrender of the Pakistan military in Dhaka.

It was however the Eastern thrust from India’s IV Corps commanded by General Sagat Singh that made spectacular progress and broke the back of Pakistani resistance. On 9 December, 4 Guards had been lifted by MI-4 helicopters and dropped across the mighty Meghna River, South-West of Bhairab Bazar. Next day, as 4 Guards had secured the bridgehead across the Meghna, 19 Punjab and a battalion of the East Bengal Rifles, commanded by Lt Col Shafiullah, who later rose to be the Chief of the Bangladesh Army were ferried across the River. By 11 December, two more battalions, 18 Rajput and 10 Bihar had been airlifted by helicopters to Narsingdi. The road to Dhaka now lay open.

On 11 December, 2 Para Battalion Group, taking off from the Dum Dum and Kalaikonda airfields, was para-dropped into Tangail, 70 miles North-West of Dhaka. The battalion captured Poongli Bridge and later that night set an ambush for the retreating Pakistani troops from Jamalpur, causing heavy casualties to the enemy. By 12th evening, a link up had been established by 95 Mountain Brigade of 101 Communication Zone Force (CZF), thus opening another axis to Dhaka. On 14 December, the Indian Air Force mounted an attack on the Governor’s house, after Indian intelligence intercepted a message about a high-level meeting of the civil leadership, taking place there. While the meeting was in progress, four MiG 21 aircraft of 28 Squadron based in Guwahati fired their rockets which ripped through the massive roof of the main hall. The Governor, Mr AH Malik was shell-shocked and tendered his resignation with immediate effect. This proved to be the proverbial last straw that broke the camel’s back. On 15 December, 311 Brigade was close to Gulshan Model Town next to Dhaka Cantonment and 301 Brigade was in the area of Adamji Jute Mills in Narayanganj. 101 CZF was at Mirpur Bridge over the Bhuriganga River and early next morning was at Kurmitola. The Pakistani Army in Dhaka was now hemmed in from all sides and it was simply a matter of time and form, on how they would surrender.

The initial plans of Army Headquarters and of the Eastern Command did not envisage Dhaka as the terminal objective. It was General Sagat’s brilliance and strategic foresight which made him turn the direction of his thrust towards Dhaka as against his orders to advance towards Chittagong. His crossing of the Meghna on 9  December was a master stroke, and could well have led to the end of the war at that stage itself. Gavin Young, a British correspondent reported that General Niazi, soon after getting information of the crossing of the Meghna, informed Army HQ in Rawalpindi that he was no longer in a position to stop the Indian advance and asked them to arrange for a ceasefire. He was prepared to surrender on the 10th itself, but was given false hopes of American and Chinese intervention held out by Yahya Khan, and so he desisted.

Recently, two books on the Liberation War have been published, one by Mr Jairam Ramesh, a politician and the other by Mr Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a retired diplomat, both questioning the narrative put forth by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw that the then Prime Minister, Smt Indira Gandhi, delayed the start of the war from April-May to December, based on his advice. It is likely that Indira Gandhi had received advice on the timing of the war from many quarters, and not only from the Army Chief. But it was the Chief’s advice which would have been binding. Politicians do not set the date for military operations without military advice as that is a sure recipe for disaster and Indira Gandhi was much too shrewd a person to fight a war which could be lost. She would have listened to advice from her Chief. A needless controversy really to undermine an iconic Army Chief, but such barbs cannot dent the image of the Field Marshal. 

In the final analysis, the Liberation War was a victory for humanity, won by the combined efforts of the Indian Armed Forces, the Mukti Bahini and the people of Bangladesh. With the surrender of the Pakistan armed forces, an era of unprecedented brutality committed by the Pakistan military came to an end. Today, as we commemorate the Golden Jubilee of the Liberation War, let us also build on this spirit of cooperation to make the region a safer and better place for the people of the two countries and also for the region.

SUPERSONIC: A THRILLER THAT REWRITES HISTORY By Murali Murti Book Reviewed by Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch

On 6 August 1945, Colonel Paul Warfield Tibbets, the 30 year old commander of 509 Composite Group, US Army Air Force, flew a mission which was to bring World War II to a quick close and change the course of world history. Flying the B-29 Superfortress—an American four-engined propeller-driven heavy bomber, named Emola Gray by Tibbets after his mother, the mission was to release a 10,000 pound atomic bomb, dubbed “Little Boy,” over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The bomb was dropped at 0815 local time, the blast killing about 100,000 people and injuring countless more. Japan surrendered nine days later, on 15 August, bringing World War II to an end. But a new era of atomic warfare had begun. 

The US effort to build an atomic weapon had been designated as the Manhattan Project. The Soviet Union soon followed with its first atomic test on 29 August 1949, code-named RDS-1. Britain tested its first nuclear device in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964. The nuclear race had well and truly begun. But it was destined to be within these five powers, for none of them wanted nuclear technology to further proliferate. And thus began under the radar operations to prevent other countries from acquiring these technologies—and India was in the crosshairs of such attempts.

Towards the end of World War II, a brilliant Indian nuclear physicist, Homi Bhabha, conceived the idea of setting up a school of research in fundamental physics, with special reference to cosmic rays and nuclear physics. He hoped to set up such an institute in Bombay, with support from the Tata group through their trust funds. And thus began India’s journey in this very exotic branch of science. Unknown to him, there were forces at work which would go to any length to see that he did not succeed.

Along with India’s nuclear ambitions, was the quest to produce its own fighter jet aircraft. This became another bone of contention with the nuclear haves, who wanted to deny India not only the means to produce a nuclear weapon, but also the means to deliver such a weapon.

In this backdrop, Murali Murti has set the stage for his novel, “Supersonic - A Thriller that Rewrites History”. The plot is nothing short of a Frederick Forsyth pot-boiler, which keeps the reader glued to the book. Set as a novel, it makes the reader wonder where truth ends and fiction begins. Or is this simply truth telling, disguised as fiction? It is a fact that people who were involved in India’s nuclear programme died under mysterious circumstances. Homi Bhabha, in an interview he gave to All India Radio in October 1965, stated that if given the green signal, India could make a nuclear bomb in 18 months. Three months later, Bhabha was dead, killed when the Air India Flight 101 he was travelling in—a Boeing 707 airplane named Kanchenjunga—crashed near Mont Blanc on 24 January 1966. A few days earlier, on the night of 11 January 1966, India’s Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri died in Tashkent, after concluding a peace deal with Pakistan, under Soviet auspices, post the 1965 India-Pakistan War. The cause of Shastri’s death remains a mystery till date. No autopsy was carried out of his body, even after it was brought back to India! Significantly, Shastri had given the green signal to manufacture the bomb. These deaths cannot be put aside as mere coincidence. Neither can the death of Vikram Sarabhai in December 1971. Sarabhai was the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission when death came to him in a quiet room in a Kovalam resort on 30 December 1971. His death too was not investigated. That India still tested its first nuclear device in Rajasthan’s Pokhran desert on 18 May 1974—an operation code named Smiling Buddha—is a testimony to the grit and determination of India’s scientific community and the support it received from every Prime Minister of India, who upheld the national interest above all else.

Along with hostile attempts to sabotage India’s nuclear programme, there were attempts to scuttle the building of India’s first fighter jet aircraft. The story of Kurt Tank who helped India make its first fighter jet, the HF 24 Marut, and the devious attempts to sabotage India’s nascent fighter jet programme cannot just be wished away. Could India have had a robust aerospace sector today, had things been done differently then? One wonders! The lessons are stark and clear. In the realms of upper end technology, other nations will be out to scuttle India’s programmes. The Nambi Narayanan case, though not part of this book, is just an example to show the extent that foreign agencies can go to, to scuttle cutting edge technology development in India. Nambi Narayanan was in charge of the cryogenics division at ISRO and he was falsely implicated on trumped up charges and imprisoned. That set back India’s quest for a cryogenic engine by a good two decades. 

The world of shady defence deals, and the death and destruction it brings in its wake makes for spine-chilling reading in this book, and starkly brings home the truth about the Indian defence public sector’s shoddy performance, which is why India has remained dependent on imports for meeting its defence requirements. Much of the development effort for a vibrant defence industry was scuttled by officials who could be bribed for a pittance or lured through other means. This is a story of corrupt politicians and government officials, shady arms dealers, of spies and killers lurking in the shadows, a story which makes one sad to see how national interest can be compromised for a handful of silver. But it is also a story of hope, of rejuvenation, of women and men with unimpeachable integrity, of those occupying high office in the political realm, and also in government and in the private sector, who could not be bought and for whom the country came above all else. Many such people remain unacknowledged, primarily due to the nature of work that they were then doing and which many continue to do in the present times. It is a mix of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, all juxtaposed in a seamless web, to come to what most certainly is a fascinating twist in the tale, in the very last chapter.

Do read this book. It is a thriller. More importantly, it gives an insight into what India is up against, both from external agencies and from fifth columnists within. The book could have done with better editing at a few places and the language used is prosaic, akin to a Chetan Bhagat novel, but that is a minor inconvenience. So go out, get yourself a copy, sit on the cockpit and enjoy a Supersonic Ride. You will not regret it. 

 

The Killings in Kashmir: A Shift in Terrorist Strategy

The recent killings of non-muslims in Kashmir bespeaks of a new strategy being adopted by Pakistan’s ISI to foment fear and discontent in the Union Territory and to unhinge the return of normalcy in the Valley.

Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s sinister strategy to “bleed India through a thousand cuts” gave form to Bhutto’s promise of a thousand-year war. At that time, provocative statements made by both Bhutto and Zia were not mere rhetoric, but formed the core of a war fighting strategy which sought to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Today, this facet of Pakistan’s foreign policy remains a key component of its ideology and the very raison d’être for its existence. Thus began the era of cross-border terrorism in the late 1980s, with Pakistan pushing in armed and well-trained groups of terrorists into India. Pakistan referred to these terrorists as “freedom fighters,” and claimed that they were only providing moral support to such groups, but the truth tumbled out when a Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) told the Pakistan National Assembly that the ISI had been sponsoring such support in Kashmir.

But even before the onset of terrorism in J&K, a more insidious process to radicalise the people had started in the 1960s, with the introduction of Salafi Islam, which gradually displaced the earlier Sufi school of thought. The Jamaat-e-Islami came onto the Kashmir scene in the late 1960s, and intoxicated the young minds about establishing a Caliphate. The Indian state, in a false sense of secularism, allowed the Jamaat to have its own schools, which over the years indoctrinated the young minds to a toxic jihadist ideology. In a comedy of errors, in 1992, the state government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its Falha-e-Aam trust (educational wing), for indulging in anti-social activity, but at the same time, issued an order for absorption of teachers of the Falah-e-Aam Trust in government schools. In one fell swoop, the Jamaat onslaught on government schools began.

It took great effort on the part of the Indian Army to bring Pakistan sponsored terrorism to manageable levels. By 1996 the situation had been brought sufficiently under control to permit the holding of state elections. For the next 22 years, elections were held regularly with political parties holding sway, except for a brief interregnum of six months in 2008 when Governor’s rule was imposed. In June 2018, Governor’s rule was once again imposed as no party could form a government.

A fence along the LoC, built in 2003-2004, under the directions of General NC Vij when he was the Army Chief curtailed the movement of terrorist groups. This, in conjunction with effective anti-terrorism hinterland operations, contributed to bringing down terrorist-related violence. This prompted a shift in strategy by the ISI. From 2008 onwards, stone pelting by the youth became the norm to bolster unrest in the state. Dealing with unarmed stone-pelting mobs became a new threat to the security forces, and even the use of non-lethal means raised a hue and cry by human rights activists. Stone pelting mobs were also used to extricate terrorists entrapped in encounters with the security forces, with hundreds of mobsters collecting at the site. The situation was not helped by the fact that the regional political parties often took a soft separatist stand, which further emboldened the terrorists as well as their Pakistani handlers.

The abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 and the splitting of the state into two union territories on 5 August 2019 created a new dynamic. The stone pelting mobs practically disappeared from the streets, the number of such recorded incidents in 2020 reducing by over 90 percent. A combination of security forces operations against terrorist groups, actions to curb terrorist fundings and a focus on the developmental agenda, helped bring about normalcy. This clearly was not to the liking of the Pakistan military, which has thriven on creating disturbance in the state. And so, a new strategy to promote violence in the state has now been formulated by the Pakistan military establishment. 

The new strategy aims to target the non-muslim civilian population in the UT. Killing non-muslim civilians at random throws up huge security challenges for the state. While the targets may be chosen at random, the killings of innocent civilians is not a random act but is part of a well designed strategy to promote fear through the use of violence.

The killing of Makhan Lal Bindroo, owner of a prominent Srinagar pharmacy on 5 October was hence carried out to instil fear in the minority Hindu population. Two other civilians were killed that day, one of whom was a labourer from Bihar. The killing of two people on 7 October, Ms Supinder Kaur, the principal of a local government school and Mr Deepak Chand, a school teacher, was part of the same nefarious design. The former belonged to the Sikh faith and the latter was a Hindu. Such targeted killings will now form part of the larger strategy being used by Pakistan to prevent the return of normalcy to the UT.

Obviously, the new methodology to stoke violence in the state will not be easy to address. A terrorist can simply walk up to a non-muslim, identified earlier, shoot the individual at point-blank range and disappear into the crowds. As mentioned earlier, the targets may be random but the act of killing is planned. This now opens up a totally new security paradigm for the state, which if not effectively handled, will have severe repercussions. At the tactical level, the need of the hour is effective policing and ground intelligence, to eliminate the terrorists. But at the strategic level, it is necessary to make the Pakistan military pay a heavy price for its support to terrorism. The coming winter will be a long, cold and dangerous one, with exceptionally high levels of violence, not seen since August 2019.

India China Relations: One Year Post Galwan

Tensions between India and China over continued Chinese attempts to encroach into Indian territory in its border with occupied Tibet, both in Eastern Ladakh and in Arunachal Pradesh, have been ongoing now for over a decade, largely due to the fact that China has not ceased creeping forward surreptitiously, in what is commonly referred to as ‘salami slicing’ tactics. Post the ice-breaking trip by India’s then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 to China, and the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Borders of September 1993, the two countries managed to deal with volatile situations without resorting to the use of kinetic force and without the loss of lives. This changed on 15 June 2020 when the Chinese attacked a small party led by the Commanding Officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel B Santosh Babu, which had gone to check whether the Chinese had dismantled a post in Galwan, as agreed upon in the meeting held earlier at the level of the Corps Commanders. While firearms were not used, the Chinese attacked the Indian party with metal spiked clubs and barbed-wire-wrapped rods. Indian troops rushed in reinforcements and in the ongoing clashes over the night, 20 Indian soldiers including Colonel Babu lost their lives, fighting on the narrow ledge. The Chinese, by various accounts lost between 35 and 100 men, but no formal acknowledgement of casualties was forthcoming from the Chinese political and military leadership.

This by itself tells a tale. Writing in ‘The Washington Post’,  Jianli Yang, the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China, said, “Beijing fears that admitting that it had lost troops, that too more in number than its opponent, could lead to major domestic unrest that can even put the regime of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at stake.” After a gap of eight months, in February 2021, China finally admitted it lost four soldiers in the Galwan clash. This was under reporting on a humungous scale, and led to many in the Chinese social media, ridiculing the Chinese claim. This also brought back memories of consistent Pakistan denial of the loss of its troops in Kargil  in 1999, which was equally shameful and condemnable. 

One year down the line after the Galwan clashes, relations between India and China remain frosty. Both sides mobilised their air and ground forces post the clashes and while disengagement has taken place in some areas, deescalation is still a far cry away. Post the Galwan clashes, India put a ban on 267 Chinese Apps on security concerns, with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology giving out a press statement, "Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has issued the order for blocking the access of these apps by users in India based on the comprehensive reports received from Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Center, Ministry of Home Affairs.” 

India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) has stated on multiple occasions that relations between the two countries cannot be separated from happenings on the border. As recently as on 20 May 2021, in an event hosted by the Financial Times and the Indian Express, the EAM said that India’s relations with China are at a crossroads, and that the future trajectory of ties will depend on whether Beijing will adhere to pacts aimed at ensuring peace on the border. This insistence by India of linking the normalisation of trade, economic and other ties with China with peace and tranquility on the border marks a major shift in Indian policy, and is at stark variance with Chinese attempts to delink the two. 

Chinese intransigence has much to do with increasing Chinese nervousness with the Indian growth story, India’s refusal to join up with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s closeness with the US. The Quad is viewed with great concern by Beijing, despite the fact that it has yet to form a charter and as of now, it is not a security grouping. But it is the potential of the Quad to derail Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea and in the wider Indo-pacific that is a matter of great concern to China. 

India’s push back against China in Eastern Ladakh has greatly disconcerted Beijing, which had not anticipated such a firm response. China had hoped that its threat of the use of force would force New Delhi to adopt a more conciliatory tone, especially as India was battling with the Covid-19 pandemic, which had spread from a virus which originated in Wuhan in China. As the Indian political and military leadership held firm, China was not willing to escalate to a limited level conflict, as failure to win would have impacted on the credibility of the CCP leadership. A quick victory in a limited conflict would require air dominance over the Tibetan plateau, which as of now the PLAAF does not possess. India would do well to ensure an edge in air capability over Tibetan air space to deter China.

Sino-Indian relations are unlikely to improve in the near to medium term as Chinese aims and objectives are not restricted to mere grabbing of territory along the Indo-Tibetan border but extend to achieving control over the entire Himalayan massif, which would give them control over the waters which flow into South Asia. While a conflict at this point of time between Indian and China appears unlikely, the probability of such an occurrence in the next decade or so appears high. India would have to prepare accordingly, especially in terms of building adequate infrastructure in all its areas of interest, enhancing its capability in the C4I2 domain, countering Chinese missile capability and in maintaining a credible air deterrence.

There is also a need to look Southwards towards the Oceans, where credible deterrence can be imposed on China on select choke points. India would have to invest more in sea capability and strengthen its naval arm accordingly. Greater focus would also be required on improving India’s defence industrial base, especially in terms of cutting edge technologies. Finally, on the political and diplomatic front, India would have to lead in strengthening the Quad and in countering Chinese moves in the area. Peace with China can only come about if India remains strong and vigilant, ready to impose costs on Chinese intransigence. India must prepare accordingly.

Published in Chintan: 18 June 2021

BOOK REVIEW: BENGAL AND ITS PARTITION by Bhaswati Mukherjee

The partition of Bengal on communal lines was carried out by the British for the first time in 1905. This was rescinded six years later, but the communal divide created could not be bridged and resulted in a second partition in 1947. Who can better understand the pain of partition than those who were uprooted from their homes, where their ancestors had lived for millennia. This book tells the story of the tragic events that unfolded in Bengal since the dawn of the eighteenth century till the partition of India in 1947. 

Bhaswati Mukerji is a former diplomat. More importantly, her family, who had strong roots in what is now Bangladesh, were the victims of the unfolding events. She tells the story devoid of rancour and bitterness, the narrative finally coming out as a brilliantly researched and eminently readable book, factual and cogent, clinically precise, and written in a manner that makes history come alive. 

The Battle of Plassey and the subsequent sale of Bengal marked a turning point in India’s destiny, setting the stage for the ultimate conquest of India. This epochal  battle was fought and decided on one fateful day—23 June 1757. During the course of the battle, Mir Jaffar, a General in the army of Siraj-ud-Daulah, who had been bought over by the British, moved away from the battlefield with his 16,000 men at a critical juncture, which facilitated the subsequent British victory. Mir Jaffar’s name is associated with treachery till the present time, but his deceit was not the only factor which led to a decisive British victory.

The army of Robert Clive had just 3000 men as opposed to the 50,000 of Siraj-ud-Daulah. Clive had 10 artillery pieces to the 57 held by Siraj-ud-Daulah, all manned by well trained French personnel. So, despite Mir Jaffar’s treachery, the odds were still heavily stacked in favour of Siraj-ud-Daulah. But the nawab panicked and fled the  battlefield, a monumental blunder as his presence could have rallied his men and resulted in victory. His cowardice was comparable to the treachery of Mir Jaffar. The Battle of Buxar, fought on 22 October 1764, once again was won by the troops of the East India Company, despite being heavily outnumbered. Good battlefield leadership is a prime war-winning factor, as relevant today as it was in the mid eighteenth century. This is a lesson we must never forget.

The decline of Bengal started with the defeat at Plassey. It did not take even a decade thereafter for the East India Company to cement its position through vast swathes of India. Post the Treaty of Allahabad, signed on 12 August 1765, the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam II was in effect a mere puppet in the hands of the British. Paradoxically, it was these epochal events which gave birth to the idea of freedom and resulted in the first war of Independence in 1857. Virtually the entire Bengal Army which had a strength of about 1,35,000 native soldiers revolted and while the uprising was eventually put down, it spelt the death knell of the East India Company, with India coming directly under the British Crown.

To maintain its hold over India, the British Indian Army was overhauled, the concept of a martial race was developed and the army was divided on caste and religious lines. ‘Divide et impera,’ the motto of the old Roman empire, meaning divide and rule was to become the motto of the British Empire in India, heralding changes at the political, military and administrative level. In Bengal, as indeed the rest of the country, the education curriculum was fashioned to create for the British rulers a class of Indians, who would best subserve the colonial interest. They created a middle class and a bureaucracy, convinced of the inferiority of its own culture and the superiority of western systems and thought. Sadly, that mindset still pervades a section of India’s bureaucracy and intelligentsia till date.

This period also saw the revival of Wahabism amongst the Bengali Muslims and the British were quick to exploit the religious divide emerging in the Bengali population. While language and culture remained the binding adhesive within Bengali Hindus and Muslims, fissures on religious lines started to appear and led to the first partition of Bengal in 1905, based on communal lines. This was rescinded six years later in 1911, in response to the protests launched by the Swadeshi movement. But the divisive process had been set in motion and got a fillip with the communal award of 1932. The Muslim political leadership increasingly utilised the mullah and the mosque to establish contact with their electorate, further exacerbating the fissures created by communal disharmony. The seeds of division thus sown were destined to grow in malignancy, culminating in the great Calcutta killings of 1946, in which over 10,000 Hindus and Muslims were slaughtered and over 15,000 suffered grievous injuries. Suhrawardy, who is considered a hero in Bangladesh, was responsible for inciting his muslim compatriots to the path of violence. The polarisation on communal lines which had taken place in Bengal, led to the horrendous slaughter, rape and mass conversion of Hindus in Noakhali district, a predominantly Muslim area in Chiitagong Division in November 1946. The partition of Bengal in 1947 was thus a foregone conclusion.

What of the future? Can books like this help assuage the hurts of the past? Burying the truth, as many in India are inclined to do, is hardly a remedy for healing past wounds and is akin to an ostrich burying its head in the sand. For nearly a millennia, foreigners ruled over India, but the spirit and soul of India could never be vanquished. Enslavement of a people requires obliterating their roots—changing their culture, their language and their religion. India, for the most part remained resilient and held on to what was most sacred in its identity as a people. That is why history is important: to give us a sense of who we are, what we have become and where do we go from here. 

This book is an important addition to the historical works that are already available on the subject. More importantly, the book is a pointer on how history needs to be written—factual and concise, analytical and precise, it grips the attention of the reader from the very first page. Affordably priced, it is a book which should be read by people of all ages from high school onwards, to include teachers, historians and the lay public.

Review published in the Sunday Guardian, 18 April 2021

 

 

 

Pakistan’s Peace Overtures: Tread with Caution

In a discussion between the DGMOs (Director General of Military Operations) of India and Pakistan, over their established telephone hotline, which presumably took place on 22 February 2021, a ceasefire was agreed to between the two countries, effective from midnight 24-25 February 2021. A joint communique issued by the two sides stated…“In the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders, the two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence”. The wording had just the right amount of ambiguity to mean different things to different people, but for India, it is hoped that it reflects the change in attitude by the present government, which has made it clear that the only outstanding issue with Pakistan is its sponsorship of terror and its illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad.

An event of this magnitude was well beyond the pay scale of the two Generals concerned, so obviously, the top leadership of both countries would have been in the loop. The Pakistan National Security Advisor, Mr Moeed Yusuf, in a tweet denied any back-channel diplomacy between him and Indian National Security Advisor, Shri Ajit Doval for the ceasefire announcement, describing such reports as “baseless”. In an audio statement issued to journalists in Islamabad, he stated that the agreement on the ceasefire was the outcome of “behind-the-scenes” contacts and “more roads will open” in the future. He however did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts.

On 18 March 2021, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa, in his address at the second day of the Islamabad Security Dialogue, made a strong pitch for peace with India stating, “…we feel that it is time to bury the past and move forward”. In his inaugural address on the opening day of the Dialogue, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan Niazi called for establishing ‘civilised neighbours’ like relations with India and resolving the outstanding disputes through dialogue. This was in sharp contrast to the shrill statements made over the last two years by Niazi and members of his cabinet against Prime Minister Modi and India. This gives rise to the question: Is there a change of heart in the Pakistani establishment, or is this mere tactical posturing?

Let us first address the issue of whether there has been a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. On the positive side, since February 25, when the ceasefire once again came into effect, there have been no instances of cross border firing along the Line of Control (LoC), nor has any case been reported of cross border infiltration by terrorist groups from Pakistan. A meeting of the Indus Water Treaty Commissioners is also on the anvil after a hiatus of two years which is all to the good. But beyond that, nothing much seems to have changed within the Pakistani political and security establishment. Pakistan has not abandoned its policy of using terrorism as an instrument of statecraft, and it continues to maintain and support terrorist groups within its soil, for use as its strategic assets.

Given the above, it is surprising that some analysts are waxing eloquently on the ‘thaw’ that has taken place in the frosty relations between the two countries. In a surreal manner, they believe that  a love-fest is in the air and that soon, diplomatic relations would be restored, summit meetings would take place and there would be much greater people to people contact. This may be what Pakistan is hoping for, but it  is not something which the Indian leadership will blindly rush into, unless Pakistan shows visible and credible evidence that it has closed its terror camps and hands over to India for trial, those terrorist leaders it shelters, who have carried out terror attacks on Indian soil.

There is no gainsaying the fact that peace would give welcome dividends to both countries. But desirable outcomes are often held hostage to vested interests within Pakistan—in this case, the Pakistan army. Peace with India will erode the very raison d’etre of the Pakistan army and its role in controlling the levers of power within Pakistan. They will not allow that to happen. Dismantling the terror structure network within Pakistan, created as strategic assets, will cause serious blowback, with a high degree of possibility that such groups may then  turn against the Pakistani state itself. This becomes all the more plausible, seeing the manner in which Pakistani society has been radicalised over the last four to five decades and has been fed a continuous and viral hate-India diet. It would be delusional to expect a common Pakistani, who believes that killing the ‘kafir’ is a duty enjoined on him by his religion, to suddenly develop a love for India. That remains the preserve of a very small minority in Pakistan, who still retain rational thought.

Why then, this charade of peace? Three reasons are apparent. One, Pakistan is in an unholy mess as far as its economy is concerned, and is on course to becoming a failed state. Peace with India would give the country’s leadership a better chance to pull their economy out of the rut. Two, Pakistan stands isolated on the world stage as a sponsor of terror, and besides China and a handful of other countries finds no takers for its cause. They have been placed on the grey list by the FATF and while they have evaded being placed on the black list, they are keen to come out of the grey list, which too has economic consequences. Three, the Pakistan Army is finally having to bear the consequences of its actions in promoting terror within India due to the firm response by the Indian Armed Forces. It is gradually coming to the conclusion that bearing such cost over a long period of time, especially with an unstable Afghanistan on its western flank, is unsustainable. 

What we are witnessing is a tactical pause by Pakistan, the peace-offering being a mere charade—no better than a poisoned chalice. Pakistan’s past performance does not enthuse us with any hope that this time around, peace will be the outcome. While past performance cannot with certitude be a measure of future response patterns, in the case of Pakistan, whose society has been overtly radicalised, and whose military holds the levers of power regardless of which political party within Pakistan forms the government, Pakistan’s future response can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty. India, while being open to the peace overture, needs to tread cautiously. There must be no change in the government’s stance, that talks and terror cannot go hand in hand. Pakistan will have to close its terror factory and hand over all wanted terrorists to India, if it truly desires peace. As such an outcome is unlikely, peace will remain a chimera.

Published in Chintan: 26 March 2021

Talk at CENJOWS Seminar - 9 March 2021

 Thank you Gen Srivastava, for giving me this platform to share some of my thoughts with this very distinguished audience on the CPEC, Gwadar and Balochistan - the game plan.

We have seen the freedom movement in Balochistan play out since 1948, albeit with different levels of repression by the Pakistani state. But what we are seeing now is perhaps one of the most vicious elements of suppression of a people by the security forces of Pakistan. It would be worth dwelling why this is happening and how the future is likely to unfold.

Let me begin with a small anecdote. On 19 October 1977, the Corps of Engineers set off on a historic boat voyage in a small sailing boat, the Albatross, from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas in Iran. The crew of three halted at Karachi and from there sailed along the Makran coast to Iran. They crossed Gwadar by night and were surprised that hardly any lights were visible, though so much had been heard about its strategic importance. The complete lack of fishing activity along the long coastline also mystified them.

The truth of the matter really was that Gwadar remained undeveloped for a very long time till President Pervez Musharraf approached the Chinese in 2001 and they got on board to build the deep sea port. Pakistani fears were amplified after the Kargil War, and they wanted a second port in case Karachi was blockaded by India. 

The first phase of the port was completed in 2007 after a delay of three years, but the movement of cargo was limited, Karachi remaining the main port for trade purposes. Things changed dramatically post 2015, when Xi Jinping launched his Belt and Road Initiative of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor was the crowning jewel.

The CPEC is not really a commercial concern. Nor is the route likely to be used an alternate energy supply route in case of closure of the Malacca Straits. The reasons for the CPEC have more to do with GeoPolitics rather than Geo Economics. China’s objective has perhaps more to do with its desire to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean Region, to balance India - what some call geo strategic balancing. Chinese presence in Gwadar also gives them access to the nearby Strait of Hormuz as a point of influence. In any case, if Malacca is closed, the Chinese can move further south to the Sunda and Lombok passageways, though at a slightly higher cost. The Gwadar project is hence for the Chinese military. It is estimated that half a million Chinese professionals will be settled in Gwadar by the end of 2022, and that Gwadar will be used as military base. This has caused great concern to the local Baloch, who fear becoming a minority in their own homeland. 

There are also Chinese concerns regarding their investment in the CPEC, as it passes through Gilgit Baltistan which is Indian territory, illegally occupied by Pakistan. Post the revocation of the provisions of Article 370 and splitting the state into two union territories, the Chinese concern over the future of CPEC has been heightened. The announcement by Pakistan on 1 November 2020, to grant Gilgit Baltistan the status of a full province has perhaps been done under Chinese prodding, to protect their commercial interests. Post the elections held in the same month, and which were won by the ruling PTI, there is the possibility that the region may be declared as the fifth province of Pakistan. What impact this will have on Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir remain to be seen but the Chinese are hoping that it will lead to a permanent settlement of the border dispute between India and Pakistan, and this will secure their commercial interests.

Finally we have Chinese fears about the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who are fighting for an independent East Turkestan. This is the occupied region of Xinjiang, which the Chinese are ruling by brute force. The activities of the ETIM have merged with that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, making the situation more volatile for the Chinese. Allied with this is the future of Afghanistan, in the event of a total US withdrawal from the region. This could well plunge Afghanistan into instability, with consequences for all other countries in the region.

In this backdrop, I will now give my assessment on certain scenarios that may play out.

Let me start with the possible future of Balochistan. The likelihood of the Baloch people getting independence appears bleak. The situation cannot be compared to what happened in Bangladesh in 1971. For starters, Bangladesh or the then East Pakistan was totally surrounded by India, and the battlefield was isolated. This hampered the actions of the Pakistan military, but was conducive for the operations carried out by the Mukti Bahini and later, by the Indian Armed Forces. The population of Bangladesh was more than the population of then West Pakistan, and suppressing a people’s movement of such proportions was a virtual impossibility for the Pakistan army.

Balochistan has a small population - about 1.2 crore, which is about 5  percent of the total population of Pakistan. However, it comprises about  40 percent of the area of Pakistan. The Baloch is 52 percent of the population, with the Pashtuns accounting for 36% and others the remaining 12%. With these statistics, it appears a virtual impossibility for Balochistan to become an independent entity, unless there is external aid. 

Here, geopolitics comes into play. The two foreign neighbours of Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. Iran has a restive Baloch population in its Sistan-Balochistan province and will not fan the flames of independence in Balochistan. Similarly, Afghanistan has a large Baloch population bordering Balochistan and it will do nothing to fan the flames of Baloch separatism for its own interests. India does not have a land border, so can de precious little to assist the people in their just demands.  

On the flip side, however, the Pakistan military will be unable to regain total control of the area, precisely for the same reasons. Insurgency in Balochistan will hence continue unabated in the region, with varying levels of violence.

CPEC will remain disturbed and will require protection. As of now, over 30,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in its protection and this level of commitment will only increase in the days to come. The economic miracle that Pakistan is hoping for from the CPEC is not likely to materialise, considering the volatile security situation that prevails over much of Pakistan. Added to that is the bleak economic situation of Pakistan, which is worsening by the day. High inflation, coupled with low growth, increasing joblessness and an ever growing population adds to the cocktail of poor governance within the country.

Gwadar, in my view, will at some point of time, be taken over by the Chinese, who will use it as a naval base. Such a scenario, to my mind is at least a decade in the horizon and things may change by then. But the Indian security establishment needs to factor in growing Chinese presence in the area and build its naval assets accordingly. 

What can change the above hypothesis is an implosion within the Pakistan military or a rapprochement taking place between India and Pakistan on the one hand and the warring Afghan groups on the other. An India-Pak rapprochement does not suit the Pakistan military narrative as their place in the Pakistani governance structures will come under question. In Afghanistan, the Taliban will not settle for anything less than total control over the country and the present establishment will not be willing to meekly surrender. So the possibility of a civil war looms large in the country. But stranger events have taken place, so peace, though unlikely, is not an outcome that can be ruled out. 

The Pakistan military can implode, if the levels of radicalisation within the rank and file cross the tipping point. As of now, the Pakistan military is stable, but an implosion within the military could have possible fallouts in the further bifurcation of the country. A possible scenario could be a tie up between Sindh and Balochistan for an independent state. Together, it is a viable proposition. 

The options for India remain limited. Whatever commitment the Govt of India gives to the people of Balochistan must be on a long tern basis and should be sustainable. It should continue to support an Afghan peace process which is Afghan owned and Afghan led. And it should concentrate on increasing its economic and military might, to remain a relevant player in future. 

Thank you. Jai Bharat, Jai Hind