THE AMBUSH IN CHANDEL DISTRICT: AN ANALYSIS

6 Dogra had completed their tenure in Manipur and were scheduled to move out shortly to their new location. The unit was deployed in the Chandel District of Manipur, and a convoy of four vehicles was moving on the Tengnoupal-New Samtal Road on 4 June 2015. It was a routine convoy movement. The road had been sanitised or so the unit believed. At least they had sanitised the portion that fell in their area of operational responsibility. The rest of the road was the responsibility of an Assam Rifles Battalion. 

Unknown to the unit, a group of militants had planned an ambush on that stretch of the road. The area was hilly, with thick undergrowth, which enabled the militants to lie well concealed and was  about 15 to 20 km from the Myanmar border, which enabled a quick getaway to a safe sanctuary after the operation was over. At about 9 a.m., the convoy was on a stretch of road between Paralong and Charalong villages, when the militants struck, firing Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and Lathode Grenades, followed by a deadly fusillade of automatic fire. This firing continued for about 10 to 12 minutes. The first vehicle carrying the quick reaction team and the next two vehicles carrying troops came into the killing zone of the ambush. The leading two vehicles suffered the maximum number of fatalities and the third vehicle suffered the maximum number of non fatal injuries. Of the 30 plus personnel travelling in these three vehicles, 18 were killed in action and 11 were wounded.

A lot has been said and written about his ambush. Indeed, it was the biggest attack on the Army in over a decade, and brought forth questions about operating procedures and drills. Some were quick to castigate the unit, alleging that Standard Operating Procedures had not been followed. There was a desire to be first with the news, a ‘breaking news’ moment with all the gory details, mostly conjecture and half truths. In the process, some fundamental issues remained unaddressed.

That the unit was not moving as per SOPs is not correct. The troop carrying vehicles had about 15 personnel each to include the driver and the co-driver. That meant that in the body of the vehicle, there were about 12 to 13 men. So obviously, the vehicles were not overloaded. 6 Dogra had sanitised their stretch of the road, so that was all right too. The Assam Rifles Battalion responsible for the stretch of road where the ambush took place had also confirmed that the road had been sanitised. How the ambush took place in a stretch of sanitised road is now being investigated and doubtless lessons will emerge. But reports stating that SOPs were not followed were patently false and were an attempt to inject some element of sensationalism into the incident and to find an immediate scapegoat for what was certainly a very serious loss to the Army, both in terms of casualties suffered and in credibility.

What got missed out however, was the counter ambush drill followed by the Army. The militants were many times more in number than the army jawans and they had the element of surprise with them. In the initial burst of fire, they had caused massive casualties to the Army personnel. What was left were a few injured personnel in the vehicles that were attacked. From here onwards, an adverse situation was retrieved and a massacre was averted. Despite the shock of the initial assault, the survivors fought back. This surprised the militants who did not expect any resistance at all. They had planned to kill the survivors by closing in on the vehicles and thereafter taking away all the weapons. That plan could not fructify. With fire being returned immediately on the militants, they found the going too tough to handle and left the scene in haste. Their commander, a 30 year old man called Rajabglung Kamei of Noney in Tamenglong district was killed and his body and weapon recovered. Another militant was killed and his body was found some distance from the ambush site. It appeared from radio intercepts that quite a few militants were injured of which two more are believed to have died later. This indicates a very high standard of training and discipline of the Army and undoubtedly must redound to the credit of the unit.    

But something did go wrong, else we would not have had 18 Indian soldiers killed. There perhaps were shortcomings in the road opening drills followed. That will be determined by the investigation. But looking at the situation from a different angle, what a road opening party does is to ensure that their are no IEDs placed on the road and after that it pickets the road to see that the road remains clear. In hilly terrain with thick forest cover, it is easy for a large group of men to lie concealed about a hundred yards off the road and move forward just before the ambush is to be sprung. In the ambush, there was no IED on the road, so the road opening party would have assumed all was clear. If the militants were hiding away from the road, it would be practically impossible to detect them. As the area to be covered is large, every nook and corner cannot be picketed, especially in an area where the entire stretch of road is a potential ambush site and the aim is to hit a vehicle by rocket fire. This, to all intents was what the ambush did. It did not use IEDs and initiated the attack by firing RPGs. A change in operating philosophy of road opening parties is hence called for and doubtless drills will be refined in the near future.

The attack was carried out by three groups. These were NSCN (K) (Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)), The KCP, (Kangleipak Communist Party) and the militant Meitei KYKL  (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup). The NSCN (K) was formed in 1988 after a fallout between the Burmese-born S S Khaplang and the leaders of the NSCN (IM), Thuingaleng Muivah and Isaac Swu. For the last few years, the Khaplang Group, which is strong in Eastern Nagaland and in the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, has made inroads in Manipur, which is the stronghold of NSCN (IM). It withdrew from a declared ceasefire with India in March this year but continues to have a ceasefire with Myanmar.

‘Kangleipak’ is the Manipuri name for Manipur. There are about 30 factions of the KCP currently operating in Manipur. The smaller groups number just about 15 to 20 personnel; the larger groups go up to 100. Amongst the banned groups, the KCP splinter groups are considered mercenaries who can be hired to shoot at small-time shopkeepers, deliver extortion demands, plant IEDs on highways, attack non-locals, and kidnap for ransom.

The third militant group which carried out the attack was the KYKL (Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup), formed in 1994 after the Oken faction of the UNLF, the Meiraba faction of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (Prepak), and the Ibo Pishak faction of the KCP came together. The KYKL has traditionally been close to the NSCN (IM).

The joint attack by the above groups, led by NSCN (K) was apparently a message by Khaplang to the Central Government that they were a strong force and not to be trifled with. The Centre is in talks with the NSCN (IM), but has generally ignored the Khaplang faction, which is its rival. The attack was meant to show that despite being based in Myanmar, the NSCN (K)’s sphere of influence and strike capability extended deep inside India. It was well planned and expertly executed, showcasing capability, intent and will. The group was well trained and operated almost to perfection in executing its task. It is fortunate that despite being taken by surprise and hit hard in the initial stages itself, the remaining personnel of 6 Dogra responded with speed, courage and guts to retrieve the situation after suffering the initial onslaught. 

Traditionally, militant groups in the Northeast represent tribal affiliations and exert influence over the areas they dominate and from which they receive their support. Over a period of time, income through taxes from their respective areas has expanded to the control over government contracts, affiliations with political entities, control over smuggling routes and day-to-day business activities. Now that the ‘K’ faction has carried out an ambush in an area where the PLA is powerful and where the NSCN (IM) has support, internecine warfare amongst them for influence could perhaps lead to greater instability in the region, further adding to security concerns. The NSCN (K) did not traditionally have an influence in the Chandel district of Manipur. The ambush indicates its desire to join forces with Meitei terrorist groups to have a greater say in the regional balance of power, especially in relation to the NSCN (IM). The growing capacity of militant groups, their ability to unite and forge a unified entity for operations, and the availability of safe havens in neighbouring Myanmar presage a worsening of the security situation and the need for appropriate response mechanisms.

While the NSCN (K), has shown its ability to spring an ambush with precision, the larger failure on the part of the security forces does not rest on the shoulders of the unit, but on the state police forces and the intelligence agencies. The RPG is a sophisticated tool of war and Indian agencies should have been tracking the movement of such weapons from their supply sources to India. The militants also used incendiary devices for the first time, which resulted in the vehicles catching fire. How and when they got access to such sophisticated munitions should have been known to the intelligence agencies. Within Manipur, it is evident that the intelligence units of the state were taken by surprise. Launching an operation of this nature would have required a great deal of intelligence and ground reconnaissance. The movement of a large body of militants too would have attracted some level of attention, which did not come to the notice of the state police forces. Evidently, ground level intelligence remains weak and is a cause for concern.

The army too needs to enhance its intelligence gathering capability in the Northeast through enhancing  electronic surveillance capability, improving language skills and laying emphasis on Humint. With the availability of sophisticated weaponry and communication devices with the militant groups, we could be looking at attacks from stand off ranges, to permit easier getaway by the militants as an antidote to future swift and firm responses as given by 6 Dogra. Finally, better intelligence sharing and analysis of available inputs could give the security forces the edge in countering militancy. A firm response across the border has already conveyed a message to all militant groups that they have no place to hide. But along with a firm military response, political initiatives too must proceed hand in hand to bring lasting peace to the region.

Published in the June July 2015 issue of SALUTE Magazine. 

COMBATTING LEFT WING EXTREMISM: NEED FOR A REALISTIC APPROACH

Introduction

The use of the term Naxalism has become synonymous with that of Maoist activities in India. All such activities are branded as Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The Maoist movement calls for a complete transformation of the political, social and economic system as existing in India. In its essence, it challenges the validity of the Indian Constitution and rejects the parliamentary system, seeking to replace it with a new social order. It draws its strength from existing weaknesses in society where certain vulnerable sections have been marginalised and exploited and thus can be penetrated and swayed by Maoist ideologues, who promise the people a fulfilment of their aspirations and a life of dignity and self respect. 

The Naxal movement has a relationship to communism. Karl Marx propounded that in order to fight feudalism and capitalism, “you must have a scientific philosophy and a sound theory, for a workers movement to be built up on a scientific basis”. In dealing with the problem of social change, Marx examined two concepts, the first dealing with the “Forces of production” and the second with the “Relations of production”. He was more interested in examining the military concepts of the social revolutionaries, which earlier lay in the domain of great political leaders, legislators and pioneering reformers. According to Marx, the social process would lead to revolution at a certain stage of development and the material productive forces of society would come in conflict with the existing relation of production. He emphasised that change could be brought out only by revolution and not by peaceful means. The Naxal ideology flows from this line of thought.

Lenin raised the Marxist revolutionary doctrine to a higher level while applying it to Russian conditions. He stressed the need for clarity as to the historical conditions that gave rise to war, the classes waging it and the ends to be achieved. In his work, “Socialism and War” Lenis went on to justify civil wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor class, by serfs against landowners and wage owners against bourgeoise as legitimate, progressive and necessary. Mao Ze Dong modified the theories of Marx and Lenin and adapted them to the conditions as existing in China. He found the Marxist theory of revolution being led by the industrial proletariat to be unsuited to Chinese conditions and used peasants as the major force to achieve the political objective. He also propounded the ‘United Front Theory’, observing that there was inevitable weakness in the efforts to make revolution, relying on the workers alone. It was necessary to also rally all possible revolutionary classes and strata in forming a revolutionary united front. To Mao, ‘unite’ meant forming a united front with the bourgeoise, while ‘struggle’ meant peaceful struggle without bloodshed with the bourgeoise, on matters of ideology, politics and organisation. This would turn to armed struggle when the time came to split with the bourgeoise. Such armed struggle was to be waged through guerrilla warfare. Such warfare required political military leadership and would pass through three phases, namely the Passive or Preparatory stage, the Strategic Defensive or Retreat and the Counter Offensive. The Indian Naxal movement draws its sustenance from Maoist thought. This understanding is essential if LWE is to be eradicated in India.

The Naxals

The Naxal movement was essentially an agrarian movement, which, post independence had influence in parts of Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and certain other parts of the country. It lost its agrarian character after a clash between peasants agitating for land rights clashed with the police in a village called Bengai Jote in the Naxalbari Block of Siliguri district in West Bengal on 25 May 1967. Nine adults and two children were killed in police firing, subsequent to which the movement lost its agrarian character and became a militant movement. As per one of the local leaders of that time, ‘There is no peaceful way to establishing rights for the poor. The gun is where the answer lies’.  

Today, we have a number of Maoist groups, spread over the Eastern half of the Indian land mass, operating in parts of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Telangana and a couple of districts each in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The most prominent of these is the CPI (Maoist), formed in 2004 with the merger of two groups, the MCCI (Maoist Communist Centre of India) and PW (People’s War). The new organisation's ideological-political orientation is fully dominated by the MCC brand of Maoism.   

The social base of the movement varies in different states. At some places it comprises peasants with small or nil landholdings and to lesser extent middle peasants. At others, it consists of tribals. At still others it is an amalgamation of the above along with other marginalised sections of society. In caste terms, the base of the movement consists of lower and intermediate castes. This applies to the Hindu as well as Muslim communities. The leadership of the movement is largely from the upper castes and classes and to a large extent is Andhra Pradesh centric.  

To most of the common people who form part of the movement, the term Naxalite has come to represent a movement or struggle for basic rights. The testimonies convey an anti-system sentiment and suggest that the Naxalites have a fair idea of the important components of their struggle for basic rights as well as knowledge of their opponents - the government machinery, landlords, upper classes, big business houses and the like. In their self-identity, therefore, the Naxalites clearly see themselves as individuals who have chosen a path which clashes with the existing order. In their view, their struggle for basic rights has met with fierce opposition and condemnation which has turned their ‘right’ into a ‘wrong’ in the eyes of a large part of the world. They generally disassociate themselves from the wrongs that are commonly attributed to the movement to the extent that they may distance themselves from the term itself. They define who they are by who they are not and in so doing affirm the positive values of the Naxalite movement. 

At the lower levels, the ideological factor of Maoism is clearly missing. The migration of Telugu speaking people in the areas near the Godavari has also continued unabated and they have done in Bastar Division what they have done in Adilabad, Warangal, Khammam and East Godavari. They have swamped the tribal population, exploited them mercilessly and have reduced them to penury and second class citizenship in their ancient lands. And quite ironically it is from these that the nucleus of the Naxalite leadership has emerged. Though the Naxal movement is now almost entirely centred in the Adivasi homelands, one cannot but notice a disconnect between what the tribals seek and what the Naxalites provide. 

Few Adivasis have heard of Mao Zedong or care for what he stood for and did. The Naxalites on the other hand deify him. To them, China’s Chairman is ‘their Chairman’. Today, the entire greater homeland of the Koitur Gonds in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh is under the thrall of the Telugu speaking Naxalite leadership, which now has an increasingly symbiotic relationship with rapacious forest and Public Works department (PWD) contractors, and corrupt officialdom. 

An understanding of the ideological content of the Maoist movement as well as the social base of its core constituents must therefore be an essential first step if LWE is to eradicated form India. A lack of such understanding is perhaps a primary cause for its continuance, despite brave proclamations made periodically, by political leaders and defence and social analysts that LWE is declining. Neutralising the foot soldiers in ground offensives is but a palliative. Like a bad penny, the movement will spring up again, and will continue to do so till the ideological and social characteristics of the movement are understood and addressed. A three pronged approach is essential to achieve success. This would involve firstly, winning the ideological battle; secondly, breaking Maoist linkages and fronts and lastly, neutralising their military base. All actions would have to proceed concurrently.

The Battle for Ideology 

This is perhaps the least understood aspect by those responsible to halt and eliminate LWE from the country. In its essence, the battle is ideological. The tools used by Maoists may manifest in public mobilisation and violence but the central aim remains imposing a particular social order for governance. The Maoist movement is thus an antithesis to the nation’s democracy and its Constitution. The Maoists do not aim to split India but to change its nature of government through force, in accordance with Maoist philosophy that ‘power flows through the barrel of the gun’. That fundamental will not change. Those who continually call for and propagate the idea that the Maoist leadership can be brought in to the ambit of the democratic process are not cognisant of Maoist ideology and  thought. Talks with the Maoist leadership will not yield results, precisely for this reason. The Maoists may abjure violence for a short period of time in places of their choosing but that process is temporary and will be used more often than not to achieve short term tactical advantage in terms of regrouping their forces after a debacle or as part of a larger strategic design. 

For any worthwhile gains to be made, the ideological content of the movement has to be defeated. As an idea, the movement can only be defeated if it is supplanted by another idea and that idea perforce has to be the idea of Indian Democracy. But for that to happen, Indian democracy must be seen as a superior alternative, which means that democratic structures must work in delivering social good to society. This would encompass the entire gamut of deliverables such as creating forums where the voice of the people is heard, having effective justice delivery mechanisms, providing socio economic opportunities to the affected masses and providing basic facilities in terms of drinking water, roads, power supply, education, sanitation and health. All of these fall under the banner of ‘good governance’ and are common to all parts of the country, but assume greater relevance in areas affected by LWE. 

Political penetration is perhaps the best antidote to LWE. Wherever political parties hold sway, the voice of the people is heard and people have a forum to state their needs and vent their grievances. This space gets filled by Maoist activity when the state abjures its responsibility in the less populated and remote areas of the country. A decline in LWE in West Bengal can be attributed to political penetration of affected areas. People generally prefer choosing among a set of alternatives in the democratic system, as against the totalitarianism of the Maoists. Hence the democratic path offers a construct which is preferable to what Maoist ideologues offer. Off course, political parties would have to deliver, else they will be thrown out of power. Society is becoming increasingly aspirational, which places increasing responsibility on the state administration to deliver. In conditions where  political parties cease to perform or have limited reach, the area becomes fertile hunting ground for Maoists.

This highlights the importance of good governance. Justice delivery mechanisms and a sensitised administration and police force are perhaps the most potent weapons in the fight against LWE. Both the judiciary and the political leadership have to look closely into these aspects as part of a concerted effort at conflict resolution. However, it is not development alone that will deliver tangibles but attitudes and perceptions. An elderly villager, when asked by a visiting Deputy Commissioners in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, about what differentiated the Naxals from the government servants, gave a caustic reply. “We do not see much difference”, he said. “When your forest guards and police constables come here, they take our poultry and eye our women. The Naxals do likewise”. This is where the primary change is needed.

On the development front, there appears to be a lack of clarity on the long term strategy being adopted to tackle LWE. Interaction at the ground level brings home the truth that a long term vision for development is lacking and concerned officials are barely looking even one month ahead in terms of goal realisation. There is a need for a vision statement, both at the level of the Centre and the state, spelling out goals to be achieved. This must then be translated into a time bound long term perspective plan. The requirements must initially flow from the districts encompassing a period of 5 to 10 years. The plan should then be coordinated at the state level and issued as a directive to the districts. This directive must be unique to each district and must state the benefit that will accrue to the local population. The directive should encompass what is proposed to be achieved, the cost to be incurred, the resources that would be made available the time lines for completion. Unless such focus is brought in, the development effort will remain a mirage and the ideological battle will be far from being won.

The Linkages

Mao appreciated the necessity of forming united fronts to achieve the goal of revolution, believing rightly that the peasants by themselves would not be able to do so. The CPI (Maoist) document, titled ‘Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution’, bases its core ideology on Mao’s teachings. It seeks to ‘creatively apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions prevailing in India’. The political strategy aims to… ‘develop progressive forces, win over fence sitters and isolate staunch opponents’, in order to defeat the state. This understanding is vital as it brings into focus, the role of various organisations in India which the Maoists use for their own purposes. By aligning themselves with such forces, through direct or indirect support, they propagate and strengthen their cause and give it further legitimacy.

The fronts alluded to comprise four classes; the proletariat, peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoise, and national bourgeoise. These can be broken down into Tactical United Front (TUF) and Strategic United Front (SUF). The former is formed with organisations that are opposed to the state for one reason or the other. A good example of this category is the People’s Democratic Front of India (PDFI), which was formed in July 2006 through the efforts of a Maoist front organisation known as ‘Revolutionary Democratic Front’ (RDF). The PDFI has amongst its members eminent personalities such as Medha Patkar, Nandita Haksar and SAR Geelani. Some of the organisations which form part of the PDFI are the Samyukta Sangram Committee (West Bengal), Indian Federation of Trade Unions, All India Federation of Trade Unions, Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, Daman Virodhi Manch (Orissa), Jharkhand Progressive Students Union –– an affiliate of the All India Radical Students Federation (AIRSF), etc. The emphasis in alignment is with educational establishments, NGOs and other establishments which could be used by the Maoists to further their cause. Here, the Party seeks to take advantage of the conflicts and contradictions within the ruling class, to achieve control over our vast resources and markets. They make use of each and every activist, many of whom may not even be aware that they are part of the broader plan of Maoists to sabotage the state. The aim is to create mass struggle through propaganda, agitation and action. Thus, Maoist involvement comes to the fore in the activities of student groups in the Jawahar Lal Nehru University, in the activities of environmentalists like Medha Patkar and even in civil movements such as the anti corruption campaign launched by Anna Hazare. The counter to such activities lies in an effective intelligence network and in formulating a counter perception management strategy, to give the target audience an alternate narrative. The SUF consists exclusively of Maoist mass organisations that are underground and operate in the base area/struggle area. The combined strength of these organisations is synergised to serve the cause of the revolution. They would need to be penetrated by own intelligence agencies.

In addition to the above, the Maoists have developed linkages with a number of foreign and Indian terrorist  and insurgent groups. These include Maoists of Nepal, militant groups operating in the northeast India, anti-Indian actors – state and non-state – based in Pakistan, and umbrella organisations at regional and global levels like Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), Friends of Indian Revolution (FOIR), International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organisations (ICMLPO) and International Communist Movement (ICM). These linkages are not only increasing in depth and quality, but also turning deadly. The counter strategy here is once again on neutralising threats though an effective intelligence apparatus.

Security Force Operations

This is the third triad in operations against LWE. While ideological, governance, intelligence and perception management issues play a pivotal role in addressing Maoist violence, no realistic solution can come about till such time as the military power of Maoist groups is neutralised. The most powerful of the militant groups, the CPI (Maoist) has in its Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), about 9000 to 12,000 hard core cadres, grouped into military companies, platoons, and special squads. Military companies, platoons, and even special guerrilla squads are equipped with AK 47/56 rifles, INSAS Rifles, LMGs, and mortars. 

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is the lead security agency, tasked to defang the PLGA and other military groups of the Maoists. A broad survey of security forces operation over the last decade throws up disturbing trends which are yet to be   addressed. The most disturbing aspect of SF operations is the abnormally  high rate of casualties suffered by the CRPF and local police forces in encounters with the Maoists. Statistical data from the South Asian Terrorism Portal reveals that for the five year period 2010-2014, the police force lost one man for each terrorist killed. This bespeaks of a very heavy rate of attrition on security forces which impacts negatively on their morale and will to confront the Maoists. But an analysis of encounters indicates an even more worrisome fact. In one on one encounters with the Maoists, the police forces have been bested most of the times. In many cases, when the police forces were ambushed, they did not return the fire, which enabled the Maoists to remove the weapons and equipment of the fallen policemen. This denotes tremendous weakness in leadership and training of the forces deployed in combating the Maoists in India’s heartland. 

Reports suggesting that the police forces suffered because they were out gunned by the Naxals lack credibility and are not substantiated by facts. After every major encounter, in which the police forces have suffered grievous loss, there is a renewed clamour for better weapons and equipment, improved protection gear and use of advanced technology for identifying and neutralising the Maoist cadre. This is for the most part uncalled for. Let us consider some of the demands made after each successful strike by the Maoists.

The issue of mine protected vehicles continues to crop up whenever a vehicle is blasted by an improvised explosive device. The use of such vehicles is however self defeating. Put simply, each vehicle can withstand a certain quantum of explosives. It is but a simple matter for the Maoists to increase the quantum of explosives in the improvised explosive devices (IED) they bury in the ground, to defeat at nominal cost nay such equipment that is bought. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE exploded an IED under an ICV (infantry combat vehicle), the explosion sending 30 tons of metal over 50 feet in the air. Vehicles with armour protection are useful against small arms but offer little protection against IEDs. Their use in combating the Maoists serves little purpose. When used, they become obvious targets and could be likened to metal coffins.

Another factor which repeatedly crops up is the demand for drones in seeking out and destroying the terrorists. After a Naxal attack in March 2014 in Chhattisgarh in which 15 policemen were killed, a leading national daily raised a rhetorical question on why the 200 million dollars worth of Israeli drones were not being used to track the movement of Naxals. This underlies a basic misunderstanding of the employment of drones. The Heron UAV in use in the services is useful to gain information in conventional operations. To combat LWE, it would be practically impossible to keep the entire length and breadth of the areas affected by LWE under constant surveillance. The UAVs required for total area coverage as well as the support infrastructure required would be colossal. Even so, the utility would remain doubtful. In the type of terrain that exits, there are obvious challenges to detection of small bands of lightly armed men and women using drone. Even if they were detected, the time required to process the information and pass it down to the local police for taking action is so large that the Maoists would have long left the scene by then. Medium Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) UAVs of the Heron class are this inherently unsuitable as a tool for tactical level operations against Naxals. Micro UAVs in the hands of operating troops would be more useful in such environments and that is where emphasis must be laid. The police forces need to be empowered at the tactical level. Better observation and communication devices and navigation tools with the operating forces would achieve far better results than upper end equipment more suited for conventional operations.

It needs reiteration that while technology is an enabler, the battle against the PLGA can only be won by police forces which are well led and well trained. This remains the Achilles heel of our operations. The leadership, drawn from police officers remains well below par for operations in the jungles. The training standards too remain a cause of concern. Unless these concerns are rectified, the PLGA will continue to get the better of our forces.

Conclusion

India cannot achieve its rightful place in the sun if a major portion of its land mass remains affected by extremist violence. The political leadership as well as the state administration tasked with addressing security concerns arising out of extremist violence needs to develop a holistic understanding of the Maoist philosophy, and then take steps to insulate the masses from the Maoists. Governance challenges need to be addressed through a time bound long term action plan, which should be monitored at the highest level in each state. Maoist linkages and fronts need to be broken through a concerted intelligence action plan. Finally, the police forces need to get their act together and provide the requisite training and leadership to our forces deployed in combatting LWE. Only through such an integrated model can we hope to overcome the challenges that face us. 

Published in CLAWS Journal - Summer 2015. For footnotes, refer to the CLAWS Journal. 

Required: A Different Paradigm for Operations for J&K

Elections have been held successfully in the state of J&K yet again, which indicates a yearning for peace among the residents of the state. The security climate has shown a marked improvement, with lower violence levels and a decrease in fatalities. On an equally positive note, the attrition suffered by terrorists remains high, and averages four terrorists killed to one Security Force (SF) personnel killed in action (KIA) for the period 2008 to 2012 and two terrorist killed for each SF KIA for the period 2013-2014. The actions taken by the SF to prevent infiltration appear to be successful, with reports suggesting that terrorists have not been able to make up the losses suffered by them, through infiltration from across the border. As per the IG Police (Kashmir), Mr Abdul Ghani Mir, only residual militancy prevails, and the major component of militants operating in the state are foreigners, with only a handful of local militants working with them. This has been done despite the fact that the terror infrastructure across the border remains intact and there is no let up on the part of the Pakistani state in trying to push terrorists through into India.

Politically, the situation holds great promise. While the three divisions of the state have voted differently, each has given a distinct mandate to the party of its choice. While this has thrown up a coalition government, whose two major constituents have ideological differences, this by itself may not be a negative attribute. On the contrary, compulsions of coalition politics, may help help to stabilise the state rather then splinter it further on regional fault lines. In the changed political and security environment, the terrorists would in all likelihood look into a change in strategy, through which a wedge could be created between the security forces and the public. Anti terrorist operations would perforce have to be handled with a higher degree of sensitivity to avoid collateral damage and this throws up a fresh set of challenges.

The death of two boys who were fired upon by troops when they refused to stop at a mobile vehicle check post, in Nowgam on 3 November 2014, saw widespread protests in the Valley. In a bid to douse public anger, the senior military leadership in the state apologised for the death of the two boys and started an inquiry into the incident. This however, was not viewed favourably by many in the army, who felt that the troops were only doing their duty. The first challenge then, is handling sensitive issues with a greater degree of finesse. The Nowgam incident had its repercussions on the next attack by militants on an administrative base of 31 Field Regiment in Baramula District on 5 December. In this attack, an officer and seven men were killed in action, prompting many comments in the social media, mostly ill informed. The Army reacted swiftly, killing all the militants, but a popular though fallacious story that went viral stated that the attack was made possible because the sentry did not stop the terrorist vehicle, for fear of action being taken against him. This was patently false, as the terrorists did not come in vehicles but sneaked through into the area on foot, taking advantage of the broken ground and the darkness, but it highlighted the impact which social media can have on the morale of troops operating in J&K. This is another challenge that would need to be addressed.

The tragic loss of Col MN Rai, the CO of 42 Rashtriya Rifles who was KIA, while offering a couple of terrorist holed up in a house, in a village about 30 km from Srinagar an opportunity to surrender., points to yet another challenge for the Army. The action by Col Rai exemplifies the front line leadership which has been the hallmark of the Army, but it underlines yet another danger. In an effort to avoid collateral damage, there will be a tendency among senior officers to personally supervise operations which in the context of the present situation in J&K is not desirable. This aspect would need to be addressed. While all loss of life must be prevented, the loss of senior officers must be prevented at all costs as success by terrorists to target the Army leadership, is a strong motivator for terrorists of all hues. 

What the Army needs is a revised strategy to move with the times. Terrorist propaganda as well as the efforts of some elements in civil society who remain ignorant of the real issues involved will continue to target AFSPA, which is simply an enabling law allowing the Army to operate in areas affected by militancy and terrorism. This has to be effectively countered through a focussed awareness campaign. It would be a good idea to select unit and formation commanders for posting to such areas, based on their known track record. It would be beneficial if such commanders were formally sensitised to the challenges of operating in the state before being posted in. Other initiatives could be cultivating local language skills by unit personnel, to enable better outreach. Instead of formal language training in military establishments, this could be done by making provisions at the unit level for hiring a local teacher for the purpose. Success needs to be measured on the basis of a units capability in restoring normalcy in an area, rather than on statistical evidence of terrorists neutralised. Such small steps could make a huge difference in strengthening the bonds between the public and their Army. At the national level, there is a need for a concerted and well directed perception management campaign to wean the public away from conflict. This needs to be conducted in concert with a focused economic development plan that can create jobs in the private sector. 

In the age of the electronic media, it is also important to send the right signals to the public at home and abroad. Presently, from the local police to the Central Armed Police Forces like the BSF and CRPF, all personnel are dressed in combat uniform, akin to the Army. This gives an impression of a militarised state. A change could perhaps be affected by giving the local police a distinct uniform and restricting the use of combat uniform exclusively for the Army. This would give the correct perspective of the local police handling security in the state, increase confidence levels of the local people in their own police forces and give a sense of pride and belonging to the police personnel. Likewise, the CAPF, must also don the khaki only, and not the combat dress worn by the Army. Only then can the reality of reduced Army presence in populated areas be also perceived to be so.    

J&K: SHAPING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Perception Management is increasingly being viewed as an essential tool to win the battles we are currently engaged in or are likely to face in the future. While shaping the information environment is not a substitute for hard power, its absence can diminish the result of hard fought success or amplify the impact of failure.   

Perceptions can be shaped through an understanding of the viewpoint of all stake holders involved. Today, the most interesting types of power do not come out of the barrel of a gun;  much bigger payoffs can be achieved by ‘getting others to want what you want’.  That is the essence of a successful perception management campaign. 

In counter insurgency or counter terrorism operations, a key component of perception management is the requirement to reach out to the hearts and minds of those people who directly or indirectly support the terrorist or who are simply sympathetic to the ‘cause’. At the strategic level, this would involve addressing causative factors through political, social and economic tools. Without this effort, a network can actually be defeated military, but still maintain support for the ‘cause’ whilst in a period of hibernation. At the operational level, activities which foment divisions within a terrorist network, undermine the morale of its members (particularly those on the fringe), and drive a wedge between the network and its support base will pay dividends. While direct action (military, law enforcement, intelligence, political, economic activities) will assist in this effort in the short term, long-term success will only come about when such support is withheld willingly because the people providing it have been convinced that it is no longer in their best interests to do so. 

With this as a backdrop, what should we do in the state of J&K? The situation has multiple complexities, especially when viewed in the context of identity, statehood and rights. Within J&K, perceptions vary in each of the three divisions of the state, the administration, the security forces and the political parties. An understanding of each viewpoint is essential to form a coherent and effective perception management campaign.

Objectives

While military force will remain an instrument to put pressure on the insurgent groups, the need to change mindsets is becoming increasingly relevant for conflict resolution. The end objective of a perception management plan would have to be considered at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level, Perception Management operations would entail creating a belief in Indian democracy, promoting religious harmony and the idea of ‘Kashmiriyat’ and preventing the Islamisation of society. This would have to be dealt with by the Centre and the state government. Actions at the operational and tactical level would involve isolating the insurgents from the population support base, neutralising the support which social and other organisations give to the insurgents,  educating the public on the need for laws such as AFSPA and creating a bond between the Indian Army and the local populace. It is important at this stage to understand what perceptions currently exist in the state and then look at measures to affect a change in the same.

Perceptions of Stakeholders

In the Valley, a small group of hardline Kashmiri activists remain vocal in their dual demand of removing the Army from Kashmir and having a plebiscite to decide their future. In this, they echo the line propagated by Pakistan but are silent on the status of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Many people in the Valley view the Army as being overly aggressive when moving around in public areas. They feel that the soldiers on the ground (as defined separately from the officers) operate from a position of permanent suspicion when it comes to dealing with locals and this reflects in their public dealing. It appears that ground troops who come in contact with the civilian population apparently lack communication and inter-personal skills and this facet militates against improving relations with the public. There is also a widespread belief that cases of human rights abuses from 1990 till date have not been addressed by the Army or the government. There is also a sense that troops do not exhibit adequate sensitivity while dealing with the citizens, especially women, children and the aged, when carrying out search operations or other activities. The humiliation felt by the common citizen when Army personnel or police personnel barge into their homes and ask for their identity cards is quite marked and enhances feelings of alienation. In the context of identity, this feeds the ‘we’ and ‘them’ syndrome. Many people are of the view that the problem with the Indian Army is a lack of a sense of belonging and viewing the Kashmiris as not being part of the country. As attitudes get hardened on both sides, the population too starts looking on the Army as ‘foreigners’, thus, contributing to the cycle of mistrust between the two. Many also feel that Army personnel from South India look upon Kashmir as a foreign country and question the need for their being deployed there. Some are of the view that the problem calls for a political solution and unless the same is found, the question of the presence of the Army becoming acceptable in Kashmir and in the Kashmiri speaking areas of the state does not arise.

The military, however, is also perceived by many in the Valley as defending Kashmir from external powers and as being successful in reducing cross-border infiltration. Opinions, however, vary from place to place and with different interest groups. Unlike in the early 1990s, the presence of the Army now receives support, primarily due to initiatives taken by its leadership over the last few years. Other factors include declining militancy, a yearning for peace, positive impact of Sadbhavana projects and the Army’s role in providing assistance in times of calamities. Many people now speak of “an evident change in the attitude of Army soldiers everywhere in the area”. 

The people from Jammu and Ladakh Divisions have vast differences in perception with their brethren in Kashmir. There are no separatist tendencies but intra-state conflicts of interest exist which require political resolution. Most are related to economic and development issues; the people here feel that the bulk of development funds go to the Kashmir region at their expense. 

Within the government, there is a feeling that Army actions undermine the authority of the civil administration. There is a feeling that the Army needs to be sensitised to the culture and mental landscape of the people who live there. There is also a feeling that CI/CT operations should increasingly be conducted by the CAPf and that the Army should be on the border only and should not administer or be seen to administer civilian areas. There is also a perception that hardline Muslim leaders in Kashmir are trying to ‘Islamise’ the state, and they view the Army’s role as necessary to maintain stability and fight against religious extremism. They consider the problem in Kashmir as having nothing to do with ‘Azadi’ but being essentially a movement towards rapid Islamisation of the state, killing in the process every semblance of ‘Kashmiriyat’. That the state has remained with India and still maintains a secular character is mainly because of the Army which should be facilitated to a greater extent in performing its duties in Kashmir. 

Army personnel generally have a very high sense of ‘self-image’ and of working for the ‘country’. They believe that barring some aberrations, most personnel are conscious of their constitutional responsibilities while combating terrorism and insurgency and take care to see that the human rights of the local people are respected. Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) is viewed positively as a factor which is essential for conflict resolution. The contemporary situation is encouraging and all stakeholders must provide the healing touch and commitment to vastly improve matters. While the Army perceives that it has achieved the military objective of constraining the militancy, it is less sanguine about the political processes, which it feels have not capitalised on the military’s success or kept pace with it. 

Perceptions on Image Makeover 

It is apparent that a need exists for an image makeover, as far as the Armed Forces in J&K is concerned. It is important to always bear in mind the fact that when the Army is acting in Kashmir, it is not only perceived as the Army, but the ‘Indian Army’. All actions involving interactions with people are ascribed to India/Centre/Union and hence impact on the overall situation of the state. They must therefore be carefully conducted. What then must the State and the Army do, to have an image makeover? Ten points are given below, which if implemented could have a positive impact.

Firstly, the Army needs to be sensitive to, and understand the cultural and sociological aspects of the people they are tasked to protect. This will give the requisite human touch and improve relations considerably. Train of its soldiers on communication and inter-personal skills, especially those who come in contact with the public will go a long way in improving the Army’s image. . 

As the situation of the early nineties no longer exists, a reduced Army footprint would go a long way in improving relations and reducing hostility. Allied with this is the need to retain a separate identity. As of now, it is difficult to distinguish Army jawans from central armed police forces personnel, as they are dressed alike. The police forces must not wear military uniforms as it gives a wrong impression to the public. 

Thirdly, justice, against abuse of powers must not only be done but seen to be done to restore public confidence in the Army. Swift action must be taken against erring personnel and the same must be well publicised. The Army, as is well known, is swift in punishing defaulters, but for some reasons, its actions are not publicised. This must change as perceived injustice inflames the people and enables political forces to manipulate the youth, thus, fuelling the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

Fourthly, it is absolutely necessary to have good relations with the state bureaucracy. It will be useful to engage with the new ‘panches' and ‘sarpanches’, care being to see that such action is  not perceived as obtrusive by the civil administration. The bonhomie in civil-military relations, thus, visible, will go a long way in building a positive image. 

Sadbhavana has created goodwill for the Army, but has limited utility. In the words of the former  Chief Minister of J&K, Mr. Omar Abdullah,  “A lot of goodwill and rapport depends upon the actions of the local commanding officers and troops on the ground. Sadbhavana is a good project, but you put a good CO on the ground without Sadbhavana and he’ll show better results”. The importance of selecting the right COs for posting in such areas hence cannot be overstated. 

Sixthly, the Army needs to develop structures for peace building and be empathetic to the problems of a society brutalised by violence between the state and non-state actors. Gender sensitivity, with special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence will go a long way in nurturing confidence and trust in the local population.

Seventhly, the Army must learn to use the media as a force multiplier. It is important to not only speak the truth, but to be the first with the news so that a distorted picture does not emerge. It must be understood that perceptions once created are difficult to remove. First impressions are generally the ones which remain in the public consciousness and this fact must be understood. The Army must shed its reluctance and fear of the media and must also accept that all news may not be favourable as we have a free and robust media.

The state government needs to alter its approach to security and change the design of the stability system. It could look into ‘Stability units’ to build coherence between disparate elements of governance and public security, which could have both mediating and enabling qualities to link the public with governance. This inter alia could include security and public safety needs, delivery of socio-economic programmes and enabling public access to the justice system as well as security apparatus. 

Next, the civil administration in the state has to be strengthened. Once a civil administration which is accountable is in place, the Army’s role will reduce and this will pay political and peace dividends. The weakness in the delivery system is glaring and must be overcome. Lastly, the alienation dilemma must be solved. This could be done by establishing and institutionalising the dialogue process with civil society. As insurgency is now in remission, perhaps mediation groups could be established at the brigade level to inform communities on the role of the Army and its legal accountability procedures. This could also serve as a point for interaction to redress civilian grievances. Institutionalised dialogue among the state, the military, the public and conflict transformation experts in the public domain would be an important step in improving the image of the Army.

Prerequisites for a Perception Management Campaign

The role of the Army must remain confined to operational and tactical aspects only which will assist the Army in its operations against the insurgents. The image makeover of the Army should pertain to the force being perceived as the people’s Army – an Army which the local people can look up to.

Themes must be prepared and executed at the corps level and the end state required to be achieved for each target segment must be clearly enunciated. Themes would be different for the three divisions of J&K. Even within Kashmir, themes would have to target segments and not be uniform for all. Dissemination must be done through multiple means and must be continuous. It must be based on truth. Under no circumstances can anything be done which will hit at the credibility of the Army.

Capabilities too have to be real otherwise the projection of deterrence will not succeed. The strategic narrative must not be lost sight of while formulating a perception management campaign. The strategic narrative is focused on end term goal realisations while operational and tactical level narratives are more focused towards the immediacy of the conflict situation. While the tactical and operational level narratives are important, they must not run counter to the long term aims of the country. In future conflict, perception management will play an increasingly important role. The concept must hence be understood and should be coopted into all military plans.

LT GEN HANUT SINGH, PVSM, MVC: The Standard Bearer

On 10 April 2015, a legend of the Indian Army, Lt Gen Hanut Singh, PVSM, MVC, passed away. He was two months short of 83 years when he died, and was cremated three days later on the banks of the Ganges in Haridwar. The mainstream print media did write nostalgically of the legend, but the outpouring of eulogies on the social media from across the world, was indeed something only reserved for a very special few. What was it in the man that made it impossible to forget him even after he had shed the uniform for a quarter of a century and lived the life of a recluse?

Most people remember the Battle of Basantar in the 1971 War, when Hanut, then commanding the iconic Poona Horse, gave a crushing defeat to Pakistan’s mechanised forces, his regiment virtually decimating the enemy’s 8 Armoured Brigade. This was also the battle where a young officer of the Poona Horse, 2 Lt Arun Khetrapal became a byword for courage and honour, being posthumously awarded the nations highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra. In his biography of General Hanut Singh, Major General VK Singh states that “Arun Khetarpal's act of supreme sacrifice was more than an act of personal courage, and valour. It was a manifestation of 'The Poona Horse Spirit', which Hanut had inculcated amongst his officers”. While that famous victory by itself was adequate to grant Hanut a permanent place in the pantheon of heroes, it could not by itself have led to such a cult following within the Armed Forces. There had to be that something extra, which distinguished him from the rest; something which made people remember the General, long after they were no longer in contact with him. 

Lt Gen Ajai Singh, who was Hanut’s Second in Command in Poona Horse during the 1971 War describes an incident which has remained deeply etched in his mind. When Ajai joined the Poona Horse on Commissioning in 1956, Hanut, then a Lieutenant and the Senior Subaltern met him for the first time. In Ajai’s words, “He met me with such enthusiasm, warmth and affection that I felt as though we had known each other for ages”. Hanut then took Ajai around the Squadron and introduced him to all members of the troop he was to take over. Having done this at the garages itself, he gave him a programme for his training which was to commence from the next day and also gave him a large bundle of books and précis which he was to read in his own time. “I went through all this businesslike activity in a state of total shock,” said Ajai, “because till then, such a serious approach to professional matters had neither been seen nor heard during the few days I had spent in the Regiment”. At that time, Hanut had less than four years service, having been commissioned in December 1952. But even so, he exhibited a standard of professionalism at that young age and service, which was exceptional and rare, even for officers many years his senior in age and service. Later, his thoughts on armoured warfare were to become standard text for training in the military establishment and remain so till date.

His close friend, the former Maharaja of Kapurthala, Brigadier Sukhjit Singh, MVC, spoke of Hanut as “The standard bearer of a set of values that place him above mortals that I ever knew.” According to Lt Gen Surrinder Singh, a former  Army Commander of Northern Command, Hanut was “uncompromising in his beliefs and convictions…a man of sterling character combined with a forceful personality, he had no time for fools - a fact which was soon apparent to those in this category.” This is what characterised the General - total professionalism, integrity and courage of his convictions, that set him apart from the rest. General PK Singh, a former Army Commander, South Western Command and the present Director USI, succinctly summed up Hanut as “A tall military leader who inspired confidence amongst the professionals and fear amongst the others”!

Physical courage has never been a shortcoming in the Indian Army, but men with exceptional moral courage, especially at senior levels of command, remain a rare breed across the world. General Hanut was one of them. On professional matters he never compromised. Indeed, he never compromised on any matter at all. Many of his superiors felt that Hanut was too individualistic and did attempt to side line him. He was after all a loner who abhorred socialising, had no time for sycophancy and worse still, was intellectually far superior to those under whom he had to serve - a quality which certainly would not have endeared him to them. But there were others who appreciated his mastery over his profession and his vision. General Sundarji, who later became the Chief and General Inder Gill, who rose to Command the Western Army, both iconic Generals in their own ways, recognised his genius and integrity and appreciated his honesty of purpose, even when he differed with them on professional matters.

In many ways, the human side of General Hanut Singh, merged with the professional. Lt Gen Baljit Singh speaks of an incident in 1974, when Hanut was the Colonel GS of the Division and he was commanding a SP Artillery Regiment equipped with the ABBOT Field Gun. At that time, reminisces Baljit, 11 of the 18 Guns in his Regiment were declared "out of action” for want of replacements for the electric diode that activated the firing mechanism. This status prevailed for over a year as their was an embargo in the warranty clause that they could not use any derivatives and the spares had not been bid for in the contract. The regiment took the initiative of stripping the circuit and finding a replacement from the Bangalore electronic market for a mere Rs 20/- per piece. The guns were made functional and they all fired successfully in the Annual Practice Camp which was overseen by a Gunnery Instructor who reported that "All 18 guns fired to perfection on all ten days.” However, instructions had been violated and a Staff Court of Inquiry (COI) that was ordered, found Baljit guilty of procedural lapses and the Army Headquarters ordered the Division to initiate appropriate action. When Hanut saw that letter, he drove over to Baljit’s office to familiarise himself with the case. After having done so he spoke to the Divisional Commander who thereafter disagreed with the conclusion of the COI, recommended closure of the case and the Powers that be accepted the Bangalore manufactured derivatives as valid replacements. That too was the measure of General Hanut Singh. 

His concern for the men was legendary and he did everything in his power to make their life more comfortable, both in terms of giving them time to look after their own requirements and to aspects such as their accommodation, entitlements and training. A deeply religious man, his unimpeachable moral conduct was the product of his deep spirituality. He did not just set matchless standards of professionalism, probity and character; he lived them in his daily life. This continued post retirement too, extending right unto his final days, when he left his body and found union with the Creator, while in ‘Dhyan’ (meditation). His concept of a ‘soldier’s dharma’, was ‘righteous living’, a precept he unwaveringly followed. That he left his body while on meditation, speaks of the remarkable levels of spirituality attained by him. The legacy he leaves behind would be hard to emulate. As one of his admirers said, he was that rare breed of professionally competent senior officers, the like of which I have not met till date. What more can one say. He was truly a soldiers General, but more than that, he was a visionary and an original thinker. Not for him the trodden well beaten path, taken by so many others. His vision, his courage, his strength came from his own spirit - a spirit nurtured in ‘Dharma.’ And he had the strength of character to walk the path, even if that path was a lonely one.

In his poem ‘The Road not Taken’, Robert Frost ends with the famous lines…

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—

I took the one less traveled by,

And that has made all the difference.

General Hanut took the less travelled road. Hopefully, some at least in our Armed Forces will continue in that tradition. In that lies our strength - and our salvation.

AFSPA: WHY THE ACT IS REQUIRED

If there has been consistency over any one demand made by a section of civil society, academics and certain political parties over the years, it has been the demand to repeal the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). Continuing protests against the provisions of AFSPA are a testimony to the fact that on this issue, the Army has not been able to project its viewpoint in the public domain. Many people across the country now perceive the Act as a draconian piece of legislation. To that extent, social and civil rights activists and a variety of NGOs and militant groups campaigning for its removal have been successful in shaping public opinion on this score. While this betrays a poor understanding of the security environment in which the armed forces operate as also ignorance about internal Army procedures in upholding the rights of individuals in the areas where the Act is operative, the fact remains that the Army has not been able to counter this perception. 

The issue has been debated from the standpoint of human rights with a great deal of emotion, and serious aspersions have been cast on the conduct of the security forces. Over time, the narrative has become one sided as the security forces lack a forum to express their concerns and challenges. Issues thus remain misunderstood, which further vitiates an already charged atmosphere. It is important to understand that in the Indian context, the Armed Forces do not have a say in the imposition of AFSPA. That is a decision that the political leadership has to take. Constitutionally, the Army does not have a mandate to operate in internal security duties. If it is required to do so, special constitutional provisions have to be made to permit such employment. 

The framers of the Indian Constitution, despite their brilliance and acumen, did not foresee an eventuality, where the nation’s armed forces would be used against their own people. This is understandable because in the euphoria of gaining Independence, few in India could have visualised the fissiparous tendencies that led to armed secessionist movements, and which required both force and political acumen to resolve. Many in  the Indian establishment at that time were under a mistaken belief that India had no enemies, so leave aside using the Armed Forces against internal actors, there was no necessity felt by luminaries such as J.L. Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, for keeping an army at all! The Constitution of India was hence silent on the employment of the Armed Forces in internal security duties, because such a possibility at that time was perhaps too far fetched to fathom. However, such a necessity became painfully obvious when the civil administration expressed its helplessness to deal with the armed insurrection that erupted in Nagaland in 1958. The Centre thereafter acted swiftly, the President of India promulgating on 22 May 1958, the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance, 1958, which gave the Armed Forces the power to operate in the disturbed areas in the State of Assam and Union Territory of Manipur. Later the Ordinance was replaced by the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Bill, which received Presidential assent on 11 September 1958. It came on the Statute Book as THE ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958 (28 of 1958). It was later extended to Jammu and Kashmir as the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, on July 05, 1990. The Act initially covered areas in the Kashmir Division of the state. Subsequently, in August 2001, it was extended to the Jammu Division too.

The Act has six sections, the first giving out the short title and extent of the Act and the second defining various terms as to their meaning. Section 3 empowers the Constitutional head of any state to declare the whole or any part of the state to be a disturbed area. Only after such declaration can the Armed Forces be employed to deal with the situation. Section 4 of the Act grants enabling powers to the military, once an area has been declared as disturbed. This includes the use force if required against a person acting in contravention of the law, even to the extent of killing a person for the commission or suspicion of the commission of offences, the power to destroy any arms dump or fortified position from which armed attacks are being made or likely to be made and the power of search and arrest without a warrant. Section 5 provides for an arrested person to be handed over to the police with the least possible delay. Section 6 provides protection to persons in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act.

Activists agitate against the provisions of Sections 4 and 6, believing them to be too harsh and open to misuse and demand that the provisions be withdrawn or made less stringent. The Army views the Act as enabling, without which they will be unable to perform in the highly volatile and violence prone situation prevailing in the areas they have been tasked to operate. Evidently, if the situation is so out of control that the local police forces and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) are unable to deal with it, then the situation is an extraordinary one, requiring additional powers. This lies at the heart of the debate. 

In the wake of the intense agitation launched by various civil society groups in Manipur following the death of Kr. Th. Manorama Devi in July 2004 and the earlier indefinite fast undertaken by Ms. Irom Sharmila since November 2000 demanding repeal of the AFSPA, a 5-Member Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, former Judge of the Supreme Court was set up to advise the Government whether the Act needed to be amended, to bring its provisions in consonance with the obligations of the Government towards protection of Human Rights or to replace the Act by a more humane Act. The findings of the committee have not been placed in the public domain. The Act has however been subjected to legal scrutiny and has been upheld by a 5-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court. The apex court also extended the scope of powers to include the power to interrogate persons arrested and retain custody of weapons seized.

It is important to understand that the Army operates on the direction of the political authority. The onus for deploying the Army hence lies on the Centre and not on the Army. Declaring an area as ‘disturbed’ is also not an arbitrary decision by the state government, but follows from a complete breakdown of the state machinery due to the hostile activities of insurgents, militants or terrorists. The Army is thus called in as the last option and the consequences of failure could well mean the disintegration of the state. If the Army is not enabled to carry out its task, then the result could be failure with serious consequences.

A cursory glance at the violence levels existing in J&K since 1988 is instructive. In just under three decades of violence, over 22,800 terrorists have been killed, with the security forces suffering over 6150 casualties. Civilian deaths due to violence are about 14,700. That the movement has continued for so long points to the devious role played by external actors in giving support to terrorist groups. The roots go back to the policy enunciated by Z.A. Bhutto in the eighties to ‘bleed India with a thousand cuts’. The Pakistani state continues with its rabid support to terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the like which they view as their ‘strategic assets’. Such groups are trained, financed and equipped by Pakistan to carry out violent activities to ‘keep the pot boiling’ in J&K. Casualties suffered by such groups are made up by infiltrating the required number of terrorists across the border. While a check has been imposed on infiltration and the strength of resident terrorists has decreased substantially, the problems in the state are by no means over. Violence levels have reduced in the state but the security environment is still not conducive as the casualty figures for the five year period 2010-2014 show:

                                       

A glance at the weapons, ammunition and explosives apprehended since insurgency began in the state in the late eighties, indicates that the environment of operations for the security forces is much akin to war (See Table 1). What the Army is dealing with is state sponsored terrorism, much akin to sub conventional conflict. Let us examine one by one, the angst of activists against AFSPA. These pertain to sections 4,5 and 6 of the Act.     

                                 

Activists state that the power to kill and to search and arrest without a warrant opens up the possibility to their misuse. While the power exists in the statute, in its application there is strict control. No search or arrest is made randomly, each being done based on specific inputs. Just because such powers are available, does not mean that troops can enter any house or arrest any person at will. The fluid nature of operations in terrorist and insurgent infected areas, however, makes it essential for the armed forces to have this power, else the terrorist will get away every time. It must be remembered that the Army is deployed largely in remote areas, many of which have the most rudimentary of amenities if any. Search and Arrest warrants are for normal police time crime control and not for combatting highly organised and trained terrorist groups armed and equipped with the latest weaponry and communication devices.

The power to open fire is also judiciously used, Army troops engaged in operations rarely being the first to open fire. That is the reason why the casualty rate of officers in such operations is exceptionally high as they lead from the front and the terrorist invariably has the first opportunity to fire. Once a fire fight erupts, there could be collateral damage, as terrorists and insurgents deliberately initiate conflict in built up areas or in close proximity to the civil population. While terrorists have no compunctions in killing or injuring innocent civilians, the Indian Army remains very sensitive to such occurrences and seeks to avoid them to the extent possible. Such sensitivity is not displayed by foreign armies, as seen in the brutal handling of such operations by the Pakistan Army in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA where air power and artillery has been indiscriminately used to destroy entire villages and townships, leading to heavy loss of civilian life, and millions of internally displaced persons. Even the U.S. and British forces, the pillars of Western democracy, routinely use missiles and air power to destroy what they believe to be terrorist hideouts. The hundreds of women and children killed in such engagements in Afghanistan and the Levant is conveniently put across as collateral damage. The Indian Army on the other hand has kept its operations confined to the use of weapons at the platoon level and has been very sensitive in ensuring that collateral damage either does not occur or is restricted to the bare minimum. Individuals do not flee their homes during Army actions. On the contrary, the presence of the Armed Forces in disturbed areas provides a sense of security to the public at large and not a sense of fear.

Activists also vent their ire on Section 6 of the Act, which grants legal immunity to the forces against prosecution. What is not appreciated is that it is part of the operating methodology of terrorists and insurgents to deluge the security forces with false cases to hinder their ability to operate. Statistics from the National Human Rights Commission (Table 2), clearly indicate that most complaints are motivated and designed to malign the Armed Forces. Troops across the world require legal protection against prosecution for acts done in good faith in such high intensity operations. Without immunity from future prosecution, troops will cease to operate in such areas fearing legal action. This will lead to a resurgence in insurgency, causing the people greater misery and  hardships and could over time lead to the break up of the state.

Today, countries across the globe are going in for more stringent laws in their effort to tackle the cancer of terrorism. AFSPA has to be seen in the light of current day realities and not in an isolated prism. The debate on AFSPA also needs to follow a different narrative. AFSPA can no longer be discussed in terms of the Act being  ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The central issue is whether the Act is essential. In disturbed environments, the issue often gets deflected from real causes to imaginary ones. AFSPA is not the cause of the problem. That lies in the failure of the political and administrative processes to meet the aspirations of the people. A prominent academic gave forth the view that as AFSPA has not succeeded in bringing peace to the Northeast and to J&K, it should be scrapped. That was being too clever by half. On a similar yardstick, we could well ask for the scrapping of the political and administrative machinery of the state for failing to deliver. Be that as it may, the security forces have delivered time and again on stabilising the state to permit other initiatives to flourish and take root. The onus for building peace now lies on other actors.