Pakistan’s Peace Overtures: Tread with Caution

In a discussion between the DGMOs (Director General of Military Operations) of India and Pakistan, over their established telephone hotline, which presumably took place on 22 February 2021, a ceasefire was agreed to between the two countries, effective from midnight 24-25 February 2021. A joint communique issued by the two sides stated…“In the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders, the two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence”. The wording had just the right amount of ambiguity to mean different things to different people, but for India, it is hoped that it reflects the change in attitude by the present government, which has made it clear that the only outstanding issue with Pakistan is its sponsorship of terror and its illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad.

An event of this magnitude was well beyond the pay scale of the two Generals concerned, so obviously, the top leadership of both countries would have been in the loop. The Pakistan National Security Advisor, Mr Moeed Yusuf, in a tweet denied any back-channel diplomacy between him and Indian National Security Advisor, Shri Ajit Doval for the ceasefire announcement, describing such reports as “baseless”. In an audio statement issued to journalists in Islamabad, he stated that the agreement on the ceasefire was the outcome of “behind-the-scenes” contacts and “more roads will open” in the future. He however did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts.

On 18 March 2021, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa, in his address at the second day of the Islamabad Security Dialogue, made a strong pitch for peace with India stating, “…we feel that it is time to bury the past and move forward”. In his inaugural address on the opening day of the Dialogue, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan Niazi called for establishing ‘civilised neighbours’ like relations with India and resolving the outstanding disputes through dialogue. This was in sharp contrast to the shrill statements made over the last two years by Niazi and members of his cabinet against Prime Minister Modi and India. This gives rise to the question: Is there a change of heart in the Pakistani establishment, or is this mere tactical posturing?

Let us first address the issue of whether there has been a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. On the positive side, since February 25, when the ceasefire once again came into effect, there have been no instances of cross border firing along the Line of Control (LoC), nor has any case been reported of cross border infiltration by terrorist groups from Pakistan. A meeting of the Indus Water Treaty Commissioners is also on the anvil after a hiatus of two years which is all to the good. But beyond that, nothing much seems to have changed within the Pakistani political and security establishment. Pakistan has not abandoned its policy of using terrorism as an instrument of statecraft, and it continues to maintain and support terrorist groups within its soil, for use as its strategic assets.

Given the above, it is surprising that some analysts are waxing eloquently on the ‘thaw’ that has taken place in the frosty relations between the two countries. In a surreal manner, they believe that  a love-fest is in the air and that soon, diplomatic relations would be restored, summit meetings would take place and there would be much greater people to people contact. This may be what Pakistan is hoping for, but it  is not something which the Indian leadership will blindly rush into, unless Pakistan shows visible and credible evidence that it has closed its terror camps and hands over to India for trial, those terrorist leaders it shelters, who have carried out terror attacks on Indian soil.

There is no gainsaying the fact that peace would give welcome dividends to both countries. But desirable outcomes are often held hostage to vested interests within Pakistan—in this case, the Pakistan army. Peace with India will erode the very raison d’etre of the Pakistan army and its role in controlling the levers of power within Pakistan. They will not allow that to happen. Dismantling the terror structure network within Pakistan, created as strategic assets, will cause serious blowback, with a high degree of possibility that such groups may then  turn against the Pakistani state itself. This becomes all the more plausible, seeing the manner in which Pakistani society has been radicalised over the last four to five decades and has been fed a continuous and viral hate-India diet. It would be delusional to expect a common Pakistani, who believes that killing the ‘kafir’ is a duty enjoined on him by his religion, to suddenly develop a love for India. That remains the preserve of a very small minority in Pakistan, who still retain rational thought.

Why then, this charade of peace? Three reasons are apparent. One, Pakistan is in an unholy mess as far as its economy is concerned, and is on course to becoming a failed state. Peace with India would give the country’s leadership a better chance to pull their economy out of the rut. Two, Pakistan stands isolated on the world stage as a sponsor of terror, and besides China and a handful of other countries finds no takers for its cause. They have been placed on the grey list by the FATF and while they have evaded being placed on the black list, they are keen to come out of the grey list, which too has economic consequences. Three, the Pakistan Army is finally having to bear the consequences of its actions in promoting terror within India due to the firm response by the Indian Armed Forces. It is gradually coming to the conclusion that bearing such cost over a long period of time, especially with an unstable Afghanistan on its western flank, is unsustainable. 

What we are witnessing is a tactical pause by Pakistan, the peace-offering being a mere charade—no better than a poisoned chalice. Pakistan’s past performance does not enthuse us with any hope that this time around, peace will be the outcome. While past performance cannot with certitude be a measure of future response patterns, in the case of Pakistan, whose society has been overtly radicalised, and whose military holds the levers of power regardless of which political party within Pakistan forms the government, Pakistan’s future response can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty. India, while being open to the peace overture, needs to tread cautiously. There must be no change in the government’s stance, that talks and terror cannot go hand in hand. Pakistan will have to close its terror factory and hand over all wanted terrorists to India, if it truly desires peace. As such an outcome is unlikely, peace will remain a chimera.

Published in Chintan: 26 March 2021

Talk at CENJOWS Seminar - 9 March 2021

 Thank you Gen Srivastava, for giving me this platform to share some of my thoughts with this very distinguished audience on the CPEC, Gwadar and Balochistan - the game plan.

We have seen the freedom movement in Balochistan play out since 1948, albeit with different levels of repression by the Pakistani state. But what we are seeing now is perhaps one of the most vicious elements of suppression of a people by the security forces of Pakistan. It would be worth dwelling why this is happening and how the future is likely to unfold.

Let me begin with a small anecdote. On 19 October 1977, the Corps of Engineers set off on a historic boat voyage in a small sailing boat, the Albatross, from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas in Iran. The crew of three halted at Karachi and from there sailed along the Makran coast to Iran. They crossed Gwadar by night and were surprised that hardly any lights were visible, though so much had been heard about its strategic importance. The complete lack of fishing activity along the long coastline also mystified them.

The truth of the matter really was that Gwadar remained undeveloped for a very long time till President Pervez Musharraf approached the Chinese in 2001 and they got on board to build the deep sea port. Pakistani fears were amplified after the Kargil War, and they wanted a second port in case Karachi was blockaded by India. 

The first phase of the port was completed in 2007 after a delay of three years, but the movement of cargo was limited, Karachi remaining the main port for trade purposes. Things changed dramatically post 2015, when Xi Jinping launched his Belt and Road Initiative of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor was the crowning jewel.

The CPEC is not really a commercial concern. Nor is the route likely to be used an alternate energy supply route in case of closure of the Malacca Straits. The reasons for the CPEC have more to do with GeoPolitics rather than Geo Economics. China’s objective has perhaps more to do with its desire to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean Region, to balance India - what some call geo strategic balancing. Chinese presence in Gwadar also gives them access to the nearby Strait of Hormuz as a point of influence. In any case, if Malacca is closed, the Chinese can move further south to the Sunda and Lombok passageways, though at a slightly higher cost. The Gwadar project is hence for the Chinese military. It is estimated that half a million Chinese professionals will be settled in Gwadar by the end of 2022, and that Gwadar will be used as military base. This has caused great concern to the local Baloch, who fear becoming a minority in their own homeland. 

There are also Chinese concerns regarding their investment in the CPEC, as it passes through Gilgit Baltistan which is Indian territory, illegally occupied by Pakistan. Post the revocation of the provisions of Article 370 and splitting the state into two union territories, the Chinese concern over the future of CPEC has been heightened. The announcement by Pakistan on 1 November 2020, to grant Gilgit Baltistan the status of a full province has perhaps been done under Chinese prodding, to protect their commercial interests. Post the elections held in the same month, and which were won by the ruling PTI, there is the possibility that the region may be declared as the fifth province of Pakistan. What impact this will have on Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir remain to be seen but the Chinese are hoping that it will lead to a permanent settlement of the border dispute between India and Pakistan, and this will secure their commercial interests.

Finally we have Chinese fears about the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who are fighting for an independent East Turkestan. This is the occupied region of Xinjiang, which the Chinese are ruling by brute force. The activities of the ETIM have merged with that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, making the situation more volatile for the Chinese. Allied with this is the future of Afghanistan, in the event of a total US withdrawal from the region. This could well plunge Afghanistan into instability, with consequences for all other countries in the region.

In this backdrop, I will now give my assessment on certain scenarios that may play out.

Let me start with the possible future of Balochistan. The likelihood of the Baloch people getting independence appears bleak. The situation cannot be compared to what happened in Bangladesh in 1971. For starters, Bangladesh or the then East Pakistan was totally surrounded by India, and the battlefield was isolated. This hampered the actions of the Pakistan military, but was conducive for the operations carried out by the Mukti Bahini and later, by the Indian Armed Forces. The population of Bangladesh was more than the population of then West Pakistan, and suppressing a people’s movement of such proportions was a virtual impossibility for the Pakistan army.

Balochistan has a small population - about 1.2 crore, which is about 5  percent of the total population of Pakistan. However, it comprises about  40 percent of the area of Pakistan. The Baloch is 52 percent of the population, with the Pashtuns accounting for 36% and others the remaining 12%. With these statistics, it appears a virtual impossibility for Balochistan to become an independent entity, unless there is external aid. 

Here, geopolitics comes into play. The two foreign neighbours of Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. Iran has a restive Baloch population in its Sistan-Balochistan province and will not fan the flames of independence in Balochistan. Similarly, Afghanistan has a large Baloch population bordering Balochistan and it will do nothing to fan the flames of Baloch separatism for its own interests. India does not have a land border, so can de precious little to assist the people in their just demands.  

On the flip side, however, the Pakistan military will be unable to regain total control of the area, precisely for the same reasons. Insurgency in Balochistan will hence continue unabated in the region, with varying levels of violence.

CPEC will remain disturbed and will require protection. As of now, over 30,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in its protection and this level of commitment will only increase in the days to come. The economic miracle that Pakistan is hoping for from the CPEC is not likely to materialise, considering the volatile security situation that prevails over much of Pakistan. Added to that is the bleak economic situation of Pakistan, which is worsening by the day. High inflation, coupled with low growth, increasing joblessness and an ever growing population adds to the cocktail of poor governance within the country.

Gwadar, in my view, will at some point of time, be taken over by the Chinese, who will use it as a naval base. Such a scenario, to my mind is at least a decade in the horizon and things may change by then. But the Indian security establishment needs to factor in growing Chinese presence in the area and build its naval assets accordingly. 

What can change the above hypothesis is an implosion within the Pakistan military or a rapprochement taking place between India and Pakistan on the one hand and the warring Afghan groups on the other. An India-Pak rapprochement does not suit the Pakistan military narrative as their place in the Pakistani governance structures will come under question. In Afghanistan, the Taliban will not settle for anything less than total control over the country and the present establishment will not be willing to meekly surrender. So the possibility of a civil war looms large in the country. But stranger events have taken place, so peace, though unlikely, is not an outcome that can be ruled out. 

The Pakistan military can implode, if the levels of radicalisation within the rank and file cross the tipping point. As of now, the Pakistan military is stable, but an implosion within the military could have possible fallouts in the further bifurcation of the country. A possible scenario could be a tie up between Sindh and Balochistan for an independent state. Together, it is a viable proposition. 

The options for India remain limited. Whatever commitment the Govt of India gives to the people of Balochistan must be on a long tern basis and should be sustainable. It should continue to support an Afghan peace process which is Afghan owned and Afghan led. And it should concentrate on increasing its economic and military might, to remain a relevant player in future. 

Thank you. Jai Bharat, Jai Hind