Friday, May 29, 2020

THE DELHI RIOTS: AN ORCHESTRATED ANTI-INDIA CONSPIRACY

The latter half of 2019 saw four major long pending issues in India’s polity being resolved. Article 370, a temporary provision in the Indian Constitution was finally rendered inoperative, a bill was passed to ban instant triple talaq, the Apex Court gave a verdict on the Ram Janambhoomi issue and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act became a law, after it was passed by both houses of Parliament. The closure to these four issues was truly an unprecedented development, which many had thought was an unachievable chimera. But it agitated a certain section of people who had a vested interest in keeping issues simmering and this lobby now got to work on derailing the government. It started off as a protest against the CAA, but gradually snowballed into a much larger orchestrated campaign to wreak havoc on the Indian State, through finances from external sources, creating a web of lies and deceit on the social media, and through inflammatory speeches.

Responsible political leaders added grist to the mill by making some very provocative and inflammatory statements. Sonia Gandhi called the protests “aar-paar ki ladai,” Rahul Gandhi told the protestors not to be afraid as the Congress Party was standing behind them, Mani Shanker Iyer said that he was ready to make whatever sacrifice was needed. “Now let's see whose hands are stronger”, he said. These statements were incendiary, but many more were made in the days leading up to the visit of President Donal Trump to India. And in response, some local leaders of the ruling dispensation too retorted in like fashion, with Anuraag Thakur, a junior minister in the Union government stating that such traitors will be taught a lesson and another local politician stating that the streets will be cleared after President Trump leaves. And so the upward spiral continued.

Radical Muslim groups spewed venom, with a whole range of such groups joining hands to create mayhem. Pinjra Tod, Jamia Coordination Committee, Alumni Association of Jamia Milia Islamia, Popular Front of India (PFI), etc., and the local politicians from the Delhi State government (AAP), all did their bit to accelerate misinformation and resorted to hate speech campaigns using Anti-CAA as a basis. Hate speeches were blared from mosques, with the hate mongers also moving from door to door, instigating people. And thus the Delhi riots took place.

That the riots in Northeast Delhi were orchestrated and planned is borne out by the fact that the inciters had assembled sticks, stones and incendiary material to carry out their dastardly attacks. The financing was done through the PFI, with Rs 120 crore being deposited to finance the Shaheen Bagh protesters and others. The riots that took place were not due to popular upheaval, but was a deliberate attempt to stoke a communal divide. The whole dastardly affair was well orchestrated and synchronised, pointing to a deeper conspiracy which shook the secular fabric of the nation.

It was a sad day in the nations capital when hundreds of people lost their homes, 53 people were killed among whom were one IB official and two Delhi Police personnel, shops were looted and burnt and women were raped. But it was not a simple communal flare up. It was a planned and executed attack by certain forces, with the underlying motive of breaking India and destroying its composite culture. These forces need to be uncovered and exposed. There was, in all likelihood, a foreign hand also in the events which shook Delhi in late February 2020. This too must be uncovered. If justice is delivered swiftly, and the perpetrators are given an exemplary punishment, then perhaps there would be a higher degree of assurance that such acts would not be repeated. In any case, the guilty, regardless of their political affiliation or their caste and religious identity, must be brought to book, soonest. In that lies India’s hope that such incidents will not occur again.

Sunday, May 24, 2020

India-Nepal Realtions: Dangerous Portents


In his address to the Nepalese Parliament on 19 May, Nepalese Premier KP Sharma Oli, said, “Those who are coming from India through illegal channels are spreading the virus in the country and some local representatives and party leaders are responsible for bringing in people from India without proper testing”. And then, in a deliberate act of provocation, he made the astounding statement that the “Indian virus looks more lethal than Chinese and Italian now”.

What caused Oli to spew such venom? A day earlier, the Nepalese government made a unilateral change to their map, on the North western extremity of the Nepalese border with India. The traditional trijunction at Lipulekh Pass between India, Nepal and Tibet had never been a point of dispute, but the Nepalese Parliament now claimed that the trijunction was at Limpiyadhura, a point about 32 kilometres North West of Lipu Lekh. The Nepalese Parliament also took up a resolution to get back the territory, a stretch of approximated 335 square kilometres from India, through diplomatic and political efforts.

Was Nepal acting on its own or at the behest of its other big neighbour is a subject which can be debated. The boundary between India and Nepal is the Kali River, which has its origins in the springs of kalapani. The Boundary came into being over two centuries ago, post the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16, whereby in the Treaty of Sagauli, the Western boundary of Nepal was fixed as the Kali River. While the river itself is not in dispute, the origins of the river came up for discussion for the first time in 1997, with Nepal claiming the Kalapani area. The Indian contention was that the origins of the river lay in the springs of Kalapani, and this has been India’s stated position, which is aslo borne out by local lore.

While Nepal earlier only claimed the Kalapani area, which is a territory of about 35 square kilometers, it has now jumped the ante and laid claim all the way to Limpiyadhura, seeking claim now over an addition 335 square kilometers of area. That its Parliament has resolved to get this area back, means that this will always remain a contentious issue in local Nepalese politics, making it virtually impossible for any future ruling party to rescind the demand. The stated provocation was India’s inauguration of a road to Lipu Lekh, which cuts down the journey time for the Mansarovar pilgrimage by a week or so. But that road has been years in the making and in any case, Indian pilgrims have been going to Mansarovar via Lipu Lekh for decades now. Evidently, there were other factors at play in Oli’s outburst and Beijing’s tightening embrace over Kathmandu will surely not be a factor that can be ignored.

Chinese actions on India’s borders have been aggressive at the tactical level, though the India-China relationship at the strategic level remains stable. The recent spat between the soldiers of the two countries at Naku La in North Sikkim on 8 May, point to a consistent pattern in Chinese behaviour, which has earlier been witnessed at Pangong Tso lake, Demchok and other places as well. The Naku La incident resulted in both countries sending in additional troops to the area. Naku La, lying at over 5000 meters is hardly the spot for raising temperatures, but it has added a further measure of uncertainty between the security forces of both countries. It would be naive to believe that these incidents are unconnected. The Chinese military is part of the political establishment and its actions are neither random nor not through. So are the Chinese trying to give India a message?

Covid-19, the disease bought on by the SARS-CoV-2 virus has isolated China across the world stage, with many countries pressing for an independent probe into the origins of the virus from Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province. China also senses a weakness in the USA and Europe which are engaged, as indeed much of the world is too, in the fight against Covid-19, and has ratcheted up its claims over Taiwan and in other disputed areas in the South China Sea. So, are the border clashes and the messaging emanating from Kathnandu, a not too unsubtle message to India to not lend its voice to the growing clamour against China?

That being said, the need to repair the India-Nepal relationship is of paramount importance, but negotiating the same will require deft political and diplomatic skills. Over the longer term however, there is a need to invest in building upon the traditional goodwill that exists between the peoples of the two countries. Through such goodwill can perceptions be changed and the relationship brought once more on an even keel.

The author is a retired Major General who is currently, Director India Foundation. 

Saturday, May 16, 2020

INTEGRATING THE ERSTWHILE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR: REIMAGINING POSSIBLITIES


Introduction
The Kashmir issue has been at the centre stage of India-Pakistan relations since Independence. Tensions have run high between the two neighbours since partition, but it would be incorrect to state that the causative factor is the Kashmir issue. The fault lines lie much deeper and are embedded in the ideological moorings of Pakistan and the larger than life role which that country’s military plays within the country. The Kashmir issue however, has been used by Pakistan to draw the attention of the world community on Pakistani claims to that area. This has resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan and a prolonged proxy war, since the late 1980’s which is still ongoing. An understanding of the issues involved in the dispute between the two countries must of necessity begin with historical legacies of the pre-partition era, and a recounting of events as they took place in the first decade post independence, and thereafter till the present times. But it would not be out of order to first understand the significance of the area as part of India’s civilisational heritage.

Early History
Ancient Indian spiritual texts such as the Vishnu Purana, Shiv Puraan, Matsya Puraan and the Mahabharata, describe India as stretching between the Himalayas in the North and the sea in the South. A passage in the Vishnu Puraan states that the country South of the Himalayas and North of the Ocean is called Bharat and all born to it are called Bharatiyas.

Uttaram yat samudrasya, himadres saiva dakshinam
Varsam tad Bharatam, nama Bharati natra santati

The Markandeya Puraan too states that “India is girdled by the sea on three sides and on the North by the Himalayas, which stretch like the string of a bow”. That the Himalayas were a part of the Indian experience since millennia is also made clear by the work of early Tamil poets who marked the mighty peaks as the northern extent of India and spoke of the land as the abode of Siva and the tapovans of saints and seers. Indian scriptures thus make repeated references to the Himalayas as part of India’s civilisational ethos. Here, Kashmir had an important role to play, with ancient texts constantly referring to Kashmir Mandala in terms of its spatial and temporal locus as part of India’s sacred geography which was why Kashmir has been variously described as the northernmost outpost and sometimes even as the very fountainhead of Indian culture.

While the Himalayas, for millennia, provided India with a formidable natural line of defence, they also formed the cradle from where ancient Indian culture spread to Central Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia and became an important constituent of trans-Himalayan communication networks. Kashmir, nestled in the lap of the Himalayas connects with Afghanistan, China and Central Asia and is thus a region of great strategic significance. It was this facet of the region which in the early 19th century saw developments in the region which were consequential to the rivalry being played out between Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, which came to be called the Great Game.

At the time of Partition, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. This was a Hindu land since ancient times, being part of the Mauryan empire. It was Ashoka who expelled the Greeks from Kashmir, and during his reign, established a complete system of administration. Perhaps the most well known Hindu King was Lalitaditya of the Karkota dynasty (724 CE - 760 CE) during whose reign Kashmir flourished. Over the next 600 years, Kashmir was ruled by different dynasties and had its fair share of trials and tribulations. But it was the first quarter of the fourteenth century which witnessed major upheaval in Kashmir, when the Mongols invaded the land. The then King, Raja Suhadeva thought of appeasing the Mongols by way of expensive gifts, but that was spurned by the Mongol army which ravaged the land for eight months, leaving only before the onset of winter. With Suhadeva’s death, his Prime Minister, Ram Chander occupied the throne. He appointed Rinchan, a Buddhist prince from Ladakh as an administrator. Rinchan soon wormed his way into the confidence of the Raja and then treacherously killed him, usurping the throne in 1320 CE. To gain legitimacy, he married Ram Chander’s daughter and desired to convert to Hinduism, but the head guru of the Brahmin Pandit’s Devaswami spurned his request due to his role in eliminating the erstwhile Raja. Rinchan then converted to Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Sadruddin Shah. 10,000 of his subjects converted along with him.

The Sultanate
Thereafter, Rinchan did not live long. He founded Rinchanapura, a quarter in Srinagar after his own name and built a mosque, known as Bud Masjid on the site of a Buddhist temple. He died in 1323 CE. There was a brief interlude when Kashmir reverted to Hindu rule under Kota Rani, the widow of Rinchan. But she was defeated by Shahmir, an astute diplomat in her kingdom, who ascended the throne in 1339 CE, with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. His son, Jamshed, ascended the throne but was killed in battle a year and a half later by his younger brother Allauddin. While Rinchan was the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, the consolidation of the Sultanate started with Shamir, till the advent of the Mughals.

This period also witnessed the reformation of Hinduism as it was practised in Kashmir through Padmavati, a yogini par excellence who was given the appellation Lai Ded. She remains much revered in Kashmir to this day as the earliest known social and educational reformer of Kashmir. She laid emphasis on the brotherhood of man and the unity of god. She was a pioneer of Hindu-Muslim unity. She stood like a bridge between Hinduism and Islam, and left it for her younger contemporary, Shaikh Nur-ud-din, popularly known as Nund Rishi, the founder of the celebrated order, to popularise.

This period also saw the arrival of Saiyid Ali Hamadani to Kashmir in 1379 CE in the reign of Qutb-ud-din. He came with 600 disciples, with the purpose to convert the populace to Islam. Popularly known in Kashmir as ‘Shah-i-Hamadan,’ he was the son of Saiyid Shahab-ud-din, who was the son of Mir Saiyid Muhammad Al-Hasani of Hamadan, Persia. He distributed his disciples in the towns and villages so that they would live among the people and spread their faith by example as well as by precept. He himself took upon the task of preaching true Islam to Sultan Qutb-ud-din and his close associates at Srinagar. His Islam was more virulent, though some of the precepts were aligned with the teachings of Lai Ded and Nund Rishi and thus made Ali Hamdani’s work easier. We thus see both a fusion of Hinduism and Islam in Kashmir as also the gradual conversion of the local population to Islam, through coercion. Successive Sultans thereafter destroyed Hindu temples and inflicted cruelties upon the Hindu population, as per Persian Chroniclers.

Mughal, Sikh and Dogra Rule
The rule of the Sultans, encompassing a period of over 200 years, ended with the conquest of Kashmir by the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1586. During Mughal rule, the period under Aurangzeb (1658 CE-1707 CE) was once again characterised by religious intolerance and discriminatory taxation. After his death in 1707 CE, the influence of the Mughals declined. Nadir Shah’s invasion of India in 1738 CE led to further weakening of Mughal influence and by 1753 CE, Kashmir had come under Afghan rule. The brief Afghan interlude was noted for its cruelty and avarice, and it was with a sense of relief that the people witnessed the conquest of Kashmir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819, ending the despotic rule of the Pathans and also marking the end of Muslim rule in Kashmir.

Sikh rule over Kashmir was short lived and ended with the defeat of the Sikhs at the hands of the British in the battle of Sobraon in February 1846. The British did not annex Punjab but ended the war with the Treaty of Lahore. Thereafter, on 16 March 1846, through the Treaty of Amritsar, Kashmir was handed over to the Dogra ruler, Maharaja Gulab Singh and thus Kashmir came under Dogra rule. 

Gulab Singh had joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army in 1809 and rose to be a commander of the Sikh army. Jammu state, which had been annexed by Ranjit Singh in 1816, was handed over to Miyan Kishore Singh for administration in 1817. Miyan Kishore Singh, during his lifetime, declared his son Gulab Singh as the legal heir. In 1819, seeing the outstanding contribution made by Gulab Singh in the defeat the Pathans in Kashmir and in strengthening Sikh rule, Maharaja Ranjit Singh crowned Gulab Singh as the Raja of Jammu on 16 June 1822. Even after getting Jammu and its adjoining principalities under his territory, Raja Gulab Singh continued to serve the rulers of Lahore and at the same time, annexed many small principalities to his kingdom. Kishtwar was subdued and its governorship was handed over to Zorawar Singh, a Rajput soldier in the Sikh army. It was Zorawar Singh who annexed Ladakh in 1842 and added it to Dogra rule.

It needs mention that through the Treaty of Amritsar, read along with the Treaty of Lahore (Article 12), the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a sum of Rs 75 lakh, paid to the British Government. This sum was paid for the whole of the outer hills between the Ravi and the Indus, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and the Indus Valley down to Chilas. The Treaty was modified soon thereafter in respect of the Ravi River, which was taken as the boundary with the Chamba State and which divided the Chamba State into two portions. The Raja of Chamba objected to this arrangement as he did not want any part of his state to being subject to Jammu. Under the new arrangement, Chamba surrendered its claim to Bhadrawah in lieu of territory to the west of Ravi. Chandgraon and Lakhanpur were also exchanged. While not part of the Treaty, there is a belief that Maharaja Gulab Singh paid money not for the territories alone, but also for being recognised as the Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This was also the time when great power rivalry between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia was at the fore, in what came to be called the ‘Great Game’. Britain, in its desire to keep Russian influence at bay, wanted to keep a watch over the activities of the Sikh rulers and desired to keep their resident in Kashmir. This was resisted, but after the defeat of the Sikhs by the British in the Second Sikh War in 1948-1949, Punjab was annexed by the British, the Dogras could not but succumb to the pressure put on them by the British who were focussed on furthering imperial interests in Kashmir. In 1877, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British India Government, acting as the suzerain power of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency. The Agency was re-established in 1935 under the control of the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas. The agency was given on lease for a period of 60 years commencing from 29 March 1935.

The Dogra period of Kashmir history is thus also marked with British advent into the area. After Maharaja Gulab Singh, his son Ranbir Singh ascended the throne (1856 - 1885), and on his death, his eldest son  Pratap Singh (1885 - 1925) was crowned the Maharaja. Pratap Singh passed away without leaving a male heir and so his nephew, Hari Singh became the ruler. He was destined to be the last Dogra ruler of the state. Dogra rule saw reasonable prosperity of the state. But the period of the last Maharaja was also the time when the independence movement in India was gathering steam. At this time, there also developed a movement by Muslim fanatics to stoke communal violence in the state. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of the J&K Muslim Conference which was formed in 1932. The Party was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on 10 June 1939. When India was partitioned and achieved independence on 15 August 1947, most of the princely states had opted to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had the choice to remain independent under the Maharaja or to join either India or Pakistan. Britain had also terminated its lease of the Gilgit Agency, which reverted back to the state. At this time, the   boundaries of the state encompassed the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit and Baltistan in the North, Ladakh in the East, Kashmir to include Muzaffarabad in the Centre and Jammu, to include Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur, Udhampur, Bhadarwah and Kathua in the South. A hand drawn map, not to scale, of the territory which came under the control of the Maharaja on 15 August 1947 is placed at appendix.

Post Independence Developments
On 12 August 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He offered the same to India which India did not accept. To force the Maharaja’s had to accede to Pakistan, armed raiders were sent under its military officers to forcibly annex the state. On 22 October 1947, about 7000 Pashtun armed tribesmen in 300 trucks, pushed their way through the Domale-Mahulla-Baramulla-Srinagar road, in a bid to capture the capital city. Two days later, a provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ government was announced in Pulandri. These raiders then continued their advance to Srinagar. In Poonch, the situation took on an equally serious turn. Here, the Muslim troops of the Maharaja, in the early hours of 22 October, while their Dogra comrades lay sleeping, rose, drew their weapons from the company armoires and trained their fire on the barracks where the Dogra troops were sleeping to prevent them from getting their weapons. They killed their own comrades including their commanding officer, Lt Col Narain Singh who had placed implicit trust in them and then moved to establish contact with the Pakistani raiders. They then swarmed in on the town of Muzaffarabad and indulged in loot, rape and arson.  

Under these conditions, the Maharaja requested India’s help, but was told that this could not be given unless he acceded to India. This was agreed to by the Maharaja and the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. The Indian Army was flown in to Srinagar on 27 October and they managed to halt the raiders on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, the raiders were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared between the two sides on 31 December 1948. With this, Pakistan remained in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control.

Post 1947, the fortunes of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir went into different trajectories. On the Indian side, there were elections held periodically, and the state remained relatively peaceful. In the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the Pakistani forces were resisted by the local population and failed to achieve any of the objectives set to capture the Kashmir Valley by force. On the contrary, they suffered huge reverses and were edited from the Haji Pir Pass. Post the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Turtuk, lying in the Nubra Valley and on the banks of the Shyok River was liberated by Indian forces and now forms one of the northernmost villages in the Leh District of Ladakh.

While the state continued with its political and economic progress over the decades, its emotional integration with the Indian Union was hindered due to the impact of Article 370 and Article 35 A. A more insidious aspect of the states growth, however, was the fact that in the mid 1960s, Jamaat-e-Islami indoctrinated cadres first made their appearance in the Kashmir Valley and were soon absorbed in government institutions, particularly in government schools. This process continued  in the 1970s, with the rate of intrusion increasing rapidly post the onset of armed insurgency in 1989. While the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its educational wing Falah-e-Aam Trust in 1992 for indulging in anti-social activities, the teachers from the Trust were all absorbed in government schools! Terrorism and radicalisation grew hand in hand in Kashmir, the former supported by Pakistan and the latter by the Jamaat, as a result of which the Kashmir Valley today stands totally radicalised. The conflict in Kashmir has never been for Azadi—whatever the term may mean to different people. It was always a fight for Nizam-e-Mustafa—rule by Sharia and not by democratic norms. The deployment of the Army to curb terrorist violence kept the situation under control, but Articles 370 and 35 A were a hindrance to the restoration of complete normalcy in the Valley and in other parts of the state. As the provisions of these Articles stand repealed and as the Constitution of India is now applicable to the whole state of J&K, the prospects of complete peace descending on the state have considerably been enhanced. Moreover, the bifurcation of the state into the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature has come as a boon the people of Ladakh who have long felt stifled and deprived by the policies of all the earlier governments of J&K. 

It is a well known fact that the Kashmiri politicians led the agenda for the whole state (prior to bifurcation), despite being only 55 percent of the population. In terms of land area, Kashmir is just one-sixth of the state. Yet it held complete political and economic domination of the whole state, with voices from the Jammu and Ladakh divisions being smothered. Even in Kashmir, a small coterie, comprising just about three percent of the population of Kashmir Division held total political dominance over the state. These were the Mullah clan—the people who had come to the Valley about 600 years earlier to preach Islam. They are the present day Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, and they achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy and dominating the original inhabitants. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze. With the state being bifurcated into two, the possibility of peace now appears far brighter than ever.

Pakistan Occupied Ladakh (POL) and J&K (POJK)
Now, let us shift focus to the region occupied by Pakistan, through aggression. This is the region of Gilgit and Baltistan, earlier referred to by Pakistan as the Northern Areas and also the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad, which Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir. The former will be referred to here as Pakistan occupied Ladakh (POL) and the latter as Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK).

As stated earlier, in the pre Mauryan period, the entire state of J&K (as it existed in 1947) was ruled by local Hindu Kings. Buddhism replaced Hinduism in the reign of Emperor Ashoka (274 BCE-237 BCE). Buddhism was the dominant religion till the time of  the Kushan dynasty in the first century till about 375CE after which period Hinduism replaced Buddhism as the dominant religion. The region came under Lalitaditya (724 CE-761 CE), whose empire stretched all the way down to Southern India, and remained with the Karkota kings who followed him. The region thus has had a historical and civilisational connect with the rest of India for at least three to five thousand years. It is important to understand this fact, to negate the propaganda which is spewed by Pakistan on the subject.

The first India-Pakistan war of 1947-48 came to an end with the declaration of a ceasefire, which took effect on 1 January 1949, leaving the region of POJK and POL under Pakistani control. On 28 April 1949, the occupied territories purportedly entered into a formal agreement with the Government of Pakistan, which was called the Karachi Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the so called “Azad Kashmir,” ceded to the Government of Pakistan complete control over Gilgit-Baltistan (then called the “Northern Areas”), and the control over subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications in its own area. For some reason, this Agreement was kept as a secret document till the 1990s! It came to light for the first time when the High Court of Azad Kashmir gave a verdict on Gilgit-Baltistan (Northern Areas), which stated that the agreement "appears to have been executed on 28 April 1949." Later, it was published as Appendix XVII of The Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir by Justice Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani in 2008.

The Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949 formalised the links between Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan. Through this agreement, all affairs of Gilgit and Baltistan, which were referred to as Northern Areas, were placed under the control of Pakistan through their political agent, who was given full powers. The Northern Areas consisted of the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Astor Wazarat and Skardu Tehsil of Ladakh Wazarat—an area of 72,496 square kilometres (excluding the Trans Karakoram Tract which was ceded to China in 1963).

The agreement lacked constitutional legitimacy as Gilgit-Baltistan was never a part of the so called “Azad Kashmir”. It also lacked popular support as the people of the region were not consulted. A matter to note was that the region was kept constitutionally separate from the rest of Pakistan, and was ruled directly by the Karachi based Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA). The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which treated tribesman as barbaric and uncivilised, and levied collective fines on them, were applied to Gilgit-Baltistan. Political activity was not permitted, there was an absence of socio-economic development and the region was treated as a virtual colony of Pakistan. To compound matters further, the Government of Pakistan signed an agreement with China ceding the entire Shaksgam Valley to China—an area of 5,180 square kilometres. which was the territory of the former state of Hunza. When the Karakoram highway was built which passed through the region, the people were not consulted. In 1969, the Northern Areas Advisory Council was formed which functioned under the Resident, but it had a purely advisory role. The first elections for the 16 members were  held in 1970, but it remained a toothless body. 

Post the 1971 war, the Bhutto administration carried out some administrative reforms. The princely states were abolished and Chitral was annexed and merged with the North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Interestingly, in 1972, the “Azad Kashmir” General Assembly passed a resolution asking Pakistan to return the Northern Areas, which it had taken over temporarily on the basis of the Karachi Agreement. But Pakistan has remained silent over this till date. 

In 1972,  Presidential Ordinance abolished the jagirdari system and with it, the institutions of Rajas. Gilgit and Baltistan were designated as districts and their political agents were designated as Deputy Commissioners and the Resident for the Northern Areas was designated as the Commissioner. Subsequently, Diamer, was constituted as a district. However, the region has never been represented in the Pakistani Parliament nor in the “Azad Kashmir” Assembly. In 1974, the Bhutto government removed the FCR and brought the region under the purview of the Pakistan Penal Code. The 16 member Advisory Council was converted to Northern Areas Council with 14 directly elected members, but it was presided over by the Commissioner and lacked legislative and executive powers. The Pakistan government also abolished the State Subject Rule which provided protection to the local populace by preventing outsiders from becoming naturalised citizens of the state. The floodgates were thus opened for outsiders to settle in the region and with state connivance, the demography of the region started changing.

When President Zia imposed martial law on 05 July 1977, the region came under the military jackboot. In May 1982, Zia made the astonishing claim that Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu were outside the Kashmir dispute and were an integral part of Pakistan, but he later backtracked from that statement in an interview he gave to Mr MJ Akbar. In 1999, the NAC was expanded and renamed as the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). It however failed to legislate on any subject, though it did pass 18 resolutions recommending issues of public interest to the ministry of KANA, but none were executed.

The attempts by Zia to introduce Sunni-Deobandi Islam led to the sprouting of Sunni-Deobandi groups like the Sipa-e-Sahaba in the region, which further exacerbated the local population and led to increased alienation. The region, in May 1988, also witnessed the first violent demonstration by the Shias in Gilgit. In retaliation, the Sunni hordes, supported by the state, descended from outside the region and indulged in murder and mayhem, killing hundreds of people and burning their crops and houses. Ever since, sectarian strife has become a regular feature in the region. When Zia died in 1993, riots erupted in which over 20 people were killed. The Pakistan army accused the Shias of bringing in weapons from Iran and thereafter started persecuting them. In 2005, schools remained closed for a full year in protest when Pakistan introduced Urdu and Sunni Islam texts in school books. The schools reopened only when all controversial portions were removed. The Sunnis, unhappy with this outcome assassinated the revered Shia cleric Imam Aga Syed Ziauddin, which once again resulted in large scale violence. Such violence has become a recurring feature of the region since then.

In 2009, the Northern Areas were renamed as Gilgit Baltistan. The two administrative divisions are Gilgit and Baltistan. The former has five districts namely Astore, Diamer, Ghizer, Hunza Nagar and Gilgit. Baltistan has four districts, namely Skardu, Ghanche, Kharmang and Shigar. The region is currently administered under the Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order issued by the government of Pakistan in August 2009. Gilgit-Baltistan now has a Legislative Assembly which has 24 directly elected members and a 15 member Gilgit-Baltistan Council headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The structures work under the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan (KAGB).

The region has a high percentage of Shia Muslims and many Ismailis, who are considered heretics by hardline Islamists. Since 1974, people from outside the region were settled in the area at the behest of the Pakistan government and today, there is demographic change to what was earlier a majority Shia area. Now, the Shias in Gilgit comprise just 60 percent of the population, with the remaining 40 percent being Sunnis. The Hunza, Punial, Yasin, Ishkoman and Gopis are 100 percent Ismailis. Nagar remains 100 percent Shia while Astor is 90 percent Sunni and 10 percent Shia. In Baltistan, the Shias are 96 percent, with Sunnis and Nurbakshi forming the remainder with two percent each. Lack of educational facilities and poor economy have made the region a hub of continual strife and the Shia feel a sense of neglect and marginalisation. It is apparent that Pakistan is intent on changing the demographic composition through large scale influx of people from outside the region, to suit its own agenda.

Causative factors of violence in the region can thus be attributed to absence of political rights, lack of representation in government, cultural, linguistic, sectarian and ethnic marginalisation, lack of educational opportunities, poor health cover and  unemployment. The area has also seen economic exploitation, with the benefits going mainly to Pakistan Punjab. The impoverished people are concerned about their unique ethnocultural identity being wiped out by the state, and have demanded the opening of the Skardu-Kargil bus service to revive their cultural links with Ladakh and Kargil. Due to the strategic significance of the area, connecting as it does Pakistan to China, and being the source of Pakistan’s fresh water resources, Pakistan seeks to tighten its hold over the area. The people are forced to live in abject conditions, under the jackboot of the Pakistan military.

The so called “Azad Kashmir,” referred to here as POJK, is presently administered by Pakistan as a nominally self-governing jurisdiction. It is one-sixth the size of Gilgit-Baltistan with a total area of 13,297 square kilometres and comprises the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. POJK has a parliamentary form of government with President being the constitutional head of state, while the Prime Minister, supported by a Council of Ministers, is the chief executive. The unicameral Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elects both the Prime Minister and President. The state has its own Supreme Court and a High Court. However, the Government of Pakistan's Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan serves as a link with the “Azad Kashmir’s” government, although “Azad Kashmir” is not represented in the Parliament of Pakistan. Despite their so called independent status, POJK is but a colony of Islamabad. The people remain confused about their identity and desire to be rid of Pakistani dominance. In 2018, riots in Muzaffarabad saw two locals killed in police fining, with many being injured. October 22 is commemorated as a black day, marking the invasion of the area by Pakistani troops.

What Next?

Pakistan’s attempts to annex the state of Jammu and Kashmir by force has been the prime causative factor for conflict in the region. The discourse for the first time changed after India abrogated Article 35A and certain provisions of Article 370 in the Indian Constitution in August 2019 in a bid to emotionally integrate the state with the rest of the Union. The state was split into two union territories, thus meeting the aspirations of the people of Ladakh division who felt stifled and short changed by the successive governments in Srinagar. Ever since the splitting of the state, the levels of violence have diminished considerably, giving hope that violence in the Valley will soon be a thing of the past and peace and tranquility will emerge.

More importantly, a radical change has come in the discourse between India and Pakistan over the issue. Earlier, whenever the Kashmir issue came up for discussion, it was presumed that the only issue for discussion was the state of J&K with India. The areas illegally occupied by Pakistan were, for some unfathomable reason, not part of the discussion. Now, post the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, the Indian Government has made it clear that the only point to be discussed with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue is the areas illegally occupied by them—POL and POJK. This has altered the dynamics of the discourse as India is firm on its resolve to get these areas back. 
A unification through military force is however not a viable option. However, this remains the longterm goal and would need to be fulfilled. The Indian Parliament has passed a resolution in the House in 1994, that the territories of the erstwhile state of J&K, illegally occupied by Pakistan were  part of India. Interestingly, In 2017, the British Parliament, too, adopted a resolution stating that Gilgit-Baltistan legally belongs to India by virtue of accession of princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

The best way forward would be to see that the two Union Territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, develop in such a manner, that the people from across the border would willingly want to join India. POL has historical linkages with India and there is already a strong groundswell of opinion for merger with India, though this gets suppressed by the force used by the Pakistan military. However, an upraising in the future against the Pakistan establishment cannot be ruled out and the area can be liberated, if the local people so desire, on the lines of the Liberation of Bangladesh. POJK is a different matter, as the people there have been thoroughly indoctrinated over the past 70 years. However, there is a desire there too, to be free of the Pakistani military. How this will pan out, remains to be seen.

For the moment, the efforts of the government of India must remain on seeing the total return to normalcy in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the development of the Union Territory of Ladakh. This area as as beautiful if not more than Switzerland; yet, for the last six hundred years of its history, it has been mired in conflict and poverty. The contrast with Switzerland is both relevant and thought provoking, considering the levels of development achieved by that country. Can J&K and Ladakh follow that course? That is the dream that the Indian state must realise. And in the achievement of that dream, it will be but a matter of time that the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan will finally be merged with India.

Hysteria, Tears and a False Analogy


The eruption of violence in Jammu and Kashmir in the late 1980s was a manifestation of a virulent Islamist ideology, sponsored by an inimical hostile neighbour. The process of radicalisation started in the 1960s but took on increased urgency a decade later, as expounded on by Bashir Assad in his book, ‘The K File’. In the 1980s, a deliberate hate campaign was started against the minority Hindu population in the Kashmir Valley, which forced them to flee their homes in January 1990 after hundreds were murdered and raped. The genocide went largely unreported in the country, which constitutes the biggest blot on the Indian State.

It has been three decades since then and today, terrorism in the UT of J&K has been defanged to a large degree. The political initiative of doing away with the provisions of Article 370 and 35A, and in splitting the erstwhile state into two union territories appears to be paying off, but it is still a work in progress. Inevitably, in long drawn out conflicts, there will be times when the Armed Forces suffer casualties. When that happens, we must further strengthen our resolve. Introspection must take place periodically, but the need is to look at the larger picture, rather than focus on individual instances. This goes for terrorist elimination too. The number of terrorists killed is not a pointer to the success or otherwise of the military’s Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism (CICT) operations. That must be viewed in a different prism. And that is why the nature of the conflict must be understood.

In early April, the Army lost five of its brave hearts from the Special Forces when they were on a mission to neutralise some terrorists in snow bound peaks. All the five terrorists who were holed up in that area were eliminated, but the Army’s operational strategy came under question by some arm chair critics. Then in early May, the CO of 21 RR, Col Ashutosh Sharma, was Killed In Action (KIA), when he, along with a team of three army personnel and one police sub inspector went on a hostage rescue mission. While the terrorists were eliminated, once again voices rose in criticism of the need and necessity of a senior officer to personally lead such operations. Some veterans who should have known better, even started questioning the Indian Army’s operating procedures and their training standards.

At times it is easy to forget that the Indian Army is a great army, precisely because of its frontline leadership. That does not of course mean that officers rush in blindly into combat missions; it simply means that they take measured risks, and when they do so, they place their lives on line, as an example to the men they have the honour to lead and to command. This explains the outstanding performance of the Armed Forces in the four wars fought against Pakistan and in the numerous CICT operations which the Army continues to be engaged in. Kargil highlighted what frontline leadership could achieve. Against impossible odds, peak after peak was captured, a feat perhaps no other army in the world could have achieved. This is a great tradition of the Army, which has been nurtured over the years and which has made the Indian Army what it is today. 

Some journalists went totally off tangent, when they wrote that death of our soldiers in battle should never be glorified. These worthies used wrong terminologies. The country does not glorify the death of its soldiers Killed in Action (KIA). It honours their memory—and there is a huge difference between the two. If a nation cannot honour its heroes, then truly, that nation is doomed. It is hoped that Indian scribes would understand the difference and not seek to inject an element of venality into the supreme sacrifices made by our brave hearts.

A few days after the 21 RR team of five led by their CO were KIA, the Indian Army, in a brilliant operation, eliminated the local head of the Hizbul Mujahideen. Some people now went on a different tangent and claimed that the Army had avenged the loss of its soldiers. While the killing of the head of a rabid terrorist organisation is indeed a positive marker, it must never be equated with having avenged our brave hearts. That is putting the bar at the lowest possible level. Taking the analogy of a game of chess, the person eliminated was but a mere pawn. His handlers based in Pakistan are the major pieces and the King is the Pakistani State. Our soldiers KIA can only be avenged when the source of terrorism is struck and fear is put into the hearts of such perpetrators. 

Let us not look at conflict on the basis of small scale actions which take place frequently in our attempt to bring peace to the UT of J&K. There is a need to look at the larger canvas. And here, some of our veterans, who have occupied key positions during their time in uniform need to exercise restraint in their comments. A former Army Commander of the Norther Command, while writing in The Print, wrote:(1)

But what is more important is for the government and the Army to review the political and military strategy to deal with the situation in J&K. This encounter and the killing of three CRPF personnel that followed on 4 May, is part of a disturbing trend that has been noticeable for the last few months… India’s strategic response to Pakistan’s proxy war is high on rhetoric and low in substance…It would be prudent for the government to shed the ideological fantasies and face the strategic reality. It must put the ‘hard’ strategy on the back burner until we have created overwhelming technological military superiority…Prime Minister Narendra Modi must use his political acumen to reach out to the alienated people of Kashmir to win their hearts and minds…

An assessment based on a couple of incidents makes for poor analysis. For the first time, Pakistan is on the back foot, having to face the brunt of adverse world opinion for its sponsorship of terror. Pakistan has been placed on the grey list of the FATF and its leadership, both political and military has not been able to get out of the impasse it finds itself in post the political initiatives taken in August 2019, which has completely changed the narrative in the UT of J&K. The ground situation in the Valley has improved considerably, a result of the political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives taken by India. Let not our veterans become apologists for the enemy and for the inimical forces within the country. The country and the military deserve better.
(published in the India Foundation web, May 2020)

Note
1: The full article is available at https://theprint.in/opinion/instead-of-organising-spectacles-military-must-focus-on-faultlines-in-kashmir-now/415818/