Friday, December 27, 2019

INTEGRATING THE ERSTWHILE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR: REIMAGINING POSSIBILITIES

Introduction
The Kashmir issue has been at the centre stage of India-Pakistan relations since Independence. Tensions have run high between the two neighbours since partition, but it would be incorrect to state that the causative factor is the Kashmir issue. The fault lines lie much deeper and are embedded in the ideological moorings of Pakistan and the larger than life role which that country’s military plays within the country. The Kashmir issue however, has been used by Pakistan to draw the attention of the world community on Pakistani claims to that area. This has resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan and a prolonged proxy war, since the late 1980’s which is still ongoing. An understanding of the issues involved in the dispute between the two countries must of necessity begin with historical legacies of the pre-partition era, and a recounting of events as they took place in the first decade post independence, and thereafter till the present times. But it would not be out of order to first understand the significance of the area as part of India’s civilisational heritage.

Early History
Ancient Indian spiritual texts such as the Vishnu Purana, Shiv Puraan, Matsya Puraan and the Mahabharata, describe India as stretching between the Himalayas in the North and the sea in the South. A passage in the Vishnu Puraan states that the country South of the Himalayas and North of the Ocean is called Bharat and all born to it are called Bharatiyas.

Uttaram yat samudrasya, himadres saiva dakshinam
Varsam tad Bharatam, nama Bharati natra santati

The Markandeya Puraan too states that “India is girdled by the sea on three sides and on the North by the Himalayas, which stretch like the string of a bow”. That the Himalayas were a part of the Indian experience since millennia is also made clear by the work of early Tamil poets who marked the mighty peaks as the northern extent of India and spoke of the land as the abode of Siva and the tapovans of saints and seers. Indian scriptures thus make repeated references to the Himalayas as part of India’s civilisational ethos. Here, Kashmir had an important role to play, with ancient texts constantly referring to Kashmir Mandala in terms of its spatial and temporal locus as part of India’s sacred geography which was why Kashmir has been variously described as the northernmost outpost and sometimes even as the very fountainhead of Indian culture.

While the Himalayas, for millennia, provided India with a formidable natural line of defence, they also formed the cradle from where ancient Indian culture spread to Central Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia and became an important constituent of trans-Himalayan communication networks. Kashmir, nestled in the lap of the Himalayas connects with Afghanistan, China and Central Asia and is thus a region of great strategic significance. It was this facet of the region which in the early 19th century saw developments in the region which were consequential to the rivalry being played out between Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, which came to be called the Great Game.

At the time of Partition, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. This was a Hindu land since ancient times, being part of the Mauryan empire. It was Ashoka who expelled the Greeks from Kashmir, and during his reign, established a complete system of administration. Perhaps the most well known Hindu King was Lalitaditya of the Karkota dynasty (724 CE - 760 CE) during whose reign Kashmir flourished. Over the next 600 years, Kashmir was ruled by different dynasties and had its fair share of trials and tribulations. But it was the first quarter of the fourteenth century which witnessed major upheaval in Kashmir, when the Mongols invaded the land. The then King, Raja Suhadeva thought of appeasing the Mongols by way of expensive gifts, but that was spurned by the Mongol army which ravaged the land for eight months, leaving only before the onset of winter. With Suhadeva’s death, his Prime Minister, Ram Chander occupied the throne. He appointed Rinchan, a Buddhist prince from Ladakh as an administrator. Rinchan soon wormed his way into the confidence of the Raja and then treacherously killed him, usurping the throne in 1320 CE. To gain legitimacy, he married Ram Chander’s daughter and desired to convert to Hinduism, but the head guru of the Brahmin Pandit’s Devaswami spurned his request due to his role in eliminating the erstwhile Raja. Rinchan then converted to Islam and adopted the title of Sultan Sadruddin Shah. 10,000 of his subjects converted along with him.

The Sultanate
Thereafter, Rinchan did not live long. He founded Rinchanapura, a quarter in Srinagar after his own name and built a mosque, known as Bud Masjid on the site of a Buddhist temple. He died in 1323 CE. There was a brief interlude when Kashmir reverted to Hindu rule under Kota Rani, the widow of Rinchan. But she was defeated by Shahmir, an astute diplomat in her kingdom, who ascended the throne in 1339 CE, with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. His son, Jamshed, ascended the throne but was killed in battle a year and a half later by his younger brother Allauddin. While Rinchan was the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir, the consolidation of the Sultanate started with Shamir, till the advent of the Mughals.

This period also witnessed the reformation of Hinduism as it was practised in Kashmir through Padmavati, a yogini par excellence who was given the appellation Lai Ded. She remains much revered in Kashmir to this day as the earliest known social and educational reformer of Kashmir. She laid emphasis on the brotherhood of man and the unity of god. She was a pioneer of Hindu-Muslim unity. She stood like a bridge between Hinduism and Islam, and left it for her younger contemporary, Shaikh Nur-ud-din, popularly known as Nund Rishi, the founder of the celebrated order, to popularise.

This period also saw the arrival of Saiyid Ali Hamadani to Kashmir in 1379 CE in the reign of Qutb-ud-din. He came with 600 disciples, with the purpose to convert the populace to Islam. Popularly known in Kashmir as ‘Shah-i-Hamadan,’ he was the son of Saiyid Shahab-ud-din, who was the son of Mir Saiyid Muhammad Al-Hasani of Hamadan, Persia. He distributed his disciples in the towns and villages so that they would live among the people and spread their faith by example as well as by precept. He himself took upon the task of preaching true Islam to Sultan Qutb-ud-din and his close associates at Srinagar. His Islam was more virulent, though some of the precepts were aligned with the teachings of Lai Ded and Nund Rishi and thus made Ali Hamdani’s work easier. We thus see both a fusion of Hinduism and Islam in Kashmir as also the gradual conversion of the local population to Islam, through coercion. Successive Sultans thereafter destroyed Hindu temples and inflicted cruelties upon the Hindu population, as per Persian Chroniclers.

Mughal, Sikh and Dogra Rule
The rule of the Sultans, encompassing a period of over 200 years, ended with the conquest of Kashmir by the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1586. During Mughal rule, the period under Aurangzeb (1658 CE-1707 CE) was once again characterised by religious intolerance and discriminatory taxation. After his death in 1707 CE, the influence of the Mughals declined. Nadir Shah’s invasion of India in 1738 CE led to further weakening of Mughal influence and by 1753 CE, Kashmir had come under Afghan rule. The brief Afghan interlude was noted for its cruelty and avarice, and it was with a sense of relief that the people witnessed the conquest of Kashmir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819, ending the despotic rule of the Pathans and also marking the end of Muslim rule in Kashmir.

Sikh rule over Kashmir was short lived and ended with the defeat of the Sikhs at the hands of the British in the battle of Sobraon in February 1846. The British did not annex Punjab but ended the war with the Treaty of Lahore. Thereafter, on 16 March 1846, through the Treaty of Amritsar, Kashmir was handed over to the Dogra ruler, Maharaja Gulab Singh and thus Kashmir came under Dogra rule. 

Gulab Singh had joined Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s army in 1809 and rose to be a commander of the Sikh army. Jammu state, which had been annexed by Ranjit Singh in 1816, was handed over to Miyan Kishore Singh for administration in 1817. Miyan Kishore Singh, during his lifetime, declared his son Gulab Singh as the legal heir. In 1819, seeing the outstanding contribution made by Gulab Singh in the defeat the Pathans in Kashmir and in strengthening Sikh rule, Maharaja Ranjit Singh crowned Gulab Singh as the Raja of Jammu on 16 June 1822. Even after getting Jammu and its adjoining principalities under his territory, Raja Gulab Singh continued to serve the rulers of Lahore and at the same time, annexed many small principalities to his kingdom. Kishtwar was subdued and its governorship was handed over to Zorawar Singh, a Rajput soldier in the Sikh army. It was Zorawar Singh who annexed Ladakh in 1842 and added it to Dogra rule.

It needs mention that through the Treaty of Amritsar, read along with the Treaty of Lahore (Article 12), the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir was handed over to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a sum of Rs 75 lakh, paid to the British Government. This sum was paid for the whole of the outer hills between the Ravi and the Indus, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, Baltistan and the Indus Valley down to Chilas. The Treaty was modified soon thereafter in respect of the Ravi River, which was taken as the boundary with the Chamba State and which divided the Chamba State into two portions. The Raja of Chamba objected to this arrangement as he did not want any part of his state to being subject to Jammu. Under the new arrangement, Chamba surrendered its claim to Bhadrawah in lieu of territory to the west of Ravi. Chandgraon and Lakhanpur were also exchanged. While not part of the Treaty, there is a belief that Maharaja Gulab Singh paid money not for the territories alone, but also for being recognised as the Maharaja of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This was also the time when great power rivalry between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia was at the fore, in what came to be called the ‘Great Game’. Britain, in its desire to keep Russian influence at bay, wanted to keep a watch over the activities of the Sikh rulers and desired to keep their resident in Kashmir. This was resisted, but after the defeat of the Sikhs by the British in the Second Sikh War in 1948-1949, Punjab was annexed by the British, the Dogras could not but succumb to the pressure put on them by the British who were focussed on furthering imperial interests in Kashmir. In 1877, in order to guard against the advance of Russia, the British India Government, acting as the suzerain power of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, established the Gilgit Agency. The Agency was re-established in 1935 under the control of the British Resident in Jammu and Kashmir. It comprised the Gilgit Wazarat; the State of Hunza and Nagar; the Punial Jagir; the Governorships of Yasin, Kuh-Ghizr and Ishkoman, and Chilas. The agency was given on lease for a period of 60 years commencing from 29 March 1935.

The Dogra period of Kashmir history is thus also marked with British advent into the area. After Maharaja Gulab Singh, his son Ranbir Singh ascended the throne (1856 - 1885), and on his death, his eldest son  Pratap Singh (1885 - 1925) was crowned the Maharaja. Pratap Singh passed away without leaving a male heir and so his nephew, Hari Singh became the ruler. He was destined to be the last Dogra ruler of the state. Dogra rule saw reasonable prosperity of the state. But the period of the last Maharaja was also the time when the independence movement in India was gathering steam. At this time, there also developed a movement by Muslim fanatics to stoke communal violence in the state. Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the leader of the J&K Muslim Conference which was formed in 1932. The Party was renamed as the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on 10 June 1939. When India was partitioned and achieved independence on 15 August 1947, most of the princely states had opted to join either India or Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had the choice to remain independent under the Maharaja or to join either India or Pakistan. Britain had also terminated its lease of the Gilgit Agency, which reverted back to the state. At this time, the   boundaries of the state encompassed the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit and Baltistan in the North, Ladakh in the East, Kashmir to include Muzaffarabad in the Centre and Jammu, to include Poonch, Rajouri, Mirpur, Udhampur, Bhadarwah and Kathua in the South. A hand drawn map, not to scale, of the territory which came under the control of the Maharaja on 15 August 1947 is placed at appendix.

Post Independence Developments
On 12 August 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He offered the same to India which India did not accept. To force the Maharaja’s had to accede to Pakistan, armed raiders were sent under its military officers to forcibly annex the state. On 22 October 1947, about 7000 Pashtun armed tribesmen in 300 trucks, pushed their way through the Domale-Mahulla-Baramulla-Srinagar road, in a bid to capture the capital city. Two days later, a provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ government was announced in Pulandri. These raiders then continued their advance to Srinagar. In Poonch, the situation took on an equally serious turn. Here, the Muslim troops of the Maharaja, in the early hours of 22 October, while their Dogra comrades lay sleeping, rose, drew their weapons from the company armoires and trained their fire on the barracks where the Dogra troops were sleeping to prevent them from getting their weapons. They killed their own comrades including their commanding officer, Lt Col Narain Singh who had placed implicit trust in them and then moved to establish contact with the Pakistani raiders. They then swarmed in on the town of Muzaffarabad and indulged in loot, rape and arson.  

Under these conditions, the Maharaja requested India’s help, but was told that this could not be given unless he acceded to India. This was agreed to by the Maharaja and the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. The Indian Army was flown in to Srinagar on 27 October and they managed to halt the raiders on the outskirts of the city. Thereafter, the raiders were pushed back till a ceasefire was declared between the two sides on 31 December 1948. With this, Pakistan remained in possession of about one-third of the state of J&K, to include the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. This line has seen minor modifications post the 1971 war with Pakistan, where it came to be known as the Line of Control.

Post 1947, the fortunes of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir went into different trajectories. On the Indian side, there were elections held periodically, and the state remained relatively peaceful. In the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the Pakistani forces were resisted by the local population and failed to achieve any of the objectives set to capture the Kashmir Valley by force. On the contrary, they suffered huge reverses and were edited from the Haji Pir Pass. Post the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Turtuk, lying in the Nubra Valley and on the banks of the Shyok River was liberated by Indian forces and now forms one of the northernmost villages in the Leh District of Ladakh.

While the state continued with its political and economic progress over the decades, its emotional integration with the Indian Union was hindered due to the impact of Article 370 and Article 35 A. A more insidious aspect of the states growth, however, was the fact that in the mid 1960s, Jamaat-e-Islami indoctrinated cadres first made their appearance in the Kashmir Valley and were soon absorbed in government institutions, particularly in government schools. This process continued  in the 1970s, with the rate of intrusion increasing rapidly post the onset of armed insurgency in 1989. While the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its educational wing Falah-e-Aam Trust in 1992 for indulging in anti-social activities, the teachers from the Trust were all absorbed in government schools! Terrorism and radicalisation grew hand in hand in Kashmir, the former supported by Pakistan and the latter by the Jamaat, as a result of which the Kashmir Valley today stands totally radicalised. The conflict in Kashmir has never been for Azadi—whatever the term may mean to different people. It was always a fight for Nizam-e-Mustafa—rule by Sharia and not by democratic norms. The deployment of the Army to curb terrorist violence kept the situation under control, but Articles 370 and 35 A were a hindrance to the restoration of complete normalcy in the Valley and in other parts of the state. As the provisions of these Articles stand repealed and as the Constitution of India is now applicable to the whole state of J&K, the prospects of complete peace descending on the state have considerably been enhanced. Moreover, the bifurcation of the state into the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature has come as a boon the people of Ladakh who have long felt stifled and deprived by the policies of all the earlier governments of J&K. 

It is a well known fact that the Kashmiri politicians led the agenda for the whole state (prior to bifurcation), despite being only 55 percent of the population. In terms of land area, Kashmir is just one-sixth of the state. Yet it held complete political and economic domination of the whole state, with voices from the Jammu and Ladakh divisions being smothered. Even in Kashmir, a small coterie, comprising just about three percent of the population of Kashmir Division held total political dominance over the state. These were the Mullah clan—the people who had come to the Valley about 600 years earlier to preach Islam. They are the present day Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, and they achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy and dominating the original inhabitants. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze. With the state being bifurcated into two, the possibility of peace now appears far brighter than ever.

Pakistan Occupied Ladakh (POL) and J&K (POJK)
Now, let us shift focus to the region occupied by Pakistan, through aggression. This is the region of Gilgit and Baltistan, earlier referred to by Pakistan as the Northern Areas and also the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad, which Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir. The former will be referred to here as Pakistan occupied Ladakh (POL) and the latter as Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK).

As stated earlier, in the pre Mauryan period, the entire state of J&K (as it existed in 1947) was ruled by local Hindu Kings. Buddhism replaced Hinduism in the reign of Emperor Ashoka (274 BCE-237 BCE). Buddhism was the dominant religion till the time of  the Kushan dynasty in the first century till about 375CE after which period Hinduism replaced Buddhism as the dominant religion. The region came under Lalitaditya (724 CE-761 CE), whose empire stretched all the way down to Southern India, and remained with the Karkota kings who followed him. The region thus has had a historical and civilisational connect with the rest of India for at least three to five thousand years. It is important to understand this fact, to negate the propaganda which is spewed by Pakistan on the subject.

The first India-Pakistan war of 1947-48 came to an end with the declaration of a ceasefire, which took effect on 1 January 1949, leaving the region of POJK and POL under Pakistani control. On 28 April 1949, the occupied territories purportedly entered into a formal agreement with the Government of Pakistan, which was called the Karachi Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the so called “Azad Kashmir,” ceded to the Government of Pakistan complete control over Gilgit-Baltistan (then called the “Northern Areas”), and the control over subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications in its own area. For some reason, this Agreement was kept as a secret document till the 1990s! It came to light for the first time when the High Court of Azad Kashmir gave a verdict on Gilgit-Baltistan (Northern Areas), which stated that the agreement "appears to have been executed on 28 April 1949." Later, it was published as Appendix XVII of The Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir by Justice Syed Manzoor Hussain Gilani in 2008.

The Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949 formalised the links between Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan. Through this agreement, all affairs of Gilgit and Baltistan, which were referred to as Northern Areas, were placed under the control of Pakistan through their political agent, who was given full powers. The Northern Areas consisted of the Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazarat, Astor Wazarat and Skardu Tehsil of Ladakh Wazarat—an area of 72,496 square kilometres (excluding the Trans Karakoram Tract which was ceded to China in 1963).

The agreement lacked constitutional legitimacy as Gilgit-Baltistan was never a part of the so called “Azad Kashmir”. It also lacked popular support as the people of the region were not consulted. A matter to note was that the region was kept constitutionally separate from the rest of Pakistan, and was ruled directly by the Karachi based Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas (KANA). The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which treated tribesman as barbaric and uncivilised, and levied collective fines on them, were applied to Gilgit-Baltistan. Political activity was not permitted, there was an absence of socio-economic development and the region was treated as a virtual colony of Pakistan. To compound matters further, the Government of Pakistan signed an agreement with China ceding the entire Shaksgam Valley to China—an area of 5,180 square kilometres. which was the territory of the former state of Hunza. When the Karakoram highway was built which passed through the region, the people were not consulted. In 1969, the Northern Areas Advisory Council was formed which functioned under the Resident, but it had a purely advisory role. The first elections for the 16 members were  held in 1970, but it remained a toothless body. 

Post the 1971 war, the Bhutto administration carried out some administrative reforms. The princely states were abolished and Chitral was annexed and merged with the North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Interestingly, in 1972, the “Azad Kashmir” General Assembly passed a resolution asking Pakistan to return the Northern Areas, which it had taken over temporarily on the basis of the Karachi Agreement. But Pakistan has remained silent over this till date. 

In 1972,  Presidential Ordinance abolished the jagirdari system and with it, the institutions of Rajas. Gilgit and Baltistan were designated as districts and their political agents were designated as Deputy Commissioners and the Resident for the Northern Areas was designated as the Commissioner. Subsequently, Diamer, was constituted as a district. However, the region has never been represented in the Pakistani Parliament nor in the “Azad Kashmir” Assembly. In 1974, the Bhutto government removed the FCR and brought the region under the purview of the Pakistan Penal Code. The 16 member Advisory Council was converted to Northern Areas Council with 14 directly elected members, but it was presided over by the Commissioner and lacked legislative and executive powers. The Pakistan government also abolished the State Subject Rule which provided protection to the local populace by preventing outsiders from becoming naturalised citizens of the state. The floodgates were thus opened for outsiders to settle in the region and with state connivance, the demography of the region started changing.

When President Zia imposed martial law on 05 July 1977, the region came under the military jackboot. In May 1982, Zia made the astonishing claim that Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu were outside the Kashmir dispute and were an integral part of Pakistan, but he later backtracked from that statement in an interview he gave to Mr MJ Akbar. In 1999, the NAC was expanded and renamed as the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). It however failed to legislate on any subject, though it did pass 18 resolutions recommending issues of public interest to the ministry of KANA, but none were executed.

The attempts by Zia to introduce Sunni-Deobandi Islam led to the sprouting of Sunni-Deobandi groups like the Sipa-e-Sahaba in the region, which further exacerbated the local population and led to increased alienation. The region, in May 1988, also witnessed the first violent demonstration by the Shias in Gilgit. In retaliation, the Sunni hordes, supported by the state, descended from outside the region and indulged in murder and mayhem, killing hundreds of people and burning their crops and houses. Ever since, sectarian strife has become a regular feature in the region. When Zia died in 1993, riots erupted in which over 20 people were killed. The Pakistan army accused the Shias of bringing in weapons from Iran and thereafter started persecuting them. In 2005, schools remained closed for a full year in protest when Pakistan introduced Urdu and Sunni Islam texts in school books. The schools reopened only when all controversial portions were removed. The Sunnis, unhappy with this outcome assassinated the revered Shia cleric Imam Aga Syed Ziauddin, which once again resulted in large scale violence. Such violence has become a recurring feature of the region since then.

In 2009, the Northern Areas were renamed as Gilgit Baltistan. The two administrative divisions are Gilgit and Baltistan. The former has five districts namely Astore, Diamer, Ghizer, Hunza Nagar and Gilgit. Baltistan has four districts, namely Skardu, Ghanche, Kharmang and Shigar. The region is currently administered under the Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order issued by the government of Pakistan in August 2009. Gilgit-Baltistan now has a Legislative Assembly which has 24 directly elected members and a 15 member Gilgit-Baltistan Council headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The structures work under the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan (KAGB).

The region has a high percentage of Shia Muslims and many Ismailis, who are considered heretics by hardline Islamists. Since 1974, people from outside the region were settled in the area at the behest of the Pakistan government and today, there is demographic change to what was earlier a majority Shia area. Now, the Shias in Gilgit comprise just 60 percent of the population, with the remaining 40 percent being Sunnis. The Hunza, Punial, Yasin, Ishkoman and Gopis are 100 percent Ismailis. Nagar remains 100 percent Shia while Astor is 90 percent Sunni and 10 percent Shia. In Baltistan, the Shias are 96 percent, with Sunnis and Nurbakshi forming the remainder with two percent each. Lack of educational facilities and poor economy have made the region a hub of continual strife and the Shia feel a sense of neglect and marginalisation. It is apparent that Pakistan is intent on changing the demographic composition through large scale influx of people from outside the region, to suit its own agenda.

Causative factors of violence in the region can thus be attributed to absence of political rights, lack of representation in government, cultural, linguistic, sectarian and ethnic marginalisation, lack of educational opportunities, poor health cover and  unemployment. The area has also seen economic exploitation, with the benefits going mainly to Pakistan Punjab. The impoverished people are concerned about their unique ethnocultural identity being wiped out by the state, and have demanded the opening of the Skardu-Kargil bus service to revive their cultural links with Ladakh and Kargil. Due to the strategic significance of the area, connecting as it does Pakistan to China, and being the source of Pakistan’s fresh water resources, Pakistan seeks to tighten its hold over the area. The people are forced to live in abject conditions, under the jackboot of the Pakistan military.

The so called “Azad Kashmir,” referred to here as POJK, is presently administered by Pakistan as a nominally self-governing jurisdiction. It is one-sixth the size of Gilgit-Baltistan with a total area of 13,297 square kilometres and comprises the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. POJK has a parliamentary form of government with President being the constitutional head of state, while the Prime Minister, supported by a Council of Ministers, is the chief executive. The unicameral Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elects both the Prime Minister and President. The state has its own Supreme Court and a High Court. However, the Government of Pakistan's Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan serves as a link with the “Azad Kashmir’s” government, although “Azad Kashmir” is not represented in the Parliament of Pakistan. Despite their so called independent status, POJK is but a colony of Islamabad. The people remain confused about their identity and desire to be rid of Pakistani dominance. In 2018, riots in Muzaffarabad saw two locals killed in police fining, with many being injured. October 22 is commemorated as a black day, marking the invasion of the area by Pakistani troops.

What Next?

Pakistan’s attempts to annex the state of Jammu and Kashmir by force has been the prime causative factor for conflict in the region. The discourse for the first time changed after India abrogated Article 35A and certain provisions of Article 370 in the Indian Constitution in August 2019 in a bid to emotionally integrate the state with the rest of the Union. The state was split into two union territories, thus meeting the aspirations of the people of Ladakh division who felt stifled and short changed by the successive governments in Srinagar. Ever since the splitting of the state, the levels of violence have diminished considerably, giving hope that violence in the Valley will soon be a thing of the past and peace and tranquility will emerge.

More importantly, a radical change has come in the discourse between India and Pakistan over the issue. Earlier, whenever the Kashmir issue came up for discussion, it was presumed that the only issue for discussion was the state of J&K with India. The areas illegally occupied by Pakistan were, for some unfathomable reason, not part of the discussion. Now, post the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, the Indian Government has made it clear that the only point to be discussed with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue is the areas illegally occupied by them—POL and POJK. This has altered the dynamics of the discourse as India is firm on its resolve to get these areas back. 
A unification through military force is however not a viable option. However, this remains the longterm goal and would need to be fulfilled. The Indian Parliament has passed a resolution in the House in 1994, that the territories of the erstwhile state of J&K, illegally occupied by Pakistan were  part of India. Interestingly, In 2017, the British Parliament, too, adopted a resolution stating that Gilgit-Baltistan legally belongs to India by virtue of accession of princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

The best way forward would be to see that the two Union Territories—Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, develop in such a manner, that the people from across the border would willingly want to join India. POL has historical linkages with India and there is already a strong groundswell of opinion for merger with India, though this gets suppressed by the force used by the Pakistan military. However, an upraising in the future against the Pakistan establishment cannot be ruled out and the area can be liberated, if the local people so desire, on the lines of the Liberation of Bangladesh. POJK is a different matter, as the people there have been thoroughly indoctrinated over the past 70 years. However, there is a desire there too, to be free of the Pakistani military. How this will pan out, remains to be seen.


For the moment, the efforts of the government of India must remain on seeing the total return to normalcy in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the development of the Union Territory of Ladakh. This area as as beautiful if not more than Switzerland; yet, for the last six hundred years of its history, it has been mired in conflict and poverty. The contrast with Switzerland is both relevant and thought provoking, considering the levels of development achieved by that country. Can J&K and Ladakh follow that course? That is the dream that the Indian state must realise. And in the achievement of that dream, it will be but a matter of time that the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan will finally be merged with India.


Sunday, December 15, 2019

TO SIEZE THE MOMENT

In August 2019, the special status accorded to the state of Jammu and Kashmir vide Article 370 was revoked by the Indian Parliament and the state was divided into two union territories—The Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature). In December of the same year, Parliament passed the Citizen Amendment Bill (CAB). The passage of both these bills in Parliament was indeed a momentous moment, and exhibited firm political resolve in addressing long standing issues.

Article 370 gave the erstwhile state of J&K a special status, which prevented its emotional integration into the Indian Union. However, it was Article 35A that empowered the J&K state legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and provide special rights and privileges to those permanent residents. Through Article 35A, a veneer of Constitutionality was given to provisions which were discriminatory to women, Valmikis, West Pakistani refugees who had settled in the state as also to other minority groups. It was thought of by many that Article 370, though a temporary provision in the Indian Constitution, could not be abrogated. Similarly, with respect to the grant of citizenship to the minority groups who fled religious persecution from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, there was a view that the matter was too complicated and that passing legislation to grant citizenship to these hapless people was fraught with risk. That the government of the day took these historic decisions points to the strength and resilience of India’s democracy and the power of India’s parliament. While the issues still remain contentious and hotly debated, the very fact that they were debated in Parliament before being put to vote and the fact that the proceedings were televised live, point to transparency in the system where the will of the people prevails. Long pending issues have finally been brought to centre stage, and through legislation made into law. This obviously will pose its own set of problems which would need to be addressed. But sans legislation, the problems would simply have dragged on interminably. Now we have a real possibility of resolution and closure. 

In November 2019, a heinous act of rape and murder took place, which left the country in shock and rage. A young veterinary doctor, while returning from work on the night of 29 November in Hyderabad, was abducted, raped, murdered and her body was thereafter burned. The sheer brutality of the incident enraged the country and there were calls for giving the death sentence to the four accused who were apprehended by the police a day after the victims charred body was found. This gruesome crime raised questions on women’s safety and the tardy pace of justice delivery in the country. A twist to the case took place when all the four accused, when taken to the encounter site at 3 am on 6 December, attempted, as per the police, to escape with a pistol they snatched from one of the police officers. The police claimed that the accused in their escape bid, fired at the police officers and the police responded, killing all the four in the ensuing encounter. There was jubilation and a sense of relief in many parts of the country at this immediate dispensation of justice, but there were many who felt troubled too.

Post the dastardly rape and murder and the arrest of the four suspects in the case, there was a sense of fatality that the case would drag on interminably. The police encounter hence came as a breath of fresh air, in that instant justice was delivered. But if that remains the only means of delivering justice in a time bound manner, it reflects poorly on the Indian state and its criminal justice system. The slow pace of justice delivery in the country is indeed a cause of worry, as even in the much publicised Nirbhaya rape and murder case, the death sentence granted to the convicts is yet to be executed, six years after the crime. But a police encounter is hardly the right way to go about delivering justice. If such a means is institutionalised, the certain misuse of such a provision will lead to far more dangerous outcomes.

A day after the four accused were shot dead in Hyderabad in the police encounter, the Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice Sharad Arvind Bobde, while speaking at the inauguration of the new building of Rajasthan High Court Bench in Jodhpur, said, “I don't think justice can ever be or ought to be instant. And justice must never ever take the form of revenge. I believe justice loses its character of justice if it becomes a revenge”. These were indeed words of wisdom which needed to be said. The CJI also alluded to the need to settle cases expeditiously, which remains the bane of India’s criminal justice system. The clamour for swift justice, especially in cases where a heinous crime has been committed, is unlikely to die down unless the courts can deliver justice speedily. There is no gainsaying the fact that India’s criminal procedure is long and process-driven. But vigilante justice is not the panacea that we are looking for, though such acts might seem justified to an indignant public. If this becomes the norm, there would be even further dilution of accountability and an erosion in the credibility of the criminal justice system. Justice Madan B Lokur, in an article in the Indian Express, makes the succinct point that encounters achieve little and while they “seem to raise questions of instant justice, they actually raise questions of instant injustice”. He goes on to say that while the problems are many, the solutions are many too and that all stakeholders need to identify all problems and demonstrate a will to resolve the issues. But there can be no getting away from the requirement of progressing cases in a time bound manner. It is hoped that CJI Bobde will keep this as a priority item during his tenure.

India’s burgeoning population growth is also a matter of concern. In his Independence Day speech on 15 August 2019, Prime Minister Modi also expressed concern over "population explosion,” a trend that, if left unchecked, could go against efforts to bring millions of people out of poverty and undo the benefits of higher welfare spending for the poor. The prime Minister said that this causes new challenges for the coming generations, and asserted that the central and state governments should launch measures to deal with the issue. He further stated that a small section of society, which keeps their families small, deserves respect and those who have small families  are doing an act of patriotism.

That India needs to control its population growth is a point well understood and all political parties are on the same page on this subject. Where they differ is on the means to be adopted. It would be difficult if not well nigh impossible to give all Indians a decent life and jobs to its youth if population growth eats into the capacity of the state to provide for its citizens. A few years after Independence, as per the 1951 census, India’s population was just over 31 crore. The population has increased to over 121 crore as per the 2011 census, and is assessed to be over 137 crore today. An increase of over four times since a short period of 70 years has greatly strained the available infrastructure and is a drain on the finite resources of the nation, of which water is a key component. How India plans to curb its clearly unsustainable growth in population will have to be seen, but there would be a need for legislative intervention. How this is to be brought about and implemented would remain the defining challenge for the next decade. It is hoped that this matter is vigorously debated in the media and legislation is brought about to reward those who have small families while imposing penalties on those that choose not to do so. 

Religion, as far as the Constitution is concerned, is a personal matter and the state has no role to play in the same. But in the personal life of most Indians, religion does play a vital role and is also deeply enmeshed in the national value system. As a secular country, India’s laws should have been equal for all, but the Constitution has given special preference to religious minorities through Article 30 of the Constitution. It is also discriminatory in terms of state control over religious places, which impact on Hindu places of worship and not on others. There is a need to define what constitutes a minority, both at the national level and at the level of states. These issues cannot be swept under the carpet, leaving the entire burden of secularism to be borne by the majority religion. 


These are just a few of the issues which need open discussion and legislative correction. The government has shown great will in passing legislation and has also not hesitated to take bold decisions in the national interest which earlier governments have shied away from on the specious grounds that the results could be destabilising. Vested interests will certainly attempt to muddy the discourse, but that cannot be grounds for inaction. Great will and fortitude has been shown in 2019, in passing major legislations which had been pending since ages. The momentum must be maintained in 2020, to catapult India to its destined leadership role in the coming decades. We must seize the moment. It may not come again.
Published in IF Journal Jan Feb 2020.


Friday, December 6, 2019

HONOUR CODES AND THE PERCEIVED BELITTLING OF THE FORCES


There has, in the last few years, been an anguished cry among veterans about what is perceived to be a dilution in the status and entitlements of the Armed Forces. This has manifested in direct criticism of the serving leadership of the Armed Forces by some veterans who perceive the decline in terms of the inability of the leadership to take an appropriate stand against the establishment. This sense of unease has spread through the social media, impacting all veterans, and now the impact is also being felt by those still donning the colours, leading to concerns about the state of morale of the Armed Forces and on how the issues are to be addressed.

The issue of One Rank One Pension (OROP) continues to be a sore point. The agitation on this issue by a group of veterans still continues in Jantar Mantar, despite the government having gone quite  a distance in fulfilling this demand. A bit of deft handling could have led to a closure, as the financial outlay for fulfilling the requirement of the veterans was quite meagre. For the veterans, it was not so much about the money but the principle behind the issue at stake. This had been promised to the veterans as far back as 1973, when their pensions were decreased and a commitment given that all retirees will be given the same pension based on rank. A subsequent parliamentary committee had also recommended in favour of OROP. Manohar Parrikar as the Defence Minister pulled up the babus in the defence ministry and in defence finance and finally implemented, to a large extent, what had been asked for. But a recalcitrant bureaucracy, true to its nature, kept the full implementation in abeyance, which forced the veterans to continue with their stir. This miffed the political leadership which did not get the expected appreciation for the efforts it had taken in bringing the OROP issue to closure and now we have a stalemate on the subject! The issue of OROP has been very well highlighted by Maj Gen Satbir Singh in a letter to the Government, which is published on Page 5 of this issue.

But it is not just OROP. There is a perceptible feeling in the forces that with each pay commission, the status of the Armed Forces has taken a beating—a result of the shenanigans of the bureaucracy and the fact that the Services have no representation in the deliberations which take place. The allowances applicable to personnel of the Armed Forces has also taken a hit as compared to what is entitled to civilians and to members of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). Worse, issues like NFFU (Non Functional Financial Upgradation) have caused a lot of heart burn as the IAS, IFS and IPS cadres have conveniently got the privilege allotted to themselves, which has now also been extended to Group ‘B’ Services, but the Armed Forces have been deliberately left out of the loop. Viewed impartially, the very grant of NFFU to any organisation is unethical. But if it is given to the civilian government employees, the rational for withholding it from the officers of the Armed Forces cannot really be explained. As a corrective, the Government must stop the grant of NFFU to all its employees. But if it chooses to continue with the same, it must then also be given to the military.

Another sore point amongst the veteran’s fraternity was the decision by the government to open up some of the cantonment roads to civilian traffic, which was perceived to be a first step towards sale of defence land to enrich the land mafia! Earlier, the veterans had protested vociferously against the governments move, recommended by the Service HQ, to do away with providing scholarships to the wards of serving personnel, especially gallantry medal winners. The vociferous protest ultimately forced the Government to restore the provisions. And then came the news that the Service HQ had recommended withdrawing income tax exemption on disability pension, which further exacerbated matters. But worse was to come. Faced with mounting criticism from the veterans, some of it unpardonably being couched in crude and vulgar language, and most of it being uncharitably directed at the Army Chief, the Army hierarchy decided to introduce a code of conduct for the veterans. That literally set the cat amongst the pigeons!

On the last day of his service, the Adjutant General of the Army, Lt Gen Ashwani Kumar, gave an interview to a media house which was widely publicised and spread like wildfire on the social media. Here, the General supported the Army action in withdrawing the income tax exemption on disability pension and also spoke at length on the need for instituting a code of conduct for the veterans. The proposal being formulated was predicated on seeking an undertaking from all serving officers that on retirement they will adhere to a code of conduct or ethics after their superannuation. The logic was that military personnel were permitted to carry their rank with them post retirement and so must abide by the code. It was also felt that some veterans posted comments on the social media which gave adverse publicity to the Army and as such, there was a need to impose penalties on those violating the code to obviate such behaviour. General Ashwani Kumar also stated that the matter is a tri-service issue and that the recommendations would also go through various tri-service committees.

Post the interview there were a flurry of comments given by veterans. Brig Narender Kumar, Distinguished Fellow, USI viewed the utterances as a failure in higher leadership. Writing on the issue he stated:
“…Off late there have been utterances among serving military leaders to portray own men and junior leaders as gullible, morally fragile and willing to cross moral red lines including avoiding harsh combat duties. It started with off the cuff loose remarks on officers misusing entitled hotel stay during temporary duty, allegations of exchange of brief cases for gratification, exploitation of disability for pension and hard field tenure. This aggressive stance of the military leadership could be attributed to suppressing the growing unease among the officers about withdrawal of service rations (now restored after four years), non-acceptance of NFFU for army officers and non-resolution of anomalies of successive Central Pay Commissions. Probably, there is a perception that military leadership did little precious to resolve the outstanding issues of pay, allowances and more importantly status. The damage that such irresponsible statements by senior military serving officers, wherein they suggest that officers exchange briefcases while staying in hotels, manipulate disabilities etc, and that military veterans are in need for disciplining, are detrimental to build a strong army and will only help the cause of nation’s adversaries. If there are few rotten apples those can be isolated but to portray bulk of the fraternity as malingerers is appalling and goes against the ethos of building a team out of teams. It will give ammunition to the politicians and bureaucracy to arm twist soldiers for grant of pay and perks and status. One must remember that once a military organisation loses trust, morale, camaraderie it is irreversible and demotivated leaders cannot deliver victories in war…

Another veteran, Brig Injo Gakhal from the Sikh Regiment, pithily summed up the feelings of a large number of veterans. “Those whom one taught how to become  better officers will now teach us how to behave as a Veteran,” he said. “I have no objection” he added, “in learning from subordinates or for that matter from anyone.  Learning after all is an unending process. But I must first know as to what is wrong with me that necessitates that the Army at the highest level must consider framing a Veterans Code of Conduct”.

In his inimitable style, Lt Gen PG Kamath, The former commandant of Army War College penned what in essence sums up the angst of the veterans as also of a large number of serving personnel. He wrote:

“A string of events has ensured the marginalisation of the once gallant and proud armed forces. Their pride was undermined, their swagger was mocked, their cantonments were opened up, their disability pensions were taxed, their sacrifices were belittled, FIRs were lodged for doing their legitimate duties, their AFTs (Armed Forces Tribunals) were downgraded and under posted to only 2 of the 17 benches thus  denying them justice, anomalies of the past several pay commissions were not addressed, they were singled out from all other central government services for denial of NFFU and their veterans were given a truncated OROP. Their seniority and equivalence was played around by pitching them with Group B Services; The veterans were lathi-charged from Jantar Mantar and were humiliated. Their difficult area allowances were a pittance when compared to other civil services and the Central Armed Police Forces. They all believe that Siachen is more comfortable than Shillong”!

While sober comments from the veterans are welcome, there was some disquiet shown by a large number of veterans on the actions of those who resorted to abuse and slander against the serving hierarchy. Gp Capt Anant G. Bewoor made very sensible remarks, which were deeply appreciated by the veterans community as well as by the saving fraternity. He said that all of us who passed out from the academy have taken a pledge and thus it would be inappropriate to sign another pledge once we become veterans. An extract of his comments are placed below:
“The limitations placed on me while in service are shed when I retire. But at the same time the traditions, customs, unwritten codes of conduct, integrity, loyalty to country & Service and their leadership remains intact. This does not restrict my ability and freedom to disagree with systems and processes, but that original pledge does without doubt, cautions me how and in which manner I will exercise that ability and freedom. All of us are aware of this reality, and all of us are equally susceptible to feel threatened by someone misusing that ability & freedom to attack us and our views. The methodology we decide to use to elaborate and set forth our freedom to disagree and expound our beliefs is guided by that original pledge. Forget not how many of today’s critics are guilty of not doing proper things in their time, when they had the power to do good, but failed. I saw the interview given by the Adjutant General, and was displeased by both the questions and answers. The whole exercise was unnecessary and should not have happened. Notwithstanding the hurt that has been spread by the interview, our ripostes have not been commensurate with the dignity we attach to us Veterans. I believe most, if not all of us, are aware about what we should say in public, including e-groups, and how we should temper our frustrations and anger. We have learnt it while in service, and certainly with our families and friends; it is within our capacity to do it right, always and every time. We wrongly believe that casting aspersions on serving or retired people is being brave. Far from it. So many of us have become vitriolic and unkind without any semblance of ‘maryada’. This is sad and unacceptable. Veterans have written bitterly about having to keep their mouths shut while in service, and therefore now they wish to let off that pent up angst. If you did not have courage to speak out when you thought and believed your are correct, then now is not the time to let off vituperative adjectives behind the safe screen of retirement and under the guise of freedom of speech”.

To this, Wing Commander Ravi Bali, an Air Force veteran added some more sobering advice. “Why wash dirty linen in public,” he said. “If we are behaving with dignity, why are we scared of any code? We played our innings. Let us allow the serving to do their jobs in peace. Allow the mechanism in place to sort out veteran issues. Don't rush to media and social media at the drop of a hat. It destroys the image of defence forces built over centuries with no one gaining any thing”.

There is no gainsaying the fact that washing dirty linen in public only serves to dent the image of the Armed Forces. The Forces are looked up to by everyone in India and are held in the highest esteem—a status that no other organisation enjoys. That is why it is important that the veteran community must exercise the utmost restraint when communicating in the public space. Abusive language against serving officers reflects poorly on the organisation as also on the originator of abusive posts. Let us all be cognisant of the fact that an officer makes it to flag rank after being assessed by dozens of officers through his career, most of whom have seen him in close quarters. While there may be anomalies in our promotion system, it is the same system which has given us a leadership that has ensured victory on the battlefield and that continues to deliver under all and every type of conceivable challenges.

The issue of the Adjutant General’s interview has now also found its way to court.  A legal notice was sent by PK Associates, Advocate and Legal Consultant, on behalf of their client Lt Col Niraj Bakshi, a resident of Greater Noida to the former Adjutant General (AG), Lt Gen Ashwani Kumar for ‘Defamation of Disabled Soldiers, Disabled Military Veterans and other Military Retirees including their client’. Col Bakshi is a resident of Greater Noida and was granted disability pension which had been fixed at 30 percent for life. 

The complainant alleged that the AG had spoken in an irresponsible manner and expressed views that were against the expressed statements of the Union defence minister, statutory provisions and judgements of the Honourable High Court. Under Rule 21 of the Army Rules, it is an offence for a serving Army Officer to speak to the media on any such subject without the sanction of the Government. In the interview you spoke disparagingly about the disability pensioners of the Army and persons with disabilities conveying as if many such pensioners do not deserve disability benefits. You even spoke disparagingly about hypertension, as if it is not even a medical condition and also emphasised that there should be an incentive for those people who retired in a fit shape from the army and not to those who retire with a medical category, as if any medical condition, disability, disease, disorder or injury is in a persons hands. You spoke disparagingly of persons with hearing loss and said that they could get hearing aids. You also spoke about the tax exemption controversy for disability pensioners which is already  being looked into by the defence minister and and is also sub juice in the Apex court. The complainant also mentioned a tweet by the Army HQ in which it was stated that officers had misused disability pension and the provision of broad banding of disability pension, which has shown disabled veterans in a poor light. In addition, the complainant stated that the AG, in the interview given to a media house had spoken about a code of conduct for veterans which is an illegal supposition since retirees are not covered by service rules and those who run foul of the law and those who are convicted under the IPC for offences involving moral turpitude are already covered under the pension regulations for requisite action. Finally, the complainant stated that they would lodge a defamation suit of Rs 1 crore against the AG unless an apology was issued in 15 days.

Such actions only fuel further controversy. But this was not the only one. Lt Gen Ashwani Kumar, post retirement, has also issued a legal notice to through his lawyers, the legal firm HVP, to Lt Gen Prakash Katoch and to the magazine Fauji India through its Editor, for an article purportedly written by the latter and published by the magazine. While the article by Gen PC Katoch was widely circulated on the social media, Fauji Magazine has denied publishing such an article and has asked the legal firm to apologise or face legal action. It is but to be hoped that the Armed Forces are kept out of such self created controversies, for the good of the Defence Forces and for the security of the nation.


Most importantly, there must be a great deal of introspection on the part of the Service headquarters too, and a platform created for an exchange of views with the veterans, before venturing on turf which would most certainly lead to bitterness. For the veterans, it is incumbent that they choose their words with care. We, as the veteran community have had our day donning the colours and now there is someone else holding the reins. Let them do their job. They are as patriotic and professional as we were in our time and do not need barbed comments from people who cannot be held accountable for speaking and acting out of turn. We also need to look into mechanisms wherein the concerns of the Armed Forces including the veterans are suitably addressed, which would require a great deal of sensitivity on the part of the government. The Armed Forces are the final instrument of the state and nothing should be done to jeopardise their state of morale and their status in society. Blunting the instrument of last resort can only harm the nation, as Indian history since the 8th century CE has shown. We cannot afford to go down that path again.
Published in SALUTE, Vol 11 Issue 11

Wednesday, December 4, 2019

TREAD WITH CAUTION

India’s Armed Forces have a reputation worldwide of being tough, resilient and disciplined, and capable of executing any task assigned to them. The 1971 war, in which the Indian Armed Forces helped liberate a country in less than a fortnight—a feat unmatched by any Force in the world, was not just a saga of military acumen, but also a message to the world on how a military force should conduct itself. Coming after the brutal murder, rape and genocide of the local population by the Pakistan Army, the conduct of the Indian troops was a model in stark contrast, remembered fondly by the civilian population of Bangladesh till this day.

Armies achieve greatness by the quality of leadership that they possess and here too, the Indian Armed Forces are second to none. Turning the tables on Pakistan after being surprised in Kargil was yet another saga in courage, heroism and frontline leadership. This has consistently been displayed in all the operations conducted by the Armed Forces, whether they be counter terrorism operations within the country or providing assistance to the Sri Lankan Government in Operation Pawan, neutralising a coup attempt in the Maldives or the numerous missions in providing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief during natural calamities.

What has sustained the Forces through the various tribulations that they have faced since independence are the strong bonds of camaraderie which exist among the officers and men. The much spoken of Chetwode motto is one that is taken seriously by the officer corps, which finds its resonance across the country. That is why military personnel are instinctively trusted all across the country, regardless of the few blips which one encounters at infrequent intervals. Ultimately, it is the cohesiveness of the Force which gives it its strength, and nothing must be allowed to erode that ethos which has bound us together since decades.

There is disquiet among the very large veteran community about the government of the day shortchanging the Armed Forces. That perception, whether wholly or partially right, is simply a reflection of the bonds which the fraternity has with the organisation they once served and which they continue to regard as their own. However, the manner of expressing their angst is not only not helping their cause, but contributing to distrust between the serving leadership and the veteran community. This situation calls for serious introspection by all concerned as it does no good to the military and leads to erosion of morale and capability of those donning the colours.


It needs to be appreciated that the way the military is structured in the national power hierarchy, they have but a limited voice in matters which pertain to them, with the civilian bureaucracy willy nilly ruling the roost. How this situation can be changed should be what the veteran community should look into, especially as they all have been through this process and so, with hindsight and reflection, should be able to come up with a viable action plan to rectify perceived injustices. As a first step, it would behove both the serving leadership as well as the large veteran community to be circumspect in speech. Let us live as role models and effect change with dignity, keeping the national interest in mind.
Published in SALUTE, Vol 11, Issue 11.