SPACE SECURITY: NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

In the history of warfare, the high ground has always provided a position of advantage over an opponent occupying lower ground as the observation provided over the battlefield enabled better situational awareness. In the modern battlefield, Space is the ultimate high ground. Today, space is getting increasingly democratised with the inflow of a myriad range of space applications, making the space sector a tool for global influence and diplomacy and space the fourth operational domain after land, sea and air. While control over the seas and the air was always considered as an essential element in power play, today it is the ability to exploit space to one's advantage which is the new game changer. Hence the race to achieve dominance in space.

Since ancient times, conflict has revolved around two principal facets which are essential for gaining victory. The first is situational awareness and the second is having the means to act on the knowledge so gained. This is the essence of warfare, which encapsulates all other facets of war fighting. The former involves battlefield transparency—that is having the knowledge of the location of friendly, hostile and neutral forces, their weapon and equipment holding, means of communication, and information about terrain and weather. The latter involves advanced technology giving one the capability to destroy or disrupt enemy assets with pin-point accuracy over long distances, using kinetic or non-kinetic means. Space capability enables both these aspects.

Technology has enabled interconnection of participants and the distribution of sensors on the battlefield at a reliability, continuity and data transfer rate never before imagined. When integrated with precision long range weapon systems, the lethality which can be achieved at the point of decision gave rise to the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Future conflict is moving towards this end as witnessed in the conflicts which have taken place over the last three decades in West Asia, Afghanistan and parts of Africa. Networks, however, do not alter the fundamental nature of warfare, but simply alters its character. So, while direct and indirect engagements will continue to exist, the network has enabled collaborative engagements in which the sensor is not always identical to the shooter. Mass is still useful, but it can leverage far greater precision. Because sensors can be linked to distant shooters, entire systems can be used to eliminate platforms rather than symmetric platform-on-platform engagements. 

As I stated earlier, networks are not a substitute for the fundamentals of warfare. They do, however, provide significant additive advantages. While warfare is progressing towards net centricity, in the Indian context, the linearity of the land battle with respect to conflict on the borders with Pakistan and China will remain a reality though the battle space will get extended in depth. A major concern for India will also be on the high seas, where the battle space is not confined to India's territorial waters, island territories and its EEZ but across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, also stretching on to the Pacific. On the land frontiers, Information Warfare, especially with respect to cyber attacks will transcend the linear space and assume an all encompassing character. In the context of sub-conventional conflict the zone of conflict will remain non-linear and will cover the entire affected population at large.

Warfare as we see it, will not be so much about dealing with the biggest threat in the environment but in dealing with the environment of threats. There will be multiple threats which will have to be dealt with in real time, requiring great agility. In his pioneering work on the Origin of Species, Darwin postulated his theory of the survival of the fittest. In modern warfare we are looking at the survival of the agile. Agility hence will be a key feature of future conflict and will largely depend both on the quality of decision making as well as the speed at which decisions are taken. In this process, societies which are knowledge driven will have the edge as power has shifted to knowledge based real time actors. As we move towards self synchronisation of forces we may well be looking at a future in which decision making and action will take place at electronic speed. ‘War at the speed of thought,’ is no longer outside the realm of what is possible though its actualisation is still far from the horizon. With greater availability of information at our fingertips we are also looking at information overload, and its consequences, but that is a far better situation to be in than to be in a state where there is a paucity of information. Space will impinge on the entire gamut of operations on land, sea and air and will play a major role in all aspects of future conflict.

The Threat

Let us take a look at a hypothetical war which takes place between India and China over the Himalayas. Whatever strategy China pursues to prosecute war, the opening round will be the launch of an aggressive high intensity information campaign. This is an ongoing process and takes place at all times, but its intensity increases when hostilities are imminent and thereafter continues for the duration of the conflict. The next step will be the launch of intense cyber attacks on both military and non-military targets. This requires exploiting space capabilities. Along with cyber attacks, we could well see the PLA launch precision missile attacks on military targets. These missiles will require terminal guidance which again will require space capabilities. We will see aerial combat to gain control over the skies over Tibet. Again, space assets will come into play. For the build up and concealment of forces, and for ground operations, the Chinese would be looking to exploit space for reconnaissance and communication. Every facet of war fighting will have enabling content from space. India will have to be prepared to respond accordingly. Space capabilities hence need to be developed to match what China can throw against India. A similar scenario can be painted for the Indian Ocean Region where Chinese naval and air assets will be in play. India must be in a position to match Chinese capability, both as a war winning strategy as well as a strategy of deterrence.

So, where does India stand in space capabilities. 

India's Space Programme

India's political leadership had the wisdom to visualise the benefits that could accrue to the country from space based assets. Consequently, the Indian Space Research Organisation was set up in 1969, barely a decade after the US had set up NASA in 1958. But there was an element of diffidence in India's space programme, a hesitation to use the power of space for India's defence—and so it was confined to civilian use only, and was focussed on development activities. Since the launch of India's first satellite, numerous satellites have been launched by India with applications for broadcasts, communications, weather forecasts, disaster management, Geographic Information Systems, cartography, navigation, telemedicine, distance education and the like. ISRO has also gone in for space expeditions like the moon probe—the Chandrayan 1 and 2 missions which took place in 2008 and 2019 and the Mangalyaan mission to Mars in 2014. Importantly, launch capabilities have also been developed. India presently has three launch sites: we have the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre at Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala, the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh and the Dr Abdul Kalam Island, about 150 km East of Bhubaneswar, off the coast of Odisha. India's first satellite the Aryabhata was completely designed and fabricated in India but was launched by a Soviet Kosmos-3M rocket from Kapustin Yar on April 19, 1975. This site is about 100 km East of Volvograd in Russia. Since then, India has launched a total of 135 satellites for its own use. Most of these were launched using Indian Launch vehicles. In addition, India has launched 345 satellites for 36 countries till date: truly, an outstanding feat.

The Launch vehicle used by India was the Satellite Launch Vehicle or the SLV and the Augmented SLV. These went through various upgrades and now the operational launchers are the PSLV, GSLV, GSLV Mk III and Sounding Rockets. For the future, India is looking at reusable launch vehicles. The Technology demonstration for such a vehicle was done in 2016 and at some point in the future, India will have commercially viable RLV technology. The RLV-TD is India's first uncrewed flying testbed developed for the Indian Space Research Organisation's Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstration Programme. It is a scaled down prototype of an eventual two-stage-to-orbit reusable launch vehicle. The RLVs use Scramjet Technology Engine — This is an Air Breathing Propulsion System.

GSLV with indigenous Cryogenic Upper Stage has enabled the launching of up to 2 tonne class of communication satellites. The next variant of GSLV is GSLV Mk III, with indigenous high thrust cryogenic engine and stage, having the capability of launching 4 tonne class of communication satellites. Sounding Rockets are smaller rockets from the Rohini series on suborbital and atmospheric flights for aeronomy and meteorological studies.

In essence, India's space programme has the capacity to make satellites indigenously, and launch them using indigenous launchers in the Low earth orbit (LEO), Medium earth orbit (MEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO) or in Geo-stationary orbit. Despite sanctions which were put on India after the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, India has persevered, and has even made the cryogenic engine which is extremely credible. In addition, India through GAGAN and IRNSS has made a significant breakthrough in navigation capability. GAGAN stands for GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation. This was launched in 2008 for the Airports Authority of India. GAGAN augments GPS signals over the Indian sub continent and is similar to the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) which is used by the US. Similarly, the European Union has EGNOS, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service as its Satellite-Based Augmentation System. 

The IRNSS which is the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System is a cluster of seven satellites over India in the Low Earth Orbit, and is more accurate than the GPS. It is called NavIC or Navigation by Indian Constellation. Both have dual use capability. GAGAN is dependent on GPS while NavIC is independent of GPS. 

Space as a Military Domain  

 

Once satellites were launched into space, there was a need felt for a space treaty. Consequently, a Treaty came about in 1967 called the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This is referred to as the Outer Space Treaty, 1967. 112 countries have signed this treaty, which forms the basis of international space law. The Treaty bans the weaponisation of space. This means that putting weapons of Mass Destruction in space is banned. It also prohibits military activities on celestial bodies and details legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. 

There is however great dichotomy in these rules as it does not ban use of space assets in warfare such as GPS. There is also no ban on anti satellite destruction from earth. Thus, satellites can be used to further a whole host of military objectives such as military intelligence of an adversary, pin-point targeting, military communications etc. Another point to be understood is that while the air space over a country is sovereign territory, there is no sovereignty attached to any part of outer space. As a general rule, anything above 100 kms from the earths surface is outer space, so when satellites in low earth orbit fly over any country, they can provide legal intelligence. The killing in Afghanistan of Zawahiri, the al Qaeda head, by a US Predator missile strike is a classic example of the manner in which space stands militarised. While the predator was flying in air space, the precision targeting came from GPS systems via satellites. There is thus a fine distinction between militarisation of space and weaponisation of space.

In the on-going Ukraine War, when Russia hacked the network that was providing the communication link to the Ukrainian front line troops, Elon Musk the private operator of StarX used his Starlink satellites to restore communication. Within a matter of days he set up over 500 ground terminals to restore the data links. Considering the utility of space for military purposes, India has now set up, in 2019, the Defence Space Agency and the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Prior to that, in 2013, for the first time, India launched a dedicated military satellite called GSAT-7 which was named Rukmini. This satellite covers a footprint of about 2000 nautical miles and is designed primarily to provide secure, real time communication links between the land establishments, surface ships, submarines and aircraft of the Indian Navy. Five years later, GSAT-7A, also called Angry Bird, was launched in 2018 from Sriharikota, for the IAF. The satellite helps in boosting the connectivity between the ground radar stations, airbases and the airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) of the IAF. It also helps in satellite controlled operations of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which gives a great deal of reliability to the operations as compared to ground controlled operations. The Army will soon be getting its own dedicated communication satellite, the GSAT-7B. As of now, it shares 30 percent of GSAT-7A transponder capacity.

In 2020, the EMISAT was also launched through a PSLV launch for electromagnetic intelligence gathering. It has an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) package called Kautilya, which allows the interception of ground-based radar and also carries out electronic surveillance across India. This satellite circles the globe pole-to-pole, and is helpful in gathering information from radars of countries that have borders with India. India also has a RISAT 2BR1 synthetic aperture radar imaging satellite, which was launched in December 2019 from Sriharikota. Presumably, there are over a dozen Indian satellites which are dual use and have military applications.

A significant advancement in military capability was the successful test carried out in March 2019 of India's anti-satellite weapon. India is the fourth country in the world after the US, Russia and China to develop this capability. The significance in the Indian context is that such a capability will deter a hostile power from attempting to destroy Indian satellites as they could be faced with retaliatory measures.

Defence Space Agency

India established two new space agencies in 2019: the Defense Space Agency (DSA) and the Defense Space Research Organisation (DSRO). Existing military organisations such as the Defense Imagery Processing and Analysis Center and the Defense Satellite Control Center have now been merged into the DSA. The Agency formulates space strategy for the military with a focus on leveraging communications and reconnaissance satellites to integrate intelligence and firepower across the range of Indian military capabilities. The DSRO facilitates the development of civilian space technology for military purposes.

The DSA will probably be focussed on the Indian Ocean where China is increasing its influence and the Himalayas where there is increasing Chinese intransigence. On India's land border, satellite coverage would, at the very minimum, be required over the whole of Tibet and Xinjiang Province. As of now, India has limited satellites in the sky and military applications can be said to be in their infancy. To that extent, India is a much smaller player as compared to the US, Russia and China. However, with the space sector now being opened up to the private sector, we can expect to see in the coming years a quantum leap in space applications in the civil, commercial, and defence verticals. 

Chinese Space Capabilities

China on the other hand is aiming to be a global leader in space by 2050. In 2015, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), under which function all of China's military space assets. It is structured to engage in the information space, with emphasis on electronic countermeasures, network offence and defence and satellite management. Focus areas are on target acquisition, reconnaissance, navigation operations and electronic and cyber warfare and countermeasures. China aims to have a permanent space station by the end of this year, a lunar research base by 2036 and solar power satellite (SPS) transmission capability from geostationary orbit (GEO) by 2050. China also has its own navigation system, BeiDou. 

Indian Initiatives

Currently, India possesses more than a dozen military satellites. The Indian military also uses a variety of commercial satellites and those run by friendly foreign nations in its operations. Many of these are prohibitively expensive and carry the danger of service interruption in the event of emergencies. A heartening development now is the creation of Indian Space Association (ISpA), in October 2021, This is an apex industry body, which provides a platform to the private space industry and heralds the opening of the space sector to private entities. ISpA will be the collective voice of the Indian Space Industry, with an aim to create an enabling environment to strengthen the private industry in the Indian Space Sector. What ISpA hopes to do is to make India a global hub in all areas related to space technologies. It will energise business growth, interface with defence and security agencies and enhance international partnerships and cooperation in space. The entry of the private sector into space is a major initiative and will greatly enhance India's space capabilities. In essence, ISpA seeks to make India a global space manufacturing hub with participation of Indian private industry and startups and provide space based solutions both for the domestic and international market while also meeting the space aspirations of the security and strategic sector. Many startups have also entered the space sector despite the risks involved. The effective leveraging of the private sector can be a game changer and ensure that India catches up quickly with the big three in space. This would require financial support and continuous policy reforms to create an enabling climate.

Conclusion

Space is the frontier where the course of future war will be decided. It is crucial to aggressively improve defence space capabilities as part of the “militarization of space”. How this plays out over the next decade will determine India's relative standing in the comity of nations. Space assets are by nature dual use assets. India should not shy away from using them for the defence of the motherland. With this I conclude. Thank you, Jai Bharat, Jai Hind. I am open to questions now.

Q&A

Some in the Indian defence community have advocated for more drastic changes, such as creating a military space service akin to the Space Force in the United States. This would make protecting India’s expanding satellite network easier and set the stage for coercive measures against adversary networks. India is still well-positioned to benefit from its positive relations with Russia and the United States, the two most developed space powers in the world, even though it is still unclear whether India has the long-term technological and financial foundations required to support a separate space force.

Chinese Aggressiveness in the Region: An Analysis

China's growing aggressiveness in recent years has much to do with China's self image and how its citizens perceive China's place in the comity of nations. While individuals have personality traits, a survey of a group of countries carried out over three years has suggested that a country too, can be said to have personality traits. With respect to China, this survey suggests that as a country, Chinese people exhibit two distinct traits. One, they have a deep, abiding belief in the ideals of humanism, encompassing altruism, compassion, and understanding. Two, the people showed a preference for order and organisation. They preferred certainty and thoroughness, and often judged success in terms of task accomplishment. On the macro level then, it appears that humanism and order are two traits valued by the Chinese people. 

So, if humanism and order constitute the personality of China, why is China perceived as an aggressive and volatile force? This is where the concept of a Nation’s character comes in. This refers to the shared beliefs or perceptions of personality characteristics common to members of a particular nation, both within the nation and outside it. This perception of China in the eyes of its own people and even outside of China is controlled by the Communist Party of China, the CPC, which founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is its sole ruling party.

Viewed through this lens, the personality of China is not congruent with its character. This has the potential to lead to internal unrest, protests and displeasure against the ruling dispensation. Hence, we see the heavy hand of propaganda inside and outside of China, by the CCP controlled outlets, trying to convince their own people and the outside world that a CPC run China, actually functions in terms of the Chinese personality and is humanistic, orderly and completes its projects in a timely manner, keeping the good of the people at heart. The ending of poverty in China is hence an important landmark, along with projects such as the One Belt one Road which are termed as China's humanistic and altruistic outreach. The crackdown on corruption can also be seen in a similar light. 

There is also a third characteristic which defines China and that is its sense of nationalism, grounded in the belief that China was once a great power and that it must regain that status. This sense of nationalism dates back to well before the establishment of the PRC, but it was the PRC which has, since 1949, promoted the narrative of the 'Century of Humiliation,' which is largely conceived as having begun with the first Opium War in 1839, in which the Royal Navy opened up China to Western capitalism, and ended in 1949, with the PRC coming to power in China. This discourse reiterates the humiliation of the Chinese people, the dismemberment of territory, the loss of sovereignty to foreign powers and domestic weakness and corruption. 

This sense of nationalism also drives China's foreign policy, with the PRC being sensitive to public concerns and taking into account popular nationalist sentiments. As an example, in 2012, when tensions arose over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese public boycotted Japanese products, linking the same to patriotism. There is a deep sense of hurt amongst the Chinese people of what happened after the Japanese Imperial Army seized Nanjing on 13 December 1937. For the next six weeks, the conquerors went on a rampage, killing all the Chinese soldiers who survived, which was against the canons of war. But worse, they murdered the civilian population, raped the women and pillaged and burnt the township. This massacre still weighs heavily on the Chinese consciousness. It is the Chinese public which is averse to the continuing Japanese practice of honouring of its WWII martyrs at the Yasukuni Shrine. This public vehemence at times outstrips even the hardliners within the PRC government, serving to push policy further toward hawkishness, with netizens criticising their own country’s policymakers for not being aggressive enough. And if China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is perceived to be undermining Chinese interests, then they too are subjected to ridicule by the public. Two factors indicate this trend. One, China's MFA receives calcium pills when the public feels their diplomats need to stiffen up their backbone—a popular choice of insult to indicate spinelessness. And two, in the online world, the MFA has garnered the unofficial nickname ‘the Ministry of Protests’ due to its tendency to do little more than issue denouncements of unfavourable international developments. It is this public pressure which has perhaps forced a change within China's diplomatic community, leading to what we now see as wolf warrior envoys.

With this as a background, let us look into Chinese aggressive policies astride its land borders as well as in the Western Pacific. Since early 1990s, while China was pursuing its economic and military growth agenda, it did not want its growth to be seen as threatening to its neighbours. So Beijing resorted to the rhetoric of its peaceful rise and was restrained in its foreign policy options. It engaged with regional multilateral organisations such as ASEAN, and with neighbouring states, using trade and investment deals to foster better relations. But as China grew in strength and clout, its foreign policy too has distinctly changed, with Beijing now focussed on aggressively promoting its core interests, getting more assertive with its neighbours and pushing back with greater confidence against the United States. Towards this end, China has not shied away from applying military and other coercive economic and diplomacy leverages to further its interests. That is why we see Beijing intensifying its construction activities on the artificial islands it has constructed in the South China Sea, and despite protests from the US and neighbouring states, continues with the construction of airstrips and other military facilities in these islands. In the economic sphere, China continues to intrude into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its neighbours to carry out fishing and oil exploration activities. With respect to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, and some other ASEAN countries, China is resorting to increased military activity, especially in the East China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits, as also in exerting economic and diplomatic pressure. These changes are reflective of a weakening uni-polar world order taking place concurrently with China's rise. China now feels it can push back against the U.S.-led international system, to promote a new international order.

It must be remembered here that China's rise took place in a uni-polar world. While unipolarity creates strong incentives for states to balance the unipole, there is a cost attached to such balancing which makes the challenger tread cautiously. As China grew in strength, it resorted to soft balancing, which is what we see playing out today. While not directly challenging the United States, it is using military and non-military means such as territorial denial and entangling diplomacy to delay, frustrate and undermine US policies. It desists from hard balancing which is reflected by military build up and military alliances, because of the high transaction costs involved. Hard balancing is easier to achieve in a bipolar or multi-polar environment but in a uni-polar environment, hard balancing would be viewed as revisionism and as a dangerous threat to international order. That is why Beijing, rather than confronting the United States directly, has fixed its attention to its own neighbourhood. In East Asia, while Beijing is confronted with the dominant position which the US occupies, because of China's strengthened economic and military capabilities, and because of the advantage that accrues to it from geography, it has greater confidence to do something about it. No rising power would want military bases and forward-deployed troops of its rivals next to one’s own borders. This is why China, with the growth of its economic and military might, seeks to control its immediate neighbourhood and is pushing back at US dominance. The quest for influence between the US and China in this region will thus continue to increase in intensity as time goes by. The imperative for the US, due to geographical distance from the region, will be to continue to expand its diplomatic, economic and especially military reach in the region. The Quad is but one manifestation of US efforts to keep China in check. 

But the real story is that a change is in the offing, though it may be many years distant from the present moment. Essentially, the uni-polar dynamics is weakening, and other dynamics are strengthening, presenting Beijing with a variable set of options in which it can manoeuvre in east Asia. For this, the CPC would rely on the support of its people, in the absence of which its ability to manoeuvre gets restricted. As of now, the Chinese sense of nationalism provides the necessary level of support to the CCP to pursue its agenda.

The Chinese strategy of promoting a narrative of a peaceful and non-threatening rise amongst its neighbours was predicated on US unipolarity. In the circumstances, a low profile approach was possible. With China's rise, its resistance to US power has also increased, though it still desists from carrying out hard balancing options. An example of resistance is the defensive measures that have been instituted by China against the most threatening elements of US military power such as China's Anti Area Access Denial (A2/AD) strategy. This encompasses the creation of artificial islands and militarising the same with airstrips, submarine pens, logistical support for its warships etc, along with adequate Air Defence cover, to push back against US naval and air power. It is a sea denial strategy, to restrict US military options in the Western Pacific, more specifically in the South and East China Sea. 

The show by China of its anti-ship ballistic missiles in its military parades is also designed to send a clear message to Washington that China has the capability to sink US aircraft carriers. By augmenting its A2/AD capabilities, China has raised the cost and the risks for the US to operate its aircrafts and ships close to China's near seas. China is also attempting to shape international developments by  increased activities in setting the agenda in multilateral organisations, without directly confronting the US. In a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in 2014, Xi Jinping, in his keynote address, sketched out a new security architecture for Asia. His advocacy for a new Asian based regional security cooperation architecture was obviously a challenge to the US role in regional security and was the first instance since the end of the Cold War that such an iteration had been made by a Chinese leader. In the economic sphere, China has responded to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to the US led regional free trade agreement, with Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The latter was concluded in 2020, albeit without India. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has to be seen in this light. To maintain its position, the US launched its pivot or rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration and now is invigorating the Quad. But the US strategy has been a bit incoherent, which has resulted in uncertainty in US allies and partners about the extent of US engagement and commitment. This is still playing out.

But internal power dynamics are also playing out in China, which could impact on the single party rule of the CPC. The four Chinese modernisations which have been underway over the last four decades have seen rapid economic development in China which has huge implications for Chinese society and its relationship with the CPC. The economic reforms which were initiated necessitated granting more space to Chinese entrepreneurs, which in turn has created a more diverse and active Chinese society, in which voices have emerged that are not shy of expressing opinions that are critical of developments within and outside China. The spread of communication technology and the increasing use of social media platforms has also produced societal change which could potentially challenge the CPC’s capacity to rule. This has increased the party leaderships proclivity with maintaining domestic control and legitimacy, even to the extent of using increasingly repressive methods to deal with the situation, if so required. At the same time, efforts by the CPC continue apace to seek support from the society to maintain the existing order. The support sought is no longer for ideological legitimacy but for performance, the commitment being to provide the Chinese people with higher standards of living, economic development, peace and stability as part of the social contract. This remains the main claim to legitimacy of the CPC led by Xi Jinping, but as expectations within Chinese society are rising, the leadership will continue to be tested in the years to come.

Chinese societal expectations are not just confined to economic concerns but to nationalists ambitions as well. As China grows, the yearning in society to regain its perceived past glory is all too evident. This growing nationalist sentiment will constrain Chinese foreign policy choices, forcing it on a more belligerent path and reducing room for manoeuvre. This was evident in the 2012 anti Japanese protests in China that flared up after Japan's nationalisation of three Senkaku Islands. The Chinese government termed the act as a "gross violation" of Chinese sovereignty over the territory, and hinted at taking military action, but did not go down that path. That may change, with heightened concerns among the CPC to meet people's demands. We now see nationalism in China projecting to Chinese claims in the surrounding seas, and being linked to the domestic legitimacy of Chinese ruling clique. The CPC will however have to balance out its foreign policy objectives with the consequences such policies may have on the Chinese economy. How the dynamics between the top-down nationalism and the bottom-up nationalism in China plays out remains to be seen, but the present leadership is seen to be less averse to risk-taking and in promoting a more uncompromising nationalism, to advance what are perceived to be China's legitimate claims. The construct here is based on a Chinese civilisational rejuvenation, drawn from its imagined glorious past, which gives it adequate scope to operate outside the confines of a straitjacketed ideology and also to expand its territorial reach. Such an approach is perforce more aggressive, which explains why Chinese diplomats are taking a stronger position on nationalist issues. We can thus expect to see more volatility on foreign policy issues in the coming years, especially with relation to Chinese claims on Taiwan. It must be noted here that President Xi Jinping is personally invested in the above narrative, to claim his place among the leading figures in the CPC pantheon.

The coming years will thus see greater belligerence from China, with increasing militarisation of both the South and East China Seas. Military confrontation, in all probability will be avoided, with China resorting to non-military methods to attain its territorial objectives and to achieve national rejuvenation. The ASEAN countries will attempt some form of rapprochement with China, on their respective claim lines, but Japan will in all probability dramatically increase its defence spending and seek parity with Chinese naval and air power in the Western Pacific. 

For India, we have the advantage of geography in the Indian Ocean Region, but would have to ensure an effective naval presence to guard our interests. The Quad serves India's security interests though it is not yet a security grouping. On India's border with Tibet, it is a conflict which India will have to fight alone, should the situation so arise, though help in the form of intelligence and logistic support will in all likelihood come from the US and others. The key factor in any war over the Himalayas will be cyber and space capability and control over the skies over the Tibetan Plateau. So long as India is prepared, China will be reluctant to undertake a military adventure which she may well lose. Internal stability, economic growth, military preparedness and astute diplomacy thus will be the essential components of India's response to Chinese belligerence.

Pakistan’s anti-India machinations in Sweden

The war in Ukraine has led to a complicated security situation in Europe, with some member countries of the European Union (EU), especially those from Eastern Europe, feeling the heat from the potential fallout of the war on their security environment. While the EU has responded to the crisis with a certain measure of unity, some countries have started taking additional measures to protect their national security interests. Towards that end, Sweden and Finland, which hitherto zealously guarded their neutrality, are now initiating measures to facilitate their entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Admission into NATO, however, happens by consensus. Turkey had threatened to veto the application of these two Nordic countries unless they address Turkish concerns with respect to Kurdish separatists, which Ankara believes are being harboured by both Stockholm and Helsinki—especially members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which has been designated by Turkey, US, UK, and dozens of other countries as a “terrorist” outfit. After hectic diplomatic parleys, Sweden and Finland agreed “to crack down on groups that Ankara deems national security threats, including [PKK], and its Syrian extension”. They also agreed not to impose any “embargo restrictions in the field of defense industry” on Turkey. Thereafter, on 28 June 2022, Turkey lifted its objections. A week later, on 5 July 2022, all the 30 NATO member countries signed the accession protocols for Sweden and Finland.

However, as per NATO procedures, the accession protocols have to be ratified by the parliaments of the respective member countries. President Erdogan of Turkey has once again seized the moment to veto the membership of the two Nordic countries if they “do not fulfil their promises to combat terrorism and extradite suspects”. To salvage the accession, Sweden has now started hobnobbing with Islamabad, Ankara’s all-weather friend and ally, hoping that Pakistan will use its good offices to influence Erdogan to soften his stand. But the Pakistanis, as payback, intend to use Sweden, which is seen by many as an influential human rights advocate at the international level, to malign India. Consequently, we are now witnessing increased activity of the Pakistani government and organisations backed by it, in trying to influence Swedish journalists and policymakers against India and Indian interests through its information warfare machine, based on lies and disinformation.

Pakistan considers Stockholm significant for pushing through its propaganda based information war against India and has begun a vicious anti-India campaign in Stockholm, as also in other world capitals, as part of the so-called Youm e Istehsaal (the Oppression Day), in connection with the anniversary of the constitutional rearrangement by India on 5 August 2019. The abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament has unnerved Pakistan, more so as normalcy has come in a big way in the Union Territory, after decades of Pakistani sponsored violence. As Pakistan continues to lose the plot in its attempts to destabilise J&K, it is indulging in a vicious propaganda campaign, trying to portray a wrong picture of the peace process in the UT, through disinformation and a cabal of lies. Pakistan feels doubly compelled to do this to divert the attention of its own people from the impending economic crisis they are facing, which may well lead to the break-up of that country.

In Stockholm, as part of its itinerary for 5 August, Pakistan is inviting “members of the Swedish parliament, media and human rights organizations” to feed them vicious propaganda about Jammu and Kashmir, including through letter-writing campaigns to the Swedish policymakers and policy-influencers by the Pakistani diaspora in Sweden. The pervasiveness of this campaign is demonstrated by the fact that it aims to target every arm of Swedish official life, from the host government to human rights organisations, academia, think tanks, local journalists, and civil society members. This has become a standard modus operandi of the Pakistani state, which is primarily responsible for keeping the conflict industry alive in Kashmir, by pushing the fake narrative of Indian oppression, especially in the western capitals, to malign India globally.

Pakistan has a history of using different platforms, including the United Nations, to export its false propaganda. It has funded academics, journalists, and government lobbyists to influence and mislead foreign governments, albeit unsuccessfully, against India. A 2021 detailed report titled “Kashmir Inc: A Conflict Industry” by DisInfo Lab has comprehensively exposed Pakistan’s machinations of sponsoring Kashmir-centric propaganda against India across many states through an intricate web of organisations, journalists, academics, and human rights groups, among others. It is ironical that Sweden, which purports to uphold human freedoms and democratic values, is bending its principles, and is accommodating Pakistan, simply to influence Turkey to support Swedish membership of NATO. This is evident by the manner in which Swedish policymakers and policy influencers are engaging with Pakistan. A communication from the Embassy of Pakistan in Stockholm indicates that some Swedish parliamentarians, funded by Pakistan, would likely rake up Kashmir at Pakistan’s behest in its parliament, raising questions and belittling the very integrity of this founding institution of democracy in Sweden. Additionally, by responding to these overtures from Pakistan, Stockholm appears hell-bent on straining its longstanding close relations with India “based on common values, strong business, investment and R&D linkages; and similar approaches to meet global challenges of peace & security and development”.

Should Sweden cave in to Pakistani machinations, it will likely adversely impact its relations with New Delhi. If the recent actions and position of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government are any indicators, the administration of Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson should tread carefully, for any negative campaign against New Delhi is likely to come with high diplomatic costs. The ball is in Sweden’s court.

https://thedailyguardian.com/pakistans-anti-india-machinations-in-sweden/

J&K Post Abrogation of Article 370: A Brighter Future Beckons

On 5 August 2019, the nation witnessed what can perhaps best be described as the passing of the most transformative piece of legislation since Independence by India's law makers, in both the Houses of Parliament. This historic legislation pertained to the abrogation of Article 35A and of the provisions of Article 370 of India's Constitution—which paved the way for normalcy to return to J&K after decades of terrorism, death, destruction and fear. Today, 5 August 2022 marks the completion of three years into this transformative journey; a journey on a road not hitherto traversed, a tryst once again with freedom, but this time within the ambit and protection of the Indian Constitution, signifying freedom in its truest sense. 

It was Article 370 which stultified the growth of J&K and prevented its emotional integration with the rest of the country. Why Article 370 was introduced into the Constitution, albeit as a temporary provision, is itself a matter of debate, but the more insidious legislation was the introduction of Article 35A into the Constitution in 1954, which empowered the J&K state’s legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and provide special rights and privileges to those permanent residents. This piece of legislation was added to the Constitution through a Presidential Order in 1954, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Introduced through the back door, bypassing India's Parliament, it was in that sense, a fraud committed on the Constitution. 

But not everyone was happy with the events that transpired on 5 August 2019. Pakistan was taken by surprise and is still reeling from the legislative shock, which was a body-blow delivered to its efforts to keep the region in an ever-increasing spiral of violence. But within India too, there were nay sayers, especially from amongst the radicalised segments of society. In an article published in Dawn, a Pakistani daily, in January this year, Mr AG Nororani, a Bombay based lawyer who has for long written on Constitutional issues, showed his bias and proclivity for partisan reporting when he opined that Kashmir is in flames and that the entire exercise of repealing the provisions of Article 370 was to give to J&K, a Hindu Chief Minister. Nothing could be more preposterous, but the bias is inherent in Noorani's belief that J&K can only have a Chief Minister from the Islamic faith. What happens then to India's secular Constitution? Has Noorani forgotten that India has had Muslim Chief Ministers in Maharashtra, Assam, Rajasthan, Bihar, Kerala and Manipur? This is what gives vibrancy to India's democracy and secular mindset. Noorani was also concerned with the removal of Urdu as the official language of J&K. But why should Urdu have been the official language of the state, when the people in the Valley spoke Kashmiri and the Jammu Division spoke Dogri and Hindi? That Noorani had a Muslim centric world view is apparent. As a lawyer, he held the view that Article 370 had acquired the status of a permanent fixture in India's Constitution and could not be modified or withdrawn! Really!

People like Noorani, since independence, have attempted to distort narratives to suit a particular ideology, propagating the worldview of the Left-Islamist combine. But Kashmir, after decades of violence is finally on the mend. This year has already seen a footfall of 1.06 crore tourists, with 55 to 60 flights into Srinagar each day. The hotels in the Valley are full to the brim, and getting a room requires booking months in advance. The inflow of tourists has been the highest ever, which is but one indicator of the rejection of violence by the local population and the return of normalcy. The Tricolour can be seen fluttering proudly from all government buildings, which was not the case earlier. In Srinagar itself, over 80 government departments have installed permanent Tricolour, which also flutters on 100 feet masts in Hari Parbat, Shopiyan, Gulmarg and Kupwara. The National Anthem is sung proudly now, and a visit today to Ghanta Ghar and Lal Chowk in Srinagar is a visible symbol of Naya Kashmir.

The success achieved in development initiatives has also been amazing. The performance of Panchayats, District Development Council and Municipal Corporations has been good resulting in better administration. There is a distinct improvement in the performance of youth in sports (Rowing, Taekwondo, Cricket, etc) at National and International levels and campaigns to clean the Jhelum River as well as the Dal, Wular and  Manasbal lakes are proceeding apace. 

On the security front, there is strong synergy between UT Administration, Security Forces and the Centre. There is a distinct public push back against the Gupkar group, JeI, APHC and against Pakistan supported terror groups, which has resulted in near zero incidences of stone pelting and bandh calls. Attempts by Pakistan and their backers in the Valley to engineer a seventh exodus of Kashmiri Hindus has been thwarted, which speaks well for the security situation in the Union Territory. 

It is true that J&K is yet not fully terror free, but great strides have been made over the last three years to achieve that goal. It is understandable that decades of violence would require greater time for complete healing to take place, and cannot be achieved in a short period of time, but the task would have been impossible to achieve had Article 370 still been in force. Terror related incidents have dipped by half over the last three years, and with the support of the local population, we can expect a return to total normalcy in the not too distant future. 

In his iconic poem, The Road Not Taken, Robert frost ends with these stirring lines: 

Two roads converged in a wood, and I,

I took the one less travelled by

And that has made all the difference. 

On 5 August 2019, the Indian Nation embarked on a journey in Jammu and Kashmir, on a road that had not been travelled in. And yes, that has made all the difference, because we are now witnessing, despite the many challenges still remaining, the dawn of a happier and brighter future for the people of India, and more so for the residents of Jammu and Kashmir.