THE GOOD, BAD AND UGLY OF AGNIPATH

A lot has been said and written about the new Agnipath scheme for enrolment into the Armed Forces of India. In essence, the scheme is a radical departure from past practises as from now onwards, all enrolment will only be through the pan-India, merit-based Agnipath scheme. Selected individuals, called 'Agniveers' will serve for a period of four years, which includes a six-month training period. Entry is for individuals in the age bracket of 17.5 - 21 years with educational qualification being 10/12 pass. As no recruitment has taken place for the last two years due to the Covid pandemic, a one time waiver has been given for the year 2022, wherein the upper age limit has been increased to 23 years. 

The Good

The financial package is reasonably attractive. The Agniveers will be entitled to risk and hardship allowance and to death and disability pension. They will contribute 30% of their monthly emoluments with the government contributing an equal amount towards a lump sum gratuity that will be given to each individual on completion of four years contractual service. This amounts to Rs 11.7 lakh. On termination of the contractual period, an option is to be exercised for permanent entry into the Armed Forces, which will be restricted to 25 percent. Selection procedures are well laid out and transparent. The Commanding Officers will have a major role to play in the same.

Itv has been stated that the Agnipath scheme will yield a more youthful profile for the military and will result in improved battle preparedness through more trainable and resilient youth. But the Army already has a youthful profile and the soldiers are well trained, so this will make little difference. The benefits of skill India are also proposed to be harnessed. The individuals not selected will, it is hoped, form a disciplined, motivated and physically fit group of youth that will be inducted into civil society. Some of these youth may be employed by the corporate sector on the basis of their skill sets or by the Central Government in the Central Armed Police Forces (BSF, CRPF, ITBP) or in the para-military forces (Assam Rifles and the Coast Guard). The state government's may also absorb some of these individuals. It is also hoped that all those not so employed will become small-scale entrepreneurs with the skill sets they have gained and the financial package they will receive at the end of four years. Most of what has been stated is more in the nature of a promissory note rather than a concrete proposal, but even so, there is merit in the same.

The Bad

What needs questioning is the basic premise for launching the scheme, which was to bring about a reduction in revenue expenditure. The outgo on pensions every year was thought to be very high and unsustainable in the long run, which necessitated this step. However, a more holistic course of action would have been to look into force effectiveness, based on a fixed budget. There is a large civilian work force numbering over 3.5 lakh persons, which is paid from defence estimates and which has been left outside the ambit of this structure. The productivity of the ordnance factories and the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) as also of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have also not been considered. A qualitative improvement in the functioning of all these government owned research and production facilities will, by itself, generate huge revenue for modernisation of the military. Decision making at the apex level too is sluggish, resulting in time delays and cost overruns. Streamlining the same will again lead to reduced costs and enhanced force effectiveness. The utility of a large civilian bureaucracy is also questionable. The Agnipath scheme is modelled in some fashion on the US military, so it would be logical to model higher defence management on the same lines. We could thus consider placing the Department of Defence, the Department of Defence Production and the DRDO under the CDS who would be the one point contact on all military matters with the Defence Minister. This would not be easy to accomplish as the bureaucrats will fight tooth and nail to preserve their turf, though they contribute little to force enhancement. 

The Ugly

In terms of military effectiveness, the scheme will throw up some uncomfortable realities, when it is fully operational. One of these is the fact that about 60 percent of an infantry battalion's profile will be of Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. Armoured,  artillery and engineer regiments will also have a similar profile as shown in the diagram. The Army will no longer have a uniform profile of solders spread equally over the years, but a tiered structure, with the 0-4 years bracket soldiers occupying over 50 percent of the operational space. This will have adverse consequences for the military as seen by the performance of young soldiers in the war in Ukraine.

 

More importantly, the ratio in rifle companies will be further skewed. Training and induction into the specialist platoons like the 81 mm mortar, medium machine gun, anti tank, signal and pioneer platoons will be only of the permanent inductees, which means that the rifle companies will have most of the Agniveers in the 0-4 years service bracket. This ratio could be as high as 80-90 percent and does not augur well for force effectiveness either in a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CICT) environment or in hot war. 

Many other imponderables also crop up. How much time will the unit spend now, on continuously training a bunch of raw soldiers? How will the Agnipath scheme impact on traditional unit activities such as sports and professional competitions, which are so necessary to build esprit-de-corps and unit and sub-unit bonding? What will be the impact on the motivational level of young inductees in the fourth year of their service? 

The list of questions are endless and too innumerable to be dealt with in a short opinion piece, but the challenges are mind boggling. The military leadership would most certainly have given a thought to all these issues, but the devil really lies in the detail. Perhaps, the Agnipath scheme will have greater acceptability if the ratio of permanent inductees into the military is increased to fifty percent and the term of duty for the Agniveers extended to six years instead of the current four. This would give better operational pay offs and would remove most of the infirmities discussed above. Also, it would be better if lateral induction to the CAPF and para military forces is guaranteed to 25 percent of the Agniveers. Then, just a quarter of the Agniveers would require rehabilitation in the private sector, which is a more manageable task. This would cater to both the military's operational requirement as well as the needs of the individuals seeking a career in the military.

Only time will tell whether the scheme to reduce the revenue expenditure has been a worthwhile experiment. In its present form, it will most certainly result in savings to the exchequer. But one shudders to think of the cost the nation will have to pay, in case of defeat on the battlefield.

The author is an army veteran who is presently Director, India Foundation.

Published in Sunday Guardian: 19 Jun 2022.

 

PAKISTAN: IN SLOW BURN

“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” 

(the more things change, the more they remain the same)

 — Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr

When Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi was sworn in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, he came in with a promise to usher in a 'naya Pakistan'. The dream never materialised and four years later, in April 2022, with Niazi's unceremonious ouster from the chair in a vote of no confidence, Pakistan was in a far more precarious position than what it was in 2018. The dream of a 'naya Pakistan' was stillborn and Pakistan remains, at least for the world's democracies, a problem child, steeped in debt, obscurantism, religious bigotry and a cradle for fostering terrorism. 

A volatile mix of religion, military control and internal strife has hampered the growth of a healthy democracy within the country. Pakistan's current challenges are a mix of political instability, a tottering economy and ethnic and religious fissures. Much of this has to do with the circumstances of Pakistan's birth, which was  shrouded in an almost total lack of conceptual clarity. The coining of the word ‘PAKSTAN’ by Rahmat Ali is in itself instructive for it included in its vision the Provinces of Punjab, NWFP, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan but left out Bengal. Despite the aspect of territorial ambiguity, there was lack of ideological lucidity. Was it to be a secular state, a state of Muslims or an Islamic state? This lack of clarity still exists in Pakistan despite over seven decades of independence and is one of the reasons why Pakistan continues to teeter on the brink of disaster.

Economy

The World Bank’s Pakistan Development Update, released in April 2022, speaks of double digit inflation in the country caused by high demand pressures and rising global commodity prices, which have adversely impacted the Pakistani Rupee. More importantly, the report states that long-standing structural weaknesses of the economy including low investment, low exports and low productivity growth, pose risks to a sustained recovery. Tighter global financing conditions and a further rise in world energy prices will exacerbate the already high macroeconomic risks, these getting further compounded by the current political uncertainty and policy reform slippages. As per Zehra Aslam, the lead author of the above report, the "government would need to focus on containing the fiscal deficit at a level which ensures debt sustainability, closely coordinate fiscal and monetary policy, and retain exchange rate flexibility to mitigate immediate macroeconomic risks," but that is easier said than done. 

An economic crisis in Pakistan is not something new, the country having faced such a situation twice in the 1990s and a few times thereafter, but the magnitude this time is unprecedented.  Besides other issues, Pakistan is faced with a severe debt crisis, with serious concerns about its ability to repay and service external debt. Pakistan's external account is under pressure due to a spike in import prices, coupled with lax handling of domestic policy. Unlike 2018, this time Pakistan's ability to deal with the crisis is severely challenged by political strife, internal security challenges as well as a volatile global situation caused by the war in Ukraine. Pakistan's external debt repayments profile is very high, and its gross external financing requirement is estimated to be around nine per cent of GDP. While Pakistan has just about enough foreign exchange reserves to cater for two months of import requirements, it will have to depend on the generosity of the IMF and other lenders to keep its economy afloat. Inability to do so will cause Pakistan to slip further into an economic debt trap.

Conflict

Pakistan remains mired in internal conflict, the origins of some of which stretch all the way back to the early years of independence. As stated by Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s leaders since the country’s inception have played upon religious sentiment as a nation building tool, and turned Pakistan into an ‘ideological state’ whose ideology is Islam. Zia's policy of ‘Islamising’ Pakistan’s legal and educational system was merely an extension of a consistent state policy, though he went further down that road than his predecessors. The alliance between the mosque and the state, forged over decades, has had its pitfalls on two counts. Terrorist groups such as the TTP have sprung up, which seek imposing Sharia in Pakistan. These groups are at war against the Pakistani state. Then we have groups which were created to fight India such as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the Lashkar-e Taiba. The State has not always been able to control them, as seen in the radical and violent manifestations of an Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan’s stability.

In Balochistan, a freedom movement has been ongoing since 1948. The Baluch people are still engaged in a freedom struggle to rid them of the yoke of Pakistan, which continues to exploit their resources and offers little in return. The suicide bombing which took place at the Confucius Institute at Karachi University on 26 April 2022, is but a grim reminder of the desire of the Baloch people to attain freedom. The bombing killed the Director of the Institute, Mr Huang Guipin along with two other Chinese, Ding Mufang and Chen Jai. A fourth Chinese national, Wang Yuqing was seriously injured, along with a private security guard and two personnel from the Pakistan Rangers. Also killed was the driver of the van, a Pakistani national. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which they stated was carried out by the Majeed Brigade of the BLA. A statement released by the spokesperson of the group, Jeeyand Baloch, warned of many more attacks to come, the note in English stating: “Hundreds of highly trained male and female members of the Baloch Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade are ready to carry out deadly attacks in any part of Balochistan and Pakistan.” This is the first case of a suicide bombing being carried out by a female bomber. More importantly, the bombing was not carried out on religious motivations, but on the grounds of achieving independence for the Baloch people. This will open up a whole range of new challenges for the Pakistani establishment, besides acting as a motivator for Baloch youth to continue with their quest for independence.

There is internal turmoil also in Gilgit-Baltistan, which too has been exploited by the Pakistani State at the expense of the local residents. To make matters worse, the Chinese have made great inroads in this area, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which has added to the angst of the local population. While the  China-Pakistan nexus at the political and military level is vibrant and strong, a similar level of connect at the people to people level is distinctly missing. Chinese investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (C-PEC) are viewed with distrust by the Baloch people who feel that their land in Gwadar has been bartered away. The BLA hence targets both the Pakistan government and Chinese nationals. The C-PEC is also viewed with distrust by the people of Gilgit Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which means that the entire corridor requires protection from sabotage by inimical groups.

Political Turmoil

Pakistan's economy is in shambles and it is dealing with multiple internal security challenges. To make matters worse, there is lingering political instability in Pakistan, which inhibits effective decision making. The ouster of Imran Khan from power followed a script much akin to a Bollywood thriller, with desperate attempts being made by Khan to stick on to his chair, but the combined opposition finally outmanoeuvred him. The Army's decision to stay neutral is widely viewed as support for Khan's bête noire, Shehbaz Sharif.

Khan has since been holding massive political rallies across the country and has called for early elections. He retains popularity amongst a large section of the populace, particularly the youth, and believes that he will sweep the elections, as and when they are held, on the basis of the strong stance he has taken against the US.

Shehbaz Sharif, who took over as Premier after Khan's ouster, is struggling to deal with a deteriorating economy, rising inflation and the devaluation of the rupee. He has had to take the unpopular decision to hike fuel prices, the price of petrol having increased by a whopping PKR 60 a few weeks back. This was necessitated to get an IMF loan to bail out the economy. As usual, the incumbent government blames Khan for mismanaging the economy, but the onus now is squarely on the present set of rulers to pull Pakistan out of the economic morass. 

The stakes are high for the Pakistan military, which too will face a funds crunch, which will adversely impact its preparedness to deal with both internal and external threats. The core interest for the Pakistan military for the moment is internal stability, as an increase in political turmoil will more likely than not descend into political violence. With its current security commitments, and with the precarious state of Pakistan's finances, this is not something which the military will look upon favourably. Despite the political turmoil, the military is unlikely to effect a takeover, as directly ruling the country will be far more problematic.  A combination of the financial mess that Pakistan finds itself in, the volatile political environment and a wide-ranging set of security challenges will see Pakistan tottering on the verge of collapse. Western financial support may however prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state.

Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch is an Army veteran who is currently Director, India Foundation.

Targeted Killings in Kashmir: A New Phase of Terrorism

The recent spurt in killings of civilians in the Kashmir Valley is not a random act of violence but a well thought out strategy by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, to continue to fuel terrorism in the Union Territory (UT). The killings may be random but the act has a deeper purpose of spreading fear among the minority Hindu population and forcing once again, a mass exodus of this minuscule group. The message being given by the terrorists is clear: leave the UT or be killed. In terms of optics, an exodus now will be reminiscent of what happened earlier to this hapless Hindu population in Kashmir in 1991 and will be viewed as a failure of the Centre in bringing about normalcy post the abrogation of the Special Provisions of Article 370. On the ground, through ethnic cleansing, the terrorist groups and their Pakistani sponsors intend to keep the valley on the boil, in furtherance of their aim to create an Islamic caliphate in Kashmir, which would be a step towards their ultimate goal of Ghazwa-e-Hind.

Paradoxically, this revision in strategy by the Pakistani deep state is a result of the success achieved in moving swiftly towards the total integration of the state, post the abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament on 5 June 2019. Since the abrogation, terrorism in the UT has nosedived considerably, with normalcy returning to large parts of the Valley. Local body elections have been successfully conducted and the delimitation exercise has been completed. Tourism has picked up despite the lingering fears of  Covid-19— the Wuhan virus. The first five months of this year have already seen more arrivals than the 6.6 lakh tourists that visited Kashmir in 2021, and all hotels in Kashmir are filled to capacity. The number of terrorists being killed every month remains high, while the casualties suffered by the security forces have gone down. It is this disproportionate losses being suffered by terrorist groups and the swift manner in which Kashmir was returning to normalcy that has unnerved their sponsors in Pakistan and prompted a shift in their strategy to targeting the minority Hindu community. So how should India respond to this challenge?

There are just about 5000 Kashmiri Hindus employed by the government who are currently working in Kashmir. In addition, over one lakh people from other parts of India are working as labour in the Valley. Providing security to each individual is physically impossible, but during the high level review meeting held by India's Home Minister, Mr Amit Shah on 3 June, future actions to be taken to counter the threat were discussed. This included providing security to the migrant Hindu labour as well as to Kashmiri Hindus by concentrating them in clusters, which would facilitate protection. But it would be naive to presume that a problem which has been festering for decades can be quickly resolved, especially as it involves de-radicalising a population which has been exposed to an insidious ideology for two to three generations. It is a work in progress that requires sustained action over a period of time. 

The current approach to tackling terrorism in J&K is holistic, encompassing political, diplomatic, military and administrative initiatives. This has worked well in bringing a large semblance of normalcy to the state, but the fact remains that a society so deeply radicalised over two to three generations will take time to revert to normalcy. The UT has also been caught off guard by the change in tactics being employed by terrorist groups, wherein they are using young Kashmiris who have no earlier criminal record, in random killings of innocent Hindus. The capacity of the terror groups to strike at such soft targets was perhaps underestimated. 

As a long term measure to combat terrorism, it would be important to impose further deterrents on Pakistan to force that country to stop using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy. It is also important to address the issue of radicalisation which has seeped into a large segment of Kashmiri muslims. An important step towards this end would be an acknowledgement that what Kashmir has faced over the last few decades is not a movement for 'Azadi', but an attempt to create an Islamic State. Only then will policies be focused on countering this hateful ideology among Kashmir's muslims. These would include keeping a check on what is taught to school children in schools and madrassas, and what is preached by the clerics in mosques. 

The return of the Kashmiri Hindus to their homeland must also be taken up on priority. For these individuals to go back to their original homes is presently fraught with danger. It may be advisable then, to resettle them in one or two areas, where appropriate security measures can be put in place. In addition, as and when elections are held in the UT and a new government is installed, the genocide that the Kashmiri Hindus were subjected to must be publicly acknowledged and the perpetrators made to stand trial, regardless of the time that has elapsed since then. Such an act will bring about the process of healing which will bode well for the future of all Kashmiris. The Kashmiri Hindus must also be compensated for the loss they have suffered.

As an immediate measure, it is vital to instil in the minority population, a sense of confidence in the ability of the administration to protect their lives and property. Simultaneously, it is important to impose a deterrent to the terrorists and to their sympathisers and supporters which will make them desist from carrying out such attacks in future. All such offences must legally be non-bailable. In addition, all individuals providing support to terrorists should be deprived of all elements of state support such as subsided ration and other facilities as also employment in government jobs. They must be debarred from standing in elections at all levels and must be made to surrender their passports. Terrorists who are killed must not be allowed a funeral. Their remains must be burnt and the ashes disposed off. Their property must be confiscated by the state and sold and the proceeds given to the victims of terror. Property of individuals apprehended on terror charges or for supporting terror activities must also be confiscated and disposed off in like manner.

The administration also needs to be revamped, especially at the lower levels. Many individuals in the police, education, revenue and other administrative departments are beholden to Geelani of the Hurriyat Conference for their jobs. They remain compromised in their loyalty to the country. Such individuals need to be weeded out in a phased manner. 

Finally, it is for the Kashmiri muslims to rise against terrorism. They have been exploited long enough and they need to break the shackles which their clergy and regional political parties have confined them. Only with a concerted action by all concerned can the scourge of terrorism be permanently erased from the face of this region.

Published in Chintan: 6 June 2022.