A 5 Trillion USD Economy by 2024? Possible But…

Addressing the nation from the ramparts of the Red Fort on India’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, spelt out important policy directives for his government which was swept back to power in the 2019 General Elections. Amongst the electrifying announcements made was a pitch to double India’s economy to USD 5 trillion over the next five years. This was truly an inspirational announcement for an aspirational India, but the government as well as the people of India will have to outdo themselves to achieve this target.

It took India six decades post independence to become a USD one trillion economy. Thereafter, it took just seven years to double the economy to USD 2 trillion. With the Indian economy at USD 2.8 trillion (June 2019), India would require to grow at 12 percent annually if the ambitious target of USD 5 trillion is to be achieved by 2024. That is indeed a tall order, but not something that cannot be achieved. With the current global meltdown, and the Indian economy growing at just above 6 percent, there is evidently a need for transformational reforms in multiple sectors, to create an enabling climate for growth in agriculture, industry, manufacturing, power, education, health care, services and a host of other sectors. An enabling climate would also need effective, transparent and speedy justice delivery mechanisms, something for which the Indian State is not known for.

As of now, the challenges are indeed many. India is a large country with pockets of excellence, but many areas remain under-resourced and under-powered. There are also concerns with respect to an ever burgeoning population, which wipes out any gains made in providing even the basic level of facilities to the people of India. The cities are thus bursting at the seams, the roads are jam packed and the growth of the population outstrips all efforts to give gainful employment to the millions who join the work force every year. There is also the challenge of addressing internal armed conflict within the country, which hinders economic growth.

But perhaps the most serious challenge remains in the capability and capacity of India’s bureaucracy to deliver results on ground. A complete overhaul of India’s bureaucracy is needed as it is still imbued with an arrogance reminiscent of the British Raj, and a mindset of the license control raj which afflicted the country till the last decade of the twentieth century. Unless India’s civil services are more aligned to the needs of a twenty-first century India, the goal of achieving a USD 5 trillion economy by 2024 will be just a flash in the pan.

Published in India Foundation Journal, September - October 2019

BOOK REVIEW: K File: The Conspiracy of Silence By Bashir Assad

What can explain the fact that one of the most beautiful places on earth has been turned into a living hell? Much of the troubles faced by the state can be attributed in the initial years to the ambitions of two men—Maharaja Hari Singh, who was looking at ways and means to remain in power and Sheikh Abdullah, who was determined to oust the Maharaja and take over the reins of the state. The Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947, following the Pakistan backed tribal invasion of India. It was fortuitous  that Indian forces, which were flown in to Srinagar Airfield on the very next day, reached just in time to halt the raiders at the outskirts of Srinagar. Over the next 14 months, the Pakistani backed forces were pushed back, till a ceasefire was declared, leaving Pakistan in control of Gilgit-Baltistan and the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. With minor modifications, this has, since the Simla Accord of 1972, been sanctified as the Line of Control.

A great deal of political shenanigans took place since the accession of the state to India in October 1948. But what is generally not known is how a small coterie of people, whom the author of K File: The Conspiracy of Silence, Mr Bashir Assad describes as the Mullah caste—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy. This was the clan which moved into Kashmir from Arabia, and slowly established dominance over the original inhabitants of Kashmir. Today, this small group, representing  just about 3 per cent of the Valleys Muslim population, has a stranglehold on the state’s politics and on its bureaucratic structure. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze.

Article 370 was never a demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, it was not even the demand of Sheikh Abdullah! Why India’s first Prime Minister, Mr JL Nehru insisted on including it in the Constitution remains a mystery. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar was vehemently imposed to the same and he made this known in no uncertain terms, while the Constitution was being drafted. That is why it was kept as a temporary provision. Would the history of the State have taken a different trajectory if such a provision had not been placed on the statute book? The answers can only be hypothetical. But one thing cannot be denied. The seeds of separatism were sown with the inclusion of Article 370 in the Constitution. And later, with the promulgation of Article 35A through a Presidential Ordinance, free rein was given to the politicians of the Valley to keep the embers of a separatist philosophy alive.

These aspects are not covered in the book, which is rightly focussed on a singular theme; the radicalisation of a society that had absolutely no reason to take to that path. How is it that a society, which for millennia symbolised a culture of inclusiveness,  now celebrates death through jihad as a means of gaining salvation? Why is death celebrated? Why is the word of the hate mongers and terror perpetrators taken as the truth? Why have the scholarly institutions of traditional Islamic jurisprudence been demolished in Kashmir? How and why have we allowed the youth of Jammu and Kashmir to be swayed by the force of a radical ideology which seeks the killing of those not conforming to the Muslim faith as a righteous act; which believes that it is a moral imperative to take up arms against the state; and which is ideologically primed to the extent of believing that laying down one’s life for the cause of jihad is an act that will win rewards in heaven? Once we find answers to these questions, we will be a step closer to understanding the causative factors of violence in the state of J&K. Only then, can we begin to look at policy options to address the alienation that has evidently taken place.

Bashir Assad is a son of the soil. Born in South Kashmir and having being educated in a Madrassa, he was privy to every aspect of life in the state and thus is perhaps more competent than others to expound on the radicalisation that has swept through the Valley and destroyed its Sufi culture. Unknown to many is the fact brought out by Assad that the spread of radicalisation was linked to the growth of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir. The process started sometime in the mid 1960’s, when Maududi’s literature was first made available. It gained impetus after 1977, ostensibly with Pakistani backing—a throwback to the Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Liberation war. With the advent of armed insurgency in 1989, the process took on a menacing hue. 

All these aspects are well covered in the book. Most alarmingly, while the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its Falah-e Aam Trust (Educational Wing)  in 1992, it simultaneously issued orders for the absorption of the teachers of Falah-e-Aam Trust in government schools. And thus began the onslaught of a radical ideology on young and impressionable minds. It is incomprehensible to understand why this was done by the State. A charitable explanation is that the state leadership was naive. More likely however is the possibility that they were complicit. Be that as it may be, the end result today is that the educational system has been taken over by a radicalised clergy and even government jobs are available only to those who support the Mullah caste. A small group of people, who had no Kashmiri roots and who comprise barely three percent of the Muslim populace, are thus now ruling the roost. 

Why did we allow this to happen? Both the Centre and the State must accept responsibility for the mess that has been created in Kashmir. The Mullahs mentioned earlier—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis et al, are the ones spearheading the Azadi narrative, and linking it with Islam. Thus the slogan—‘Azadi ka matlab kya, La illaha illallha’. The factors which drive the terrorist movement in the state have been variously attributed in public discourse to poverty, a sense of alienation, joblessness, and many other factors. But the real cause, radicalisation of the minds of the youth, is rarely discussed. That is the nature of the secular state, wherein to speak of an issue in religious terms gets the individual labelled as communal! But unless the facet of radicalisation is addressed—something that has been ongoing for close to over five decades—peace cannot return to the Valley.

It is surprising that the Mullahs exhort the common Kashmiri, the original inhabitants of the land to make sacrifices for the cause. Yet they themselves keep their children safely ensconced in other parts of India, where they receive a good education. These Mullahs have amassed fortunes in the name of the poor and have cornered political and administrative power.  Their shackles need to be broken if Kashmir is to return to peace. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A is but a first step in this direction. The road ahead is however going to be long and arduous one, but it is one that must be traversed.

Bashir Assad’s book must be read to understand the way the narrative has been shaped and exploited by a small group for their personal ends. It gives out a facet of Kashmir from the perspective of a son of the soil, that has never before been penned, because of the risk to life and limb that such an account would invariably bring. It is thus a brave account, giving out in explicit detail how the Valley got radicalised and in the process, exposing the author and his family to great risk. The author appears to have a soft corner for Sheikh Abdullah and his brand of politics, but that is par for the course. There is also an oblique reference in passing, linking the growth of the Jamaat to the rising influence of the RSS. This may be the popular narrative in Kashmir but it is devoid of substance and is a mere rationalisation of the acts of the Jamaat. The radicalisation of the Valley was a deliberate act, well thought out and planned by a rabid clergy, supported from across the border and was not a result of internal causes. It is a sad reflection of our times, and of the state of India’s professed  secularism, that this philosophy was not nipped in the bud and allowed to flourish till it had all but consumed the state. 

For those looking at conflict resolution in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, post the dramatic revocation of the special status of the state on 5 August 2019, this book must be read. It provides an essential backdrop to understanding the situation in the Valley, which makes it an indispensable read for policy makers, think tanks, personnel form the Armed Forces, Police personnel and even the lay public. A few printers devils have entered into the book which otherwise has been well produced by Vitasta Publications. These need to be corrected in the next edition. Overall, a very brave book on Kashmir, for which the author must be commended.

IOR: NEED FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

An extremely complex region in human terms, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) includes within its ambit a wide variety of races, cultures, and religions. Differences in development levels and pace of economic growth, varying political structures with different levels of stability, demographic pressures, ethnic and religious tensions and wide variations in the quality of governance in the rim countries of the Ocean add to the complexity of the region.

Though Asia is home to over half the world’s population, at the turn of the century, it accounted for barely 35 percent of the world’s GDP at PPP $. Even this low figure marked a quantum leap from the earlier three centuries, as Asia’s economy shrank while the Western economies expanded, powered by the industrial revolution and advances in science. But the gradual transformation of Asia since 1950 has reversed a long historical trend and by 2020, Asia will equal the world’s GDP in PPP terms and thereafter will surpass it. This is largely attributed to the growth of India and China and also to the growth of smaller and mid-size countries. In a sense, we are seeing the reset of history, for towards the end of the 17th century, Asia accounted for over two-thirds of the global GDP. Today, while Asia still remains poorer than the rest of the world, the gap is narrowing, marking the end of “The west’s two-century epoch as global powerhouse” as Kishore Madhubani puts it in his book, “Has the West Lost it?”.

This shift marks the appearance of the Indian Ocean as a key emerging region in world affairs and a major transit route for the world’s shipping and energy needs. Over two-thirds of global oil shipments and one-third of global bulk shipping trade, including petroleum products and coal transit across this region. About 80 per cent of the world’s maritime oil trade flows through three narrow choke points in the Indian Ocean—Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. Unhindered flow of trade and energy resources would need stability in the region and security of the sea lanes of communication. Changes in the regional and global geo-political landscape are posing challenges to stability in the IOR which could lead to tensions that may play out over the sea lanes. Non-traditional maritime threats ranging from maritime terrorism to natural disasters, human smuggling and illegal fishing, could further increase the risks to maritime security and stability.

Geo-political Landscape

The Western limit of the Indian Ocean is defined by the East African coast, stretching from South Africa to Somalia. The African coastline states are relatively stable barring Somalia. The criticality of the region pertains  to the narrow Bab-el-Mandeb outlet from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Northeast of the Strait lies Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with the latter embroiled in a civil war, where Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, in 2014, allied with the Houthi rebels against the government led by Mr Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The conflict escalated in 2015 with Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states, jumping in the fray to support Hadi. In 2017, the Houthis broke with Saleh and he was killed in December of that year. The Houthis are seeking independence for South Yemen. The region remains a flashpoint which could lead to a wider conflagration, especially as Iran is supporting the Houthis. In the Horn, Somalia remains unstable, increasing the risks of piracy in the region. While Somalia has no strategic importance, it is a source of violent Islamist extremism that affects neighbouring states and its poverty has been a source of piracy. 

The major challenge in the Red Sea and Horn will thus remain to achieve regional stability and end piracy.

The Strait of Hormuz is another flashpoint, especially since the US reimposed sanctions on Iran, after withdrawing from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the grounds that the Agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its role in regional wars. Iran has responded by resuming some of its nuclear activities, leaving the deal in a tenuous state. Tensions in the region have risen following attacks on oil tankers in May 2019 in the Persian Gulf, which the US blames Iran of orchestrating and which Iran denies. Tensions flared further when the United Kingdom seized an Iranian oil tanker of the coast of Gibraltar in July on suspicion it carried Iranian crude oil to Syria in breach of European Union sanctions against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran thereafter seized a British flagged oil tanker in the Start of Hormuz, further escalating tensions in the Gulf. Needless to say, a conflagration in the Gulf could also spill over to the Bab-el-Mandeb, which will have serious ramifications across the world, but more so on the Asian economies heavily dependent on crude supplies from the Gulf. 

Within the Gulf, while the civil war in Iraq is over, the Islamic State continues with a lower-scale insurgency. In Syria, the civil war still rages, with numerous factions, both foreign and domestic involved, including the Islamic State. Iran, Russia and Hezbollah support the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad while the US-led international coalition, established in 2014 with the declared purpose of ousting the Islamic State, supports the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria and its armed wing, the SDF, materially, financially, and logistically. Turkey is also directly involved in operations against the Syrian government since August 2016. The region hence remains volatile, and is also seeing the play out of an ethnic conflict between the Sunni and Shia, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, with both countries jockeying to increase their influence. 

In South Asia, the situation in Afghanistan remains a major concern. Elsewhere, the region has varying levels of stability, though strained relations between India and Pakistan remain a source of concern. Conflict between the two is however unlikely, though Pakistan’s attempts to ratchet up terrorist attacks on Indian soil will be responded with increasing vigour by India. The abrogation of provisions of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution and the break up of the state of J&K into two Union Territories—The Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of J&K (With a legislature) has led to a heightening of tensions between the two countries, but over the long term, this will lead to stability in the region. 

Conflict continues to rage in Afghanistan, with the Taliban appearing to be on an ascendant path, following the proposed withdrawal of US forces from the region. Pakistan is riddled with terrorist factions, some of which it supports and others which are fighting against the state. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are also vulnerable to terror attacks, though both states are taking resolute measures to combat the menace.

In Southeast Asia, the broader risks driving security and stability in the subregion are shaped by the threats posed by piracy and by ethnic and sectarian divisions. The concerns of most ASEAN countries therefore revolve around dealing with extremism, terrorism, and ethnic and sectarian tensions and threats. There is also concern expressed about the strategic threats posed by rising competition with China. China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea, which borders many states in the region, add to the complexity of Southeast Asian security concerns. All of the states in the region, with the exception, of Myanmar – have some form of security ties to the United States.

India is also expanding its footprints in the IOR as a counter to Chinese moves to gain salience in the Indian Ocean. China already has its footprints in the region, having built the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. It has also constructed a port in Karachi, several ports in Myanmar, and container terminals in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. While none of these ports have become naval bases, their potential for such use in future remains a possibility. Chinese concerns in the IOR mainly stem from its need to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf. It will thus continue to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India.

India sees itself as the dominant naval power in the IOR in spite of the role that US air and sea forces have played and continue to play in the region. China’s emergence as a major air-sea power is a challenge to India’s position in the IOR and a future source of political or military challenges to India, besides being a potential source of aid to Pakistan. China will continue with its efforts to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India, primarily to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf.

The US remains the dominant outside power in the Gulf and in the IOR. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, described as a strategic “rebalancing” of its interests from Europe and the Middle East toward East Asia, is a signal that the US will be less obsessed with the happenings in the Gulf, especially as it is no longer dependent on energy supplies from the region. With East Asia becoming the “Economic Centre of Gravity,” there will be increased focus of the US in East Asia and the IOR. The US will however remain committed to the defence of the Gulf and will maintain a major presence in the IOR. The US most likely will also continue to seek closer ties, both military end economic with countries dotting the Pacific rim, which will enhance economic opportunities as well as providing these countries a hedge against growing Chinese power, which is getting increasingly assertive, clashing with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands to laying expansive claims elsewhere in disputed maritime territory. While the rise of China is the single biggest causal explanation for the pivot, there are other concerns too, which encompass issues such as nuclear proliferation, climate change and the need to ensure free passage across the seas.

The coming years will see an increasingly contested regional security landscape. The waning of American power will see its disengagements from many of the conflicts in the region, which also explains the desire of the Trump administration to disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq. The US will increasingly look towards a shared reliance on a network of allies to retain dominance in the Indo-Pacific against a China which is getting more capable to challenge the regional order by force.