Elections have been held successfully in the state of J&K yet again, which indicates a yearning for peace among the residents of the state. The security climate has shown a marked improvement, with lower violence levels and a decrease in fatalities. On an equally positive note, the attrition suffered by terrorists remains high, and averages four terrorists killed to one Security Force (SF) personnel killed in action (KIA) for the period 2008 to 2012 and two terrorist killed for each SF KIA for the period 2013-2014. The actions taken by the SF to prevent infiltration appear to be successful, with reports suggesting that terrorists have not been able to make up the losses suffered by them, through infiltration from across the border. As per the IG Police (Kashmir), Mr Abdul Ghani Mir, only residual militancy prevails, and the major component of militants operating in the state are foreigners, with only a handful of local militants working with them. This has been done despite the fact that the terror infrastructure across the border remains intact and there is no let up on the part of the Pakistani state in trying to push terrorists through into India.
Politically, the situation holds great promise. While the three divisions of the state have voted differently, each has given a distinct mandate to the party of its choice. While this has thrown up a coalition government, whose two major constituents have ideological differences, this by itself may not be a negative attribute. On the contrary, compulsions of coalition politics, may help help to stabilise the state rather then splinter it further on regional fault lines. In the changed political and security environment, the terrorists would in all likelihood look into a change in strategy, through which a wedge could be created between the security forces and the public. Anti terrorist operations would perforce have to be handled with a higher degree of sensitivity to avoid collateral damage and this throws up a fresh set of challenges.
The death of two boys who were fired upon by troops when they refused to stop at a mobile vehicle check post, in Nowgam on 3 November 2014, saw widespread protests in the Valley. In a bid to douse public anger, the senior military leadership in the state apologised for the death of the two boys and started an inquiry into the incident. This however, was not viewed favourably by many in the army, who felt that the troops were only doing their duty. The first challenge then, is handling sensitive issues with a greater degree of finesse. The Nowgam incident had its repercussions on the next attack by militants on an administrative base of 31 Field Regiment in Baramula District on 5 December. In this attack, an officer and seven men were killed in action, prompting many comments in the social media, mostly ill informed. The Army reacted swiftly, killing all the militants, but a popular though fallacious story that went viral stated that the attack was made possible because the sentry did not stop the terrorist vehicle, for fear of action being taken against him. This was patently false, as the terrorists did not come in vehicles but sneaked through into the area on foot, taking advantage of the broken ground and the darkness, but it highlighted the impact which social media can have on the morale of troops operating in J&K. This is another challenge that would need to be addressed.
The tragic loss of Col MN Rai, the CO of 42 Rashtriya Rifles who was KIA, while offering a couple of terrorist holed up in a house, in a village about 30 km from Srinagar an opportunity to surrender., points to yet another challenge for the Army. The action by Col Rai exemplifies the front line leadership which has been the hallmark of the Army, but it underlines yet another danger. In an effort to avoid collateral damage, there will be a tendency among senior officers to personally supervise operations which in the context of the present situation in J&K is not desirable. This aspect would need to be addressed. While all loss of life must be prevented, the loss of senior officers must be prevented at all costs as success by terrorists to target the Army leadership, is a strong motivator for terrorists of all hues.
What the Army needs is a revised strategy to move with the times. Terrorist propaganda as well as the efforts of some elements in civil society who remain ignorant of the real issues involved will continue to target AFSPA, which is simply an enabling law allowing the Army to operate in areas affected by militancy and terrorism. This has to be effectively countered through a focussed awareness campaign. It would be a good idea to select unit and formation commanders for posting to such areas, based on their known track record. It would be beneficial if such commanders were formally sensitised to the challenges of operating in the state before being posted in. Other initiatives could be cultivating local language skills by unit personnel, to enable better outreach. Instead of formal language training in military establishments, this could be done by making provisions at the unit level for hiring a local teacher for the purpose. Success needs to be measured on the basis of a units capability in restoring normalcy in an area, rather than on statistical evidence of terrorists neutralised. Such small steps could make a huge difference in strengthening the bonds between the public and their Army. At the national level, there is a need for a concerted and well directed perception management campaign to wean the public away from conflict. This needs to be conducted in concert with a focused economic development plan that can create jobs in the private sector.
In the age of the electronic media, it is also important to send the right signals to the public at home and abroad. Presently, from the local police to the Central Armed Police Forces like the BSF and CRPF, all personnel are dressed in combat uniform, akin to the Army. This gives an impression of a militarised state. A change could perhaps be affected by giving the local police a distinct uniform and restricting the use of combat uniform exclusively for the Army. This would give the correct perspective of the local police handling security in the state, increase confidence levels of the local people in their own police forces and give a sense of pride and belonging to the police personnel. Likewise, the CAPF, must also don the khaki only, and not the combat dress worn by the Army. Only then can the reality of reduced Army presence in populated areas be also perceived to be so.
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