THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP: HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND PRESENT TRENDS

 

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP:

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND PRESENT TRENDS

Dhruv C Katoch*

Introduction

An understanding of the fragile nature of India-Pakistan relations cannot be divorced from the idea which led to the creation of Pakistan. In a speech delivered in Lahore in 1940, Jinnah spoke of Hindus and Muslims being separate nations and two distinct civilisations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. The "Two Nation Theory" thus became the basis of the creation of the state of Pakistan, which continues to define itself as the 'other'. Pakistan as the 'other', in its ideological construct, pushes its Islamic identity in antithesis to India, which chose to be a secular, pluralistic state. Pakistan's search for an identity, to keep together the disparate elements which constituted the state, was sought to be achieved by using Islam as the unifying glue. The formula has not worked but the Pakistani establishment continues to use religion as a foundation to create an ideal nation-state. In the process, it has ridden roughshod over regional sentiments and social and cultural identities, which led to its Eastern wing breaking free in 1971 to form an independent Bangladesh. While geographically, the state of Pakistan is now a cohesive entity, fissures within society have led to multiple internal security challenges which today engulf many parts of the country. 

Pakistan: An Islamic State

The Objectives Resolution of 1949, which later became the preamble of the 1973 Constitution, defined the Islamic-religious character of the Pakistani state. Thereafter, every political leader, starting with Jinnah’s political successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, negotiated a compromise with the religious right, as a result of which the religious clergy soon began to dominate the religiopolitical discourse leading to religious ideology becoming inextricably linked with the core state ideology. The secular elite within Pakistan did not oppose this development as the religious paradigm was the raison d'être for the creation of the state. Religion was also the key rallying point for the defence establishment, which motivated its manpower on the basis of religious ideology.

The Pakistani leadership, whether civilian or military, has thus used Islam as a tool for nation-building from the time the state came into existence. General Ziaul Haq went further than others in ‘Islamising’  Pakistan’s legal and educational system, but even his policy of Islamisation was the extension of a consistent State ideology, not an aberration. One of the factors which mitigated the building of institutions which could serve to unify the country was the long spells of military rule that Pakistan has been subjected to since its inception and the lack of understanding of socio-political issues in the military dictators of Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the country's first military dictator, states in his autobiography, the reason for his opposition to the Bengali language. "It is quite clear to me", he writes, "that with two national languages, we cannot become a one-nation state; we shall continue to remain a multi-nation State. But more disturbingly, his attitude to the Bengali population of the East Wing was rather condescending and patronising. Muslim Bengalis, he averred, "have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence…had all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom". If Ayub was honest, he would simply have stated that the Bengalis of East Pakistan were not willing to be trod on by the West Pakistan centric leadership of the country. While Bangladesh has broken free in 1971, a sense of alienation still exists in large parts of Pakistan amongst the Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun populations, all of whom resent the big-brother attitude of the Punjabi ruling elite. This issue has as yet not been addressed, as a result of which the present internal security dynamics in Pakistan remain a source of concern. 

Today, Pakistan prides itself on three issues. One, its Muslim identity, two, its nuclear status and three its geo-political location, lying at the intersection of West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. All of these lie outside a development paradigm, which could showcase the progress Pakistan has made since 1947. Its ability to make a mark for itself will depend on how it navigates its relations with India and Afghanistan and breaks free from the inconsistencies of past policies.

India-Pakistan Relations: Is War on the Cards?

It is generally believed that India-Pakistan relations are held hostage to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Perhaps it may be more accurate to view the fissures in the relationship in terms of competing ideologies, which results in heightened tensions. In its formative years, Pakistani leaders played upon religious sentiment to strengthen national identity. This policy had broad support even amongst the Pakistani secular elite, who found in religion a convenient tool to ensure the survival of the state. Exacerbating tensions with India, which was projected as a Hindu state, thus served to whip up nationalistic fervour within Pakistan. Ratcheting up narratives on the status of Kashmir serves this purpose.

Ever since the military coup by Field Marshal Ayub Khan in October 1958 and the imposition of martial law in the state, Pakistan has, for a great part of its post-independence history, been under army rule. Even when civilian governments were formed through the electoral process, they had to play a subordinate role to the army. The army's dominance in Pakistan's politics is now a permanent feature of the political landscape in Pakistan. Besides guarding the country against external threats, the army has expanded its role to include internal security matters, as well as being the guardians of the state’s ideology.

For the army to remain relevant in Pakistan, it needs an enemy. Hostility with India thus remains the cornerstone of the Pakistani military establishment. The first India-Pakistan war which began in October 1947, was an attempt by Pakistan to take the state of Jammu and Kashmir by force. Though Pakistani designs were negated, the ceasefire when declared, left Pakistan in occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan and of the Mirpur-Muzzafarpur region. A second attempt by Pakistan to take Kashmir by force, which began in August 1965, led to a full-scale war in September. Once again, Pakistani designs were foiled. Speaking at the United Nations on 22 September 1965, Pakistan's then foreign minister, Mr ZA Bhutto declared a 1000-year war against India, while at the same time accepting a ceasefire at midnight of that day. As the power differential between the two countries had widened considerably, war was no longer thought winnable by Pakistan, and so it embarked on a policy of bleeding India by a thousand cuts, using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. This 'thought process' was studied and conceptualised into a military doctrine at the Pakistan Staff College, Quetta and was premised on the notion that Indian military capability can be degraded through waging a covert, low-cost, low-intensity warfare, using insurgent groups. This strategy took shape post Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 Liberation War, and was effectively employed in J&K since the middle of the 1980s. The infiltration of a large number of personnel from Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry, disguised as militants was yet another audacious attempt by Pakistan to cut off Ladakh from the rest of India by occupying the heights in the Kargil sector, overlooking the road link to Ladakh. The Indian military evicted the intrusions over a period of three months from May to July 1999, in a conflict which took place under a nuclear overhang. 

India's success in throwing out the intruders while at the same time restricting the scope of the conflict, was widely applauded. However, India felt betrayed by Pakistan, as the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had gone to Lahore on a peace mission in February 1999. Unbeknown to him, Pakistan had begun planning for the operation on the Kargil heights in October of 1998, which was code-named Operation Koh-i-Paima or Operation KP. At that very moment that Vajpayee was talking of peace in Lahore, Pakistani troops were being infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) on the heights surrounding Kargil. This was the last war fought by India and Pakistan and remained confined to the Kargil sector, but its termination did not lead to a positive peace and Pakistani continued with its attempts to foment terrorism in India. 

Some of the more serious incidences of terrorist violence post the Kargil war were the attack on India's parliament on 13 December 2001, an attack on the Akshardham temple in Gujarat on 24 September 2002 and the dastardly attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, which resulted in 175 civilian fatalities. While the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan played a covert role in all these attacks, none of them led to war between the two countries, though the Indian armed forces were mobilised after the attack on India's parliament. 

In 2014, with a new dispensation in power in Delhi under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a fresh attempt at peacemaking was made by the BJP-led Modi government. The Indian Prime Minister invited all the heads of state of the SAARC countries to his swearing-in ceremony and Pakistan's premier, Nawaz Sharif also attended. A year later, on 25 December 2015, Prime Minister Modi made a surprise unscheduled stop at Lahore, while returning from Afghanistan, to attend the wedding of Sharif's granddaughter. The rapprochement was however short-lived. Barely eight days later, on 2 January 2016, six heavily armed terrorists attacked the Pathankot Air Force Station, killing seven Indian soldiers. The six terrorists were eliminated before they could cause major damage, but the intent of the attack was clear: to sabotage the possibility of any rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The credibility of the Modi government stood dented, but India still believed that a change could be brought about in the political establishment of Pakistan, to desist from using terrorism as an instrument of state policy. India was still looking for a peaceful way to settle differences with Pakistan when on 18 September, four terrorists from the Pakistan-sponsored Jaish-e-Mohammed, carried out a suicide attack against an Indian Army base near the town of Uri in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), killing 19 Indian soldiers and injuring many more. This was perhaps the deadliest terrorist attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir in over two decades. This time the Indian government responded by launching a surgical strike at the Pakistani terrorist camps across the border. In a well-planned operation conducted on the night of 28/29 September, Indian para commandos launched multiple attacks on terrorist hides across the LoC, and eliminated a large number of terrorists. More importantly, India's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) announced the success of this operation to the world media the next day. This marked an irreversible inflexion point in the relations between the two countries. India had given an unmistakable signal that acts of terrorism would be responded to with force and would no longer be overlooked. 

An important outcome of the surgical strike carried out by the Indian forces was that the Pakistan nuclear bluff had been called. Pakistan covered its tracks by simply denying that such an attack had taken place, but the security dynamics had now altered to India's advantage. No major terrorist incident was reported from any part of India over the next two years or so, but that changed on 14 February 2019, when a vehicle-borne suicide bomber blew himself up in front of a police convoy near Pulwama in J&K, killing 40 personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force. This attack was responded to on 26 February, when Indian Air Force fighter jets crossed over into Pakistan and destroyed the base of the Hizbul Mujahideen terrorist organisation in Balakot in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Pakistan played down the attack claiming that no target had been hit, but its significance was not lost on the world. India reserved for itself the right to strike at targets deep inside Pakistan, to prevent terrorist attacks on its soil. 

Post the abrogation of the special status of the state of J&K in August 2019, which was provided by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, Pakistani capability to foment terrorist violence in J&K stands considerably degraded. Incidences of violence have shown a distinct decline, and normalcy to a large extent has returned to the Union Territory. The year 2022 has seen the largest influx of tourists which is an indicator of normalcy. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues in its attempts to foment disturbances in the newly constituted Union Territory of J&K. Pakistan also fomented similar violence in the Indian state of Punjab, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, by supporting an armed campaign by Sikh militants, but this movement was effectively dealt with and normalcy was restored.

Despite the inbuilt hostility of the Pakistan establishment to India, the precarious state of Pakistan's economy, its own internal security concerns and the political instability in that country, precludes the possibility of Pakistan initiating a war with India. Even a military misadventure on the lines of Kargil in 1999, has a very low probability, essentially because Pakistan lacks the military wherewithal to do so. India, on its part, will not initiate hostilities, primarily due to the nature of its polity, but more importantly, due to its focus on economic growth. A war with Pakistan or with any other country will set India back from the ambitious economic goals it has set for herself. In the immediate future, the probability of the two countries going to war is thus remote. 

A possible trigger for war could be a major terrorist attack in India on a high-profile target such as witnessed earlier in India's Parliament in 2001 or the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai, and which can be traced back to Pakistan. India's response will be firm but designed to be below the threshold level, and will in all probability target terrorist leadership, or infrastructure and bases within Pakistan which are used by terrorist groups. This would involve the delivery of lethal kinetic munitions, through land, sea or air, to achieve the desired outcome. An attack on Pakistani military targets on the LoC which facilitate infiltration of terrorist groups is also a possibility. This would go hand in hand with political and diplomatic moves against Pakistan. Pakistan will, in all likelihood, respond in like fashion, against Indian military targets along the LoC. Such attacks and counterattacks may continue for some time. However, if these are not contained, it could lead to a wider conflict where the militaries of both countries will engage with each other across the entire length of the international border. The probability of such an occurrence is very low, but it cannot be ruled out. Hostilities will however be confined to the conventional level only. 

Another possible scenario for a war between India and Pakistan is a deterioration of relations between India and China which in turn leads to war between the two countries. In such a case, Pakistan may choose to side with China and attempt to engage India militarily. The strategic nature of the China-Pakistan relationship makes Pakistani involvement in an India-China war more than a mere probability, especially if it senses a weakness in India's military capability. India has the capacity and capability to deal with a two-front war, but Pakistan could be tempted to support its all-weather friend and look into the possibility of making tactical gains in the Ladakh region or in J&K. 

In the near future, both the scenarios outlined above have a very low level of probability of occurrence. An improvement in India-China relations will obviate one of the possible triggers of war with Pakistan. And if Pakistan eschews the use of terrorists to foment violence against India, the possibility of an India-Pakistani war can be practically ruled out. 

War in the sub-continent goes against the interests of all concerned parties in the region. India is committed to its economic growth, which will be impacted by war. Hence, India will not initiate a conflict with either China or Pakistan, and will attempt a diplomatic and political resolution of its areas of concern. If war is thrust on India, then she has the capability to respond effectively against any aggressor. Pakistan is unlikely to initiate hostilities against India, considering the weak state of its economy, its own dire internal security dynamics and the political instability in the country. Pakistan is however, unlikely to pull back its support to terrorist groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, fearing the backlash that such an action may provoke within Pakistan. The India-Pakistan relationship will thus remain strained for the foreseeable future but is unlikely to degenerate into full-scale war. 

Is Rapprochement Possible?

A shift away from a radical Islamist state by Pakistan is an essential pre-requisite for a rapprochement to take place with India. The present Indian stance that talks cannot go hand in hand with terror is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Without such a change, India will not make any political overtures to Pakistan to restore normalcy. Pakistan, on its part, is unlikely to forego the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, especially as the state has been responsible in nurturing terrorist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen and others, for use against India. Syed Salahuddin, who heads the Hizbul Mujahideen, is based in Pakistan. He is also the head of the United Jihad Council—a grouping of a number of terrorist groups sponsored by the ISI. These organisations have built up a strong support base within Pakistan and dismantling them will cause a severe backlash against the Pakistani establishment. For the foreseeable future, the status quo as currently exists is likely to continue, which means that there is unlikely to be any forward movement in the political domain to bring about normalcy between the two countries.

Pakistan's internal problems could create a backlash by public against both the Pakistan military as well as against terrorist groups based in Pakistan. But given the extent to which Pakistani society has been radicalised, the call for a jihad against India still resonates strongly amongst the population. At the people-to-people level also, there has been a marked shift in attitudes defining the two countries. For a large segment of the Pakistani population, including the elite, the conflict remains ideological, where religion is central to Pakistani identity. This religious fervour has only increased, especially as school textbooks in Pakistan are also used to demonise non-muslims. The shift in the Indian attitude is also perceptible. Ayesha Siddiqa, the noted Pakistani academic, in a recent trip to India in March 2023, made the observation that a decade ago, she observed no hostility against Pakistan. This time around, while there was still no hostility, there was indifference. It was as if Pakistan did not exist and India has simply decided to move on. While India may be a factor in the Pakistani calculus, in the Indian mind, Pakistan no longer holds any place. 

Economic cooperation with India would benefit Pakistan, but that is a path no political party in Pakistan would be willing to take. That would spell political suicide for the party that attempts such a step. But economic pressure, if imposed by the US and affluent Western countries could cause a change in Pakistani society. Here, such aid could be made conditional to making changes in the educational curriculum by deleting those portions which advocate hate against non-muslims. A change in mindsets however is a long-term task and can only be executed over a generation. People-to-people exchanges are also passé and will have little traction. Such exchanges have meaning only in a conducive political environment.

Recent political changes in Pakistan have only widened the rift between the former Premier Imran Khan and the present all-party ruling establishment. It is this rift which has created political instability in Pakistan and is propelling the country towards possible civil war if the situation is not urgently addressed. Voices from within Pakistan are expressing a sense of hopelessness never before seen in the country, even when they were going through a very difficult patch in 2007-2008. Zahid Hussain, writing in the Dawn states: "The country’s fate is now hostage to a senseless power struggle between a reckless populist force and an obsolete conglomeration at the helm". Huma Yusuf had this to say: "If our mainstream parties do not change tack and refocus on the public’s urgent needs, we must fear for a future, fragmented Pakistan". The irrepressible Pervez Hoodbhoy has been scathing in his comments. "Let’s face it: a flawed concept of nationalism created a class of plunderers, both civilian and military. The chickens have come home to roost. The flour stampedes are just the beginning. The poor will pay first, but all will pay ultimately". And then we have Ashraf Jehangir Qazi who talks of Pakistan imploding. These are but a small sample of voices coming out of Pakistan. India will not take advantage of Pakistan's dire situation and embroil that country in a military conflict. Pakistan is not in a position to seek a conflict even as a distraction to get out of the mess it finds itself in. Friendship with India can go a long way in easing the economic hardships of the people of Pakistan but that is not the path that either the Pakistan political establishment or its military will take.

There has been a change in the military leadership of Pakistan with General Munir taking over as the Army Chief. But that hardly means that the Pakistan military establishment has changed. The Pakistan military is conscious of its interests and regardless of who the Army Chief is, the military's fundamental hostility towards India will not change. A hostile neighbour is the raison d'être for the Pakistan army, without which it loses relevance and power in the country. No army chief will let go of this hold the military has over the polity.

Conclusion  

The India-Pakistan relationship is in part hostage to history and in part to a divisive ideology which acts as the binding glue for Pakistan. For long, efforts to create an environment of peace and friendship between these two antagonistic neighbours has failed to achieve the desired results. Perhaps the time has come to accept the fact that the two countries will for the present, exist in a state of mutual suspicion and hostility. Once that is accepted, ways and means can be found to exist with that hostility, without the need to go to war.

*Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch (R) is an Indian Army veteran. Presently, he is Director, India Foundation, A New Delhi based think tank.

Published in WikiStrat - April 2023