BOOK REVIEW: K File: The Conspiracy of Silence By Bashir Assad

What can explain the fact that one of the most beautiful places on earth has been turned into a living hell? Much of the troubles faced by the state can be attributed in the initial years to the ambitions of two men—Maharaja Hari Singh, who was looking at ways and means to remain in power and Sheikh Abdullah, who was determined to oust the Maharaja and take over the reins of the state. The Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947, following the Pakistan backed tribal invasion of India. It was fortuitous  that Indian forces, which were flown in to Srinagar Airfield on the very next day, reached just in time to halt the raiders at the outskirts of Srinagar. Over the next 14 months, the Pakistani backed forces were pushed back, till a ceasefire was declared, leaving Pakistan in control of Gilgit-Baltistan and the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. With minor modifications, this has, since the Simla Accord of 1972, been sanctified as the Line of Control.

A great deal of political shenanigans took place since the accession of the state to India in October 1948. But what is generally not known is how a small coterie of people, whom the author of K File: The Conspiracy of Silence, Mr Bashir Assad describes as the Mullah caste—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis etc, achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the states political landscape as well as its bureaucracy. This was the clan which moved into Kashmir from Arabia, and slowly established dominance over the original inhabitants of Kashmir. Today, this small group, representing  just about 3 per cent of the Valleys Muslim population, has a stranglehold on the state’s politics and on its bureaucratic structure. It is surprising that this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze.

Article 370 was never a demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, it was not even the demand of Sheikh Abdullah! Why India’s first Prime Minister, Mr JL Nehru insisted on including it in the Constitution remains a mystery. Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar was vehemently imposed to the same and he made this known in no uncertain terms, while the Constitution was being drafted. That is why it was kept as a temporary provision. Would the history of the State have taken a different trajectory if such a provision had not been placed on the statute book? The answers can only be hypothetical. But one thing cannot be denied. The seeds of separatism were sown with the inclusion of Article 370 in the Constitution. And later, with the promulgation of Article 35A through a Presidential Ordinance, free rein was given to the politicians of the Valley to keep the embers of a separatist philosophy alive.

These aspects are not covered in the book, which is rightly focussed on a singular theme; the radicalisation of a society that had absolutely no reason to take to that path. How is it that a society, which for millennia symbolised a culture of inclusiveness,  now celebrates death through jihad as a means of gaining salvation? Why is death celebrated? Why is the word of the hate mongers and terror perpetrators taken as the truth? Why have the scholarly institutions of traditional Islamic jurisprudence been demolished in Kashmir? How and why have we allowed the youth of Jammu and Kashmir to be swayed by the force of a radical ideology which seeks the killing of those not conforming to the Muslim faith as a righteous act; which believes that it is a moral imperative to take up arms against the state; and which is ideologically primed to the extent of believing that laying down one’s life for the cause of jihad is an act that will win rewards in heaven? Once we find answers to these questions, we will be a step closer to understanding the causative factors of violence in the state of J&K. Only then, can we begin to look at policy options to address the alienation that has evidently taken place.

Bashir Assad is a son of the soil. Born in South Kashmir and having being educated in a Madrassa, he was privy to every aspect of life in the state and thus is perhaps more competent than others to expound on the radicalisation that has swept through the Valley and destroyed its Sufi culture. Unknown to many is the fact brought out by Assad that the spread of radicalisation was linked to the growth of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir. The process started sometime in the mid 1960’s, when Maududi’s literature was first made available. It gained impetus after 1977, ostensibly with Pakistani backing—a throwback to the Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Liberation war. With the advent of armed insurgency in 1989, the process took on a menacing hue. 

All these aspects are well covered in the book. Most alarmingly, while the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its Falah-e Aam Trust (Educational Wing)  in 1992, it simultaneously issued orders for the absorption of the teachers of Falah-e-Aam Trust in government schools. And thus began the onslaught of a radical ideology on young and impressionable minds. It is incomprehensible to understand why this was done by the State. A charitable explanation is that the state leadership was naive. More likely however is the possibility that they were complicit. Be that as it may be, the end result today is that the educational system has been taken over by a radicalised clergy and even government jobs are available only to those who support the Mullah caste. A small group of people, who had no Kashmiri roots and who comprise barely three percent of the Muslim populace, are thus now ruling the roost. 

Why did we allow this to happen? Both the Centre and the State must accept responsibility for the mess that has been created in Kashmir. The Mullahs mentioned earlier—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis et al, are the ones spearheading the Azadi narrative, and linking it with Islam. Thus the slogan—‘Azadi ka matlab kya, La illaha illallha’. The factors which drive the terrorist movement in the state have been variously attributed in public discourse to poverty, a sense of alienation, joblessness, and many other factors. But the real cause, radicalisation of the minds of the youth, is rarely discussed. That is the nature of the secular state, wherein to speak of an issue in religious terms gets the individual labelled as communal! But unless the facet of radicalisation is addressed—something that has been ongoing for close to over five decades—peace cannot return to the Valley.

It is surprising that the Mullahs exhort the common Kashmiri, the original inhabitants of the land to make sacrifices for the cause. Yet they themselves keep their children safely ensconced in other parts of India, where they receive a good education. These Mullahs have amassed fortunes in the name of the poor and have cornered political and administrative power.  Their shackles need to be broken if Kashmir is to return to peace. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A is but a first step in this direction. The road ahead is however going to be long and arduous one, but it is one that must be traversed.

Bashir Assad’s book must be read to understand the way the narrative has been shaped and exploited by a small group for their personal ends. It gives out a facet of Kashmir from the perspective of a son of the soil, that has never before been penned, because of the risk to life and limb that such an account would invariably bring. It is thus a brave account, giving out in explicit detail how the Valley got radicalised and in the process, exposing the author and his family to great risk. The author appears to have a soft corner for Sheikh Abdullah and his brand of politics, but that is par for the course. There is also an oblique reference in passing, linking the growth of the Jamaat to the rising influence of the RSS. This may be the popular narrative in Kashmir but it is devoid of substance and is a mere rationalisation of the acts of the Jamaat. The radicalisation of the Valley was a deliberate act, well thought out and planned by a rabid clergy, supported from across the border and was not a result of internal causes. It is a sad reflection of our times, and of the state of India’s professed  secularism, that this philosophy was not nipped in the bud and allowed to flourish till it had all but consumed the state. 

For those looking at conflict resolution in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, post the dramatic revocation of the special status of the state on 5 August 2019, this book must be read. It provides an essential backdrop to understanding the situation in the Valley, which makes it an indispensable read for policy makers, think tanks, personnel form the Armed Forces, Police personnel and even the lay public. A few printers devils have entered into the book which otherwise has been well produced by Vitasta Publications. These need to be corrected in the next edition. Overall, a very brave book on Kashmir, for which the author must be commended.

IOR: NEED FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

An extremely complex region in human terms, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) includes within its ambit a wide variety of races, cultures, and religions. Differences in development levels and pace of economic growth, varying political structures with different levels of stability, demographic pressures, ethnic and religious tensions and wide variations in the quality of governance in the rim countries of the Ocean add to the complexity of the region.

Though Asia is home to over half the world’s population, at the turn of the century, it accounted for barely 35 percent of the world’s GDP at PPP $. Even this low figure marked a quantum leap from the earlier three centuries, as Asia’s economy shrank while the Western economies expanded, powered by the industrial revolution and advances in science. But the gradual transformation of Asia since 1950 has reversed a long historical trend and by 2020, Asia will equal the world’s GDP in PPP terms and thereafter will surpass it. This is largely attributed to the growth of India and China and also to the growth of smaller and mid-size countries. In a sense, we are seeing the reset of history, for towards the end of the 17th century, Asia accounted for over two-thirds of the global GDP. Today, while Asia still remains poorer than the rest of the world, the gap is narrowing, marking the end of “The west’s two-century epoch as global powerhouse” as Kishore Madhubani puts it in his book, “Has the West Lost it?”.

This shift marks the appearance of the Indian Ocean as a key emerging region in world affairs and a major transit route for the world’s shipping and energy needs. Over two-thirds of global oil shipments and one-third of global bulk shipping trade, including petroleum products and coal transit across this region. About 80 per cent of the world’s maritime oil trade flows through three narrow choke points in the Indian Ocean—Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. Unhindered flow of trade and energy resources would need stability in the region and security of the sea lanes of communication. Changes in the regional and global geo-political landscape are posing challenges to stability in the IOR which could lead to tensions that may play out over the sea lanes. Non-traditional maritime threats ranging from maritime terrorism to natural disasters, human smuggling and illegal fishing, could further increase the risks to maritime security and stability.

Geo-political Landscape

The Western limit of the Indian Ocean is defined by the East African coast, stretching from South Africa to Somalia. The African coastline states are relatively stable barring Somalia. The criticality of the region pertains  to the narrow Bab-el-Mandeb outlet from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Northeast of the Strait lies Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with the latter embroiled in a civil war, where Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, in 2014, allied with the Houthi rebels against the government led by Mr Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. The conflict escalated in 2015 with Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states, jumping in the fray to support Hadi. In 2017, the Houthis broke with Saleh and he was killed in December of that year. The Houthis are seeking independence for South Yemen. The region remains a flashpoint which could lead to a wider conflagration, especially as Iran is supporting the Houthis. In the Horn, Somalia remains unstable, increasing the risks of piracy in the region. While Somalia has no strategic importance, it is a source of violent Islamist extremism that affects neighbouring states and its poverty has been a source of piracy. 

The major challenge in the Red Sea and Horn will thus remain to achieve regional stability and end piracy.

The Strait of Hormuz is another flashpoint, especially since the US reimposed sanctions on Iran, after withdrawing from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the grounds that the Agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and its role in regional wars. Iran has responded by resuming some of its nuclear activities, leaving the deal in a tenuous state. Tensions in the region have risen following attacks on oil tankers in May 2019 in the Persian Gulf, which the US blames Iran of orchestrating and which Iran denies. Tensions flared further when the United Kingdom seized an Iranian oil tanker of the coast of Gibraltar in July on suspicion it carried Iranian crude oil to Syria in breach of European Union sanctions against the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran thereafter seized a British flagged oil tanker in the Start of Hormuz, further escalating tensions in the Gulf. Needless to say, a conflagration in the Gulf could also spill over to the Bab-el-Mandeb, which will have serious ramifications across the world, but more so on the Asian economies heavily dependent on crude supplies from the Gulf. 

Within the Gulf, while the civil war in Iraq is over, the Islamic State continues with a lower-scale insurgency. In Syria, the civil war still rages, with numerous factions, both foreign and domestic involved, including the Islamic State. Iran, Russia and Hezbollah support the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad while the US-led international coalition, established in 2014 with the declared purpose of ousting the Islamic State, supports the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria and its armed wing, the SDF, materially, financially, and logistically. Turkey is also directly involved in operations against the Syrian government since August 2016. The region hence remains volatile, and is also seeing the play out of an ethnic conflict between the Sunni and Shia, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, with both countries jockeying to increase their influence. 

In South Asia, the situation in Afghanistan remains a major concern. Elsewhere, the region has varying levels of stability, though strained relations between India and Pakistan remain a source of concern. Conflict between the two is however unlikely, though Pakistan’s attempts to ratchet up terrorist attacks on Indian soil will be responded with increasing vigour by India. The abrogation of provisions of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution and the break up of the state of J&K into two Union Territories—The Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the Union Territory of J&K (With a legislature) has led to a heightening of tensions between the two countries, but over the long term, this will lead to stability in the region. 

Conflict continues to rage in Afghanistan, with the Taliban appearing to be on an ascendant path, following the proposed withdrawal of US forces from the region. Pakistan is riddled with terrorist factions, some of which it supports and others which are fighting against the state. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are also vulnerable to terror attacks, though both states are taking resolute measures to combat the menace.

In Southeast Asia, the broader risks driving security and stability in the subregion are shaped by the threats posed by piracy and by ethnic and sectarian divisions. The concerns of most ASEAN countries therefore revolve around dealing with extremism, terrorism, and ethnic and sectarian tensions and threats. There is also concern expressed about the strategic threats posed by rising competition with China. China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea, which borders many states in the region, add to the complexity of Southeast Asian security concerns. All of the states in the region, with the exception, of Myanmar – have some form of security ties to the United States.

India is also expanding its footprints in the IOR as a counter to Chinese moves to gain salience in the Indian Ocean. China already has its footprints in the region, having built the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. It has also constructed a port in Karachi, several ports in Myanmar, and container terminals in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. While none of these ports have become naval bases, their potential for such use in future remains a possibility. Chinese concerns in the IOR mainly stem from its need to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf. It will thus continue to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India.

India sees itself as the dominant naval power in the IOR in spite of the role that US air and sea forces have played and continue to play in the region. China’s emergence as a major air-sea power is a challenge to India’s position in the IOR and a future source of political or military challenges to India, besides being a potential source of aid to Pakistan. China will continue with its efforts to project air and missile power in the Indian Ocean as a competitor to the US and India, primarily to secure its energy supplies from the Gulf.

The US remains the dominant outside power in the Gulf and in the IOR. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, described as a strategic “rebalancing” of its interests from Europe and the Middle East toward East Asia, is a signal that the US will be less obsessed with the happenings in the Gulf, especially as it is no longer dependent on energy supplies from the region. With East Asia becoming the “Economic Centre of Gravity,” there will be increased focus of the US in East Asia and the IOR. The US will however remain committed to the defence of the Gulf and will maintain a major presence in the IOR. The US most likely will also continue to seek closer ties, both military end economic with countries dotting the Pacific rim, which will enhance economic opportunities as well as providing these countries a hedge against growing Chinese power, which is getting increasingly assertive, clashing with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands to laying expansive claims elsewhere in disputed maritime territory. While the rise of China is the single biggest causal explanation for the pivot, there are other concerns too, which encompass issues such as nuclear proliferation, climate change and the need to ensure free passage across the seas.

The coming years will see an increasingly contested regional security landscape. The waning of American power will see its disengagements from many of the conflicts in the region, which also explains the desire of the Trump administration to disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq. The US will increasingly look towards a shared reliance on a network of allies to retain dominance in the Indo-Pacific against a China which is getting more capable to challenge the regional order by force.

The Gulf Imbroglio: Dangerous Portents

Tension has been simmering in the Gulf for quite some time, specifically due to the strained US-Iran relationship, caused by Iran’s contentious nuclear programme, its support to Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist political party and militant group based in Lebanon, which threatens Israel, and its support to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and his Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. Sanctions imposed on Iran were withdrawn after the landmark nuclear agreement between Iran and six countries—the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia and China in 2015 called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), which in turn received support across the globe. But with President Trump unilaterally withdrawing from the Agreement in 2018 and imposing fresh sanctions on Iran, matters between the two countries have once again come to the boil. 

It was President Trump’s contention that the JCPA did nothing to curb Iran’s intervention in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. While that may be correct, the deal had a limited focus of curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and was not intended to limit its broader geopolitical goals. There has been a sense of dismay at the American action, with the former British ambassador to the U.S., terming President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal as an act of “diplomatic vandalism” against his predecessor Barack Obama, according to leaked diplomatic cables. Be that as it may, the tense relations have set off a chain of actions which can potentially have grave consequences for the world’s energy supplies.

On 12 May 2019, two oil tankers were attacked off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, leaving one ablaze and both adrift. These tankers were flying the flag of Saudi Arabia, one of which was en-route to the Saudi kingdom to be  loaded with crude oil to be sent to the US. Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih denounced the attack as a deliberate act of sabotage, stating that while no lives were lost and no oil was spilled, the incident caused “significant damage” to the two ships. Earlier, UAE officials had alleged that four boats including a UAE flagged vessel had been targeted and Thome Ship Management had stated that one of its Norwegian-registered tankers was “struck by an unknown object”. The US pointed the needle of suspicion on Iran or its proxies and dispatched an aircraft carrier strike group to the Middle East to send a "clear and unmistakable" message to Iran. The US also ramped up sanctions against Iran and designated the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group. Iran responded by stating that it would roll back some of its commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal.

A month later, on 13 June, two oil tankers, one Japanese owned and the other Norwegian, were again attacked in the Gulf of Oman, leaving one ablaze and both adrift. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet responded to the distress calls and assisted the tankers, whose crew was evacuated. As the attack occurred along one of the world’s busiest oil routes, it led to a surge in oil prices. The U.S. blamed Iran for the incident, with the U.S. Central Command, which is based in the Gulf, releasing a video footage that purportedly showed men on an Iranian boat removing a mine from one of the tankers. Iran promptly refuted the allegation, but regardless of who is behind these attacks, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman are getting weaponised.

A week into the above incident, the IRGC shot down a US surveillance drone (RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D) with a surface to air missile over the Strait of Hormuz, claiming it to have violated Iranian air space. The US on the other hand claimed that the drone was in international airspace. On 18 July, USS Boxer, downed an Iranian drone off the Start of Hormuz, which it claimed came dangerously close to the warship and did not heed to warnings to move out of the area. As per US officials, electronic jamming measures were used to take out the drone. The news site military.com has stated that the Marine Corps was responsible for bringing down the drone, using a new anti-drone system. A statement made by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, indicates that the US may have shot down a second Iranian drone on 23 July, indicating a ratcheting up of operations in the Gulf.

Adding to the existing tensions in the Gulf, the UK on 4 July, seized an Iranian tanker off the coast of Gibraltar, carrying two million barrels of crude oil, on the grounds that it was carrying the oil to Syria in breach of EU sanctions. The Gibraltar police arrested the captain and chief officer of the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1. This prompted a sharp response from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who termed the act as piracy and warned that the UK would face “repercussions” for the seizure. Those repercussions came on 19 July, with Iran seizing a British oil tanker the Stena Impero, in the Strait of Hormuz, and briefly detaining a second British ship. The IRGC reportedly carried out the seizure on the grounds that the tanker had “violated three international naval regulations,” including turning off a GPS locator, breaking the traffic pattern in the Strait of Hormuz and polluting the water by dumping crude oil residue. The message being sent by Iran to the world is clear: Iran has the ability to threaten the flow of shipping out of the Persian Gulf through the narrow Strait of Hormuz.

Importance of the Strait of Hormuz

Conflict in the Gulf serves little purpose as it would only serve to cripple the world’s economies which are dependent on energy flows from the region. The situation is thus worrisome for the world and especially for India. The channel accounts for a fifth of the world’s oil supply, a quarter of the liquefied natural gas, and USD 500 billion in trade every year. The countries which lie along the Persian Gulf and share the Gulf coastline are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman, all of whom are energy rich and export oil and petroleum products. Consequently, the Gulf has emerged as a major trade route through which most of the oil exported from these countries flows out. The Strait of Hormuz is a choke-point between the Gulf and the open ocean, being bounded by Iran to its North and the UAE and an Omanian enclave to its South. At its narrowest point, the Strait has a width of just 34 km. It opens to the Gulf of Oman and from there to the Arabian Sea. A third of crude oil exports transported via ships pass through the Strait, which makes it the world’s most important oil artery.

On an average, 20.7 million barrels per day (bpd) pass through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, of which 17.3 million bpd is crude and condensate products and 3.3 million bpd is petroleum products. (https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932). This accounts for 21 percent of the world’s exports. Alternate data provided by Vortexa, an energy analytics firm states that 22.5 million bpd passes through the Strait of Hormuz on average, which is 24 percent of daily global oil production and nearly 30 percent of oil moving across the world’s oceans. Any disruption to this supply will have serious consequences on the worlds economy and while some countries will be affected more than others, the mere fact that we are living in a globalised world, every country will be deeply impacted. India’s total imports (till June 2019) was 83,908,500 barrels of crude oil products of which 2/3 of crude oil and 1/2 of liquified natural gas (LNG) passed through the Strait of Hormuz. That defines the criticality of conflict in the Gulf for India. China too, stands critically affected. In June 2019 it imported 9.63 million bpd, 44 percent of which passed through the Gulf. 

With the Gulf getting increasingly weaponised and rapprochement between Iran and U.S. not visible on the horizon, it could take but a spark to trigger of a limited war on the high seas, impacting upon trade routes and halting the flow of energy resources. Such a scenario has played out earlier in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq first targeted Iranian fuel carrying ships in 1981, using jet aircraft. Iran responded in 1984, using a combination of means to include speedboats, sea mines, anti-ship cruise missiles and naval gunfire, to target Iraqi vessels carrying fuel. The Gulf waters were thus turned into a war zone, with a total of 340 ships being attacked and over 30 million tonnes of shipping damaged during the period 1981-1987. U.S. intervention in 1987 led to the conflict subsiding but only after Iran developed and demonstrated capability to attack any vessel that passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

Any military action taken by the US and its allies against Iran could well push Teheran to widening the conflict and choking the trade routes across the Strait. It could even spill over to a wider war where Iran targets Saudi assets, thereby crippling oil supplies across the world. That is a scenario best avoided and one which India, along with like minded countries, must work towards circumventing. India has tremendous goodwill with both Iran and the US and could use its influence to prevent matters from slipping out of control. Here, the interest of all Asian economies too coincide. By 2020, Asia will account for half of the worlds GDP. A crippling of the Asian economies caused by oil shortages would have serious impact across the globe. Even a limited conflict will push up global oil prices, adversely impacting on growth.

As a long term measure, India needs to reduce its oil consumption through alternate technologies. India’s dependency on oil imports is about 85 percent of its overall requirement, and much of this is sourced from the Gulf. This makes India’s growth vulnerable to any disruptions in the passage of crude through the sea lanes passing through the Gulf. Besides alternate technologies, there is a need to focus on increasing indigenous output of crude. Research on renewable sources of energy also needs a much greater push and a greater inflow of funding. Nuclear energy and hydro power also needs much greater exploitation. A whole of government approach would be required to enhancing the nation’s energy security to reduce the impact which oil shortages or oil shocks may cause in future.

Note: For DSA - Sep 2019 edition.

TWO DECADES POST KARGIL: HOW PREPARED ARE WE?

On 19 February 1999, India’s then Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertook a journey for peace by bus, across the Attari-Wagah border to Lahore. It was a historic visit, undertaken to break the impasse in the India-Pakistan relationship and to give peace a chance. Speaking at Lahore, Vajpayee’s words resonated across the world when he said “Hum jung na hone denge … Teen bar lad chuke ladayi, kitna mehnga sauda… Hum jung na hone denge…” (We will not let war occur…we have fought three times…what an expensive transaction…we will not let war occur again).

In hindsight, it appears that India was once again taken in by Pakistani perfidy. For, at the very moment when the Indian premier was treading the path for peace, the Pakistan military had already set in motion many months earlier, plans to capture the Kargil heights, the preparations for which were on in full swing in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan Occupied J&K (POJ&K). Listening in on the speech, the then Pakistan Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf must have been chuckling silently to himself. The Indian’s had been deceived once again, and the proof of that deception was the Indian premier talking of peace in Lahore.

It is important to understand this aspect of the Kargil War. Pakistan had lulled India into believing that peace with Pakistan was a possibility and through that act, perhaps achieved the highest level of strategic deception. After the ‘bus yatra,’ the possibility of war was far from the thoughts of India’s defence planners—the political, military and intelligence apparatus simply did not fathom the level of Pakistani duplicity. And in an artificially created atmosphere of bonhomie, love and brotherhood, Pakistan, within a few months started pushing in regular troops, in the garb of militants, into the Kargil heights. This was the time when the second failure occurred. The Indian Army was aware of the fact that infiltrators had entered into the Kargil area. They failed to assess the situation correctly, assuming that like in previous years, these were just terrorist groups crossing over the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley. Even media reports which spoke of Pakistani infiltrators holding on to some of the heights in Kargil were dismissed offhand, as such a possibility was considered tactically unsound. 

Of equal concern was the fact that Indian intelligence agencies too faltered. They failed to detect the build up that had steadily been taking place over many months in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of POJ&K. Had that movement been detected, then perhaps such heavy concentration of troops, allied with infiltration attempts would have taken on a different colour and led to a more realistic appraisal of Pakistan’s intentions. In the event, Pakistan achieved total tactical and strategic surprise and it was left to the Indian Armed Forces to evict the infiltrators from the heights that had been occupied by the enemy. 

In the perception of the Pakistan military, the eviction of their troops from the mountain tops was a next to impossible task. It was here that the Pakistan military underestimated the capability of the Indian Army and the will of the Indian people. While the plan was tactically brilliant, it was strategically flawed. It could only have succeeded if India was not prepared to risk a full scare war to evict the infiltrators. In perhaps some of the most heroic and epic battles ever fought across the world, the Indian Army, supported by the Indian Air Force, pushed back the enemy from the commanding heights they had occupied, foot by bloody foot, braving unimaginable odds. They made possible, what had once seemed an impossible task, and through their guts and valour, salvaged a victory for India, against all odds. Now, two decades later, the nation needs to ponder on the lessons we learnt from that war.

Post the war, the government set up The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) on 29 July 1999, “…to examine the sequence of events and make recommendations for the future”. The KRC found various shortcomings at multiple levels of intelligence collection, operational procedures and systematic sharing of data. Based on the KRC, the government ordered a complete review of the Indian security system under a Group of Ministers (GoM). The GoM was a powerful body, consisting of Shri LK Advani, Minister of Home Affairs, Shri George Fernandes, Minister of Defence, Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs and Shri Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance. The National Security Adviser (NSA), Shri Brajesh Mishra, was designated as a special invitee to the meetings of the GoM and the Cabinet Secretariat (National Security Council Secretariat) was tasked to service it. The GoM set up four task forces—Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus, Task Force on Internal Security, Task Force on Border Management and Task Force on Management of Defence to look into specific issues and to provide concrete recommendations. Many of the recommendations of the GoM have been implemented over the last two decades, but some critical recommendations are still to be addressed. These need to be deliberated upon and either be accepted for implementation, or discarded, being unsuitable for the present security environment.

The Task Force on Intelligence had recommended the creation of a tri-service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) as the nodal agency for the analysis of all military intelligence and to synergise the functioning of the three Services Intelligence Directorates (SIDs). The DIA came into existence in 2002, with the strategic intelligence assets of the Services like satellite imagery and Signals Intelligence being placed under it. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) also came into existence in 2003, and is now the nodal agency to procure and provide all forms of TECHINT to the nation.  However, weaknesses in India’s intelligence agencies continue to persist. This has been aptly demonstrated by the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 and the spate of terror attacks that have taken place since, most notably the attack on a CRPF convoy in Pulwama in early 2019. 

Post the Mumbai attacks, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) was established to investigate terror cases. Coastal security too was strengthened, along with the formation of a Multi Agency Centre (MAC), to improve coordination among various Central and state security agencies. However, inputs to the MAC from the state intelligence agencies remains at about 11 percent only of total intelligence inputs received by the Centre, which bespeaks of weaknesses in state intelligence agencies. There is a need to redefine the role of intelligence agencies and perhaps have a dedicated cadre for such services instead of simply staffing these agencies with police officers. Modern day complexities demand expertise in the cyber domain, scientists with specific domain knowledge, language experts, information technology experts, psychologists and a hot of professionals in many disciplines, if our intelligence gathering efforts are to bear fruit. There is also need for parliamentary oversight over the intelligence agencies. While some form of oversight is being provided by placing all the 14 intelligence agencies under the NSA, considering the volume of workload on the NSA’s plate, it is perhaps time to have a National Intelligence Head—an exclusive intelligence chief, to provide integrated intelligence assessments to the government through the NSA to facilitate seamless acquisition, processing and dissemination of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence.

India also faced its moment of truth in Kargil when the infiltrators had to be evicted from seemingly invincible positions. The then Army Chief’s statement “we will fight with what we have,” has since become a byword for lack of preparation in peacetime for potential threats to our territorial integrity. Defence preparedness is not a task which can be done in a year or two. It takes years of efforts to build a well oiled military machine and this aspect has been neglected since independence, especially in terms of defence manufacture.

The Modi government launched its mission ‘Make in India’ on 25 September 2014, and the defence sector was identified as one of the key sectors requiring indigenisation. India imports about 70 percent of its defence requirements which makes it vulnerable to external influence in times of war. However, achieving some level of self sufficiency in defence production will not materialise quickly. It will take at least a decade if not more of sustained effort to reduce our dependancy on imports from the current 70 percent to 50 percent, and perhaps another decade after that to get it down to the more respectable figure of producing 70 percent of our defence requirements and importing just 30 percent.

The Dhirendra Singh Committee set up by the government in May 2015 suggested that a conceptual ladder be evolved to correspond to progressive development of competence level in the defence industry, from the very basic level of repair and maintenance to the level of acquiring ability to design, develop, manufacture and test systems. More importantly, the Committee recommended an increasingly important role for the private sector in defence production. The Defence Procurement Procedure 2016 (DPP-2016) has accordingly been streamlined and a number of far reaching decisions have been taken to encourage both the public and the private sector to increase indigenous production. L&T, in partnership with Korea’s Samsung has procured a Rs 5400 crore order to manufacture 100 artillery guns (155/52 mm K-9 Vajra tracked SP)  and is also going to manufacture the Lakshya-1 and Lakshya-2 pilotless target aircraft with the DRDO. DRDO has tied up with Bharat Forge and General Dynamics to manufacture FICVs and Tata Strategic Division is joining hands with Airbus Industries to manufacture medium transport aircraft. Reliance industries, Mahindra Defence Systems, Dynamatic Technologies, TVS Logistics, MKU and others have also entered into the defence market for manufacture. Two defence industrial zones are also coming up which augurs well for the Make in India initiative, but the momentum will have to be sustained, for which an effective institutionalised interface between the MoD, the services and the private sector is required, at the policy making level. There is also an urgent need to corporatise the management structure of the Ordnance Factory Board and to merge shipyards under MoD into one corporate entity (retaining the yard facilities in their present geographical locations but working under one single management). In addition, expeditious implementation of the strategic partnership scheme and creation of an independent agency to oversee the complete gamut of activities related to defence industry and procurements is required. 

Finally, if India is to emerge as a strong military power, there is a need for better civil-military relations (CMR). This aspect remains strained since decades, but the relationship has become more brittle in recent years due to bureaucratic overreach. Harmonising the relationship would require overhauling the Ministry of Defence as recommended by the GoM post the Kargil War. This would need integrating the Services with the MoD, with at least half the senior posts which are held by the babus being handled by officers in uniform. There is also the need to create a CDS at the earliest, if the envisaged reforms are to keep apace with the Prime Ministers vision. For reforms in the MoD, there will be resistance by the bureaucrats. How this matter is handled will determine the timelines by which India can become a military power to reckon with. Otherwise, at some future point in time when India is once again faced with a military challenge, the Service Chief’s will once again be forced to say, “We will fight with what we have”. Let the lessons of Kargil never be forgotten.

Published in Organiser, July 2019

National Security and Conflict Resolution

Before giving my views on some aspects of National Security and Conflict Resolution, it is but appropriate that first I pay homage to the late editor of Aakrosh, Maj Gen Afsir Karim, who founded the journal and continued as its editor till he passed away in February this year. Since its inception two decades ago, Aakrosh has been dealing with issues related to terrorism and internal armed conflict under the very able guidance and editorship of Maj Gen Afsir Karim. His passing away has been a grievous loss to India Foundation, but the flame which he lit in starting this journal will forever remain bright and true to the spirit in which the Journal was launched. To General Karim, India Foundation owes a deep debt of gratitude for his sterling contribution in promoting awareness of internal security issues. We will continue to highlight issues and suggest policy interventions that will inform and put issues in a holistic perspective.

Discussions on National Security in India are increasingly finding space in the media and in Universities and think tanks which is a welcome trend. Greater awareness is essential as national security is and always will be of prime concern to the inhabitants of a state and its leadership. But what national security entails is open to different contextual interpretations. Security is being viewed now in terms of not just guarding against threats from external and internal actors, but also through a much larger prism encompassing aspects such as food and water security, energy security, protection of the environment, climate change and the like.

In essence, however, security for the citizens of a state simply means that they can go about their daily work without fear. This would necessitate a secure internal security environment where the citizens can live and work without fear. This would require a vibrant democracy where the voice of the citizens is heard, good governance, a free media and effective justice delivery mechanisms. To protect the country from external forces and to preserve an independent foreign policy, there would be a need to protect the nation’s land and maritime borders, air space, cyberspace and assets in outer space.

The requirement is hence both of a strong military which can address all internal and external security challenges as well as strong institutions of governance within the country, to address internal security concerns and other issues of governance. Allied with this is the need for accountability in all institutions, and transparency in governance.

An important aspect of governance lies in the domain of policy-making. Wrong policies though well intended can have negative consequences for national security. One of the causative factors for conflict in Sri Lanka was the issue of language. To promote unity in the country, the country’s leadership made Sinhala the official language of the country to the exclusion of other languages. This led to resentment amongst the Tamil community and to decades of conflict which could well have been avoided.

But Sri Lanka was not the only country to suffer from the consequences of a flawed policy. Pakistan did likewise too. Soon after independence, in an attempt to forge a national identity based on language, there was an attempt to impose Urdu on the Bengali population of East Pakistan. This led to an effective Bengali language movement in 1948 to counter this decision, which reached its climax in February 1952 leading to the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. But the forces set in motion eventually led to the creation of a new state, Bangladesh, in less tax two decades.

India too witnessed a similar churning but was fortunate to have come out of it much better. Here too, an attempt was made to have Hindi as a common language for the country. The riots which broke out in the mid-sixties in Madras over the issue forced the government to declare that English would continue to be used till such time as people wanted it.

Many a time, policy decisions are arrived at on an assumption that uniformity is an essential prerequisite for unity. This is a mistaken notion as the planks of nationhood have to be built on different bonds. Understanding the needs of different sections of society is perhaps the greatest bridge to reconciliation and conflict resolution. Today, India’s tribal heartland is seething because of perceived injustices to them and to their way of life, mainly due to state policies, which have not upheld the interests of the tribal people as enshrined in the Constitution. While serious efforts have been underway, particularly over the last decade or so to address tribal concerns, much more needs to be done to bring peace to the entire area.

With respect to Jammu and Kashmir, mention needs to be made of Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution, which are applicable to the state. Many analysts have opined that ‘emotional integration’ of the state with the rest of the country is yet to take place. If that be so, then evidently the policies of the state should be made in a manner that facilitates ‘emotional integration’. However, the inclusion of Article 370 in the Constitution, albeit as a temporary provision, has done more harm than good, as it has strengthened the feelings of separateness, at least in the Muslim majority Kashmir Division of the state. The inclusion of Article 35A in February 1954, further added to this feeling. As Article 35A conferred powers to the State Legislature to define who all constituted the permanent residents of the State and to make special provisions for them, the aspect of emotional integration was further eroded. In addition, rights of other communities such as the displaced persons from West Pakistan who were residing there since independence, the Valmiki and Gurkha communities and certain rights of women were suppressed. It is important that ways and means be found to repeal such Articles which have hindered the total integration of the state with the rest of the country.

Conflict resolution also demands effective justice delivery mechanisms. This is applicable to not just insurgencies such as Left Wing Extremism, but to all forms of social unrest. This is still an area of weakness across India, where the process of litigation effectively denies justice through the state’s incapacity to deliver justice in a time bound manner. Besides reforms in India’s police services, there is a drastic need to reform the entire judicial system.

Editorial in Aakrosh, April 2019.

PLA CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENT OPERATIONS

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China first felt the need to modernise its forces after its experience in the Vietnam War of 1979, which exposed critical weaknesses in command and control mechanisms and in the logistic support required in modern battlefield conditions. The process of modernising the country began with Deng Xiaopong’s ‘Four Modernisations,’—Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology and Defence Forces. While defence modernisation held the fourth place, it was by no means neglected. Between 1985-1995, major changes were instituted in doctrinal and organisational aspects, with stress being laid on indigenous production of weapons and equipment. But it was the Gulf War of 1990-91, which changed Chinese perceptions of how modern wars are fought. The Gulf War was a practical demonstration of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) brought about through the application of high technology. What the Chinese observed here was the devastating impact which information and communication technology had on the battlefield when integrated with precision long range weapon systems. The US forces had integrated satellite and aerial reconnaissance capability and a highly developed Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) system to direct the battle along with highly accurate missile systems and modern mechanised forces with air support to enable application of force with pin point precision. This enabled them to win a decisive victory with minimum losses in just 42 days.

The Chinese military accordingly concluded that modern wars would be fought with greater mobility, speed and offensive power, necessitating smaller forces, with increased battlefield mobility and lethality and with modern C3I systems to achieve battlefield dominance. Another conclusion drawn was that high end military technology can achieve strategic intimidation to achieve strategic goals. In addition, many areas of high technology such as information, biological, microelectronic, laser and infrared technology have important military applications and that military technology is no longer a special field in itself. As technology advanced, the equipment manufactured earlier would achieve obsolescence at a much faster rate; to achieve technological dominance, it would thus be necessary to be ahead of the technology curve. As such, even when new equipment is fielded, it would be necessary to have work ongoing in developing a newer next generation systems to cater for faster obsolescence.

The Chinese military thus enunciated its strategy called Active Defence, which was predicated on the need to fight under what the Chinese termed ‘Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions’, and which was later changed to fighting Local Wars Under Informationalized Conditions. Preparations for conflict were based on the following premises:

• Future wars will be shorter, perhaps lasting only one campaign;
• Will almost certainly not entail the occupation of China, although Chinese political, economic, and military centres are likely to be attacked;
• Will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space, and the application of advanced technology, especially information technology.

In its modernisation programme, the PLA laid emphasis on fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity wars along China’s periphery. This included scenarios for Taiwan, building counters to third-party, including potential U.S. intervention in cross-Strait crises and to conflicts along China’s land borders. Emphasis was laid on space warfare, psychological warfare (called Three Warfares to dictate the strategic terms of the conflict, by influencing domestic opinion, opposition will, and third-party support), Computer Network Operations (to seize the initiative and achieve electromagnetic dominance early in a conflict, and as a force multiplier), Missile Warfare to include both long range and short range ballistic missiles and Cruise Missiles, Air power and Maritime dominance. The modernisation process also included reforming military institutions, promulgating new doctrine for modern warfare and personnel development. China’s modernisation drive was supported by huge financial outlays as a result of which she has today a very capable and effective military with an impressive high-tech arsenal. However, despite China’s military capability, its lack of experience in modern combat was seen as a major liability and a potential disadvantage for the PLA. The PLAs ability to use modern weapons and equipment remains unproven without the test of combat and it is this lacuna which the PLA is now trying to overcome through “intelligentization”. 

In his address to the 19th Party Conference, President Xi Jinping spoke of “…strengthening the military for the new era and the military strategy for new conditions, build a powerful and modernized army, navy, air force, rocket force, and strategic support force, develop strong and efficient joint operations, commanding institutions for theater commands, and create a modern combat system with distinctive Chinese characteristics”. He also stated that China “…will adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution and to national security needs; we will upgrade our military capabilities, and see that, by the year 2020, mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way, and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement. In step with our country’s modernization process, we will modernize our military across the board in terms of theory, organizational structure, service personnel, and weaponry. We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces”.

In translating the vision of the President Xi Jinping in concrete terms, there is evidently a congruence of thought within the PLA of the importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in future military operations. This too was alluded to by Mr Xi Jinping, when in the course of the same address he stated, “…We will develop new combat forces and support forces, conduct military training under combat conditions, strengthen the application of military strength, speed up development of intelligent military, and improve combat capabilities for joint operations based on the network information system and the ability to fight under multi-dimensional conditions. This will enable us to effectively shape our military posture, manage crises, and deter and win wars”.

The concept of an “intelligent military” and “intelligent operations” (zhinenghua zuozhan, 智能化作战) as enunciated by China is still in the evolutionary stage. An article in the official Xinhua state news service has defined intelligent operations thus: “Intelligent operations have AI at their core, and use cutting-edge technologies throughout operational command, equipment, tactics, and other areas… they must be understood by the core concepts of ‘system intelligence is central,’ ‘full use of AppCloud,’ ‘multi-domain integration,’ ‘brain-machine fusion,’ ‘intelligent autonomy,’ and ‘unmanned struggle for mastery'” in the battlefield environment.

What intelligent operations imply is integrating new technologies into combat operations. It also aims to address perceived weaknesses in the Chinese military which pertains to lack of operational experience of its commanders, rigidity in command structures and its ability to fight joint operations.

A tool for enhancing realism in training and to give a feel of actual combat is war gaming and coopting new training techniques and operationalising new technologies, especially AI to its concepts, structures and training. Towards this end, the launch of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (Xinyidai Rengong Zhineng Fazhan Guihua), is significant. This plan seeks to use AI to support the military decision making process, for purposes of simulation and in war-gaming.

Towards this end, in April 2018, the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology  (CALT), convened a tournament called “Decisive Victory”. Here, human players from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University were pitted against an artificial intelligence commander, and reportedly it was the human players who were defeated six to two. Increasingly, PLA commanders will be put through exercises wherein their opponent is a machine. They will be given the opportunity to war game, using all the assets at their command, during which jointmanship too will be practised. AI technologies are increasingly being recognised by China as vital to modernisation of the PLA to enable and enhance a range of future military capabilities. President Xi Jinping has clearly stated that he expects the Chinese military to be of world class by 2050, and AI will be exploited to enhance the complete range of Chinese military capability.

Towards this end, in July 2017, the State Council of China released the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” outlining a strategy to build a domestic AI industry, which would make China a leading AI power by 2030. The expectation is that by 2020, Chinese companies would be at the same level as leading countries like the United States and by 2025, would be in a position to achieve a breakthrough in some select disciplines in AI. This plan also calls for the PRC to “Strengthen the use of new generation AI technologies as a strong support to command decision-making, military deductions (war-gaming and operations research), and defense equipment, among other applications.

The PLA’s apparent progress in the use of AI in war-gaming provides an initial indicator of its attempts to explore new concepts of operations for the dynamics of “intelligent operations”. It also seeks to enhance the acumen and preparedness of its officers and personnel for future warfare. Through integration of AI into wargaming, we see the potential use of AI to train commanders in developing greater skills in developing strategic thinking and command decision making, which, as brought out in the beginning of this article, remains a weakness for the PLA as their leadership has not been tested in combat.

A lot of focus by China, with respect to AI is also on hardware. Here, we are talking about robots, drones, remotely piloted submarines et al, for military use. Development of improved weapon systems using AI along with the use of big data for analytics, the Internet of Things (IOT) and cloud computing, when integrated together could be truly devastating. But this would still be merely an extension of technology, which a commander would be enabled by to achieve battlefield dominance. If such technologies could be integrated into planning for operations and into real time decision making, it could be another step towards the next major revolution in military affairs—Intelligent Operations conducted in real time and leading eventually to what could be termed as “War at the Speed of thought”. We are looking at a potential next wave revolution in military affairs, which can break through as stated by the PLA, traditional time and space limits of cognition, reconstruct the relationships between humans and weaponry and bring about entirely new models of command and control. This is intended to be achieved through gaining complete supremacy over one’s opponents in the cognitive sphere, through superior understanding and awareness of the battle space, and through intelligent unmanned systems to greatly reduce the “observation-judgement-decision-action cycle”.

There is of course the real danger that relying on AI may miss out on the complexities of real operations. The US and NATO forces achieved a quick victory in the Iraq war and later in Afghanistan, but found to their cost that sustaining operations over long periods of time was an entirely different matter. Intelligent operations, as envisaged by the PLA are designed to impact and provide advantage in the cognitive domain, but there are still many imponderables. Will this be enough to eliminate what Clausewitz termed the “fog of war”. Or will it lead to additional complexities, especially as technology can also be used to deceive and the Chinese will not be the only players in the game? How will nuclear issues be addressed? As of now, the threat of conflicts degenerating and spiralling out of control to nuclear warfare, has actually contributed to strategic stability. The ability to know and understand the battle space in the cognitive domain along with the means to disrupt enemy systems and integrating the same with long range precision weapon systems is certainly a force multiplier, but it will come with a fresh set of challenges, many of which perhaps have not yet been considered. Having said that, it is a truism that cognitive advantage is a battle winning factor and AI will be in the forefront to provide the means to achieve the same.

India too needs to move towards futuristic technologies to address the multiple challenges she faces on her land borders, in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and in internal conflicts. But it must always be remembered that such technologies would require to be used with due care and circumspection. Too often, it is not the external enemy but the internal political rival who can become the target and such technologies can lead to monopolising power by shaping opinions and eliminating threats to political power. For the PLA, “intelligent operations are still perhaps a few decades away, but whether they can be a substitute or a panacea for the weakness which the PLA perceives it has, will only be determined over time.

For Scholar warrior, September 2019.