India China Relations: One Year Post Galwan

Tensions between India and China over continued Chinese attempts to encroach into Indian territory in its border with occupied Tibet, both in Eastern Ladakh and in Arunachal Pradesh, have been ongoing now for over a decade, largely due to the fact that China has not ceased creeping forward surreptitiously, in what is commonly referred to as ‘salami slicing’ tactics. Post the ice-breaking trip by India’s then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 to China, and the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Borders of September 1993, the two countries managed to deal with volatile situations without resorting to the use of kinetic force and without the loss of lives. This changed on 15 June 2020 when the Chinese attacked a small party led by the Commanding Officer of 16 Bihar, Colonel B Santosh Babu, which had gone to check whether the Chinese had dismantled a post in Galwan, as agreed upon in the meeting held earlier at the level of the Corps Commanders. While firearms were not used, the Chinese attacked the Indian party with metal spiked clubs and barbed-wire-wrapped rods. Indian troops rushed in reinforcements and in the ongoing clashes over the night, 20 Indian soldiers including Colonel Babu lost their lives, fighting on the narrow ledge. The Chinese, by various accounts lost between 35 and 100 men, but no formal acknowledgement of casualties was forthcoming from the Chinese political and military leadership.

This by itself tells a tale. Writing in ‘The Washington Post’,  Jianli Yang, the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China, said, “Beijing fears that admitting that it had lost troops, that too more in number than its opponent, could lead to major domestic unrest that can even put the regime of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at stake.” After a gap of eight months, in February 2021, China finally admitted it lost four soldiers in the Galwan clash. This was under reporting on a humungous scale, and led to many in the Chinese social media, ridiculing the Chinese claim. This also brought back memories of consistent Pakistan denial of the loss of its troops in Kargil  in 1999, which was equally shameful and condemnable. 

One year down the line after the Galwan clashes, relations between India and China remain frosty. Both sides mobilised their air and ground forces post the clashes and while disengagement has taken place in some areas, deescalation is still a far cry away. Post the Galwan clashes, India put a ban on 267 Chinese Apps on security concerns, with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology giving out a press statement, "Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has issued the order for blocking the access of these apps by users in India based on the comprehensive reports received from Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Center, Ministry of Home Affairs.” 

India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) has stated on multiple occasions that relations between the two countries cannot be separated from happenings on the border. As recently as on 20 May 2021, in an event hosted by the Financial Times and the Indian Express, the EAM said that India’s relations with China are at a crossroads, and that the future trajectory of ties will depend on whether Beijing will adhere to pacts aimed at ensuring peace on the border. This insistence by India of linking the normalisation of trade, economic and other ties with China with peace and tranquility on the border marks a major shift in Indian policy, and is at stark variance with Chinese attempts to delink the two. 

Chinese intransigence has much to do with increasing Chinese nervousness with the Indian growth story, India’s refusal to join up with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s closeness with the US. The Quad is viewed with great concern by Beijing, despite the fact that it has yet to form a charter and as of now, it is not a security grouping. But it is the potential of the Quad to derail Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea and in the wider Indo-pacific that is a matter of great concern to China. 

India’s push back against China in Eastern Ladakh has greatly disconcerted Beijing, which had not anticipated such a firm response. China had hoped that its threat of the use of force would force New Delhi to adopt a more conciliatory tone, especially as India was battling with the Covid-19 pandemic, which had spread from a virus which originated in Wuhan in China. As the Indian political and military leadership held firm, China was not willing to escalate to a limited level conflict, as failure to win would have impacted on the credibility of the CCP leadership. A quick victory in a limited conflict would require air dominance over the Tibetan plateau, which as of now the PLAAF does not possess. India would do well to ensure an edge in air capability over Tibetan air space to deter China.

Sino-Indian relations are unlikely to improve in the near to medium term as Chinese aims and objectives are not restricted to mere grabbing of territory along the Indo-Tibetan border but extend to achieving control over the entire Himalayan massif, which would give them control over the waters which flow into South Asia. While a conflict at this point of time between Indian and China appears unlikely, the probability of such an occurrence in the next decade or so appears high. India would have to prepare accordingly, especially in terms of building adequate infrastructure in all its areas of interest, enhancing its capability in the C4I2 domain, countering Chinese missile capability and in maintaining a credible air deterrence.

There is also a need to look Southwards towards the Oceans, where credible deterrence can be imposed on China on select choke points. India would have to invest more in sea capability and strengthen its naval arm accordingly. Greater focus would also be required on improving India’s defence industrial base, especially in terms of cutting edge technologies. Finally, on the political and diplomatic front, India would have to lead in strengthening the Quad and in countering Chinese moves in the area. Peace with China can only come about if India remains strong and vigilant, ready to impose costs on Chinese intransigence. India must prepare accordingly.

Published in Chintan: 18 June 2021

BOOK REVIEW: BENGAL AND ITS PARTITION by Bhaswati Mukherjee

The partition of Bengal on communal lines was carried out by the British for the first time in 1905. This was rescinded six years later, but the communal divide created could not be bridged and resulted in a second partition in 1947. Who can better understand the pain of partition than those who were uprooted from their homes, where their ancestors had lived for millennia. This book tells the story of the tragic events that unfolded in Bengal since the dawn of the eighteenth century till the partition of India in 1947. 

Bhaswati Mukerji is a former diplomat. More importantly, her family, who had strong roots in what is now Bangladesh, were the victims of the unfolding events. She tells the story devoid of rancour and bitterness, the narrative finally coming out as a brilliantly researched and eminently readable book, factual and cogent, clinically precise, and written in a manner that makes history come alive. 

The Battle of Plassey and the subsequent sale of Bengal marked a turning point in India’s destiny, setting the stage for the ultimate conquest of India. This epochal  battle was fought and decided on one fateful day—23 June 1757. During the course of the battle, Mir Jaffar, a General in the army of Siraj-ud-Daulah, who had been bought over by the British, moved away from the battlefield with his 16,000 men at a critical juncture, which facilitated the subsequent British victory. Mir Jaffar’s name is associated with treachery till the present time, but his deceit was not the only factor which led to a decisive British victory.

The army of Robert Clive had just 3000 men as opposed to the 50,000 of Siraj-ud-Daulah. Clive had 10 artillery pieces to the 57 held by Siraj-ud-Daulah, all manned by well trained French personnel. So, despite Mir Jaffar’s treachery, the odds were still heavily stacked in favour of Siraj-ud-Daulah. But the nawab panicked and fled the  battlefield, a monumental blunder as his presence could have rallied his men and resulted in victory. His cowardice was comparable to the treachery of Mir Jaffar. The Battle of Buxar, fought on 22 October 1764, once again was won by the troops of the East India Company, despite being heavily outnumbered. Good battlefield leadership is a prime war-winning factor, as relevant today as it was in the mid eighteenth century. This is a lesson we must never forget.

The decline of Bengal started with the defeat at Plassey. It did not take even a decade thereafter for the East India Company to cement its position through vast swathes of India. Post the Treaty of Allahabad, signed on 12 August 1765, the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam II was in effect a mere puppet in the hands of the British. Paradoxically, it was these epochal events which gave birth to the idea of freedom and resulted in the first war of Independence in 1857. Virtually the entire Bengal Army which had a strength of about 1,35,000 native soldiers revolted and while the uprising was eventually put down, it spelt the death knell of the East India Company, with India coming directly under the British Crown.

To maintain its hold over India, the British Indian Army was overhauled, the concept of a martial race was developed and the army was divided on caste and religious lines. ‘Divide et impera,’ the motto of the old Roman empire, meaning divide and rule was to become the motto of the British Empire in India, heralding changes at the political, military and administrative level. In Bengal, as indeed the rest of the country, the education curriculum was fashioned to create for the British rulers a class of Indians, who would best subserve the colonial interest. They created a middle class and a bureaucracy, convinced of the inferiority of its own culture and the superiority of western systems and thought. Sadly, that mindset still pervades a section of India’s bureaucracy and intelligentsia till date.

This period also saw the revival of Wahabism amongst the Bengali Muslims and the British were quick to exploit the religious divide emerging in the Bengali population. While language and culture remained the binding adhesive within Bengali Hindus and Muslims, fissures on religious lines started to appear and led to the first partition of Bengal in 1905, based on communal lines. This was rescinded six years later in 1911, in response to the protests launched by the Swadeshi movement. But the divisive process had been set in motion and got a fillip with the communal award of 1932. The Muslim political leadership increasingly utilised the mullah and the mosque to establish contact with their electorate, further exacerbating the fissures created by communal disharmony. The seeds of division thus sown were destined to grow in malignancy, culminating in the great Calcutta killings of 1946, in which over 10,000 Hindus and Muslims were slaughtered and over 15,000 suffered grievous injuries. Suhrawardy, who is considered a hero in Bangladesh, was responsible for inciting his muslim compatriots to the path of violence. The polarisation on communal lines which had taken place in Bengal, led to the horrendous slaughter, rape and mass conversion of Hindus in Noakhali district, a predominantly Muslim area in Chiitagong Division in November 1946. The partition of Bengal in 1947 was thus a foregone conclusion.

What of the future? Can books like this help assuage the hurts of the past? Burying the truth, as many in India are inclined to do, is hardly a remedy for healing past wounds and is akin to an ostrich burying its head in the sand. For nearly a millennia, foreigners ruled over India, but the spirit and soul of India could never be vanquished. Enslavement of a people requires obliterating their roots—changing their culture, their language and their religion. India, for the most part remained resilient and held on to what was most sacred in its identity as a people. That is why history is important: to give us a sense of who we are, what we have become and where do we go from here. 

This book is an important addition to the historical works that are already available on the subject. More importantly, the book is a pointer on how history needs to be written—factual and concise, analytical and precise, it grips the attention of the reader from the very first page. Affordably priced, it is a book which should be read by people of all ages from high school onwards, to include teachers, historians and the lay public.

Review published in the Sunday Guardian, 18 April 2021

 

 

 

Pakistan’s Peace Overtures: Tread with Caution

In a discussion between the DGMOs (Director General of Military Operations) of India and Pakistan, over their established telephone hotline, which presumably took place on 22 February 2021, a ceasefire was agreed to between the two countries, effective from midnight 24-25 February 2021. A joint communique issued by the two sides stated…“In the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders, the two DGMOs agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have the propensity to disturb the peace and lead to violence”. The wording had just the right amount of ambiguity to mean different things to different people, but for India, it is hoped that it reflects the change in attitude by the present government, which has made it clear that the only outstanding issue with Pakistan is its sponsorship of terror and its illegal occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan and Mirpur-Muzaffarabad.

An event of this magnitude was well beyond the pay scale of the two Generals concerned, so obviously, the top leadership of both countries would have been in the loop. The Pakistan National Security Advisor, Mr Moeed Yusuf, in a tweet denied any back-channel diplomacy between him and Indian National Security Advisor, Shri Ajit Doval for the ceasefire announcement, describing such reports as “baseless”. In an audio statement issued to journalists in Islamabad, he stated that the agreement on the ceasefire was the outcome of “behind-the-scenes” contacts and “more roads will open” in the future. He however did not elaborate on the nature of these contacts.

On 18 March 2021, Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Qamar Bajwa, in his address at the second day of the Islamabad Security Dialogue, made a strong pitch for peace with India stating, “…we feel that it is time to bury the past and move forward”. In his inaugural address on the opening day of the Dialogue, Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan Niazi called for establishing ‘civilised neighbours’ like relations with India and resolving the outstanding disputes through dialogue. This was in sharp contrast to the shrill statements made over the last two years by Niazi and members of his cabinet against Prime Minister Modi and India. This gives rise to the question: Is there a change of heart in the Pakistani establishment, or is this mere tactical posturing?

Let us first address the issue of whether there has been a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. On the positive side, since February 25, when the ceasefire once again came into effect, there have been no instances of cross border firing along the Line of Control (LoC), nor has any case been reported of cross border infiltration by terrorist groups from Pakistan. A meeting of the Indus Water Treaty Commissioners is also on the anvil after a hiatus of two years which is all to the good. But beyond that, nothing much seems to have changed within the Pakistani political and security establishment. Pakistan has not abandoned its policy of using terrorism as an instrument of statecraft, and it continues to maintain and support terrorist groups within its soil, for use as its strategic assets.

Given the above, it is surprising that some analysts are waxing eloquently on the ‘thaw’ that has taken place in the frosty relations between the two countries. In a surreal manner, they believe that  a love-fest is in the air and that soon, diplomatic relations would be restored, summit meetings would take place and there would be much greater people to people contact. This may be what Pakistan is hoping for, but it  is not something which the Indian leadership will blindly rush into, unless Pakistan shows visible and credible evidence that it has closed its terror camps and hands over to India for trial, those terrorist leaders it shelters, who have carried out terror attacks on Indian soil.

There is no gainsaying the fact that peace would give welcome dividends to both countries. But desirable outcomes are often held hostage to vested interests within Pakistan—in this case, the Pakistan army. Peace with India will erode the very raison d’etre of the Pakistan army and its role in controlling the levers of power within Pakistan. They will not allow that to happen. Dismantling the terror structure network within Pakistan, created as strategic assets, will cause serious blowback, with a high degree of possibility that such groups may then  turn against the Pakistani state itself. This becomes all the more plausible, seeing the manner in which Pakistani society has been radicalised over the last four to five decades and has been fed a continuous and viral hate-India diet. It would be delusional to expect a common Pakistani, who believes that killing the ‘kafir’ is a duty enjoined on him by his religion, to suddenly develop a love for India. That remains the preserve of a very small minority in Pakistan, who still retain rational thought.

Why then, this charade of peace? Three reasons are apparent. One, Pakistan is in an unholy mess as far as its economy is concerned, and is on course to becoming a failed state. Peace with India would give the country’s leadership a better chance to pull their economy out of the rut. Two, Pakistan stands isolated on the world stage as a sponsor of terror, and besides China and a handful of other countries finds no takers for its cause. They have been placed on the grey list by the FATF and while they have evaded being placed on the black list, they are keen to come out of the grey list, which too has economic consequences. Three, the Pakistan Army is finally having to bear the consequences of its actions in promoting terror within India due to the firm response by the Indian Armed Forces. It is gradually coming to the conclusion that bearing such cost over a long period of time, especially with an unstable Afghanistan on its western flank, is unsustainable. 

What we are witnessing is a tactical pause by Pakistan, the peace-offering being a mere charade—no better than a poisoned chalice. Pakistan’s past performance does not enthuse us with any hope that this time around, peace will be the outcome. While past performance cannot with certitude be a measure of future response patterns, in the case of Pakistan, whose society has been overtly radicalised, and whose military holds the levers of power regardless of which political party within Pakistan forms the government, Pakistan’s future response can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty. India, while being open to the peace overture, needs to tread cautiously. There must be no change in the government’s stance, that talks and terror cannot go hand in hand. Pakistan will have to close its terror factory and hand over all wanted terrorists to India, if it truly desires peace. As such an outcome is unlikely, peace will remain a chimera.

Published in Chintan: 26 March 2021

Talk at CENJOWS Seminar - 9 March 2021

 Thank you Gen Srivastava, for giving me this platform to share some of my thoughts with this very distinguished audience on the CPEC, Gwadar and Balochistan - the game plan.

We have seen the freedom movement in Balochistan play out since 1948, albeit with different levels of repression by the Pakistani state. But what we are seeing now is perhaps one of the most vicious elements of suppression of a people by the security forces of Pakistan. It would be worth dwelling why this is happening and how the future is likely to unfold.

Let me begin with a small anecdote. On 19 October 1977, the Corps of Engineers set off on a historic boat voyage in a small sailing boat, the Albatross, from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas in Iran. The crew of three halted at Karachi and from there sailed along the Makran coast to Iran. They crossed Gwadar by night and were surprised that hardly any lights were visible, though so much had been heard about its strategic importance. The complete lack of fishing activity along the long coastline also mystified them.

The truth of the matter really was that Gwadar remained undeveloped for a very long time till President Pervez Musharraf approached the Chinese in 2001 and they got on board to build the deep sea port. Pakistani fears were amplified after the Kargil War, and they wanted a second port in case Karachi was blockaded by India. 

The first phase of the port was completed in 2007 after a delay of three years, but the movement of cargo was limited, Karachi remaining the main port for trade purposes. Things changed dramatically post 2015, when Xi Jinping launched his Belt and Road Initiative of which the China Pakistan Economic Corridor was the crowning jewel.

The CPEC is not really a commercial concern. Nor is the route likely to be used an alternate energy supply route in case of closure of the Malacca Straits. The reasons for the CPEC have more to do with GeoPolitics rather than Geo Economics. China’s objective has perhaps more to do with its desire to establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean Region, to balance India - what some call geo strategic balancing. Chinese presence in Gwadar also gives them access to the nearby Strait of Hormuz as a point of influence. In any case, if Malacca is closed, the Chinese can move further south to the Sunda and Lombok passageways, though at a slightly higher cost. The Gwadar project is hence for the Chinese military. It is estimated that half a million Chinese professionals will be settled in Gwadar by the end of 2022, and that Gwadar will be used as military base. This has caused great concern to the local Baloch, who fear becoming a minority in their own homeland. 

There are also Chinese concerns regarding their investment in the CPEC, as it passes through Gilgit Baltistan which is Indian territory, illegally occupied by Pakistan. Post the revocation of the provisions of Article 370 and splitting the state into two union territories, the Chinese concern over the future of CPEC has been heightened. The announcement by Pakistan on 1 November 2020, to grant Gilgit Baltistan the status of a full province has perhaps been done under Chinese prodding, to protect their commercial interests. Post the elections held in the same month, and which were won by the ruling PTI, there is the possibility that the region may be declared as the fifth province of Pakistan. What impact this will have on Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir remain to be seen but the Chinese are hoping that it will lead to a permanent settlement of the border dispute between India and Pakistan, and this will secure their commercial interests.

Finally we have Chinese fears about the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, who are fighting for an independent East Turkestan. This is the occupied region of Xinjiang, which the Chinese are ruling by brute force. The activities of the ETIM have merged with that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, making the situation more volatile for the Chinese. Allied with this is the future of Afghanistan, in the event of a total US withdrawal from the region. This could well plunge Afghanistan into instability, with consequences for all other countries in the region.

In this backdrop, I will now give my assessment on certain scenarios that may play out.

Let me start with the possible future of Balochistan. The likelihood of the Baloch people getting independence appears bleak. The situation cannot be compared to what happened in Bangladesh in 1971. For starters, Bangladesh or the then East Pakistan was totally surrounded by India, and the battlefield was isolated. This hampered the actions of the Pakistan military, but was conducive for the operations carried out by the Mukti Bahini and later, by the Indian Armed Forces. The population of Bangladesh was more than the population of then West Pakistan, and suppressing a people’s movement of such proportions was a virtual impossibility for the Pakistan army.

Balochistan has a small population - about 1.2 crore, which is about 5  percent of the total population of Pakistan. However, it comprises about  40 percent of the area of Pakistan. The Baloch is 52 percent of the population, with the Pashtuns accounting for 36% and others the remaining 12%. With these statistics, it appears a virtual impossibility for Balochistan to become an independent entity, unless there is external aid. 

Here, geopolitics comes into play. The two foreign neighbours of Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. Iran has a restive Baloch population in its Sistan-Balochistan province and will not fan the flames of independence in Balochistan. Similarly, Afghanistan has a large Baloch population bordering Balochistan and it will do nothing to fan the flames of Baloch separatism for its own interests. India does not have a land border, so can de precious little to assist the people in their just demands.  

On the flip side, however, the Pakistan military will be unable to regain total control of the area, precisely for the same reasons. Insurgency in Balochistan will hence continue unabated in the region, with varying levels of violence.

CPEC will remain disturbed and will require protection. As of now, over 30,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in its protection and this level of commitment will only increase in the days to come. The economic miracle that Pakistan is hoping for from the CPEC is not likely to materialise, considering the volatile security situation that prevails over much of Pakistan. Added to that is the bleak economic situation of Pakistan, which is worsening by the day. High inflation, coupled with low growth, increasing joblessness and an ever growing population adds to the cocktail of poor governance within the country.

Gwadar, in my view, will at some point of time, be taken over by the Chinese, who will use it as a naval base. Such a scenario, to my mind is at least a decade in the horizon and things may change by then. But the Indian security establishment needs to factor in growing Chinese presence in the area and build its naval assets accordingly. 

What can change the above hypothesis is an implosion within the Pakistan military or a rapprochement taking place between India and Pakistan on the one hand and the warring Afghan groups on the other. An India-Pak rapprochement does not suit the Pakistan military narrative as their place in the Pakistani governance structures will come under question. In Afghanistan, the Taliban will not settle for anything less than total control over the country and the present establishment will not be willing to meekly surrender. So the possibility of a civil war looms large in the country. But stranger events have taken place, so peace, though unlikely, is not an outcome that can be ruled out. 

The Pakistan military can implode, if the levels of radicalisation within the rank and file cross the tipping point. As of now, the Pakistan military is stable, but an implosion within the military could have possible fallouts in the further bifurcation of the country. A possible scenario could be a tie up between Sindh and Balochistan for an independent state. Together, it is a viable proposition. 

The options for India remain limited. Whatever commitment the Govt of India gives to the people of Balochistan must be on a long tern basis and should be sustainable. It should continue to support an Afghan peace process which is Afghan owned and Afghan led. And it should concentrate on increasing its economic and military might, to remain a relevant player in future. 

Thank you. Jai Bharat, Jai Hind

 

 

Valour, Courage and Righteous Conduct: The Sine Qua Non of the Indian Army

When India became independent in 1947, Gandhi’s charisma and his philosophy of Ahimsa (non-violence), which had been imbibed by the Congress Party which assumed power, led some people in authority to believe that India would no longer need an army to defend herself. That bit of myopic wishful thinking ended almost as soon as it had begun, for soon after Independence, India was plunged into its first war with Pakistan, when the Pakistan army, in the guise of armed raiders attacked Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947. That was the first call to duty for the Army in the newly independent India and the men in olive greens came out with flying colours in heroically saving the Valley and pushing back the Pakistani forces to roughly the positions held today by both countries and now called the Line of Control.

Besides fighting the war, the army also escorted convoys of fleeing Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India. Many soldiers laid down their lives in protecting their brethren from imminent death at the hands of the marauding Muslim mobs in Pakistan. The escorts were small groups, sometimes just 20 to 30 men, but they unflinchingly faced the marauders who were in the thousands and executed what can only be described as the most incredible evacuation in strife torn areas. And in all this, their personal conduct was unimpeachable.

When the first Indo-Pak war was fought in 1947-48, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army was General Sir Robert Lockhart who served from 15 July 1947 till the end of the year. He was relieved by another British officer, General Sir Roy Bucher, who in turn served for just over a year and handed over the reins of the Indian Army to Lt Gen KM Cariappa, on 15 January 1949. General Cariappa thus became the first Indian Chief of the Indian Army and to mark this momentous occasion, 15 January is celebrated every year as Army Day. Over the years, the military leadership has honed the Indian Army into a force capable of tackling internal and external threats, out of area contingencies, natural disasters and calamities and in providing aid to the civil authority, when called upon to do so.

In valour, the Indian soldier is second to none—an inheritance from ancient times. In 326 BCE, Alexander, one of the greatest conquerors of all times, after vanquishing the mighty Persian Empire, set his eyes on conquering India. But at the banks of the river Jhelum, he met with the steely resolve of Porus, a minor Indian King, who stopped the mighty emperor in his tracks. That resolve of steel is till aglow in todays Indian Army, which rightly is held in high esteem across the world. But along with courage and valour, the Indian Army is known for its righteous conduct—a tradition carried over from the time of the Ramayana and Mahabharata.

Be it the four wars which India has fought—three with Pakistan and one with China, or its continuous engagement in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism (CICT) operations, both within and beyond India’s frontiers, or even the numerous United Nations peace keeping missions that the Army has been engaged in, the conduct of the Indian Army has only drawn applause and acclaim across the world. Writing on this aspect of the Indian Army after the Liberation War of 1971, the well-known Pulitzer winning journalist, Sydney Schanberg, commented in the New York Times, that “I never saw them do a thing wrong not even when they saw just how bestial the enemy had been.” That one line sums up the high ethical standards of the Indian Army, despite grave provocation by some of its adversaries. 

While operating in Sri Lanka in Operation Pawan, the local population reposed total faith and trust in the Indian Army. I had the privilege to serve with my unit for two years conducting CICT operations, and at all times, the Indian troops deployed in Sri Lanka retained the trust of the local Tamil and Sinhala population as well as of the Sri Lankan Government and security forces—A commendable achievement indeed. Is it any surprise then, that despite continuous operations in J&K over the last three decades, the Army is held in the highest esteem amongst the local population in the Union Territory of J&K. The same can be said of the Army’s operations in the Punjab, and in North East India. Its reputation in the various UN peace-keeping missions it has been engaged in is unmatched and speaks volumes of the Indian soldier.

The Army of today is in many ways different from the Army of yesteryears. It has better firepower and mobility and is well equipped to handle the modern battlefield, especially in terms of communications and battlefield transparency. But what has not changed is its core characteristics of valour and courage, along with a high sense of moral purpose. 

Today, as the nation celebrates the Army Day, the Indian Army continues to maintain vigil on the borders with both its hostile neighbours, in extremely difficult terrain and weather conditions. The external threats are menacing with perpetual Chinese provocation in Eastern Ladakh and  a hostile and belligerent Pakistan not letting up in its proxy terror war against India. But the nation is at peace, because they have their Army to defend them. An Army with a tradition of valour and a very strong moral compass. That is what makes the Indian Army a truly remarkable and unbeatable force.

Chintan - 15 Jan 2021

Modernising the Military within Budgetary Constraint

IntroductionIndia’s defence budget has generally been in the range of 2 to 3 percent of its GDP. This includes the expenditure on pensions. Since 2009, defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has shown a decline (Figure 1). In terms of actual expenditure, however, there has been a year on year increase in the defence budget, as indicated by the graph (Figure 2). While the increase in defence expenditure over the ten year period 2009-2019 has doubled, in real terms it only reflects a marginal increase when inflation is taken into account.  

Figure 1

Figure 2

India’s military modernisation has not kept pace with the requirements of the force, largely due to budgetary constraints. To make up for decades of neglect in a short time frame is a Herculean task, especially as additional budgetary support is unlikely to be made available. There is a view in defence circles, more so in think tanks,  that the defence expenditure should be increased to a minimum of four percent of the GDP for at least one decade, to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces, but that outcome is unlikely to come about. The expenditure on defence, as a percentage of the total Union Budget is about 15 percent, and any further increase can only be at the cost of other sectors, which are equally vital for the welfare of the country. Either other means would have to be found to augment the budget or ways and means have to be found to optimise what is available.

With limits on what can be spent on defence, we need to look at optimising efficiencies. A great deal can be achieved through a radically different approach to the indigenisation effort, better and faster decision making for defence acquisitions, and through revitalising defence manufacturing, both in the public and private sector.

Indigenisation

Technology is an enabler, and this is one field where India has to push hardest. As of now, India is behind the technological curve in many defence related fields, and has to play the catch up game. A dual approach is required. One, getting to world standards in existing technologies and two, getting on board, as far as future technologies are concerned.

India’s space programme is a success story and this needs to be replicated in other sectors. The Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), also called NavIC, (Acronym for Navigation with Indian Constellation) is now operational and has been recognised as a component of the World-Wide Radio Navigation System (WWRNS) by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). NavIC covers India and an area 1500 kms around it and provides accurate real-time positioning and timing services. This has both military and civil applications. The US Congress formally acknowledged India’s NavIC global navigation satellite system (GNSS) to be an “allied system” in its finalised 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The US military and government users can now utilise NavIC along with the US Global Positioning System (GPS), QZSS, and Galileo. Presumably, it will also allow similar privileges for India’s military and government to formally utilise GPS. The advantages are huge. More importantly, the commercial applications are immense, which can offset the cost of the establishment, and over time become a profitable venture. Niche technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics , must hence be modelled on the lines of ISRO.

Another success story is in missile development. India has developed a range of strategic and conventional missiles, under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, which began in the 1980s. Despite being put under sanctions in 1989 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which led to the denial of certain technologies, India successfully developed indigenously all the restricted components denied to it by the MTCR. While certain missiles are still being imported by India, like the Russian, French and Israeli BVRAAMS (Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missiles), these will soon be replaced by missiles made in India like the Astra, which is already fitted on the Su 30 Mk 1 aircraft and are now being tested on the Tejas. With export curbs on weapons and platforms being eased, India hopefully will start exporting advanced weapon systems like Tejas, helicopters and missiles, to achieve the target set by the Prime Minister of weapons exports of USD 5 billion by 2025. To this can be added small arms which have a wide market. Export of the recently inducted Joint Venture Protective Carbine (JVPC), which is now being introduced into service could be considered.

Decision Making

Decision making on defence deals in India has been slow and tardy which has exponentially raised the cost of military equipment and delayed acquisition of critical systems. The saga of the Rafale fighter aircraft is a case in point, wherein after years of effort, the deal was scrapped at the last moment in 2014. Later, it was left to Prime Minister Modi to make an executive decision to buy 36 aircraft off the shelf, as a strategic imperative. Time delays and cost overruns have cost the nation dearly, both in terms of operational capability as well as financial outflows. Unfortunately, the Rafale case is not an exception, but rather the norm in defence acquisitions.

In the Army’s modernisation process, the artillery is finally looking up. But here too, we have seen many twists and turns which have led to exponential increase in costs and impacted on operational capability. The Bofors scam saw the supplying Swedish firm being blacklisted in India. But the gun itself was an excellent piece of equipment which later proved its worth in the Kargil War. India had paid for the technology transfer and had the blueprints to manufacture the gun, but failed to do so. It took three decades before the Army got to acquiring the next gun for the artillery—the M777 Howitzer from the US. This was folly of the highest order. Had we manufactured the gun in the 1980s itself, it would have hastened the modernisation of the artillery by at least two decades at a much lower cost. We must not repeat such follies again. The manufacture of an advanced version of the gun, called Dhanush is only now under production and the Army has placed an order for 114 guns.

The army’s search for a 155 x 52 mm Towed Howitzer finally culminated a decade back in two vendors vying for the same. Israels’ Elbit for its ATHOS 2052 howitzer and the French Nexter, for its Trajan gun. Elbit was in partnership with Bharat Forge and Nexter with Larsen and Toubro. In 2019, Elbit won the contract. But in the meantime, DRDO had also got in the act and made the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), which is currently under the last stages of trials and has 95 percent indigenous content. For manufacture of ATAGS, the DRDO is partnering with Bharat Forge Limited, Mahindra Defence Naval System and Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division.

There appears to be a lot of confusion in the thought process, both in the artillery directorate and in the MoD, over the way ahead. We have two guns now, the indigenous ATAGS being priced at Rs 15 crore and the ATHOS at 10.5 crore, with Bharat Forge a partner in both. Faster decision making would have resulted in India already having a few hundred howitzers from Elbit, and the indigenous manufacture of the same could have started by now. This is one area which needs great reform. A time bound acquisition procedure is an imperative and we need to build the eco-system for the same.

The second is the productivity factor of the public sector work force. While it is appreciated that certain costs must have been sunk in by DRDO in research and development of ATAGS, it cannot lead to such a wide price differential. The same occurred also in the Rafale fighter aircraft deal, wherein the fighter jets to be manufactured in India were projected at a higher cost than the ones bought in full built condition from Dassault. The figure below gives a comparison carried out ten years ago between a private sector company (Ashok Leyland) and a public sector company (Vehicle Factory Jabalpur) in terms of cost and worker productivity. The situation across the board is not too dissimilar, and calls for great reforms in the public sector entities and in the working of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB).

Indicator	VFJ	AL	VFJ	AL
	2008-2009	2008-2009	2009-2010	2009-2010
No of Employees	4809	11938	4368	13,662
Output per Employee	0.15	0.49	0.17	0.50
Per unit cost of Employee	3.83	1.04	4.79	1.04

An Acquisition Methodology

A look into advanced weapon systems and platforms acquired recently or which are in the process of being acquired indicates that huge budgetary support is required for the same. The S 400 deal with Russia comes at a cost of Rs 40,000 crore. The deal for 36 Rafale fighter jets from France cost India Rs 59,000 and weapon acquisitions from the US, largely for attack helicopters, strategic lift aircraft and artillery guns also came at a heavy price. Add to this the acquisition of missiles and other weaponry from Israel and the overall cost of defence imports gives a very grim picture. Reversing this trend will take time but that would depend on developing indigenous manufacturing capability in multiple sectors.  

It would be worth considering buying into technology for creating an eco-system which at present does not exist. An example is in the aviation sector. Brazil’s Embraer was up for sale and Boeing was in talks with them for the last two years for purchase of 70 percent shares of the entity for USD 4.2 billion. The deal however fell through in April 2020. What happens if India was to get into such a deal and buy out the Embraer which manufactures single aisle aircraft. As of now, Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL), a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), is the only major entity in the country in the aviation sector. For the aviation industry to come of age in India, the country needs to build its own passenger aircraft. So, if an Indian corporate acquires Embraer, backed by the government, it would give a huge boost to the aviation sector. Government support would be required to make it a leveraged buyout (LBO), enabling the banks to be the lenders for the deal. By 2040, India would need at least 2,300 such aircraft, at a cost of USD 320 billion. Indigenous manufacture would create tremendous economic opportunities as well as an indigenous eco-system as also provide strategic benefits. Starting from scratch to build such aircraft would take decades of effort and would mean diverting precious resources to the effort. LBO’s is an option India must seriously consider. We would need to change our operating methodology to execute such deals which can give great payoffs over a period of time. Buy outs can be considered for other sectors too, like semiconductor manufacturing. This involves front-end fab manufacturing and the back-end assembly, including packaging and testing. India has done well in design and verification for the semiconductor industry. However, it continues to import 100% of the chips, memory and display. The cost of imports of semiconductor chips alone is a staggering USD 10-12 billion every year.

Conclusion

While financial outlays are important, much can be achieved in military modernisation though improved acquisition procedures, informed decision making, improved productivity of the public sector work force, co-opting the private sector in a big way in the manufacturing process and by creating a business friendly eco-system. We also need to shed our ideological chains with respect to exports of weapons and platforms. Thankfully, this process has begun. Most importantly, we need to have a clear vision of the future and plan accordingly. Much can still be achieved with what we have, should we set our minds to do so.

The Blue in India’s Flag

India’s Flag is oft called the Tricolour, for its three horizontal stripes in colours of saffron, white and green. But what is often missed is the fourth colour in the flag—the blue wheel in the centre. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made reference to this, in an address he delivered at the commissioning of the ‘Barracuda’ in Mauritius on 12 March 2015. Referring to the blue wheel, he said, “To me, the blue chakra or wheel in India’s flag represents the potential of the blue revolution, or the ocean economy”.

The Barracuda—a 1,300-tonne offshore patrol vessel (OPV) built by Garden Reach Shipyard & Engineers (GRSE), was the first warship ordered by a foreign country from an Indian shipyard. In his address at the commissioning of the ‘Barracuda,’ Prime Minister Modi sketched out India’s vision of the Indian Ocean. He spoke of the criticality of the Indian Ocean to the future of the world, and stated that all would prosper when the seas were safe, secure and free for all. The vision he articulated contained five key elements. These were:

• India will do everything to safeguard its mainland and islands and defend its interests. Equally, India will work to ensure a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region.
• India will deepen economic and security cooperation with her friends in the region, especially her maritime neighbours and island states and will  continue to build their maritime security capacities and economic strength.
• Deepen mutual understanding on maritime challenges and strengthen our collective ability to address them through regional mechanisms for maritime cooperation.
• Seek a more integrated and cooperative future in the region that enhances the prospects for sustainable development for all.
• The primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean rests on those who live in the region. However, India recognises the fact that there are other nations around the world with strong interests and stakes in the region and India is deeply engaged with them.

From the above, emerged the acronym SAGAR or Security and Growth for All in the Region, which has become the fulcrum of India’s vision in the Indian Ocean and in the wider Indo-Pacific region. It is a tool for India’s development, and towards that end, this shared marine space would need to be protected. In a sense, this represents a transition in the Indian thought process, which for long has thought of itself as a continental power, but now also sees itself through a maritime lens.

Indian history records a long maritime tradition, covering a period of over five millennia. As far back as 2500 BCE, the Harappans built tidal docks at Lothal for berthing and servicing ships, and were perhaps the first in the world to do so. India’s strong naval tradition finds reference in her sacred scriptures, as also in Kautilya’s Arthashastra and in other texts. The Chola empire saw the zenith of ancient Indian sea power, but with the decline of the Cholas towards the end of the 13th century, Indian sea power declined. The Arabs gradually edged out the Indians from the sea faring trade and were themselves sidelined when the Portuguese came on the scene and assumed control of the seas in the early sixteenth century. There was a brief period which saw the resurgence of Indian sea power with the rise of the Marathas. Maharaja Shivaji had started creating his own navy, which reached the zenith of its power under the command of notable admirals like Sidhoji Gujar and Kanhoji Angre. But with the death of Angre, Maratha naval power declined.

An interesting aspect to be noted is the co-relation of India’s economic prosperity and its control of the seas. As India lost control of the seas, external forces entered to rule over the land, which in turn led to India’s economic decline. Post independence, the Indian security establishment had its focus on the land borders, as India had inimical neighbours. But now, maritime trade is becoming a key indicator in India’s growth story. And hence the need for a vibrant Ocean policy, emphasising the need to keep the sea lanes free, safe and secure for all.

Soon after assuming office for the second term in May 2019, the Narendra Modi-led government set a target of taking the economy to USD 5 trillion over the next five years. This was a daunting and an ambitious undertaking, but given that the fundamentals of the economy were strong, it was not something which could not be achieved. The pandemic caused by Covid 19, a virus that emanated from China, will certainly delay the timelines by perhaps another three to four years, so we could be looking at 2028 to achieve the laid down target. But a more important point to note is that to achieve the target, greater dependence has to be on the blue economy, which conceptualises the oceans as “shared development spaces”.

The World Bank has defined Blue Economy as the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihood and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health”. India’s development effort will increasingly be dependent on the Blue Economy and the Oceanic space thus becomes vital for India. According to the Ministry of Shipping, around 95% of India's trading by volume and 70% by value is done through maritime transport. India’s Sagarmala programme is designed to promote port-led development in the country through harnessing India's 7,500 km long coastline, 14,500 km of potentially navigable waterways and strategic location on key international maritime trade routes. A total of 189 projects have been identified for modernisation of ports involving an investment of Rs 1.42 trillion (USD 22 billion) by the year 2035. Peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is hence a key requirement for India’s development agenda.

Growing Chinese naval and air power in the South China Sea and its expansionist designs in the region, have understandably raised concerns, not only amongst the ASEAN countries, but also among other regional powers, primarily the US, Japan, Australia and India. China’s ‘nine dash line’ is being unilaterally imposed on China’s smaller neighbours, in utter disregard to the UN Conventions. Evidently, there is a need to push back against Chinese expansionism and towards a rule based order. 

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, popularly called the Quad—an informal strategic forum between the United States, Japan, Australia and India, is at present being maintained by semi-regular summits, information exchanges and military drills between member countries. There is a need to formalise the Quad and make it agenda and rule based, to prevent Chinese hegemony in the region. This would encourage some if not all the ASEAN countries to join the grouping, which will likely also see the United Kingdom, France and some other European nations coming in. 

A united effort is required to check Chinese expansionism, especially as the UN appears to be singularly ineffective in this regard. India must play a leading role towards that end, confronted as she is by Chinese hegemonist attitudes in its northern and Eastern borders. This is better done sooner rather than later, otherwise the world may well witness another moment, where lack of decisive action when required, led to the Second World War. Keeping the sea lanes of communication safe, secure and free for all, as stated by Prime Minister Modi, must hence be a priority not only for India, but for all who value peace and freedom.